






ANDREA DANDOLO, DOGE OF VENICE, DALMATIA, AND CROATIA.

A.D. 1343-54.

(From NANI, Serie de' Dogi.)

HISTORY
OF THE
VENETIAN REPUBLIC:

HER RISE, HER GREATNESS,

AND

HER CIVILIZATION.

BY W. CAREW HAZLITT,
OF THE INNER TEMPLE.

VOL. III.

LONDON:
SMITH, ELDER & CO., 65, CORNHILL.

1860.

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
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LONDON

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1801

THE END OF THE WORLD

PREFACE TO VOLS. III. & IV.

THE present Volumes, extending from A.D. 1309 to A.D. 1457, embrace the most important and interesting period of Venetian History; and they present to the English reader for the first time, in what the Author ventures to call the true light, the Quirini-Tiepolo Conspiracy; the Origin of the Council of Ten, and its real connexion with the State-Inquisition; the Tragedy of Marino Faliero (1355); the relations of Petrarch with Venice (1351-74); the War of Chioggia (1379-80); the Statistics of Venetian Commerce under the Doge Mocenigo (1423); the Thirty Years' War against the Duke of Milan (1425-54); and the episode of the Two Foscari (1445-57), concluding with the Deposition and Death of the Doge Francesco.

In Volume III., chapter 17, of the present Work (*note 1, page 56*) it will be found asserted that the notions conveyed by M. Daru respecting the Venetian *Inquisitors of State* are monstrously and utterly false. The Author of the *Documentary History* observes on this subject:—

“To the authenticity of the *Statutes* published by Daru, a sound critic will at the first glance object:

1. The discrepancies of the style and language, neither of which belongs to the period when they profess to have been written. 2. The anachronisms into which the author falls—for instance, in speaking of a decree only passed in 1507. 3. The wrong appellations given to the Magistrates, exhibiting an ignorance of Venetian History. 4. And the reference to the *Piombi*, which were not used by the Inquisitors prior to 1591!”

“The mind revolts,” continues Romanin, “against ordinances and laws which make humanity shudder, and would entitle Venice to execration, if they amounted to anything more than an infamous libel.”¹

“It is impossible,” says Bianchi Giovini, Daru’s Italian translator, “that a Government should exist on the earth based on the principles contained in the pretended Statutes of the Inquisition of State!!”

Botta, the historian, and Count Tiepolo,² as well as Giovini, have long since maintained the entire absence of genuineness from the Statutes adopted by Daru; and it is astounding, as Romanin justly remarks, that the French writer should have held them to be authentic, and have plumed himself on the discovery! The real Statutes, and the only copy known, are among the Cicogna MSS. The MS. is entitled, *Capitular delli Inquisitori di Stato*, and its history and genealogy are as follow. On the fall of the Republic (May 5, 1797), it was secured among

¹ Romanin (*Gli Inquisitori di Stato*, p. 12).

² *Discorsi sulla Storia dal Sig. Daru*: 1828.

other precious documents by a nobleman, and thus saved from dispersion. From its first owner it passed to a gentleman named Giuseppe Pasquali, a noted book-collector; and at his death his widow gave it, or sold it, to Andrea Tessier, who presented it to its present proprietor, the Chevalier Cicogna. (Romanin, *Opere citato*, p. 45.)

Far from having irresponsible command of the public purse, the Inquisitors, as shown by a passage from the Archives, were accountable to the Council of Ten for every penny, and had no funds whatever at their own disposal!!

According to the best authorities, the work called *L'Opinione come debba governarsi la Repubblica di Venezia*, attributed by Daru to Father Paul, was written by an obscure person named *Canale*, who was a voluminous writer of such pieces in the first half of the seventeenth century; and a second pamphlet, *Trattato sul Governo Veneto*, of which the same historian claims the authorship for the *Chevalier Soranzo*, and on which he lays great stress, is an acknowledged production of Francesco dalla Torre, the Emperor's ambassador at Venice, upon whom the version of the Statutes used by Daru may be also perhaps affiliated.

The foregoing remarks may be requisite to explain the *advised* silence of the Author upon the Inquisition of State under the date of 1454. It seems to be now satisfactorily and conclusively established that the Statutes published by Daru not only never had existence, *but never could*, as a moral and political

possibility, have had existence. They contradict history, and are contradicted by it. They are foreign to the genius of any Constitution which the world has ever seen, or, it is believed, ever will see. We willingly acquit M. Daru of any complicity in a fraud, which may be said to be one of the most disgraceful and impudent in the whole compass of literature: yet, perhaps, in incorporating the forgery with his work, he felt a certain amount of complacency, if not of gusto.

In regard to the story of the "Two Foscari," the Author has based his narrative on the *Documentary History*, and on the pamphlet by F. Berlan, entitled, *I Due Foscari*, Torino, 1852, where all the State Papers connected with the subject are printed entire. In this case it will be seen, that M. Daru and the Archives are equally at variance; and the Author has not hesitated in giving a preference to the latter.

It is necessary to observe that in the following pages the phrases "Venetian College" and "the Signory," have been used as convertible terms, and merely signify the Venetian Executive, excepting where the former word (College) is occasionally employed in a special sense, and in such cases the Author has carefully indicated the fact.

Attention is requested to the *Errata* at the end of Vol. III.

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HISTORY OF VENICE.

CHAPTER XVI.

A.D. 1310-1311.

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AMONG recent political occurrences there had been none perhaps which was more susceptible of being turned to good account than the late war with Padua (1301-4). The Paduans¹ had been immemorably noted for their deep-rooted disaffection to the Republic; the recent conduct of the Venetian Executive,

¹ "Erat Padua armis et equis plena, et aliis divitiis infinitis munita, et turribus et aliis ædificiis delicatis."—*Hist. Cortus*, 1310, fol. 778.

in the short negotiation which ushered in the war, had provoked the utmost animosity of the municipality; and it was well known that the soreness of feeling thus occasioned was very slightly allayed by the hollow peace of 1304. It was treated by the conspirators as a felicitous coincidence, that at Padua the influence of the Badoeri was peculiarly commanding and extensive. For a great length of time that family had occupied a prominent place among the residents of the Paduan suburb of Peraga, and several of its members had filled at various periods the highest official posts in the City. It was therefore without a dissentient voice that the partizans of Badoer Badoer acceded to a project suggested by that nobleman for the secret formation at Peraga, under his auspices, of a company of auxiliaries, which might operate usefully as a reserve.

All points of detail having been settled, everything was left to depend on the tact and rapidity with which the plan was carried into effect. Many circumstances might arise—the slightest was felt sufficient—to thwart all their anticipations, and to dispel their ambitious dreams. The moment had actually arrived when the conspirators were in reality so situated, that it was out of their power to recede. A few days ago, a free choice lay between advance and retreat; but such an option existed no longer. Delay and hesitation were at present tantamount to failure, and failure was tantamount to destruction.

On Saturday, the 14th June, Badoer, after a final

interview with his confederates, started for Peraga, where all his arrangements were complete, and where his accessories were waiting only the signal to take arms. During the same evening, the conspirators began to assemble as noiselessly as possible at the Casa Quirini at San Matteo; and the gathering continued up to a late hour. The consummation of the revolutionary crisis had been originally fixed for Saturday night; but, on the whole, it was thought expedient to postpone the catastrophe till the following day at dawn.

The morning of Sunday, the 15th June, the day of San Vito, broke inauspiciously. The sky was overcast, and the clouds were watery and low. It soon began to lighten and thunder portentously; the rain fell in a deluge; and it blew a hurricane. A very early hour had been named for the great stroke of State; and, as the day began to break, the weather failed to improve. This ominous incident had no influence, however, in deterring Quirini and his kinsman from the prosecution of their desperate adventure. The conspirators, having collected their whole disposable force at San Matteo, divided themselves into two bodies, one of which, under Quirini himself and his two sons, Nicolo and Benedetto, was appointed to proceed by the "Wolf's Bridge" (*Ponte Del Lovo*), the "Smith's Road" (*Calle Dei Fabbri*), and "Malpasso] Bridge" (*Ponte Del Malpasso*); while the other, under Bajamonte, penetrated by the Merceria. The Piazza of Saint Mark was the common point of convergence.

The revolutionists quitted San Matteo amid shouts of *Liberta* and *Morte al Doge Gradenigo*, but the sound of their voices was drowned in the howling blast. Quirini, who had taken a somewhat less circuitous route than his son-in-law, expected to have been the first to debouch into the Rialto from the Ponte Del Malpasso; but, somewhat to his surprise, he found himself anticipated, and the Piazza already in military occupation. At a second glance he perceived to his infinite dismay that the troops before him were neither the Corps of Tiepolo nor the contingent of Badoer.

Among the earliest supporters of the insurrectionary movement was a certain gentleman of good family, named Marco Donato, of the street of Santa Maddalena. Donato was a man of nervous temperament, and of vacillating and impulsive character. He had allowed his eyes to be dazzled by an overdrawn picture of existing evils, coupled with a plausible representation of the patriotism and facility of remedying them; but he had no sooner given in his adhesion than he began to repent the act. A night of calm and sound reflection convinced him of his folly and his peril; his courage forsook him; he wavered: he seceded. Donato went a step farther; for he followed up his secession by divulging his secret, and by turning evidence against his former accomplices. It was on the afternoon of Saturday, the 14th June only, while Quirini and Tiepolo were looking with unabated confidence to the successful issue of their grand machination, that

the traitor solicited a private interview with the Doge. In few words he communicated to Gradenigo the object of his visit, and the imminence of the danger which beset the government of his Serenity. The extremity of his listener's astonishment was legible in the involuntary changes of his countenance. He was absolutely thunderstruck at the intelligence. The audacity of the scheme, and the impenetrability of its contrivers, almost passed belief. For a few instants his composure was shaken ; and the suppression of his rising emotion seemed to require an effort to which even that iron nature and those rigid lineaments were barely equal. But these sensations were transitory ; the Doge soon recovered his self-possession ; and any misgivings which he might have entertained touching the veracity of his first informant were quickly removed by the arrival in speedy succession of three or four others, who substantiated Donato's statement, and apprised his Serenity of an unusual stir at the Casa Quirini at San Matteo, and at the Casa Tiepolo at San Agostino. Nearly a quarter of a century had elapsed since the year when Gradenigo, still a comparatively young man, was chosen to replace Giovanni Dandolo. He was then scarcely thirty-eight ; he was now verging on sixty. Yet he prepared with an energy, which would have done honour to the Privy Councillor of 1285, to confront the new danger. The momentous character of the crisis itself exercised a rejuvenescent influence on his vigorous mind. The old man summoned forthwith to his presence all the

great Officers of State, the five Privy Councillors,¹ the Chiefs of the Forty, the Advocates of the Commune, the Procurators of Saint Mark, the Signori di Notte, the members of the Senate, and all his personal following. He sent confidential messages, couched in the most pressing terms, to the Podestas of Murano, Torcello, and Chioggia, who were commanded to call out their respective Militia, and to hasten to his succour with the utmost privacy and despatch. He announced his wish to meet the intended surprise by a counter-surprise. He directed all his private friends to arm in silence themselves, their servants, and their dependants; and assurances of prompt and loyal co-operation were returned by the Dandoli, Giustiniani, and others. He named Antonio Dandolo and Baldovino Dolfino his lieutenants.² From time to time he employed emissaries, on whose fidelity he could rely, to reconnoitre in the neighbourhood of the Casa Quirini, and to report to him the result. Within the space of a few hours the preparations of Gradenigo were nearly finished; and in the course of the night, all his reinforcements with the exception of the Chioggians, who were not expected till the following afternoon, succeeded in joining him by water without the cognizance of the rebels congregated at San Matteo. It was true that the forces at the disposal

¹ Andrea Doro, it will be remembered, had resigned, and his place was not yet filled up. It was not known till afterward that he had gone over to the insurgents.

² Cigogna (*Iscrizioni*, i. 75).

of his Serenity were after all not very considerable. But their paucity of numbers was quite balanced by their devotion; and they were led by a master-spirit.

Shortly before daybreak, the Ducal troops under Dandolo and Dolfino were mustered in front of the Palace, along one side of the Piazza; and at that point they proceeded, regardless of the rigour of the weather, to await the course of events. It was this little army, then, which arrested the eye of Quirini so soon as the latter had emerged from the Ponte Del Malpasso.¹

A dead pause ensued, but it did not last long. The first onset was characterized by singular ferocity. Amid a storm of wind and rain, the foremost division of the Ducal troops, consisting of the Volunteers of Marco Giustiniani of San Moisé, opened an impetuous and desperate attack upon the rebels, to the cry of *Amazza, amazza: A terra, a terra: Dalli, dalli*. The ranks of Quirini, who commanded in person, were broken by the first shock; his followers, lacking any strong faith in the merit of their cause, could not be persuaded to rally; their dispersion was complete; their loss in killed and wounded was not inconsiderable; the survivors fled in precipitate confusion; and Quirini and his son Benedetto fell by the hand of Giustiniani himself.

The scattered remnant of Quirini's Corps fled so far as the Campo of San Luca, where they attempted to

¹ Cigogna (*Iscrizioni*, iii. 29 et seq.)

re-form their ranks. But they were promptly assailed by a troop of volunteers, hastily levied by the Director of the *Scuola Della Cavita*, and were, after a sharp and gallant resistance, again thoroughly worsted. This discomfiture was conclusive. They now abandoned all intention of rallying. Such was the rapid and dioramic character of the first act of the revolutionary Drama.

While Quirini was sustaining a signal defeat on the Piazza, he had vainly looked for the arrival of Badoer from Peraga, or of Tiepolo from the Merceria. The instructions of each had been explicit. Their continued absence was unaccountable. A suspicion of treachery flashed, perhaps, across his mind; and it is possible that the dying man was a prey in his latest moments to the agonizing conviction, that he had been betrayed by those whom he most trusted and he most loved.

The truth was, however, that with an absolute knowledge of the apostasy of Donato, and with every opportunity of foreseeing his subsequent revelations, Quirini himself had committed two capital errors. The first lay in dividing his forces, and in thus placing it in the power of his opponent to fight the three divisions severally; the second, in confiding to his son-in-law an independent command. Bajamonte wanted neither the natural gallantry of his race, nor the common attributes of a brave soldier; but he wanted judgment, firmness, and continuity of purpose. This fact was abundantly illustrated by the result. The collateral support on which the late Chief of

the Revolution had implicitly relied, failed him at the critical moment; and the consequence was, that the whole scheme collapsed in the course of a few hours.

Quirini alone had remained true to his engagements. The temporary obstruction which the heavy rain offered to the navigation of the Brenta, and the impossibility of transporting troops down that river, was indeed the reason why Badoer was delaying his departure from Peraga; and that reason was both simple and legitimate. But for Tiepolo no similar excuse could be found. By a waste of time, which was apparently susceptible of no rational explanation, the latter had thrown away his opportunity, and had already all but ruined himself and his partners in the enterprise by his improvidence; and it was not until the cause had experienced a fatal blow that he gained San Giuliano, about the middle of the Merceria. At that point the intelligence was brought to him of the disaster on the Square of Saint Mark, and of the fall of his two relatives; and he accordingly came once more to a halt, seeking shelter from the raging elements under a large and shady elder-tree. The detachment, which his father-in-law had commanded, being hopelessly disorganized, and the arrival of Badoer being still gravely problematical, Tiepolo, after a short consultation under the elder, decided upon marching against the troops which were remaining under arms on the Piazza, before the Chioggians, who were hourly expected in considerable force, could come up to their

relief. With this design, he subdivided his men into two Corps, one of which, led by himself, might pursue the original route of the Merceria, while the second, by a slight divergence, took the direction of San Basso. The former, in its passage through the Merceria, was pelted with stones by the householders; and one lady, named Giustina Rosso, seizing a mortar which happened to be lying in her window-casement, hurled it with her utmost strength at Bajamonte himself, exclaiming at the same moment: *Morte ai tiranni*.¹ The ponderous missile, however,² slightly overreaching its mark, missed the Chief, and crushed the head of his standard-bearer, who bespattered him with brains and blood.

At the same time, Gradenigo and his lieutenants fully comprehended the importance of disposing of Tiepolo before he was joined by the Paduan auxiliaries; and they were therefore not displeased to observe the symptoms of a spontaneous advance on the part of their adversary, which would obviate the necessity on their own of abandoning the finest strategical position in the metropolis.

A second triumph was in store for the Doge and his armed supporters. The attack, directed against the Ducal troops simultaneously from the Merceria and from San Basso, was well concerted and well sustained; it was the ablest manœuvre and the most extended

¹ Mutinelli (*Annali*, p. 151).

² Cigogna (*Storia della casa e bottega in Venezia di ragione della grazia del morter, e cenni sulla congiura di B. Tiepolo*. Ven. 1842: 4°).

operation which the resources of the General allowed ; but, after a hard struggle and no slight sacrifice of life on either side, the insurgents were driven back, and forced to retreat in some confusion across the wooden bridge of the Rialto. In their retrograde course, they diverted the attention of their pursuers by setting fire to the Office of the *Cinque Alla Pace* and the *Uffizio Del Frumento*, from the latter of which they purloined a large sum of money. So soon as the rebels had passed the canal they cut down the bridge ; and Tiepolo thus gained time to occupy the Commune House and contiguous buildings at its foot on the opposite side, and to place them in a condition of defence.

It was already somewhat advanced in the afternoon, when, by the oversight of the Doge in leaving the line of retreat open, the aspect of affairs was thus unexpectedly changed, and Bajamonte was enabled, at least, to prolong his resistance by taking up a commanding position beyond the Canal. The prospects of the opponents of Gradenigo were now brighter than ever. The latter, covered by the Canal as by a natural breastwork, and protected by the fortifications which they had hastily constructed in the precincts of its margin, were prepared to maintain their ground, and to check the advance of the Ducal troops for a considerable space of time ; and Badoer was known to have at length summoned sufficient resolution to stir from Peraga, and to be approaching the Capital. It was still quite possible, according to the calculations of

Bajamonte, that a coalition might be accomplished, and that the hopes which he had so fondly cherished might be eventually realised.

But Bajamonte deceived himself. The inscrutable blunder, by which so much time had been frittered away in the Merceria, was irretrievable. The arrival of Badoer from Peraga, though believed to be imminent, was still to be expected; and, meanwhile, the Chioggians under their Podesta, Ugolino Giustiniani, had brought a large accession of strength to the ranks of the Doge.

The line of tactics which it became incumbent on Gradenigo, reinforced in so timely a manner by the Podesta of Chioggia, to pursue, was too obvious to be mistaken. The Doge seized the auspicious moment with avidity. Directions were at once given to Giustiniani to march against Badoer, who was reported to be close at hand, and to crush him, if possible, before he had an opportunity of strengthening Tiepolo: while his Serenity undertook to dislodge the latter from his position beyond the Canal. The arms of the Podesta were brilliantly triumphant. The insurgents, dispirited by the original frustration of their scheme, and by their failure in coalescing with Bajamonte, and out of humour with themselves and their leader, offered no protracted resistance to their antagonists; they were ultimately repulsed with great loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners; Badoer himself was among the latter; and extraordinary care was taken to secure his person. The defeat of Marco Quirini and Badoer

Badoer, so closely succeeding each other, went far to put a term to the internecine war. Two of the three divisions of the enemy were now virtually annihilated. But the Great Cavalier, a host in himself, still remained in the field, and still preserved an attitude of defiance.

With Tiepolo, however, the Doge was disposed to test the effect of negotiation before he resorted to coercive measures. The fact was that the position, in which the surviving ringleader of the rebellion had established himself, was too difficult of access to be carried without severe damage to property and terrible effusion of blood. Secondly, Gradenigo felt that, even when he should have succeeded in enforcing the submission of his powerful adversary, he would find himself reduced to the embarrassing alternative of sparing a dangerous and forfeited life, or of bringing to the block the most popular man in Venice. In the third place, it was easy to perceive that the long summer evening was gradually losing itself in twilight; and it was impossible to surmise what fresh schemes might be in course of formation, and what new horrors might be perpetrated before daybreak.

While the sedition had been in its most critical stage, some Milanese merchants¹ endeavoured to prevail upon Tiepolo to accept their mediation with the Doge. But Tiepolo was then ignorant of the fate of Quirini, and sanguinely looking forward to the speedy arrival of Badoer; and the proffered inter-

¹ Caroldo, *Conjiura* (Add. MSS. 8595, Br. Mus.)

cession was superciliously rejected. Under very different circumstances, Giovanni Soranzo and Matteo Manolesso were made by his Serenity on Sunday evening (June 15) the bearers of a conciliatory message in which, after a pointed animadversion upon the ingratitude of Bajamonte toward his country, the solemn promise was conveyed of a general amnesty to himself and his followers, subject to certain specified conditions of a moderate and equitable character. This liberal proposal was spurned with similar haughtiness, though perhaps not on a similar ground. The Great Cavalier was probably influenced in the second instance less by reliance on his own fortune than by distrust of Gradenigo's honour. At this point, a venerable personage, Filippo Belegno, one of the Privy Council, who was persuaded that his age and experience would carry more weight, seasonably volunteered his services. The self-imposed task of Belegno was, however, more arduous than he had calculated. Bajamonte remained long unconvinced and inexorable. It was in vain, at first, that the Councillor conjured him, for the sake of every object which he held dear, to take counsel with an old man, and to respond in an appropriate spirit to the pacific advances of Gradenigo. It was to no purpose, for some time, that he pictured to him the perilous dilemma in which he would be situated under the singularly probable and not very remote contingency of a successful attack on his last tenable position. But the grey hairs and importunate eloquence of the speaker ultimately prevailed; the

better genius of Bajamonte prompted him at last to relent; and the Councillor procured leave to tell the Doge that his terms were accepted.

The condition, on which Gradenigo assented to a compromise, was that Tiepolo himself and such of his accomplices as possessed an actual or contingent qualification to sit in the Great Council should be relegated for a term of four years to such parts of Dalmatia as might be thereafter determined; that an unconditional amnesty should be published in favour of all his accessories who did not belong to the equestrian rank; and that all the property and treasure which had been nefariously abstracted from the Government Stores, and from private dwellings, should be surrendered.

The decision of the revolutionary leader was made in the course of Monday the 16th; and on the following day the Legislative Body was invited to assemble for the special purpose of ratifying the contract. In a House of 377,¹ the resolution to accept the submission of the rebels on the basis indicated in the recent message of his Serenity was adopted by a majority of 355, twenty-two only being dissentients. An advertisement of the Amnesty was immediately affixed to the walls of conspicuous buildings in all parts of the City; and, before the close of the 17th, the bulk of the plebeians implicated in the late treason had tendered their submission and had received a full pardon.

The Government knew perfectly well, where the real

¹ Sandi (lib. v. c. 2).

strength of its antagonists lay; and it thus contrived by a simple yet masterly stroke to win a reputation for forbearance without prejudice to its security. It might be true that Gradenigo was now master of the situation, and that it was in his power to dictate terms to all his enemies. But the Doge and his advisers probably acted under the influence of a feeling that it was more prudent, as well as more dignified, to shew a placable spirit and to disarm resentment by clemency, than to goad insignificant foes into reckless and desperate revolt by unnecessary harshness and persecution.

The expatriation of Bajamonte,¹ and of such of his more immediate accomplices as were included in the Lists of Eligibility, was achieved, on the contrary, with the slightest possible delay; the majority were allowed to distribute themselves over various parts of Lombardy and Dalmatia; the Cavalier himself was banished to the latter country; and the lives of any, who might be detected in the act of breaking their parol, was pronounced to be irredeemably forfeited. The offices, which the exiles had enjoyed, were conferred upon the saviours of the Republic; their wives and families were, by a decree of the 2nd July, expelled from the precincts of the Dogado; and to harbour them, or correspond with them, was declared to be treasonable. The dwellings of Bajamonte Tiepolo (July 25) at San Agostino, and of Marco and Pietro Quirini at San Matteo, were demolished. On the site

¹ Sandi, *ubi supra*.

of the former was raised a column, with an inscription¹ which eternized the infamy of the late proprietor; and the Casa Quirini was converted into a common shambles. The armorial bearings of both families were reversed. All the aliens who were taken with arms in their hands, or of whose complicity proof could be established, suffered capitally. On the other hand, to the Scuola Della Carita, in commemoration of the signal service which its guardian had so lately rendered to the country, was accorded among more substantial privileges the right of erecting on the Campo di San Luca, the scene of its brilliant exploits, a flagstaff from which might float the banner of the Art. The name of Marco Donato was inscribed on the books of the Great Council without an election, and his family was ennobled for ever. Giustina Rosso, whose mortar had so nearly proved itself fatal to the arch-traitor Bajamonte, was invited to choose her recompense; and the moderate wish that she and her heirs in perpetuity might be permitted to hold of the Procuratie, as heretofore, her present residence in the

¹ “ Di Baiamonte fo questo tereno
E fo per suo iniquo tradimento
Posto in comun e per l'altrui spavento.
E per mostrar a tutti sempre seno.”

Mutinelli (*Annali Urbani*, p. 150, note 4); Cigogna (*Iscrizioni*, iii. 58). The fate of the column—of which a facsimile, in its mutilated state, is given in the accompanying woodcut—has been somewhat curious. In 1785, it was removed—presumptively with the sanction of the Government—by Angelo Maria Quirini to his villa near Padua. It subsequently came into the possession of the antiquary Sanquirico, who sold it to a gentleman residing on the Lake of Como.—Mutinelli, *ubi suprâ*. The woodcut is copied from Litta *in voce* Tiepolo.

Merceria at an annual rent of fifteen ducats, accompanied by a desire that the Casa Rosso should enjoy the privilege of unfurling on the anniversary of San Vito, and on other days of public festival, a standard from the memorable *Mortar Casement*, was unhesitatingly gratified.¹

On Wednesday, the 18th June, began the trial of Badoer Badoer, before the Forty, for high treason. The guilt of Badoer was aggravated in the eyes of his prosecutors by two important circumstances. In the first place, unlike Tiepolo and Quirini, he had acted in the absence of any ostensible provocation. The second and more weighty consideration was, that that nobleman, not satisfied with disseminating his inflammatory and infectious opinions among his own compatriots, had obeyed the dictates of a profligate and unprincipled ambition by making common cause with foreign hirelings, and by preparing the way to a new war between the Republic and Padua. The indictment having been read and other preliminaries having been completed, one of the Chiefs of the Forty demanded, addressing his colleagues: — “Does it appear to you, from what you have heard, that Badoer Badoer ought to be put to the Question with a view to draw from him farther disclosures, or that we should proceed on the facts before us?” A majority decided that the facts before them were amply sufficient to criminate the accused. Badoer was remanded to his

¹ This story was included in a 12mo. volume published at Venice in 1842, under the title of *Quattro Leggende Veneziane*.

dungeon. On Sunday, the 22nd, the Great Council was convoked ; and the following question was put :—
“Does it appear to you, seeing the verbal and written charges which have been preferred against Badoer Badoer, that the said Badoer ought to lose his head ?”
The suffrages were in the affirmative. On the same evening, by the verdict of his compeers, Badoer was decapitated.

His Paduan accomplices were similarly tried before the Forty on the 23rd June ; and the [greater] part shared the fate of their principal. In the latter cases, where no privilege of nobility was pleaded, the course of proceeding was more summary ; and the fiat of the Forty was held by the executioner a sufficient death-warrant.

To mark the providential deliverance of the Republic from her extreme peril, a day of general thanksgiving was ordained ; the Doge, the members of the Government, the clergy, and the nobility, went in solemn procession to the Church of San Vito, where a special mass was celebrated, and where homage was rendered to the Almighty for the grace which He had exhibited to His people ;¹ and the 15th June, which was consecrated to that saint, was numbered henceforth among the great Venetian anniversaries. Within the space of a few months, almost all the consular and diplomatic agents of the Signory abroad were placed in full possession of the facts of the recent plot, and of the merciful dispensation by which the threatened calamity had

¹ Pietro Giustiniani, *Historia di Venetia* (King's MSS. 148, fol. 77).

been averted. Upward of fifty letters were written with this object, in the name of the Doge, between June, 1310, and June, 1311.¹

Such was a movement,² the remembrance of which naturally survived for a certain length of time in the mind of the Republic, and which is to be viewed as a reaction from the Revolution of 1297-8. It belonged, indeed, to a class of impressions which could not be quickly obliterated. The exalted rank of the leading offenders, the respectability of their connexions, the illustrious antecedents of several, coupled with the stupendous iniquity of the design, the hermetical closeness which so large a number of individuals of different station had exhibited, for even during four or five days, in so confined an area as the Venetian metropolis, in abstaining, with a single exception, from divulging the momentous secret confided to their keeping, and the conduct of the undertaking to a point within a hair's-breadth of success, were incidents which it seemed impossible that any one could view without terror and amazement. The rarity in the Dogado of an occurrence, of which the records of other Municipalities abounded in examples, gave, besides, to the Quirini-Tiepolo Conspiracy³ an importance which was,

¹ Muratori (*Rer. Ital. Scrip.* xii. 483-90). The Quirini-Tiepolo conspiracy attracted, no doubt, a good deal of attention in Italy. It is mentioned by Gio. Villani (lib. ix. ch. 2; edit. 1823), and by Albertinus Mussatus in his *Historia Augusta*: *Ap. Mur.* x.

² Caroldo, *Historia di Venetia* (Harl. MSS. 5020 *ad annum*); Pietro Giustiniani (King's MSS. 148, fol. 76).

³ The following works refer to this event:—

1. *Bajamonte Tiepolo, Poema eroico di Zaccaria Trivisano*: 1769.

perhaps, partly factitious. For a while men could not traverse the streets without the dread of an ambush, or compose themselves to rest without misgivings for the morrow. It was felt that there was no hour at which some ulterior scheme might not develop itself; and that there was hardly any moment when, out of the disorganized ingredients of the late diabolical machination, some fresh project might not be shaped. It was clear that no ordinary foresight or precaution was sufficient to meet this later-day revival of an evil which was thought barely to have outlived the First Revolution (1033). It was generally conceded that the nation required additional guarantees for its security, and that the Constitution was in need of broader pillars for its support.

This distempered condition of the public mind carried with it a tendency which could not be mistaken. That tendency acquired from day to day increased force. The conviction gained ground that the community could not be pronounced out of danger

2. *Literæ Petri Gradonici Ducis Venetiarum, ad varios 1310-11.* Apud Muratori (R. I. S. xii.)

3. *Opuscolo Storico della così chiamata Conjiura Querini e Tiepolo.* Venezia, 1797.

4. *Narrazione Storica ove si contiene la conjiura di B. Tiepolo, che segni in Venezia l'anno 1310.* Ven. 1797.

5. *Il vero carattere politico di Bajamonte Tiepolo.* Ven. 1798 (by the Abbé Tentori).

6. *Cigogna (Cenni sulla Conjiura di Boemondo Tiepolo.* Ven. 1842).

7. *Bajamonte Tiepolo, Tragedia di F. Vicino.* Torino, 1829.

8. *Il Conjiura di B. Tiepolo in Venezia, Dramma Storico.* Milano, 1844; 8°. (Translated from the Spanish of Rosa.)

9. *Alba Barozzi, ovvero una Conjiura sotto il Doge Pietro Gradenigo, Racconto istorico dal Conte Guido Pullé.* Ven. 1846.

until a rigid and searching inquiry had been instituted into the origin, bearings, and possible ramifications of the late Conspiracy. To such a call the aristocratic Organs promptly, though warily, responded. On the 10th July, a Reformation, emanating from the Forty, was laid before the Great Council. It was conceived in the following form :—

“Be it resolved that, on account of recent events, and of the likelihood that such may recur, the Council of Fifteen (the War Department), united with the Chiefs of the Forty, shall be empowered for certain specific objects to act and order in such a manner as it may think proper, and that all such acts and ordinances shall be accounted good and valid, as if they had proceeded from the Great Council.”

To the foregoing proposition, however, two objections were raised. The Council seemed too incompact and unwieldy; and it was thought preferable to create a new tribunal than to clothe an existing one with new attributes. On these grounds the Reformation was negatived.

The following amendment was then brought forward. It was moved, that a new Committee of ten persons should be elected with analogous authority, and should be similarly united with the Chiefs of the Forty. It was suggested that the members might be drawn from every branch of the administration, and that they might hold their actual offices irrespective of their seat on the Committee; but stress was laid on the principle that no family whatsoever should be

allowed to have more than one representative. The amendment likewise miscarried.

The Reformation which succeeded differed from its predecessors in a two-fold manner. It contained two supplementary clauses, by one of which the Procurators of Saint Mark were to be exceptionally disqualified from serving on the Board, and by the other of which the duration of the Board itself was to be restricted to the period of the next elections (Michaelmas, 1310). This course was ultimately adopted; and on the 10th of July,¹ the Committee of Inquiry was called into existence on the full understanding, that the trust was created for temporary and specific purposes only, and that it would expire at Michaelmas.

On the 29th September, however, the Doge, somewhat at variance with his usual practice of late years, came down to the Great Council in person. The object of the visit soon became apparent. His Serenity reminded those present that the day had arrived on which the dissolution of the Board of Inquiry was appointed by the act of the 10th July last to take place. But under the circumstances of difficulty in which the Republic still found herself, and seeing that the popular ferment and excitement had not yet subsided, Gradenigo proceeded to represent the expediency of prolonging the existence of the Board for a farther term of *two months*, in order that it might continue to direct its useful labours to the rooting out of treason and sedition. A resolution to the desired

¹ Caroldo, *Conjiura* (King's MSS. 150, or Add. MSS. Brit. Mus. 8595).

effect was framed and carried; and the Committee was entitled to retain its authority till the 30th November. On the 30th November, it procured an extension of its powers to the 30th January, 1311;¹ and then, by a general acquiescence in its utility and efficacy, it was confirmed for FIVE YEARS (1311-16). Such was the remarkable progress of that small body of men who, on the 10th July, 1310, had been invited to resolve themselves into a Committee for a special object, with determinate and purely temporary jurisdiction: such, by a total departure from its original attributes, were the stealthy approaches to the helm of government of a Committee, of which the existence had been fixed in the first instance at somewhat less than eleven weeks; and of which present symptoms gave already liberty to prophesy the perpetuation. Such was the manner in which the COUNCIL OF TEN was striding to power.²

In the meantime, the Committee of Public Safety had inaugurated the commencement of its dictatorship with an edict (July 10), directing the *Capita Sexteriorum*, or the Chiefs of the Wards, to concert such measures as might be necessary for organizing without delay a Civic Guard of 1,500 men, to be held in readiness for the future to act at the shortest notice. Two days later (July 12), the prohi-

¹ Sandi (v. 2).

² The following doggerel lines will be familiar to many:—

“Del Mille tresento e dièse,
A mezzo el mese del ceriese.
Baiamonte passo el ponte,
E per esso fo fatto el consegio di diese.”

See Mutinelli, *Annali*, p. 153, note 2.

bition against the use of side arms by members of the Great Council, which had been renewed in 1309, was provisionally rescinded in favour of such members as attended the legislative body ; and that assembly, with a view perhaps to the more effectual preservation of order and decorum, was advised to deliberate with open doors. On the 19th July, the Ten published several other decrees. They decided : 1. That a body of 200 soldiers, divided into five detachments of forty, should be distributed over the Piazza of Saint Mark from a certain hour in the evening till a certain hour in the morning. 2. That a watch of ten persons, or fewer, according to circumstances, should be set in each street. 3. That sentinels should mount guard every night at the Ducal Palace. 4. That to remove the dangerous facility of transit by which Badoer Badoer had so lately conveyed himself and his accomplices by water from Peraga, an efficient Police should be instituted forthwith to exercise a constant supervision over the traffic of the Lagoons and Canals ; and that no person whosoever should be permitted henceforth to pass from one street to another, after the third bell of the night, without special licence from the Watch. The *Capita Sexteriorum* were commanded by the Ten to charge themselves with the execution of all the foregoing measures.

These wholesome regulations of Police strikingly reveal the defective state of legislation in regard to such matters so late as the beginning of the fourteenth century ; and they lead to an impression that the

laxity, which was then prevailing, had not formed an unimportant consideration in the eyes of Quirini and his colleagues.

While the vigorous administration of the Ten was gradually restoring the public confidence and internal repose, a circumstance occurred which occupied no slight share of attention. On the 13th August, 1311, the Doge Gradenigo expired. His remains were at once borne to the Baptistery of Saint Mark's; and on the following day they were interred without pomp at San Cipriano. His funeral was purposely simple and unostentatious: for the City still betrayed a strong undercurrent of agitation, and it was apprehended that otherwise his political foes might avail themselves of the tempting occasion for creating fresh disturbances. Such was the closing scene of a career so brilliant, so stormy, and so checkered.

Gradenigo had nearly completed the two-and-twentieth year of his reign: yet he was only in his sixtieth year. He had survived barely by fourteen months the triumph of his principles and party in the extinction of the Popular Rebellion, and in the establishment of the Decemviral Council. The latter institution was an encroachment on his prerogative, which it is to be surmised that he would not have willingly tolerated at an earlier stage of his public life. It is, perhaps, nothing more than an indication of the extreme odium into which the Doge had recently fallen in certain quarters, that his death was not uncommonly ascribed to poison. By his

consort Tomasina Morosini, the niece of the Dowager Queen of Hungary, the deceased left behind him five sons and one daughter, Anna, who was united to Jacopo di Carrara. The other children of Gradenigo inherited his name, but the wife of the Carrara inherited his genius. There was issue of that marriage a daughter Taddea, who wedded, in 1321, Mastino de la Scala, Lord of Verona, the most powerful nobleman in Italy.

The character of this truly eminent man, as it has been delineated by Daniel Barbaro, exhibits, perhaps, a not unfaithful portraiture of the Great Patrician. Pietro Gradenigo (Barbaro tells us) was a person of infinite astuteness and sagacity. For the vigour of his understanding and the soundness of his judgment he was not more remarkable than for his constancy of purpose and firmness of will. In the prosecution of his formed designs his energy and resolution were indomitable. As an orator, his delivery was fluent, his language was copious, and his manner was persuasive. Toward his friends and partizans, no one was more urbane in deportment, more profuse in kindness, more apparently studious to please. Toward those who had provoked his enmity, no one could be more unforgiving and implacable. In politics, he was a dexterous tactician and an habitual dissembler; and he at all times evinced a backwardness to employ force, until intrigue and artifice were exhausted.

The interval between 1289 and 1311, during which Gradenigo presided over the government, was one of

almost unexampled importance in the annals of the Republic. The aristocratic Revolution of 1297-8 constituted the third and most sweeping stage in that grand movement of reform, which had had its rise in the changes of 1033.

The mission with which Gradenigo ascended the throne, and of which he lived to witness the accomplishment, was one which was fraught at the outset with prodigious difficulty, and which demanded the exercise on his part of the utmost tact and of consummate nerve. The ultra-liberal politics of his great predecessor in the Ducal Office had been excessively damaging to the aristocracy, and had given to that Body a blow from which it by no means easily rallied. The evil did not cease with the death of Giovanni Dandolo. The latter had not only vindicated a principle, but he had established a school. In his latest moments, he commended to his political disciples the part which he had played so well. The tradition was taken up by other men, whose character was less irreproachable, and those motives might be less disinterested, but whose zeal was not less ardent, and whose party influence was hardly less powerful. The advocacy, if not the protection, of popular rights devolved on the Bocconii, the Tiepoli, and the Quirini.

To stem this tide of democratic reaction, and to clear away by degrees the obstructions which were besetting the path of aristocratic ascendancy, became thenceforth with Perazzo Gradenigo a labour of love and the unswerving aim of a life. His genius was

triumphant at every point. At every point his enemies were humiliated and scattered. Bocconio died on the scaffold. Quirini perished by the sword. Tiepolo the Cavalier spent his declining years in exile. In 1289, the successor of Dandolo found his party a disunited minority. In 1311, he left it an oligarchy all but paramount. The whole retrospective range of Venetian History offers no similar period in which so many organic changes were wrought as in the last eleven years of the thirteenth, and the first eleven of the fourteenth century. Neither the *Serrar del Conseio*, however, nor the creation of the Decemvirs thirteen years later, instantaneously precluded the people from continuing to influence the conduct of public affairs. It was not till long after the opening years of the fourteenth century, that the upper classes succeeded in establishing their autonomic authority, and in completing the destruction of political freedom.

The reign of Gradenigo at Venice (1289-1311) was nearly parallel with that of Edward I. in England (1272-1307); and it becomes curious to compare the constitutional tendencies of the two countries at that remote epoch. It will be found that precisely similar causes were producing in each diametrically opposite results, and that, while the foreign wars of Venice from 1293 to 1298 were promoting the consolidation of the Aristocracy, the foreign wars of the Plantagenet were favouring almost in an equal degree the rise of the English Commons.

CHAPTER XVII.

A.D. 1311-1342.

Marino Giorgio, Doge (1311-12)—Relaxation of the Interdict—Zaratine War—Death of Giorgio (July 3, 1312)—His Will—Giovanni Soranzo, Doge (1312-28)—His Antecedents—Termination of the Zaratine War—Removal of the Interdict (1313)—Chastisement of Genoa—Prosperous Administration of Soranzo—Commercial Treaties with France and England (1320-6)—Relations between Venice and England—Public Regattas (1315)—Internal Improvements—Institution of a Hall of Physicians—Erection of Windmills—Cheapness of Provisions—Death of Soranzo (Dec. 31, 1328)—His Funeral—Alterations in the Promission—Elevation of Francesco Dandolo *Cane* (January 8, 1329)—His Popularity—Ceremony of his Investiture—Treaty between the Doge and Charles IV. of France (1334)—And between the Doge, the Emperor of Constantinople, and the Knights of Rhodes (1332)—Expedition of Pietro Zeno—Perpetuation of the Council of Ten (1335)—War against the Scaligers (1336-7-8-9)—Treaty of 1339—Acquisition of Treviso—Alterations in its Constitution—Appointment of Marino Faliero as First Podesta (July, 1339)—Death of Dandolo (October 31, 1339)—His Legal and Literary Claims—New Additions to the Coronation Oath—Accession of Bartolomeo Gradenigo (November 7, 1339)—Great Inundation (1340)—Overtures of Edward the Third to Gradenigo (*ibid.*)—Their Rejection—Decease of Bartolomeo Gradenigo (December 28, 1342)—Charge of Nepotism against the Doge—Establishment of the Foundling Hospital.

THE Electoral College, which was constituted by the customary process to supply the vacancy of the Crown, made choice of the distinguished senator Stefano Giustiniani, who had already filled with credit several diplomatic posts, and who was a great-grandson of Fra Nicolo Giustiniani who, in 1172, had married Anna

Michieli, the Doge's daughter.¹ But the Doge designate, solicitous to shun the responsibilities of office at a juncture when the complexion of affairs threatened to render them more than usually onerous, begged permission to decline the trust; and Giustiniani displayed considerable anxiety to obviate the imputation of an unworthy motive by entering the cloister of San Giorgio Maggiore. It is traditionally reported, that while the Forty-one, a little disconcerted by the refusal of their first nominee, were puzzled in the selection of a second candidate, an aged nobleman, Marino Giorgio by name, happened on his way to visit some objects of charity, attended by a servant with a large sack of bread, to pass at a slow pace the building where they were deliberating with open doors. The venerable personage, upon whom their eye accidentally fell, was renowned for the austerity of his manners and the sanctity of his life. He was commonly called *Giorgio the Holy*.² In 1303, he had been the ambassador of the Republic at the Papal Court; he was personally known to his present Holiness; and although the weight of fourscore years was upon his shoulders, the College, mainly with a view to the settlement of the unhappy difference with Clement V., determined to register their suffrages in his favour. The veteran Giorgio who, so recently as November, 1310, had excused himself from filling an embassy to Henry VII. of Germany on the plea of infirmity, was persuaded with some difficulty to

¹ Litta (*Celebri Famiglie Italiane* in voce *Giustiniani*).

² Caroldo, *Hist.* (Harl. MSS. 5020, fol. 91).

accept a sceptre, which he could not hope in the course of nature to retain long in his feeble grasp. His accession was proclaimed on the 22nd of August, 1311.¹ In the choice of such a man as Giorgio to replace such a man as Gradenigo, fortuitous as that choice might have been, the oligarchic influence was not impossibly swayed to some extent by a feeling that the decrepitude of the one might promote the consolidation of the power, which the other had founded by his masculine vigour.

The administration of Giorgio the Holy was signalized by the relaxation of the Interdict through his personal intercession; by a Zaratine War; and by a timely correction of the incipient tendency to a rupture with the German Court in consequence of certain novel and extravagant demands on the part of Henry VII., which the Venetian Government, during the late Dogate, had contented itself with evading, but of which it now happily succeeded in procuring the relinquishment.² In the siege of Zara,³ which had once more rebelled at the instigation of the Hungarians, and under the Apostolic licence, the Republic lost some of her best officers, and among others

¹ Dandolo (fol. 411).

² *Voyage of Henry VII. into Italy*, A.D. 1310-13; *Arch. Stor. Ital.* App. iv. 154.

³ Caroldo, *Hist.* (Harl. MSS. 5020, fol. 91). Four letters from Giorgio to the King of Hungary and other persons, touching the affairs of Zara, are given by Muratori (xii. 493-8). One of the two addressed to the King commences:—"To the Most Serene and Most Puissant Lord Charles, by the Grace of God, King of Hungary, Marino Giorgio, by the same Grace, Doge of Venice."

Belletto and his brother Giovanni Giustiniani. One of the divisions of the army consisted of Dalmasio de Banoli, a native of the Balearic Isles, and his corps of mercenaries. This man was not free from a suspicion of treachery; and affairs went so badly that it at last became a common remark that Dalmasio was neglecting his duty and betraying his trust. The general himself owned that he was not quite so energetic as he might be; "but," said he, as an excuse, "the Venetians have not sent my soldiers and myself the pay for which we stipulated."

The struggle which was thus perhaps prolonged by the tardy and irregular payment of the troops,¹ was by no means terminated when the Doge breathed his last on the 3rd July, 1312, after a reign of unusual brevity. By his will, the departed bequeathed considerable sums to various charitable purposes; and set apart funds for the endowment of an institution *for the relief and education of destitute children of both sexes*. That institution was the parent of all the other Infant Asylums which subsequently rose in the Capital.

The elevation of GIOVANNI SORANZO² (July 13, 1312) was hailed as a just tribute to his conspicuous talents, his varied accomplishments, and his long and valuable services. The successor of Giorgio was the son of the Procurator Antonio Soranzo, of San Angelo. He was

¹ *Historia Cortusiorum* (lib. i. c. 18). See also Albertinus Mussatus (*De Gestis Italicorum post Henricum Septimum Cæsarem*, lib. ii. Murat. x. 583-6).

² Pietro Dolfino, *Annali Veneti*, p. 59 (King's MSS. 149).

born in 1240.¹ Between 1293 and 1304, Soranzo had filled with equal distinction the highest posts in the Army and the Navy, as well as in the diplomatic service; in May, 1309, he accepted the office of Procurator of Saint Mark *di Sora*, which his father Antonio had formerly (1269) occupied, and thus became the second citizen of the Republic.

The termination of the Zaratine war engrossed the attention of the new Doge. But the attainment of that object, of which Giorgio might at first seem to have too hastily despaired, soon proved itself indeed no childish task. General succeeded general. One plan was substituted for another. New levies were raised. Fresh taxes were imposed. Dalmasio and his Venturi, 1,000 strong, were still in the Venetian service; but their efforts were uniformly fruitless; and it was not till the autumn of 1313 that, in consequence of the desertion of the Zaratines by their Croatian and Hungarian allies, the Signory procured the submission of that refractory colony and all but impregnable fortress. Through the tact and adroitness, however, which the Government displayed, the capitulation was framed on a basis hardly less favourable than if the arms of the Republic had experienced the most brilliant success. The Suzerain regained more than her former rights. The fief recognised more than its former ties.

Meanwhile, the Ferrarese difficulty, which had now nearly completed the fourth year of its duration, began

¹ Cigogna (*Iscrizioni Veneziane*).

to wear a highly promising aspect; and the news from Avignon was of a character which tended exceedingly to console the Republic for any disappointments in the adjustment of the Zaratine question. At length, on the 26th March,¹ the welcome announcement was brought that His Holiness had relented, that the proffered indemnity of 20,000 gold florins of Florence² for the losses, alleged to have accrued to the Guelph cause at Ferrara, was definitively accepted, and that the anathema was cancelled. The stubbornness which the Venetians had displayed in withstanding, at all hazard, the Pontifical encroachments in 1308 and 1309, did not prevent them from receiving this intelligence with exuberant satisfaction. Although they had borne with exemplary fortitude the burden and odium of the late interdict, their joy at their restoration to the Christian Communion was not less universal. On the 1st April, five days only after the arrival of the Avignon advices, a special embassy was accredited to the Papal Court, for the purpose of following up the release from the Bull to its natural consequences; and, in the course of the summer of 1313, the Signory returned to her position at Ferrara on an improved footing; and her relations with the other European Powers were satisfactorily re-established.

¹ Romanin (iii. 94).

² A. Sagredo (*Fraternita dei Fiorentini in Venezia*. Arch. Stor. Ital. App. ix. 444.) The Florentine residents at Venice, who appear to have been tolerably numerous, were charged, under pain of exile, to negotiate the exchange. Sanudo reckons that the reconciliation cost the Republic not less than 25,000 ducats. *Vite*, p. 596.

The piratical depredations,¹ which the Genoese of Pera had within the last twelvemonth committed on Venetian commerce, now reached a culminating point in a somewhat episodical manner. A certain Ottone Doria, who appears to have been largely addicted to privateering, thought proper to attack with a superior force eight Venetian ships which were trading in cotton at some neighbouring port. The prey was secured without much difficulty; and two of the merchants, Moisé Giustiniani and Donato Cornaro, were killed in the fray. The object which Doria coveted, however, was not cotton, but specie; and he gladly permitted his victims to ransom the booty for 8,000 ducats. To a suggestion that his conduct was not perfectly consonant with the law of nations, and with the usages of civilized communities in time of peace, the marauder answered with facetious effrontery:² “My plea is absolute necessity, since I have not sufficient money with me to pay for certain goods, which I have been purchasing; and it is lawful enough, *as the Scripture declareth to the Jews*, to eat in cases of similar urgency the bread of promise, even although it be consecrated;” the whimsical impertinence, with which the Genoese sought to excuse his gross outrage, was not at all appreciated by the Republic; and the time had come for putting a term to such atrocities in the just opinion of an administration, to which the Battle of Curzola was not so much a great fact as a great tradition. A squadron of forty galleys was at once

¹ Villani (lib. x. c. 64) *inter alia*.

² Marin (vi. 5, 6).

fitted out; and the command was conferred upon Giustiniani Giustiniani, perhaps a kinsman of Moisé, and a captain, who was popularly said, from the prosperous issue of all his undertakings, "to carry victory in his bosom." The merchant-service of the offending Power was in its turn exposed to capture and spoliation. The 8,000 ducats and her other Venetian spoils were wrung from her grasp. Her establishments at Galata were destroyed by Giustiniani. Above all, as the price of peace, her Government was compelled to defray the cost of her humiliation.¹

In other respects, the reign of Soranzo was equally redundant to the happiness and to the aggrandizement of his country; and in other respects, the consistent aim of the new Council of Ten at self-popularization was not less plainly discernible. An age of commercial development and industrial expansion had succeeded to an age of constitutional and administrative reform. A cycle of disaster and privation had passed away, and one of prosperity and abundance seemed to be setting in. The intercommunication of the Republic with Italy and the continent was strengthened and extended by new treaties with Sicily (1314), Hungary (1316), Milan (1317), France and Brabant (1320), Bologna (1321), Bruges (1322),

¹ "A certain fisherman presented to the Doge (Soranzo) a fish taken in the sea, having one of its fins resembling a sword; and, this being circulated through Italy, many affirmed that it was a sign that the Venetians deserved and justly possessed the sovereignty of the ocean." —De Monacis (lib. xiv. 280; Add. MSS. 8574).

Brescia (1325), England (1326), Como and Recanati (1328); and a cruise of observation was sent to Spain and Portugal to report on the benefit which might probably accrue from the establishment of factories at Seville, Cadiz, and Lisbon. At the same time similar activity was exhibited in cementing the alliances with Persia, Trebizond (1319),¹ Armenia (1321),² Tunis (1320), and the Lower Empire (1328).

In the negotiations with France, the Government conceived itself fortunate in securing, for a substantial consideration, the friendly offices of Charles of Valois; and the letter, bearing date the 8th October, 1320, is still extant, in which the Prince acknowledges the receipt at the hands of Benedetto Molini of 2,000 florins,³ as a recompense for obtaining from the King a fresh mercantile charter, and the promise of a total removal in favour of Venice of existing fiscal abuses.

It is to be suspected that in England, where the interdiction of 1309 had been carried out, in the maltreatment of the *Lombards*, to an infamous extent, the Republic found at least equal occasion to loosen her purse-strings. The dues, not excessively heavy only, but excessively arbitrary, which were levied by corrupt

¹ 1319, July. Commercial privileges granted by the Emperor of Trebizond to the Venetians at the request of the Doge Giovanni Soranzo and of the Venetian Ambassador Pantaleone Michieli. (Arch. Stor. Ital. App. ix. 374.)

² 1321. Privileges granted to the Venetians at the prayer of the Doge Giovanni Soranzo and of the Venetian Ambassador, Michele Giustiniani, by Leo IV., King of Armenia. (Ibid. 371.)

³ Marin (v. 309).

ministers and corrupter favourites on foreign imports are known to have formed one of the leading grounds of complaint, on the part of his own subjects, against Edward II.; and it seems highly probable that the burden of such exactions fell principally on the Flemings and Venetians.

A treaty of commerce with Britain had been concluded between Edward I. and the Doge Gradenigo in 1304,¹ by which the trade of London, Southampton, and other ports, was opened to the citizens of the Republic upon terms unquestionably advantageous; and the relations between the two Powers continued uninterrupted till the fulmination of the Bull against the Venetians in March, 1309. But the intercourse between Venice and England was resumed in 1313, or perhaps earlier. In 1319, the mutual good understanding was temporarily disturbed by a singular mischance. A merchant of Venice, Tommaso Loredano, despatched to London by a certain captain, Nicoletto Basadonna, 100,000 pounds of raw sugar, and 10,000 of candied sugar; and Basadonna, having disposed of his cargo in a satisfactory manner, exchanged it for wool, with which, in conformity with his instructions, he sailed to Flanders. In the Flemish waters, however, the captain encountered some English cruisers; a collision ensued; the cruisers were victorious; and

¹ There can be no doubt that the Venetians had commercial intercourse with England at a much earlier date. The slaves whom Gregory VII. emancipated in the market-place at Rome were *Angles*, who may probably have been imported by Venetian merchants.

Basadonna fell in the defence of his trust.¹ This outrage was not permitted to pass unnoticed. An ambassador was sent to London to demand satisfaction in the name of the Doge ; and Royal Letters were granted for the security and redress of the sufferers. A second disagreement arose in 1321.² Five Venetian merchantmen, trading off the Isle of Wight, entered into a dispute on some point with the tenantry and servants of Sir John De Lisle, the chief local proprietor. A fatal affray took place ; several Englishmen were killed ; the Venetian captains weighed anchor abruptly, and put out to sea ; and the fear of consequences deterred them for some time from repeating their visits. In 1323, however (April 16), a royal pardon was published, in which grace was extended to the offenders ; and this temporary estrangement was thus terminated. From the avarice and susceptibility of the Venetians on the one hand, seconded by the full sense of naval and commercial superiority, and from the stubborn and jealous character of the English on the other, it is natural to conclude that quarrels and even ruptures of a more serious kind were in these early times far from unfrequent ; but, for the most part, the placability of the Italians and the necessities of their customers speedily reconciled disputes.

It was at the present time that the Public Regatta, the most important of the Venetian pastimes, was brought to some degree of perfection. The origin of

¹ Marin (v. pp. 306 and 309).

² Rymer (iii. 1008-9, 1011-12).

this annual exhibition may be safely referred back to the middle of the thirteenth century. A regatta, as well as a water-fête, was among the festivities which attended the coronation of Lorenzo Tiepolo in 1268. In the Latin poem on the Marian Games, written by Pace Del Friuli, a Professor of Padua University, about the year 1300,¹ it is said that two boats, propelled with oars, were then usually appointed to run a course along the Grand Canal, and that whichever gained the race received a prize. On the 14th September, 1315, a decree of the Great Council ordered that an annual regatta should be henceforth held on the Feast of the Conversion of Saint Paul (January 25) with vessels of fifty oars; and the superintendence of the necessary arrangements was committed to the Masters of the Arsenal. The boats generally employed on these occasions appear to have been galleys; but it may be collected from the wording of the Great Council Minute, that the rule in this respect was not strict.

The plausible notion, that the Canal Races were instituted for the first time in 1300 by the Doge Gradenigo as one of the methods of reconciling the people to the recent loss of their political liberty, is disproved by the manifestly superior antiquity of the custom. It is highly probable, indeed, that the regatta was originally nothing more than an occasional recreation

¹ Letter of E. A. Cicogna to Cleandro, Count of Prata, *respecting certain Venetian Regattas, public and private*, p. 17. Venezia, 1856. (Ital.)

or a grand holiday entertainment, and that the earlier experiments were as rude as they were intermittent. But, in the present state of knowledge with regard to Venetian civilization and the peculiar tone of Venetian policy during the middle ages, it seems to be barely likely that the Republic remained long a stranger to a class of spectacle, which was so thoroughly congenial with the national instincts, and which was at once so admirably calculated to excite and gratify the emulation of the seamen and gondoliers, and to supply an outlet for the superfluous animal spirits of the lower orders.¹

Abroad, the policy of her Ministry was eminently such as tended to inspire the Republic with a lofty self-respect, and to raise her in the estimation of foreigners. At home, the appliance of the mechanical arts on an unprecedentedly wide scale to domestic improvements; the liberal encouragement afforded to the

¹ "El Decreto xe sta quello,
Che le Feste ha comandàe
Per le spose de Castelo
Che xe stade rescatae.

"Su le prime no ghe gera
Chi la pompa avesse in cuor:
Tuto stava in dar bandiera
A chi gera vincitor.

"Ma col tempo sta spettacolo,
Che xe pur original,
Deventà xe assàe magnifico,
Veramente nazional."

—*La Regata di Venezia*. Composizione Poetica in Dialecto Veneziano, da Cleandro, Conte di Prata. Ven. 1856.

Lucchese silk manufacture ;¹ the institution of a College of Physicians, where medicine and pharmacy were professed, and where gratuitous relief was administered to the poor by competent practitioners ; the erection of windmills in various parts of the Dogado by a Lombard engineer ; the adoption of more efficient precautions against the recurrence of fires ; the amplification of the streets and public squares ; the embellishment of the Ducal Palace ; the creation of new thoroughfares ; the enlargement of the Arsenal : were circumstances which combined to entitle that Ministry to a foremost place among the patrons of Venetian civilization.

The Venetian Arsenal was under the management of three functionaries, who were designated the *Patroni*, or Masters, of the arsenal. The Mastership was a sufficiently lucrative and honourable post ; and it was one of those to which members of the plebeian order were eligible. It is impossible to doubt that docks for the accommodation of shipping, as well as this highly important and peculiarly national institution, existed at Venice in some form or other from the earliest times. A curious picture of the state of the arsenal in the time of Dante (1265-1321) is afforded by a passage in the *Inferno* :—

“ Marvellous darkness shadow'd o'er the place,
In the Venetian's Arsenal, as boils

¹ Romanin (iii. 102) ; *L'Arte della Seta portata in Francia dagli Italiani* ; Arch. Stor. Italiano, Nuova Serie, vi. part ii. ; and Filiasi (*Ric. Storiche*, 108), who says that thirty-two families with about 300 workmen, emigrated from Lucca to Venice. They were driven from their native city by the troubles of the Peninsula.

Through wintry months tenacious pitch to smear
Their unsound vessels: for th' inclement time
Seafaring men restrains; and in that while
His barque one builds anew. Another stops
The ribs of his that hath made many a voyage.
One hammers at the prow, one at the poop.
This shapeth oars; that other cables twirls.
The mizen one repairs and mainsail rent." ¹

A prolonged interval of profound calm occasioned a fall in the market value of provisions, which offered to the war prices of former reigns a pleasing contrast. Barbaro and Sanudo relate that for a ducat, which was then equivalent to ninety-six *soldi* might be purchased a bushel of corn, a quart of wine, a cartload of wood, and a seven days' allowance of meat; and the weekly maintenance of an artizan or other operative did not exceed perhaps at this time on the whole twelve or fourteen shillings.

Under this tranquil and beneficent rule, the progress of the Venetian Ephori was steady and unopposed. In 1316, the Decemvirs, whose authority was then about to expire, obtained a confirmation for ten years; and in 1326, their powers were renewed for a second decennial term.

Soranzo continued to preside over the affairs of his country sixteen years and a half. On Saturday morning, the 31st December, 1328, the venerable Doge

¹ Cary's translation, xxi. 7, *et seq.* 3rd edit. 1831, vol. i. p. 109. There is only one other passage throughout Dante, and that of slight importance, which has any relevancy to Venice. It occurs in the *Paradiso*; and Mr. Cary has committed an error in his note on the lines under consideration, which he would not have done had he seen Zanetti (*De Nummis Regum Rasciæ ad Venetos typos percussis.* Ven. 1750).

breathed his last, in his eighty-ninth year. No prince had ever been more respected¹ or more generally beloved; the cheapness of food and the uninterrupted enjoyment of peace had made his administration exceedingly popular; and his obsequies were correspondingly magnificent.

In the first instance, the Ducal remains were transported from the Palace on the shoulders of twenty of the oldest Senators to the saloon of the Signori di Notte; one of the Household marched in front, carrying a sheathed sword with the point upward; and a large number of patricians followed the corpse. The Doge was splendidly attired in the costume which he wore on State occasions; and the gilded spurs, indicating his equestrian rank, were fastened at his heels. After a brief interval, the procession was again set in motion; and the Members of the College having taken leave at this point, the rest proceeded to Saint Mark's, where the Dogaressa and her ladies, and a throng of mourning Nobles, had assembled. Here the burial service was performed with the accustomed solemnity; and after its celebration, the bearers resumed their burden, and the body was conveyed with every mark of

¹ Nevertheless, as Sanudo (p. 599) informs us, "nel 1328 nell' ultimo anno del Ducato di questo Doge, avendo ordinato Jacopo Quirini" (the brother of Marco), "Jacopo Barozzi, e Marino Barizio" (Barozzi) *certo trattato* contro la Reppublica, ed erano nomini molto ricchi, furono presi, e pel Consiglio de Dieci fu determinato, ch' egliino fossero appiccati tutti sulla Piazza di San Marco." It is believed, however, that these executions were in consequence merely of suspected implication in the movement of 1310.

pomp to the family vault of the Soranzi in St. John's Chapel in the Cathedral.¹

A meeting of the Great Council was fixed for the afternoon of the 31st. The proceedings were opened by the senior Privy Councillor, who expressed his profound regret at the event which had just taken place, and pronounced the eulogium of the deceased, praying that his successor might be worthy of him. All the constitutional forms regarding the temporary devolution of the Ducal authority upon the College, the revision of the Coronation Oath, and the election of a new Prince, were then satisfied; and it became time to resort to a process, which was now little more than a solemn and specious illusion—to obtain for the work of the few the sanction of the many.

The Arrengo was convoked by sound of tocsin in St. Mark's; and, the College coming down to the Popular Assembly, the oldest Councillor repeated the oration on Soranzo which he had previously delivered before the Peers. He besought his audience to govern themselves by good counsels, and to pray God for a good Doge. He intimated that his colleagues and himself had, agreeably to the usages of *the Land*, taken proper steps for the correction of the Promission. Thereupon, the Grand Chancellor came forward, and read in distinct tones the amendments which had been introduced into the Oath, and when he had finished, that high functionary raised his voice, and demanded: "May it please you to approve what has been done?" The

¹ Sanudo (fol. 600).

people exclaimed, "Yes, yes!" The usual oath was administered to the Gastaldio by the Notary of the Ducal Court; and the former swore on behalf of all Venice that he would observe the Constitution,¹ and accept as Doge him who should be duly elected.

The leading emendations which were inserted, at the suggestion of the Board of Correctors and with the popular consent, in the Promission, were those which raised the salary of the Crown from 4,000 to 5,200 *lire*, and which debarred his Serenity from summoning the Arrengo for the future without the concurrence of the College, except in matters of purely ecclesiastical cognizance. After the completion of these preliminaries, Francesco Dandolo *Can* was proclaimed Doge on Friday the 8th January, 1329.² Marino Sanudo Torsello, a contemporary, writing to the Archbishop of Capua under date of the 15th February (1329), says: "Your Magnificence is aware that, on the last day of December, my lord Giovanni Soranzo, who was Doge of Venice, migrated to the Lord. In his room, my lord Francesco Dandolo, surnamed *Can*, and appropriately enough,³ has been created Doge. He is a man of good reputation, especially in the study and knowledge of the Law."

Francesco Dandolo was the son of Giovanni Dan-

¹ Romanin (iv. *Documenti*, No. 10).

² Epistola Marini Sanuti Torselli ad Episcopum Ostiæ (Januarii die 18, 1329), et ejusdem ad Archiepiscopum Capuæ, data Venetiis, Feb. 15, 1329; *Gesta Dei per Francos*, ii. 313-14.

³ Alluding, perhaps, to his bold and sturdy character.

dolo *Can*, himself a personage of some repute as a diplomatist. Francesco had served in 1309 in the embassy, which was accredited in that year to Clement V. at Avignon; and his efforts to assuage the ire of the Pontiff were of the most strenuous and meritorious kind.¹

The new Doge mounted the throne under the brightest auspices. The popularity which he had gained by his conspicuous share in mollifying the wrath of the Apostolic See was extreme. The enthusiasm at his election was unmingled. So soon as the choice of the College had become generally known, the people flocked to his private residence, and many pressed forward to carry him on their shoulders to the Palace. But Dandolo purposely eluded this boisterous display of affection; and, hurrying to Saint Mark's, he cast himself on his knees before the great altar, and received his solemn investiture at the hands of the Primicerio, with the oath of allegiance. Quitting the church, followed in procession by the Officers of State and by a promiscuous assemblage of persons, his Serenity, grasping in his hand the great standard of the Republic, passed into the Palace, where he swore before the Senior Privy Councillor to observe the Constitution; Dandolo afterward proceeded to shew himself to the people, to whom he promised the blessings of a mild, honourable, and impartial administration. The next stage of the Ducal progress was to

¹ De Monacis (lib. xv.; Add. MSS. 8574); *Hist. Cortus* (lib. iv. c. 7; Murat. xii.); Sansovino (lib. xiii. 569).

the Great Council Chamber, where Dandolo formally installed himself by sitting down for a few moments on the throne ; and when the fatiguing ceremonial was concluded, the Doge finally retired to his own apartments.

Having taken their leave of the Doge at the point prescribed by etiquette, the Privy Councillors, attended by the Grand Chancellor, paid a complimentary visit to the Dogaressa, and each was dismissed with a present of a purse richly worked in silk and gold. Her Serenity afterward proceeded to swear to certain clauses of the Promission, received the oath of allegiance, made the customary oblation on the great altar in the Basilica of 120 *sequins* (ten pounds), and was ushered in due course into the Hall of the Signori di Notte, where she momentarily occupied a thronal dais specially prepared for her. In the evening, the Privy Council was invited to dine with the Doge at the Palace ; and the Dogaressa entertained in similar manner, in her own rooms, the Guardians and Masters of all the Trading Corporations.

The earlier years of the Dogate of Francesco Dandolo were unmarked by any events of great consequence. A collision, in the beginning of 1335,¹ with her old enemy the Patriarch of Aquileia, arising out of the revolt of Pola in Dalmatia, and of Valle in the Frioul, against the usurped authority, cost the Republic some troops ; but it finally resulted, as in many former instances, in a diplomatic victory, and in the acquisition of fresh commercial advantages. In 1331 and

¹ *Hist. Cortus.* (lib. v. ch. 9 ; Murat. xii).

1334 a desultory correspondence was maintained between the French and Venetian Governments, touching a Crusade which the Papal Court of Avignon¹ was anxious to organise against the newly-risen power of the Ottomans; and in March of the latter year a treaty was actually concluded between Dandolo and Charles IV. of France, which was to have taken effect in 1335, had not the French wars of the Plantagenets² rendered it as nugatory as its predecessors of 1281 and 1306. An independent tripartite convention, however, between the Doge of Venice, the Emperor Andronicus Palæologus, and the Knights of Rhodes, had already been ratified in the autumn of 1332 for the protection of Constantinople against the threatened inroads of the Turks; and a squadron of twenty sail under Pietro Zeno, who had exercised for some years the important functions of Captain of the Gulf,³ was pursuantly despatched to the Archipelago. But this expedition developed no important fruits: nor were any serious apprehensions to be entertained at present from the quarter in question. Still, in one of his letters⁴ to the Bishop of Ostia, Apostolic Legate, Sanudo Torsello writes, under date of the 18th January, 1329: "You must know that I have received letters from my lord Marco Gradenigo, Bailo and Captain of Negropont,

¹ *Annali di Lodovico Monaldesco*; Murat. xii. 534.

² Froissart, by Berners, edit. 1812, i. 41.

³ "On the 18th February, 1330 (O.S.)," says Sanudo, fol. 773, "Pietro Zeno, returned Captain of the Gulf, presented to the Doge a glass vial, in which was contained some of the milk of the Virgin Mary."

⁴ *Gesta Dei per Francos* (vol. ii. p. 313).

son of Pietro Gradenigo, the renowned Doge of Venice of happy memory, dated the 18th September last, in which he tells me that unless some remedy be found (by the Venetian Government) against the Turks, who have marvellously increased in number, Negropont and all the islands of the Archipelago will be infallibly lost; and that for himself, with his present resources, he has no means of resisting them."

With the exception of the petty troubles of 1335, the Republic had now enjoyed halcyon days of peace since the return of the Zaratines to their allegiance in 1313. Twenty years of foreign war and domestic convulsion (1293-1313) were thus followed by twenty years of external and internal repose (1313-33). Dalmatia was tranquillized; Genoa was humiliated. The Lower Empire, though not without its alarming symptoms, was quiescent. The pressure of extraordinary taxes was no longer sensible. Prices were low. Provisions were abundant. Commerce had received an enormous impulse and expansion. The condition of trade was highly flourishing. The upper classes were elated by the development of fresh sources of wealth. The lower orders were exhilarated by the removal of their burdens. It was under these auspicious circumstances that the time was approaching for the dissolution of the Council of Ten.

The original jurisdiction of this unique tribunal had been of a purely exclusive and strictly transient character. To devise measures for the safety of the State, to obtain by any expedients every new clue

to the Conspiracy of 1310, to unravel those clues to their source with untiring diligence, to bring to justice all who might have eluded detection—were the objects to which the labours of the Decemvirs were directed, and the points to which their cognizance was confined. But the Council, even if its attributes had not been emphatically inquisitorial, shewed no disposition to be perfunctory. The line of demarcation, if any such line had existed, was soon obliterated or ignored. Every branch of the Executive was submitted in its turn under various pretexts to the novel influence. Nor could it be denied that that influence was exercised, on the whole, to a highly beneficial end. It had been accounted a great Revolution when, so recently as 1298, the Great Council succeeded in arrogating to itself the prerogatives which formerly belonged to the people. But the narrow jealousy and distrust, which were gradually growing up in the ranks of the nobility, had long made it palpably evident to the more discerning, that a still higher and still more concentric Power must eventually arise to wrest those prerogatives from the hands of the Great Council itself. That Power was already found to exist in the Decemvirs. Primarily elected, and constantly renewed by the legislative body on the clearest ground of expediency, the Ten had incessantly striven to popularize themselves and to strengthen their position by propitiating the lower classes on the one hand, and by turning to account, on the other hand, with unequalled dexterity the disunion among the patricians, to rule that order

with a hand of iron. By some the Dictatorship was viewed as an indispensable ingredient in the Constitution; by some it was tolerated as an odious necessity; but all accepted the silent innovation in a spirit of acquiescence. The Decemvirs knew their strength, and they quickly made that strength felt. It was on the 30th January, 1336, that their commission was about to expire; on the 20th July, 1335, *they caused themselves to be declared a permanent Assembly*. Such a fact speaks for itself more eloquently than volumes of comment. It was symptomatic not so much of a change in the state of public feeling as of a transition, at no distant date, from Aristocracy to Oligarchy.

So long as the crisis, to which they owed their existence, continued in their own estimation more or less imminent, the Ten had sat every day, and at all hours of the day, in one of the chambers of the Ducal Palace set apart for their deliberations. It was not till the public danger was to some extent removed that they relaxed in the closeness of their application to business, and that they contented themselves with meeting at their official residence for the despatch of all matters of routine every Wednesday and Thursday afternoon.¹

Even prior to the date of its permanent establishment, this institution necessarily tended to increase the intricacy of the Venetian administration. The attribute of intricacy was of course one of a relative, rather than a positive kind. In the middle ages, when an almost total ignorance reigned of civil prin-

¹ *Liber Presbyter*. ad cartam 82, quoted by Sanudo (*Vite*, 595).

ciples, it was not unnatural that a system pretending to rise above the common level of crude simplicity should be viewed as slightly cabalistic and inscrutable. The Venetian Executive, indeed, displayed the earliest attempt to organize a bureaucratic machinery and a plan for the distribution of public functions; and Venice also led the way in founding the practice of diplomatic etiquette and official routine. The Council of Ten was, perhaps, a constitutional evil; but it was certainly a constitutional necessity. The tribunal was more or less fatal to the political liberty of the Venetians; but it left untouched their civil privileges, and it was highly conducive to the preservation of the national independence. While it was inaccessible to the whispers of treason, it was not a stranger to the softer influences of humanity. Instances were known in which a female suppliant was permitted to penetrate into the Hall of the Decemvirs, and obtained that redress which had been denied to her elsewhere. An instance might be cited in which, when a foreign tyrant had tempted and overcome the virtue even of members of the College, the Ten, alone incorruptible and without a price, provided for the safety of the imperilled State! A leading peculiarity of the Decemviral office was, that its functions were never exactly defined, and that its place in the Constitution was never accurately marked. This vagueness and laxity of principle contributed more than any other cause to promote the wonderful growth of the tribunal. It can only be said in a general sense that of all questions of high

moment, where secrecy and despatch were essentially requisite, the Council arrogated to itself the exclusive cognizance, and that its decrees were practically final. An appeal lay nominally to the legislature; but hardly more than one instance was known, in which the latter ventured to reverse the judgment of the Decemvirs. At a subsequent date, however, it became a constant practice on the part of the Ten, in all cases which were more than usually weighty or intricate, to call up from the Senate certain supplemental members, who were termed the *Zonta* (Giunta). The *Zonta*, whose number was subject to variation, had not merely a deliberative voice, but voted on the same footing as ordinary councillors.

It has been already noted that the Decemvirs met for the despatch of business twice a week, unless unusual pressure demanded more frequent sittings. Three *Capi*, or chiefs, elected by the Council, and succeeding each other in bi-monthly rotation, presided at every meeting and initiated the proceedings. It was not very long after their original institution in 1310 that the Decemvirs resorted, in cases where peculiarly delicate investigation was requisite, to the practice of delegating their powers provisionally and specially to one, two, or three of their number, according to circumstances; and these extraordinary functionaries were known as the *Inquisitori dei Dieci*, or the Inquisitors of the Ten. The first instance in which such a course was adopted was on the 3rd January, 1313, when three were so appointed with temporary jurisdiction. The *Capi* submitted resolutions to their colleagues, and signed

decrees in their name ; and the letters, purporting to be written by the Doge himself or his secretary (*Ducali*), were generally composed under their dictation, being forwarded to his Serenity only for subscription.¹

The Inquisitors of the Ten, who were thus nearly coeval with the Ten themselves, may be recognised as the forerunners of the famous *Inquisitors of State*. But no tribunal existed at Venice under the latter title prior to 1596 :² nor even then was it clothed with the revolting attributes which have been ascribed to it by ignorance or malignity.

Intimately associated with this office was a second institution, whose province was far more specific and determinate. The management of all public prosecutions for breach of trust, fiscal malversations, and, other classes of misconduct, devolved under the Venetian Constitution on the magistracy known as the *Avogaria* ; and the Avogadors, or Advocates, of the Commune, who were generally two, were accountable for their acts to the College or the Ten only, and, in his personal capacity, not even to the Doge.

The admission of the Council of Ten in 1335 into the body-politic as an integer of the Constitution was prompted, however, to some extent by other considerations. The prospect of a new Italian difficulty, which was already to be numbered among contingencies,

¹ The hypothesis that the State Inquisition was statutorily established in the middle of the fifteenth century is completely erroneous, and the decrees of the 16th and 19th June, 1454, to which Daru refers, are now known to be spurious. The probability is that a Spanish parentage is claimable for this gross and infamous forgery, which was unquestionably designed to lower the Venetians in European opinion.

² Romanin (*Gli Inquisitori di Stato di Venezia*, 1858, p. 24).

operated more proximately in reconciling the Great Council to the adoption of that momentous step.

The shock which the imperial system in Italy had sustained from the Lombard League was one from which that system never thoroughly rallied. The distractions of Germany completed the work which the union of Lombardy had begun. The two cardinal points, at which the Republic had in her Italian policy aimed with tolerable consistency since the Confederacy of 1167, lay in destroying the centralizing influence of the Court of Pavia, and in weakening her enemies in the Peninsula by dividing them; and it was therefore with unqualified satisfaction that she had beheld the stealthy rise of a considerable number of petty municipalities, which possessed few common sympathies, and whose hostility she had comparatively slight cause to dread. An object was thus achieved which she had always had secretly at heart, and which she had been constantly promoting by arms and by diplomacy. It was to some extent with complacency that she saw at Verona a La Scala almost outvying the splendour of an imperial Court; at Lucca, Castuccio, who had been a captain in the Venetian service,¹ reproducing the worst types of imperial tyranny; even Padua elevating herself to an importance which she had not known since the days of Strabo. The dismemberment of the peninsular possessions of the German Cæsars opened to the Venetians

¹ Sanudo Torsello (*Letter to the Archbishop of Capua*, 1325; *G. D. per Francos*, ii. 292-3).

a new political career, and created for them a new class of interest. How far that career was to be developed, depended mainly on the Signory itself.

It soon became palpable enough, that the principles of government, which sprang out of the Revolution of 1167, possessed the same radical defects as those which they had been designed to supersede. It was not long before the Lombards were enabled to detect symptoms of a relapse to the evils, against which their progenitors had so nobly struggled. A few great potentates speedily absorbed the acquisitions of their feebler neighbours, and Italy was once more placed at the arbitrement of two or three military leaders. The inherent proclivity to centralization speedily revived in a slightly altered form. Instead of a line of Princes, whose weighty German interests had always engaged a large share of their time and attention, there was grave reason to apprehend that at a period, more or less remote, some dynasty might arise, whose sympathies would be purely Italian, and to whom Germany would be no more than England or Denmark. Such a contingency was one which it was alike impossible, that the Republic should not foresee, and should not foresee without extreme dismay. Jealous as the Venetians might appear of the presence of any imperial power on the mainland intolerant, as they might well be of the insolence of Frederic II. or Henry VII., they were far too acute not to perceive how incomparably preferable was a Duke of Luxemburgh or a Duke of Bavaria to a Duke of Milan or a Duke of Treviso.

Among those families which had contrived to raise themselves from comparative obscurity during the War of Independence against Frederic Barbarossa, none was more distinguished than the Veronese family of La Scala. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the representatives of that House acquired the highest political influence, and rose to the most important administrative trusts in their native city; and in 1257, Mastino della Scala availed himself with adroitness of the hostilities between the Venetians and the two Romani, to strengthen to a material extent his position and local authority. By a natural and not uncommon transition, an annual or biennial magistracy merged, in the course of time, into an hereditary possession and a ducal title; and by judicious alliances, ably-conducted wars, and scandalous diplomatic artifices, the aggrandizement of the Scaligers proceeded steadily until, toward the middle of the fourteenth century, another Mastino became the master and tyrant, not of Verona only, but of Padua, Lucca, Brescia, Vicenza, Feltre, Belluno, Cadore, Treviso, and Parma. The first had been wrested from the Carrara, the second from the Republic of Florence, Parma from its Prince-Bishop: while Feltre, Belluno, and Cadore were previously under the protection of the Bohemian Crown. In 1321,¹ the Duke of Verona was united to Taddea, the daughter of Jacopo da Carrara by Anna Gradenigo, the Doge's child. The nuptials were solemnized at Venice with great splendour in the

¹ Gataro, *Istoria Padovana*, fol. 18; Murat., xvii.

Church of San Giorgio Maggiore; and in 1329 (March 12th)¹ Mastino was created, as a rare honour, a Venetian Citizen. La Scala affected regal magnificence, and aspired to a regal diadem. His court was beyond comparison the most brilliant in Italy. His antechambers were incessantly crowded by princes, grandees, and ambassadors from other Powers, soliciting an audience. He was a man of unquestionable ability as a soldier and as a statesman, but his character had its weak side. His mind was intoxicated by success, and his heart was corrupted by pride. His thirst for dominion was not greater than his love of adulation; and in him unbridled ambition was found united with womanish vanity. He was feared by all, caressed by all, and hated by all. His extensive territories, thus mainly won by usurpation, touched Venice on the one side, and Florence on the other. By both his movements were consequently viewed with suspicion, and by both his alarming and nefarious preponderance was impatiently tolerated.

Of those neighbours who beheld themselves deprived of their possessions by the Duke of Verona, none had imbibed a more inextinguishable hatred for that nobleman than his distant kinsmen Marsilio and Ubertino, the nephews of Jacopo da Carrara. The wife of the latter had been seduced² by Mastino's brother Alberto de la Scala, who governed in the Duke's name at Padua; Ubertino superadded the wrongs of an injured husband to other motives of

¹ Sanudo (fol. 430).

² A. Gataro, *Ist. Padov.*, fol. 22.

revenge; and his vindictive feelings were cordially shared by Marsilio.

Not satisfied with committing a political crime by denuding the two Carrara of the sovereignty of Padua, the Duke of Verona proceeded, in direct opposition to the advice of his prime minister Pietro Maranese, to perpetrate a political folly by curtailing the commercial privileges of the Venetians throughout the municipality, and by laying their intercourse with Padua and the Trevisan under vexatious restrictions. The consequence was, that the government of Francesco Dandolo transmitted a protest against such proceedings, suspended the relations between Padua and the Republic, and interdicted the export of salt for that market.

The Venetians, however, in spite of the high considerations which might prompt them to impose a check on the progress of La Scala, were not disinclined to treat with forbearance one who was connected with them by the double tie of marriage and citizenship; a numerous party in the Great Council shrank besides, on economical grounds, from plunging into hostilities of which the cost was as certain as the result was doubtful; the Doge himself leaned strongly to peace, so long as peace was compatible with honour and safety; and it is probable that if the question had lain between the Signory and La Scala himself merely, the rupture would have been closed without any farther complication. But the voice of a tempter was at the Duke's ear. "What has so great a prince," whispered Marsilio da Carrara, "to fear from Venice?"

Why should you not persevere boldly in your course, and foil the aim of the Republic by planting salterns independent of her jurisdiction in the Paduan lagoons, and by building a new fortress at Peta-de-Bo for their protection? What derogation will it not be on your part to register the edicts of the Doge?" This bait was greedily devoured. The innate conceit and arrogance of La Scala drew him completely into the snare. Steps were taken for establishing the *saline*. The ground was chosen at Peta-de-Bo¹ for the site of the new fort. A chain was thrown over the Po at Ostiglia, to interrupt the commerce between Venice and Lombardy. An attempt was even made by Mastino to seize Motta, Porto Buffoletto, and Canino, which the Venetians had taken under their protection.² Carrara and his brother perceive with suppressed ecstasy that their fly is already beginning to entangle himself in the meshes of the spider's web!

The course, on which the Duke had entered at the instigation of the wily Paduan, developed the precise result on which Marsilio had counted. The Venetians at once demanded an explanation of the circumstances, under which the new works at Peta-de-Bo were being undertaken, and under which the rights of the Signory were being so grossly infringed. The tone of the Ducal message was highly minatory and ominous: it spoke of preparations for war; hostilities were intimated as no remote contingency. La Scala took alarm; and Marsilio, whose own alliance with the Gradenigi was fairly supposed to carry with it a

¹ Dandolo, contemp. 413.

² Sandi (v. 73).

certain share of Venetian influence, was charged at his own suggestion with the task of ascertaining the temper of Venice and the real state of her preparations, and of pacifying the Republic by such means as might occur to him. La Scala's envoy, who had wormed himself into the confidence of his present employer by the most unctuous hypocrisy and the most refined dissimulation, felt as if a load had been removed from his heart; he hailed with secret joy the arrival so long deferred of the hour of retribution; and while he professed with consistent duplicity the utmost devotion to the service of the Duke, he inwardly breathed vengeance against the spoiler of his own patrimony and the dishonourer of his brother's bed. As he entered Venice, the people, to whom he was peculiarly odious, cried out, "*Let him die! let him die!*"¹ and the Lord of Padua was in fear of becoming the victim of a mob. The throng, however, abstained from any actual violence, and the ambassador reached the palace in safety.

The conduct of Count Marsilio, in his diplomatic visit to the Venetian capital, offered a finished specimen of double-dealing and falsehood. To extenuate his treachery, he pleaded to his conscience, perhaps, the still blacker treachery of La Scala; but he played his part with masterly address.² Saving appearances by busying himself ostensibly with the interests of the Duke, he devoted his better energies to the promotion of the object which he had more nearly at heart.

¹ *Hist. Cortus.* (lib. vi. ch. 2, note 11).

² "Volpe vecchia che era."—Muratori, *Annali*, viii. 196.

There were no persons of political consequence in Venice whose influence was not canvassed, and whose goodwill he failed to secure. While he hoodwinked La Scala's spies and La Scala himself by specious interviews with the members of the Government and audiences of the Doge, this profound schemer applied all his knowledge of the world and all the arts of corruption to the advancement of his own ends; and in this labour of love his perseverance was matched only by his circumspection. Carrara experienced slight difficulty in inculcating on his private hearers the prejudice which was arising to the Signory from the overgrown power of the Duke of Verona. He spoke of Mastino's attitude of defiance. He rehearsed, not without interpolations, the expressions of a vaunting or contumelious import which had dropped from him in the unguarded freedom of confidential intercourse. In short, he pretermitted no artifice which might help to poison the good opinion of such as had a lingering bias to La Scala; and he employed every sleight of argument serving to prejudice those whose public duty it might become to decide the question of peace or war. A story stole at this time into currency, that on one occasion, when the Carrarese was dining with the Doge, to whom he occupied the next place, he allowed his knife to slip from his hand as if by accident, and that, in the act of stooping to pick it from the floor,¹ he bent toward his Serenity, in whose ear he whispered: "*If any one were to give you Padua, what recompense*

¹ *Hist. Cortus., ubi suprâ.*

should be his?" "*We would confer upon him the government of Padua,*" was the reported rejoinder of Dandolo. Whatever truth there may have been in this anecdote, it is certain at least that a tolerably perfect understanding now existed between Marsilio and the Government; and the humiliation of La Scala appears to have been already seriously meditated.

Upon his return to Verona, the second act of the drama opened. The Paduan was the bearer of a doleful tale. He reported that his reception at Venice had been most unfavourable; that the conduct of the Government had been outrageous; and that, on his exit from the City, he was pelted. He hastened to disabuse the mind of his employer of the impression that the character of the Venetian preparations was at all formidable; he assured La Scala that he had nothing to fear from that quarter, inasmuch as his own forces were superior to any which could be brought against them; he exhorted him to be quite firm. The Duke was immeasurably incensed at the affronts alleged to have been offered to his representative; but he could not disguise his glee at the contradiction which Marsilio gave to the rumours previously current touching the Venetian armaments; and upon the counsel which his evil genius had the excessive effrontery to tender, he had the equally marvellous fatuity to act. The Venetian legation was still waiting in his antechamber for a reply to their latest communication; they were now dismissed, in spite of the earnest remonstrance of Maranese to his

employer,¹ with a message that the Duke would make no concessions, and that he would furnish no additional explanation. He even inquired banteringly of one of the Deputies: "why does your master throw away so much lead in sealing his despatches, seeing that the metal is in such high request for roofing Saint Mark's?" The rescript of the Doge, however, demonstrated to La Scala with admirable clearness that, although he might be in jest, the Republic was quite in earnest. "You seek war," wrote his Serenity, "and you shall have war; and your injustice is our guarantee that you will be the sufferer."

This was the consummation indeed, which Venice had anticipated: nor was she a stranger to the magnitude of the enterprise, in which she was purposing to embark. After two and twenty years' repose, the Venetians were prepared to resign themselves cheerfully to the losses and sacrifices which would infallibly attend such a war. The circumstances were eminently favourable; the provocation was extremely severe. Apart from public motives of resentment, the eviction or maltreatment of several Venetian proprietors in the Trevisan had bred a strong feeling of animosity against La Scala in the Great Council; and it was in vain that the Doge and the Peace Party still affected to look wistfully at the stormy prospect, and continued to intimate their pacific convictions. It was to no purpose that, in the Senate, Dandolo himself, in a somewhat lengthened address to that body,²

¹ Sandi (v. 74).

² Marin (vi. 18).

declaimed against a relapse to the belligerent state, and declared his persuasion that the desired objects could be obtained, as in many former instances they had been obtained, merely by a total suspension of commercial intercourse with a Power, whose multifarious wants they alone were in a position to supply. It was fairly rejoined by another speaker, "that it by no means follows, because a certain policy was in former times found to answer the ends of the Republic, that such a policy continues to be suitable or advantageous, when her commerce has been expanded to an enormous extent, when her resources are immeasurably ampler, and when acquisitions of territory have created interests which were then undeveloped, and necessities which were then unknown."

All the calculations of the Government were made. A census of the able-bodied population had been ordered, which exhibited a return of 40,100¹ male adults between the ages of twenty and sixty inclusive; the persons whose names appeared in this schedule were divided according to their seniority into twelve classes, of which the first alone was at present pronounced liable to serve by themselves or their proxies;² and between 3,000 and 4,000 men were ready to take the field. As a prelude to the assumption of the offensive, the Doge sent to Testa di Cane,³ one of the conterminous points between Padua and Chioggia, an embassy which delivered on the boundary line a formal and conclusive protestation against the

¹ Romanin (iii. 121).

² Navagiero, fol. 1027; Marin (vi. 27).

³ Romanin (iii. 119).

aggression of La Scala, and then, as a symbol of defiance cast a stone three several times in the direction of the hostile territory¹ (May 28, 1336).

On the 21st June, 1336,² an offensive treaty was concluded on a satisfactory footing between the Venetians and Florentines,³ the latter of whom, by the unprincipled annexation of Lucca to the Veronese Duchy,⁴ beheld one of their fairest and most legitimate possessions snatched from them. Under this convention, which was ratified by the Great Council on the 22nd, the restoration of Lucca to Florence was guaranteed, and the Florentines consented to share with the Republic the expenses of the war within the Trevisan March.

It quickly became apparent, that any attempt to localize the war would be futile. In a short time, Venice and the neighbourhood swarmed with refugees, who were hastening from every corner of the Peninsula to proclaim their wrongs and to volunteer their services. The Allies found their ranks swelling from day to day. The revolutionary element was already somewhat more preponderant than the Republic could have wished; and there was not the slightest room to doubt that, so soon as operations had fairly begun, and a victory was announced, many whose sentiments were wavering, or whose enthusiasm was curbed by fear and uncertainty, would tender their cordial adhesion.

¹ Romanin *ubi suprà*. This custom, which was one of the canons of mediæval warfare, was apparently borrowed from the Roman practice of hurling a javelin under similar circumstances.

² G. Villani (lib. xi. c. 50); Marin (vi. 25).

³ *Hist. Cortus.* (lib. v. c. 10).

⁴ G. Villani (lib. xi. c. 44).

Agreeably to the maxims which will always sway a jealous aristocracy, the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Coalition was offered by the Venetian Government to Pietro-Maria Rossi of Parma, the youngest member of an illustrious family, a nephew of Marsilio da Carrara,¹ and one of the ablest captains of the age.² The general, to whom the Ducal letter brought not only an intimation of the desire of the Signory, but the first report of the poisoning of one of his brothers by the secret order of La Scala, accepted the trust with alacrity, vowing vengeance against the murderer of Marsilio; and on the 10th October his solemn investiture by the Doge in person with the great banner of the Republic took place in the Church of Saint Mark, amid the acclamations of the assembled people. In conformity with the usual practice, two Venetian proveditors were appointed to assist the counsels of Rossi. The names of these civilians were Marco Cornaro and Andreazzo Morosini.

The forces of the Republic and her confederates concentrated themselves on Motta,³ in the March of Treviso, from which point the general had decided on directing his strategical manœuvres. Robbed of his own estate and power by the same rapacious hand which had now imbrued itself in the blood of his brother, the Parmese displayed to full advantage his resplendent talents. The progress of the Venetian

¹ Sandi (v. 15).

² Gataro, *Ist. Pad.* 22; Platina, *Hist. Mant.* 52; Murat. xviii.

³ Dandolo, contemp. (fol. 413).

arms under his conduct was rapid and triumphant. The Florentine contingent having now effected a junction, the invaders carried fire and sword into the domains of the Veronese tyrant : while the Chioggians under their own Podesta, Tommaso Barbarigo, proceeded to occupy strong positions at Monte-Albano and Stalimbeco : while Paolo Loredano put into a condition of defence a fort belonging to the Republic on the Paduan border. The standard of geographical knowledge in this age was not very high, even among the cosmopolitan Venetians ; and the absence of maps and plans of the districts to be traversed in the course of a campaign, was a want which had been supplied to a very slight degree. But the personal acquaintance of Rossi with the new theatre of war was peculiarly accurate and extensive ; and this circumstance, which had been the proximate ground for his employment, largely contributed to the success of operations. The whole line of country so far as the Brenta was mercilessly swept ; the passage of that river was effected in a masterly manner, before the enemy, who had designed to dispute it, had time to come up ; and the Venetians advanced without serious opposition within a short distance of the ramparts of Padua. It had been expected that the gates of this city would be thrown open to the allies, according to preconcerted arrangement, by Count Marsilio ; but Alberto de la Scala, Mastino's brother and lieutenant, who exercised here the same terrorism which the Duke himself was exercising elsewhere, was still sufficiently powerful

to render such a step impossible without exposing the author to immediate destruction ; and Carrara was reluctantly obliged to postpone for the present the decisive blow. The Commander-in-Chief, who was advised not to enter rashly upon a siege, which might shortly prove itself superfluous, turned thereupon the heads of his columns from Padua, occupied Pieve di Sacco and Bovolenta, invested and took the Castle of Curano, and marching through Cavarzero, reached at length the Fort of Peta-de-Bo, the erection of which had been one of the principal causes, if not the primary cause, of the war. This infantile stronghold, which dated its foundation only from the preceding year, was assaulted concurrently by the Venetians and Florentines on the side of the land, and by a small Chioggian fleet under Marco Loredano from the sea ; the position was taken by storm on Saint Cecilia's day, 1336 (November 22), and afterward completely dismantled and razed ; and the stones and other material, having being conveyed by Loredano in boats to Stalimbeco, were at once employed in the construction of a new fortress, which was christened the *Torre d'Argere*. A festival was instituted in remembrance of the day and the exploit to the honour of the Virgin Cecilia.

To preserve through a like medium the memory of remarkable occurrences is a practice which has been common to every age. But independently of other points, such a practice was of uncommon utility at an epoch when intercommunications were difficult and slow, when newspaper literature was unthought of,

when dates, depending on oral tradition, were readily forgotten; and when important facts, known perhaps only to eye-witnesses, were extremely apt to perish. The history and chronology of the medieval period are sufficiently obscure and imperfect; but that they are not far more obscure and far more imperfect, posterity owes in a large measure to the Red-Letter days.

Before the campaign of 1336 was brought to a close, the success of the Coalition had attracted to its ranks several new members, in whose eyes, perhaps, the triumph of the cause was its best justification. The League was now joined by Azzo Visconti, Lord of Milan; Luigi Gonzaga, Lord of Mantua; and Obizzo Este, Lord of Ferrara, the last of whom had vainly striven to reconcile the belligerents;¹ and on the 10th of March, 1337, the compact of June, in the preceding year, between the Venetians and Florentines was reconstructed on an enlarged basis.² In the course of the summer,³ Cittadella, Asolo, Ceneda, Conegliano, and other places within the Trevisan and Paduan confines, rebelled against Mastino; twenty Lombard regiments in the service and pay of the Duke went over to the enemy; and at the end of July, the King of Bohemia, under whose protection had been Feltre, Belluno, and Cadore, was admitted into the Veneto-Florentine League. These accessions changed altogether the relative strength of parties; and the balance at present

¹ Pugliola (fol. 371).

² Marin (vi. 21).

³ Muratori, *Annali* (viii. 197).

preponderated greatly in favour of the Allies, who were once more directing their steps towards Padua.

But while a series of victories was wreathing with laurels the brows of Rossi and the standard of Saint Mark, the perfidy of Count Marsilio had by some unlucky mischance been rather prematurely unmasked. The wrath of his dupe was ungovernable, his indignation unbounded; and he sent immediate instructions to his brother, without explaining his motive, "to destroy instantly the two Carrara." Alberto prepared to obey the mandate; but when the fatal blow was to be struck, the heart of this naturally excellent man failed him; and three messages, each more peremptory than its predecessor, were ineffectually addressed to him with a similar object. When he summoned Marsilio¹ and his brother for the first time on some frivolous pretext to his palace, those familiar accents and that captivating manner arrested the arm, which was to give to the guards the preconcerted signal; and instead of carrying out his revolting commission, he clasped the Count to his bosom, saying, "*My brother does not well to diminish so the number of his friends.*" In the second instance, the two Carrara, having spent the evening with the Governor of Padua, had retired to their own house at San Nicolo in the neighbourhood. It was midnight; and they were preparing for rest, when a messenger arrived in haste from the palace with an announcement that "Messer Alberto

¹ De Monacis (lib. xv., Add. MSS. 8574); Gataro (*Ist. Padov.* p. 25, *et seq.*); Gio. Villani (lib. xi. c. 54).

desired to speak another word with them." Although they were already in an advanced stage of undress, they at once hurried back ; and Marsilio, espying the Governor pacing the verandah, cried out to him with an air of pleasantry and affected petulance : " What the devil do you want ? ¹ We parted from you but just now ; will you be always disturbing us ? " This sally was too much for Alberto. He was touched by the unsuspecting confidence of his late boon-companions. He had given strict orders that, so soon as the brothers entered the palace, they should be pitilessly massacred by soldiers purposely stationed at the foot of the staircase ; but he now exclaimed with an impatience which was somewhat suspicious, " Do not come in, do not come in ; go home to bed ; I want nothing ! " The third occasion presented an equally curious episode. It is on the 2nd of August at midnight, when the messenger of Mastino reaches his destination. Alberto happens to be playing at chess with a friend of the Count ; Marsilio as well as Ubertino is present ; but they are simply looking on and watching the moves. The Governor raises his eyes for an instant from the game on which he is intent, and seeing that there is a letter from Verona, he carelessly says to Marsilio : " Open and read." The courier declining, in obedience to his instructions, to deliver the packet to a third party, La Scala snatches it from him, and without examining even the superscription, hands it to Carrara. The latter breaks the seal, and runs his eye over the

¹ Gataro (*Ist. Pad.* 26).

contents with an exquisite air of indifference; his countenance remains unchanged; the muscles of his face preserve their usual rigidity; but it requires all his habitual self-command to prevent his lineaments from betraying the inward working of his mind, and the secret heart-struggle. His emotion is strengthened by its suppression. Drawing Ubertino gaily aside, he converses with him for a short space of time in an undertone; Ubertino quits the apartment immediately afterward; and his brother, turning lightly on his heel, rejoins the chess-table. The game is just finished, and the Governor, who has been fortunately too deeply absorbed in his favourite amusement to note the late byplay, demands, without inquiring for the letter itself: "*What news from Messer Mastino?*" "Oh!" returns the Count, with unruffled coolness and self-possession, "he wishes merely that you will bear in mind the purchase of those foreign falcons for him." "A momentous business, truly," retorted the other, with a barely perceptible curl of his lip. On the following day (August 3), by the collusion of the two Carrara, who had, of course, been no strangers from the outset to the true nature of the correspondence between the Duke and his gentler lieutenant, and who now felt that their lives were jeopardized, the Allies became masters of Padua; and on the 4th, Alberto de la Scala, accompanied by Nicoletto, his jester,¹ was conducted a prisoner to Venice.²

¹ *Hist. Cortus.* (vii. 5); G. Villani (lib. xi. c. 65).

² *Arch. Stor. Ital.* (xvi. part ii. p. 509); *Vitæ Principum Carrariensium*: Murat. xvi. 156.

This great event, for which the Venetians had been probably prepared to some extent by occasional advices from Rossi and the Carrara, prostrated the power, and destroyed the prestige, of the Scaligers. It was a victory which had the glory of being all but bloodless, an advantage, of which the value in the eyes of the Republic was immeasurable, and which gave her reason neither to blush nor to weep. The capture of the Governor was calculated to carry with it so much moral weight, that the Doge hastened to make it officially known throughout Lombardy; and the letter of Francesco Dandolo, dated the 4th of August, 1337, in which he notified the circumstance to the Commune of Perugia, has been preserved.¹ The fall of Padua was followed by the most important consequences. Brescia and Bergamo returned (October–November) to the Visconti. The King of Bohemia recovered his protectorate over Feltre, Belluno, and Cadore. Monselice yielded to the Carrarese. Vicenza and Montagnano were in the hands of the Venetians. Treviso was threatened, and Verona was hemmed in. One sad incident, however, had checkered the triumph of the Federation.² Before the walls of Monselice the heroic Rossi terminated his brilliant and enviable career, at the age of thirty-six; his fall, which was owing to a lance-wound received during the siege, was universally lamented, and his memory was honoured

¹ *Arch. Stor. Ital.* (*ubi suprâ*), where a copy of the original will be found.

² Muratori, *Ann.* (viii. 200–3).

by a sumptuous funeral, and by the nomination of his brother Orlando to replace him in the chief command of the forces.¹

The spirit of the Duke was entirely broken by these accumulated disasters, and by the rapid disruption of his possessions. In June, 1336, he had been the absolute master of the greater portion of the kingdom of Alboin. In June, 1337, his authority in Verona itself was not unchallenged. His mortification was excessive. His pride and vanity were wounded to the quick. But prudence counselled submission: and he demanded peace. The Republic, personally satisfied by the actual success of the war, although Lucca, which had been guaranteed to Florence, was still to be regained, and considering that there was no utility, and possibly some prejudice, in prolonging its duration, gave her assent to the renewal of the suspended conferences; and Venice, which became the centre of negotiations, soon began to witness the arrival of a flock of diplomatists from Mantua, Florence, Verona, and every other quarter of the Peninsula (January, 1337).² After considerable delay and impediment, consequential upon the natural backwardness of Florence to forego her pretensions to Lucca, peace was signed on the 24th January,³ 1339, on conditions which were dictated for the most part by the Venetians themselves; and its concurrent proclamation throughout Italy on the 14th of the fol-

¹ Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 604); *Istoria di Parma*, Murat. xii. 741; *Hist. Cortus.* (lib. vii. ch. 4).

² *Hist. Cortus.* (lib. vi. ch. 5).

³ De Monacis (lib. xv., Add. MSS. 8574).

lowing month, was generally the signal for rejoicings and festivities. On the piazza of Saint Mark, a splendid tournament was held in honour of the occasion, *Italy carols and is jubilant with delight*.¹

The treaty of January, 1339, was a treaty of partition. Its provisions were almost tantamount to a reconstruction of the map of Lombardy. The Signory reserved to herself Treviso and its dependencies,² and obtained the renewal of her old mercantile charters with Vicenza and Verona. As an equivalent for Lucca, the Florentines³ received Pescia, Buggiano, Colle, and Altopascio, in the same locality. Padua was given to Marsilio da Carrara, but not without a somewhat significant intimation on the part of the Government of Francesco Dandolo, that he was bound to bear in mind how entirely his reinstatement was due to the Venetian arms. To Ubertino da Carrara were ceded Bassano and Castelbaldo. Parma reverted to its prince-bishop. The Rossi were restored to their estates; and Orlando and his brother Andreasso were liberally pensioned. In addition to these redistributive clauses, there were two other noticeable articles. By one, the navigation of the Po was thrown open to all flags at all times, from its mouth to its source. By the other, the Venetian residents in the dominions of La Scala were not only secured for the future in the free enjoyment of their liberty, and in the unmolested pursuit

¹ *Hist. Cortus.* (lib. vii. ch. 1).

² *Ibid.* (lib. vii. ch. 18).

³ *Istorie Pistolesi*, 1300-48 (Murat. ii. 475); *Chronicon Regiense* (Murat. xviii. 52).

of their callings, but were indemnified for their passed losses and sacrifices.¹ Of all his vast domains, Verona and its outskirts alone remained to Mastino.

Such was the first acquisition which the Republic, at a distance of 135 years from the conquest of Constantinople, made on the Italian *Terra Ferma*; and such was the first war in which she had ever leagued herself with the opulent and powerful city of Florence. The conquest was one which might probably become a landmark in her eventful history. The war was one on which the Venetians, as a nation, looked back with unmingled satisfaction. It brought them glory and dominion. Nor did the Florentines on their part reflect without pride on the share which they had borne in the three years' campaign. But the peace of January was a severe disappointment, and a heavy blow to their expectations. They complained with bitterness that, while their Ally was so large a gainer, they had not even reaped the comparatively slender advantages, for the sake of which they were tempted to enter the field, and had involved themselves merely in a debt of 450,000 florins. They complained that the pledge given in 1336, and renewed in 1337, by which Lucca was secured to them, had been perfidiously ignored. They declared that, by a precipitate² pacification, their best interests had been shamefully sacrificed. They protested that the equivalent which

¹ *Hist. Cortus.* (lib. vii. ch. 18). The amount of the compensation was fixed at 10,000 florins.

² G. Villani (lib. xi. c. 90).

they had been forced to accept, was indeed no equivalent. The Venetians were able to rejoin that, as the burden of the war had chiefly devolved on their commune,¹ they conceived themselves entitled to close hostilities so soon as the grand object, with which the sword had been drawn, was effectuated; and that, although Lucca was withheld from Florence at present by political considerations, the latter was not left without a fair indemnity.

Under the new Venetian rule, the municipal Government of Treviso underwent certain organic changes, tending to assimilate its constitution to that of the Republic. At the head of the civil administration was placed a Podesta, at the head of the military staff, a Captain; but these two functions were susceptible of amalgamation. The Podesta was assisted by an executive Council of Forty, and by a legislative Council of Three Hundred; and his authority was circumscribed by a Capitulary embracing a variety of restrictions, many of which partook of a tyrannical and vexatious character. During his year of office he was forbidden to see his wife or any female member of his family, or to receive into his house such of his male relatives as had passed their twelfth year. Other regulations equally stringent were added to the Capitulary, on which he swore prior to his entry into office, and of which he was bound to rehearse the conditions at monthly intervals before the Council of Three Hundred. The civil jurisdiction was divided between two Courts,

¹ De Monacis (lib. xv., Add. MSS. 8574).

of which one took cognizance of all suits above fifty *lire*, the other of all falling below that amount.¹ The first Podesta and Captain of Treviso subsequent to the constitutional changes, who was appointed in July, 1339, was the same who had filled the office of Podesta of Padua in 1337, after the fall of La Scala. His name was Marino Faliero.² Francesco Dandolo did not long outlive the final close of that Peninsular war, of which he had so earnestly opposed the undertaking, and of which he did not stand alone in pronouncing the benefits to be showy rather than substantial. His death took place on the 31st of the following October. The event had been expected from day to day since the beginning of the month.³

Among the correspondence of his contemporary, Marino Sanudo Torsello, the author of "The Secrets of the Faithful of the Cross," and a distinguished traveller, are found two letters, respectively dated, January 18, and February 15, 1329,⁴ and addressed to Ingramo, Archbishop of Capua, in which the accomplishments of Dandolo, then newly elected, as a jurisconsult and legislator are mentioned with applause. Nor was the encomium of Sanudo unmerited. For the amendments and additions which the books of the Statute received at the hands of this prince, were of considerable extent

¹ Sandi (lib. v. c. 13).

² Sanudo (p. 594); Verci (*St. della Marca Trivigiana e Veronese*, xii. 32).

³ Dandolo, *contemp.* (p. 414).

⁴ Sanudi Torselli de Venetiis *Epistolæ*; *Gesta Dei per Francos*, ii. 312-14.

and value ; and in an edition which appeared in 1477, his labours are carefully discriminated from those of earlier and later lawgivers.¹ Sanudo the Historian speaks of the successor of Soranzo as a distinguished man of letters,² and a person of rare culture and erudition ; and it is to be regretted that of his literary tastes no memorial has descended to our time.

Preparatory to the assembly of the Forty-one, a few additions were inserted on the motion of the five Correttori³ in the Ducal Promission. Of these supplementary clauses the most remarkable was that which debarred the Doge henceforth from vacating the throne without the concurrence of the Privy Council and the legislative body. It was a somewhat novel restraint on the Prerogative, which was not proximately referable perhaps to any incident in the late reign, but which was simply designed to operate as a precautionary check on the unconstitutional and mischievous habit which the Chief Magistrate had contracted at an earlier date, of withdrawing at pleasure or on whim from political life into religious seclusion. It may be difficult to imagine any conditions under which a similar practice would not be fraught more or less with inconvenience ; but it is certain that it was more than commonly detrimental where a sudden and unexpected abdication was at all times exceedingly apt

¹ *Statuti et Ordini di Venetia*, 1477, folio.

² *Ibid.* (p. 46). "Era uomo letteratissimo."

³ Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 606) ; Romanin (iii. 141).

to breed popular disorder and foster party distempers. Still, the rule, although it was merely prospective, was unquestionably tyrannical: nor was it more than a specious argument in its favour, that any elect candidate, who accounted the prohibition obnoxious, was at liberty to take the alternative. For the significant conduct of Stefano Giustiniani, so recently as 1311, furnishes tolerably conclusive testimony that refusal on the part of any statesman was, in the absence of peculiar circumstances or the weightiest reasons, practically out of the question, unless the recusant was prepared to follow the example of Giustiniani by sacrificing his worldly prospects, and by dedicating the remainder of his life to heaven.

Summoned to make choice of Dandolo's successor, the Electoral College became divided between two candidates, Bartolomeo Gradenigo, Procurator of Saint Mark *di Citra*, and a veteran of seventy-seven, and Andrea Dandolo, Procurator of Saint Mark *di Sôra*, both of whom happened to be among the Forty-one. The latter, who was the son of Fantino Dandolo of San Luca, and who reckoned in the number of his ancestors the conqueror of Constantinople, was a young man of precocious erudition and accomplishments. He was one of the earliest Venetian scholars, who had aspired to academical honours in the University of Padua; and after prosecuting his studies with rare assiduity under Ricardo Malombra, the first legist of the age, he had graduated as Doctor of Laws.¹ Although the

¹ Sanudo (609, 627).

office of Procurator di Sôra, which he had filled since 1331,¹ placed him already so near the steps of the throne, he was at present only in his thirtieth year.² The suffrages of the college were equally balanced for some time ; and it was Dandolo himself who at length turned the scale in favour of his competitor by refusing the berretta.³ All the forms of the Constitution were scrupulously satisfied ; and the accession of the octogenarian Gradenigo was proclaimed on the 7th November, 1339.⁴

A few months subsequent to the installation of a new Doge, a tidal phenomenon manifested itself in the Adriatic, which involved the Venetian Islands in a serious inundation. On the night of the 15th of February, 1340, the level of the sea rose two feet above the ordinary high-water mark ; and a large portion of the Dogado was consequently submerged. The amount of damage which was sustained on this occasion was in all probability very considerable ; and from the hour at which the event occurred it was peculiarly terrifying. The popular mind long clung to the favourite delusion that the tempest and the accompanying flood were the work of bad spirits, which were plotting the destruction of Venice the Beautiful, and that it was by the opportune interposition of the saints alone that the dire calamity was warded off. A solitary weather-beaten mariner (so runs the legend), standing on the Piazza amid the wind and rain,

¹ Sansovino (*Cronico Veneto*, p. 57).

³ Romanin (iii. 146).

² Caresinus (fol. 418).

⁴ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 415).

suddenly becomes conscious of the approach of a venerable figure, who says to him in clear and authoritative accents, "I am Saint Mark the Evangelist; ferry me over to San Giorgio!" The man, though at first rooted to the ground by fear, is ultimately awed into compliance; and on their arrival at the specified point, there issues from the portal of the Church a second personage of robust aspect, who is in due course announced to be no other than Saint George himself. From San Giorgio the three proceed at the desire of the Evangelist to Lido, where they are presently joined by Saint Nicholas. The ferryman, who has now begun to rally from his fright, and to feel a little confidence in his fares, obeys without demur the injunction of the Patron-Saint to row onward. The boat, gliding over the crested and foaming waves, shoots into the middle of a cohort of demons, the putative conjurors of the storm; and after a preliminary exorcism, the spirits are signally put to the rout. Hereupon, Saint Mark, presenting a ring to the proprietor of the gondola, addresses him thus: "Take this ring to my Procurators; and they, recognising the symbol, will recompense thee with five ducats!" The gondolier, stupefied by the bewildering spectacle of which he has been the sole eye-witness, and dazzled by the prospect of so large a reward, collects himself only in time to perceive that his passengers have vanished.¹ Such is a story which retained a lengthened hold upon the credulity of the multitude, and upon which a

¹ Dandolo, contemp. (fol. 415-16), *et alia*.

sagacious government was so far from willing to cast discredit, that a festival was instituted forthwith, commemorative of the salvation of the Republic by her trusty champions, Saint Mark, Saint Nicholas, and Saint George. No country has been without its peculiar creed, either indigenous or transfused, in preternatural agencies, or without its peculiar system of witchcraft and demonology. Nomad nations have been seen entertaining superstitions of spirits who dried up the fountain of the desert, and who spread the murrain among their cattle; agricultural nations, believing in fiends or imps who blighted their crops, and sent them drought when they prayed for rain; warrior nations, again, putting faith in such as were imagined to ride the blinding whirlwind and to wither, in the hour of battle, the arm of the soldier; and we may naturally expect to trace in the early legendary lore of Venice belief in a class of Malignant Influences, harmonizing with the genius of a maritime people. These monkish fables and old wives' tales served perhaps, at an epoch when polite learning was confined to a few, and when popular education was undreamed of, to lend attractions to the domestic hearth, and helped to diversify the monotony of the long summer evenings.

The relations between Venice and England had experienced no interruption since 1323; and the commercial intercourse of the Signory with London and other ports preserved in the interval so even a tenor, that during many years England ceased to

occupy any place in the foreign correspondence of the Venetian government. It was not till 1340 that diplomacy resumed its suspended functions. In that year, Edward III., desirous of prosecuting with vigour his war against France, prayed the Doge and the Signory to lend him their co-operation by organizing at his cost a squadron of forty galleys, which might harass the maritime frontier of the enemy. He granted them full leave to name their own terms; and he pledged himself to discharge the debt within the twelvemonth in "gold, silver, and merchandise." He desired that, if they were disinclined on any account to enter into the scheme, they would at least endeavour to prevail on Genoa to embrace his propositions. In the mean time, he guaranteed to Venice important additions to the commercial privileges which she already enjoyed in the ports of his dominions; and in conclusion, he begged his Serenity to send two, or at any rate one, of his sons to London, where they might be assured of a suitable reception and of a cordial welcome.

The reply to this despatch was somewhat categorical and slightly evasive. After lamenting the breach between England and France, the Doge proceeded to represent that his country had no motive whatever for launching into hostilities against the latter Power; that the growing necessity of checking Turkish preponderance and aggrandizement was occupying the closest attention of the Venetian Government, and threatened at no distant period to engross its resources, and that

the Signory was consequently precluded, to its regret, from affording his Highness the assistance which he sought. Gradenigo continued, that he did not feel himself at liberty to communicate, as an alternative, with the Genoese; that the exemptions which his Highness was pleased to accord were assuredly most acceptable; and finally, that by the courteous expressions which the King had employed touching his sons, he was indeed singularly flattered. With what degree of grace and composure the choleric Plantagenet endured this rebuff, is matter of conjecture only; but it is probable that he decided on the whole upon allowing the charter, dated the 27th April, 1340, by which he had hoped to secure the active cohesion of the Republic, to remain as a tacit pledge of Venetian neutrality.¹ Every one knows that the kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland is the most prosperous and powerful of empires, and that Venetia, under the most degrading of yokes, has become the most degraded of provinces. But every one may not be aware that time was, in the fourteenth century, when the one was a third-rate Power, and the other among the greatest of European nationalities; when Venice was more to England than England to Venice; and when the Venetians looked upon their fellow-Islanders as a people whose products and manufactures rendered their friendship highly valuable, but not more valuable than the friendship of Bruges or the friendship of Marseilles.

¹ Romanin (iii. 142-3)

With the exception of the renewal of an expiring treaty with the Byzantine Court,¹ the forcible repression of a fresh revolt of the Calergi in Candia after some bloodshed and many executions,² and the quelling of certain domestic disturbances which had arisen in Poveja and elsewhere,³ no other event of consequence or note happened during the brief continuance of Gradenigo in power; and the throne was once more vacated by the death of that prince on the 28th December, 1342.⁴ A scarcity, which was experienced at Venice shortly before his decease, had impaired his popularity, and the Doge had brought himself into some odium among the patricians by the pertinacious nepotism which he displayed in thrusting his sons, to whom the invitation to London had been given in 1340, into posts of emolument.⁵ It is to the period during which Gradenigo remained in office that the institution belongs of the Foundling Hospital, as well as the embellishment of the capital with the beautiful church of the *Servi* and other picturesque buildings, in continuation of the grand scheme of metropolitan improvement which had already found so warm a patron in the Doge Soranzo.

¹ Sanudo (607); Romanin (iii. 143).

² Dandolo, contemp. (fol. 415); Sanudo (607); *Hist. Cortus.* (lib. viii. 908); Marin (vi. 46).

³ Dandolo, contemp., *ubi suprâ*.

⁴ Sansovino (xiii. 569).

⁵ Pietro Giustiniani, *Cronica*, p. 96 (King's MSS. 148); Sanudo (fol. 607, 609). The consequence was that, at the demise of Gradenigo, a clause, declaratory of the law of 1275 in this respect, was inserted in the Promission.

CHAPTER XVIII.

A.D. 1343—1355.

Andrea Dandolo, Doge (1343)—His Antecedents—Renewal of the Ottoman War—Fall of Smyrna (1344)—Dissolution of the Triple Alliance—Fresh Troubles in Dalmatia (1345)—Defeat of the Hungarians by Marino Faliero at Zara (July, 1346)—Submission of the Zaratines—Dissensions between Venice and Genoa in the Crimea (1342-3-4)—The two Republics make common cause against the Native Powers (1345)—Fresh Dissensions—Earthquake and Famine at Venice (1348)—Frightful Visitation of the Plague (*ibid.*)—Suppression of a Revolt at Capo d'Istria (*ibid.*)—Peace with Hungary (1348-56)—New War with Genoa (1350)—Capture of Genoese Prizes off Negropont—Extension of the War—Alliance between Venice, Arragon, and Greece—Desultory Character of the Campaigns of 1351 and 1352—Battle of the Dardanelles (February 13-14, 1353)—Equivocal Triumph of the Genoese—Battle of Lojera (August 29)—Total Defeat of the Genoese—Genoa accepts the Protection of the Duke of Milan (October, 1353)—Visconti employs Petrarch as his Envoy to the Doge—Character of Petrarch—His want of success—His Letter to the Doge (May 8, 1354)—The Reply—Renewal of Hostilities—Ravages of the Genoese in the Gulf—Precautionary Measures at Venice—Andrea Dandolo dies of a broken Heart (Sept. 7, 1354)—His literary and legal Acquirements—His Funeral—Dandolo is succeeded by Marino Faliero, Ambassador at Avignon (Sept. 11, 1354)—Entry of the new Doge into the Capital (October 5)—Continuation of the Genoese War—Battle of Portolongo (Nov. 4)—The Venetian Fleet, taken at a disadvantage, is totally defeated—Punishment of the Captain-General Pisani and his Lieutenant—Firmness of the Republic—Conclusion of an Armistice (January 8, 1355)—General Aspect of Foreign Affairs—Conspiracy of Marino Faliero (April 4)—Its fortuitous Revelation (April 14)—Execution of the Accomplices of the Doge (April 15)—And of the Doge himself (April 17, 1355).

ON Saturday, the 4th January, 1343,¹ Andrea Dandolo, in his thirty-third year,² was elevated to the Venetian

¹ Caresinus, *contemp.* (417); P. Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 61 (King's MSS. 149); Caroldo, *Historia* (King's MSS. 147).

² Caresinus, *ubi suprâ*; Marin (vi. 47).

throne by the unanimous suffrage of the College of Electors. In the person of the new Doge, flattering homage was paid to literature and learning. Dandolo was born in the year of the Quirini-Tiepolo conspiracy; he was one of the sons of the Senator Fantino Dandolo of San Luca. Carefully nurtured and educated, he was sent in due course to the University of Padua where, under the jurisconsult Riccardo Malombra and other preceptors, he gradually became proficient in every branch of polite and liberal knowledge. With the Venetian law he acquired peculiar conversance; he learned to write Latin with elegance, and to speak it with fluency; and he could boast of being able to read a few favourite French authors in the original.¹ Nor was he more remarkable for his versatile and multifarious attainments as a scholar than for his administrative ability and his extensive political information. Under the patronizing indulgence, perhaps, of his distant kinsman, the then reigning Doge Francesco Dandolo, he soon rose to the highest offices and was intrusted with the most responsible functions; and in 1331, at a period of life when most of his friends were still at college, he became Procurator of Saint Mark *di Sora*,² and the second citizen of the Republic. There were, indeed, few fields of inquiry which this admirable person had left untraversed, and few points of mental culture which he had neglected. With the lawyers he could solve problems in jurisprudence. With the philosophers he discussed

¹ Foscarini (*Lett. Venez.* 134, n. 1-2).² Romanin (iii. 146).

ethics and perpetual motion. With foreigners of distinction he corresponded on the current literary topics of the day—the rendering of a passage in Homer, the character of Cicero, or the discovery of a manuscript of Quintilian. In the presence of politicians, the prospect of a breach with Genoa or the Visconti, the growth of the Turkish power, or the proceedings of the late Committee of Metropolitan Improvement, were themes on which he could expatiate without constraint or embarrassment. But if there was any subject which he found more congenial than another, it was the institutions and antiquities of his native country. With an assiduity which is easily understood, he pored over the pages of writers of the dry and discursive school of Zeno and Sagorninus; and while the bulk of his time was still engrossed by graver studies and by public avocations, the pupil of Malombra applied himself in his leisure hours to the compilation of the Venetian Annals, in a narrative fully as dry and discursive as its prototypes, but which in point of precision and accuracy has deservedly placed its author in the first rank of medieval historians. The urbane manners of Dandolo, his affable disposition, his polished breeding, and his austere morality, were proverbial. He was popularly known by the epithets of *Courtesy*, and the *Count of Virtue*.¹ In person he is said to have been tall and handsome, and of a noble and prepossessing mien; and an idle tale seems to have gained currency that Isabella da Fieschi, the wife of the Lord of Milan,

¹ Sanudo (*Vite*, 609); Romanin (iii. 146).

on her recent visit to Venice, was captivated by the manly graces of the Procurator, and became enamoured of the Count of Virtue. But there is not the slightest proof or probability that Dandolo, who was already a husband and the father of three children, returned the passion, if the passion existed at all.

Such was the man who was nominated by the Conclave of Forty-one, in the first week of January, 1343, in the room of Gradenigo.

The operations of the Coalition, which had been organized so far back as 1332 between the Signory, the Pope, the King of Jerusalem and Cyprus, and the Knights Hospitallers, against the Ottoman Power, had been hitherto excessively languid and intermittent; but they now experienced a fresh stimulus.¹ The command of the naval forces of Venice remained in the nervous hands of Pietro Zeno;² that of the Pontifical levies was (1345) intrusted to Huberto Dolfino of Vienna;³ and an invaluable advantage was shortly reaped in the reduction of Smyrna (October, 1344), of which Umurbeg, Prince of Aden, the Chief of the Turks, had too tardily advanced to the relief. The destruction of the shipping and arsenal was successfully accomplished; but the exploit cost the life of the Venetian commander. The fall of the General was deeply and universally lamented. For his abilities were of the first order, and the services which he had

¹ Caresinus, contemp. (417-18-19); *Arch. Stor. Ital.* (vii. 360); Romanin (iii. 147-8).

² *Historia Cortusiorum* (lib. viii. ch. 16).

Ibid. and Romanin, *ubi suprâ*.

rendered were of the most important and meritorious kind. But he died not without bequeathing to the Republic a priceless legacy in a son named Carlo, who was destined to become an ornament to mankind, the glory of his country, and one of the greatest of Venetians.

The League was once more dissolved :¹ for the attention and resources of its members were already beginning to find more immediate and pressing occupation elsewhere. But, considering the prospective assignment to them of the ecclesiastical tenths falling due to the Pontiff within the next three years, the Venetians independently consented to close the seas during that period against the new enemy, and to resist any attempt on the part of Umurbeg to restore his shattered Navy.

The motive, which had proximately influenced the Signory itself in desisting so abruptly from the active prosecution of the Ottoman war, was the outbreak of a fresh Zaratine revolt.² As a check upon the disaffected spirit which it so repeatedly manifested, Zara had been from time to time shorn of many of its municipal privileges ; and at last, instead of a Podesta elected by itself annually, it was forced to accept the nominee of the Republic, whose authority was equally arbitrary

¹ On the books of the Pregadi, under date of November 10, 1346, appears an order for giving Dolfino of Vienna a present of 1,000 ducats.— See Sanudo (*Vite*, 778).

² Among the *Monumenti Veneziani di varia Letteratura*, 1796, edited by Morelli, is an account of this revolt from the pen of a contemporary. It is entitled: "*Istoria dell' Assedio e della Ricupera di Zara, fatta dai Veneziani nell' anno 1346, scritta da autore contemporaneo.*"

in its extent and duration. Armed with these grievances, and reliant on the promised succour and protection of Louis of Hungary, the fief foreswore its allegiance in May, 1346, and expelled its Governor Marco Cornaro and all the Venetian residents. This movement had not been without its premonitory symptoms; and the dispositions of the Signory were completed with corresponding promptitude. In the early part of June, forty galleys under Pietro da Canale, and a land force under Marino Faliero, assisted by two civil Proveditors, Simone Dandolo, the Doge's younger brother, and Andreazzo Morosini, were in presence of the rebellious dependency; on the first of the following month, a pitched battle was fought at Luca, eight miles from Zara, between the Venetians commanded by Faliero, and the Hungarians upward of 40,000 strong, in which the latter were totally defeated, with a loss in killed and wounded of between 7,000 and 8,000 :¹ while Da Canale burst the chain which spanned the entrance to the harbour; and, after repeated attempts to reduce them to submission which were only rendered abortive by the colossal height and strength of the ramparts, the besieged succumbed to the pressure of want in the month of November.² The threatening posture of the King operated, perhaps, as an inducement to grant milder terms to the Zaratines than they might otherwise have obtained. Their lives were guaranteed; their

¹ *Assedio di Zara* (Morelli, *Monumenti*, 1796). "The Venetians," says the writer, "fought not like men, but like lions."

² Caroldo, *Historia di Venetia*, pp. 347-50 (King's MSS. 147).

personal liberties were untouched. But they were compelled to dismantle their walls; to acknowledge that they had belonged from time immemorial to Venice, and that, if they had at any period formed alliances elsewhere, such alliances, being in contravention of their engagements, were unlawful, unconstitutional, and void; to implore the grace of the Doge, to promise to submit wholly and exclusively hereafter to his jurisdiction, and to provide permanent quarters for 400 Venetian foot and 200 cavalry. On this sensible basis, peace was signed on the 15th December in the same year; and Marco Giustiniani was sent out as Podesta and Captain.¹ It may appear singular that it was not till nearly 300 years after the original sedition of 1050, at the close of a war which is said by Sanudo to have cost 3,000,000 ducats, that the government of Andrea Dandolo resorted to the somewhat obvious expedient of overawing disaffection by planting at Zara an efficient military establishment in the Venetian pay.

Many years before the defection of Zara in 1346, affairs in the Crimea² had begun to wear an aspect which threatened alternately to embroil the Republic with the local authorities and with her Genoese rival. It was impossible that the immense advantages, which the antient Chersonesus presented as an entrepôt for the commerce of Europe and Asia, should long escape the notice of Venice. So far back as the age of the second Orseolo, a sort of connexion subsisted between the two countries; at some

¹ *Assedio di Zara*, contemp. 5.

² Marin (vi. 59-60).

period anterior to 1287, a consulate was established on that coast; from time to time, the islanders procured from the minor Crimean potentates additional immunities; and at length in 1333 a treaty was concluded on highly advantageous terms between the Signory and the Grand Khan of Tartary.

But the monopoly of the Black Sea trade was not retained long in the Venetian grasp; Genoa soon obtained a participation in a commerce, of which the benefits were so covetable.¹ From this source sprang a keen and chafing competition; and the international jealousy wrought itself to such a height that the two Powers found it necessary in 1342 to save themselves from drifting into war by arriving at an understanding, by which the rights of their respective subjects in the Crimea were defined with greater accuracy.

During some time subsequent to this accommodation, the face of affairs underwent slight visible change; and the year in which Dandolo came to the throne, witnessed merely a new compact with Zanibek, one of the minor princes, by which the Venetians themselves acquired a separate quarter, and were relieved from certain civil disabilities, under which they had previously laboured. But an unexpected complication was forthcoming. In the early part of 1344, the capricious Tartar took umbrage at some proceeding on the part of the two factories; and a horrible massacre, in which numerous Genoese and Venetian lives were sacrificed, was the consequence.²

¹ Romanin (iii. 151).

² Pugliola (421).

Upon receiving a report of this atrocity, the Genoese Government expressed itself in favour of an immediate appeal to arms; and the Doge, Simone Boccanegra, communicated to this purport with Andrea Dandolo. In deference to the views of the Signory, however, it was determined to frame a joint remonstrance to Zanibek; upon the neglect of the latter to redress their wrongs, they resorted to the Grand Khan himself; and when that expedient had also failed, they concurred, on the 22nd July, 1345, in a resolution to coerce the barbarians by breaking off for a twelvemonth their commercial relations with the Crimea. As some equivalent for Tana (Azoph) and the Chersonesan depôt at Soldaia, the Government of Boccanegra offered to the Signory in a generous impulse a provisional quarter and consulate at Caffa; where the two nations, knit together by a common grievance, continued during some time to transact their commerce on a footing of equality. But the rupture with Zanibek soon brought forth its natural fruits in the exercise of smuggling and contraband upon a largely extended scale; a course of bickering and recrimination followed; the two Western Powers mutually inveighed against the infraction of treaties: and Zanibek¹ had reason to complain of privateering practices on both sides, while he bewailed the loss of his three per cent.,² and the impoverishment of his treasury. The final issue of the affair was that, in June, 1347, the Signory having

¹ Romanin (iii. 153).

² The import duty charged at Soldaia was to that amount.—Marin (vi. 73).

arranged the Zaratine difficulty in the preceding December in a manner which promised to postpone at least a collision with Hungary, and having acquitted herself of her obligations to the Treaty of July, 1345, ventured to put a term to the scandalous mockery, which lay in the almost systematic evasion of the customs at Tana and Soldaia, by returning to an amicable understanding with Zanibek. At the adoption of such a course Boccanegra and his countrymen might have had no valid reason to cavil, if they had been simply consulted; it was easily explained by the rational anxiety of the other contracting party to substitute a legitimate for a stolen intercourse with the Crimea. But the complaint was that the arrangement was entirely surreptitious and deceitful, and this circumstance, added to pre-existing sources of irritation, prepared the way for a fresh breach at no distant date between the two Powers.¹

But at present the Venetians were too completely absorbed by domestic troubles to pay much attention to foreign affairs. On the night of the 25th January, 1348,² the anniversary of the Conversion of Saint Paul, a shock of earthquake was sensibly felt throughout the Dogado. On the following day the vibratory tremor returned; and the shocks were repeated at intervals during a fortnight, raising the popular consternation to a high pitch, and occasioning great

¹ M. Villani (lib. i. c. 83).

² Caresinus, contemp. (419); De Monacis (lib. xvi. Add. MSS. 8574); P. Dolfino, *Annali Veneti*, p. 62 (King's MSS. 149).

damage. Several tidal and other phenomena were observed. Wonderful, thrilling tales of hair's-breadth escapes or terrible deaths were soon current. A few, perhaps, were fabricated for the nonce. But all were greedily believed. At one moment all the church bells in Venice rang spontaneously. At another, the principal streets and thoroughfares were laid under water, while the bed of the Grand Canal was left dry. "The Venetians," says Sanudo, "continued all this time in an extreme state of trepidation: for they knew not how the earthquake came; and it was agreed to christen the day on which the trembling commenced, *Il Giorno di San Polo de' Tremuoti*." ¹

In the wake of the earthquake of January and its accompanying scarcity,² followed a still more frightful scourge. In the ensuing March, a pestilence, which the Genoese³ had brought with them from the shores of the Black Sea, and which subsequently desolated entire Europe, smote the islands with a deadly and paralysing hand. The efforts of the Government to prevent contagion, or to mitigate the severity of the evil by the timely establishment (March 30) of a *Committee of Health*,⁴ and by summoning the best medical aid which could be procured from the Terra-Ferma, were, in the absence of any quarantine, completely abortive. The

¹ Sanudo (fol. 614).

² Sanudo (fol. 778). It appears that this evil had been felt more or less since 1344; for under the date of August 12, a premium is offered by the Pregadi for corn.

³ *Istoria di Parma* (Murat. xii. 746).

⁴ Romanin (iii. 155).

mortality assumed terrific proportions. All commercial activity was suspended; all the counters were closed; all the popular amusements were abandoned. The City of Palaces was transformed into the City of Tombs. Everywhere a death-like stillness and a sepulchral gloom presented themselves. Pontoons, hung in black, traversed the canals, to the cry of "*Dead bodies! dead bodies!*" and every house was obliged, under heavy penalties, to bring out its dead. So incalculable was the number of corpses, that several boatloads were interred without the administration of the sacrament, or even without being identified by their kindred.¹ The most harrowing and heart-breaking scenes were of common occurrence. Anguish and despair were portrayed on every countenance. Orphans and widows were seen frantically wringing their hands. Parents and children were seen clinging convulsively to each other, refusing to part for an instant, lest it should be for ever. Nor was it unusual to observe mendicants crouching in doorways, or at the corners of streets, alternately begging alms in piteous accents, and delivering jeremiads over the dead bodies of supposititious relatives. In the course of the six or seven months during which the epidemic raged, two-fifths of the population of the Dogado perished; and no fewer than fifty patrician stems became extinct.² The benches of the Great Council were all but deserted; many of the members were dead; others absented themselves from dread of

¹ Sanudo (*Vite*, 615); *Hist. Cortus.* (lib. ix. ch. 14).

² Mutinelli (*Annali*, 160).

infection. The ranks of the Quarantia were thinned to such an extent that an extraordinary election was found necessary to supply the vacant seats, before a quorum of thirty could be constituted. Such a painfully peculiar emergency naturally superseded every ordinary political maxim and constitutional restraint; on the 11th June, all persons confined for debt and other civil offences were unconditionally liberated,¹ and when the mortality had subsided, the term of residence requisite to confer naturalization was reduced from ten to two years.²

The year of the plague was marked nevertheless by the vigorous suppression of a revolt at Capo d'Istria, which had too rashly counted on the internal prostration of the Republic, and by the accomplishment of an important feat of diplomacy in the conclusion of peace for eight years with Louis of Hungary (1348-56). In this affair the Venetian Government itself had taken the initiative in February, and the Ducal Ambassadors were even instructed to offer the King, who was then at Naples, the sum of 100,000 ducats, on condition that he should renounce unreservedly, and for ever, all pretension to Dalmatia in favour of the Signory. But Louis, who still chafed at the defeat of his troops at Luca by Faliero, a few years before, superciliously declined to receive the legation; and the conse-

¹ Romanin (iii. 156).

² "Nel 1348, a 27 di Giugno fu posta parte che atteso il gran numero di nobili morti, e che il Gran Consiglio non si potea assembrare, sia preso che tutti gli scritti alla Quarantia per venire al Consiglio, possano senz' altro venire al Gran Consiglio; e fu preso di 'No.'—*Sanudo* (fol. 778).

quence was, that shortly afterward (July), when his Italian projects against Joan of Naples had begun to demand his undivided attention, and the necessity became manifest of maintaining a communication with the Adriatic through Dalmatia, he found himself obliged to make overtures, instead of responding to them, and to accept, under less dignified circumstances, less desirable terms. The convention was signed at Venice on the 5th of August by the syndics of Dandolo on the one part, and by the Hungarian envoys on the other;¹ and the ratifications were exchanged in the course of the following month (September, 1348). An uncommonly weighty motive, which had already influenced the Ducal Government in accelerating from its vantage-ground the pace of negotiations, induced Dandolo and his advisers to welcome with peculiar pleasure the treaty of August.

It was impossible, indeed, to conceive anything more opportune. For at a moment when the Genoese troubles, which had so long been foreshadowed, were manifestly hastening to a climax, this arrangement left the Republic at full liberty to fix her attention, and when it became necessary, to concentrate her resources, upon the threatening points. The mutual irritation was already intense. The Genoese, on the one hand, vehemently inveighed against Venetian double-dealing in the flagrant infraction of the treaty of 1345, and against the invasion of their commercial rights in Trebizond by the Republic. The latter com-

¹ Romanin (iii. 158).

plained with at least equal fairness of the injuries sustained by her subjects in Cyprus, of the unjust seizure of certain Venetian vessels at Caffa on a frivolous pretence, and of the similarly nefarious detention of others at Pera on the impudent plea of unpaid arrears of customs, to which the Genoese authorities falsely stated themselves to be entitled. Exclusively of these leading circumstances, there were minor grievances without number. With these wounds, which remained unclosed and festering, the two Republics appeared to be desirous of goading each other to phrenzy ; and both were destined soon to taste the acrid fruit of their short-sighted folly.

Two years before the plague of 1348, Faliero, who had greatly distinguished himself at the siege of Zara, was charged by the Doge with the delicate task of signifying to the Government of Genoa the nature of the claims which the Republic was prepared to advance for damages inflicted on her subjects in Cyprus and elsewhere. The mission of Faliero,¹ though not entirely barren of results, was by no means entirely successful, and a moody and somewhat lengthened silence ensued. Among other agencies which contributed to interrupt the active prosecution of the question, the heavy and calamitous floods of January, 1348, and the subsequent epidemic were of course foremost ; and it was not until the beginning of 1349 that the suspended correspondence between the two Powers was resumed. In the January or February

¹ Pietro Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 63 (King's MSS. 149).

of that year Giovanni da Murta, Doge of Genoa, wrote to the Doge of Venice suggesting a joint crusade against the Turks; in this letter no allusion whatever was made to the embassy of 1346; and the proposition being treated as an impertinence, was set aside with significant coldness. The identical measure which Da Murta and his advisers designed to postpone the crisis, hastened such a result; and the Signory, plainly perceiving that Genoa was trifling with her interests, and was endeavouring to evade her demands, resolved to hazard the reference of the dispute to a more summary arbitrement.

On the 6th August, 1350, accordingly, a new public credit was taken, and a committee of six sages was named to superintend the assessment of householders and the collection of the loan, which was negotiated at two per cent.¹ The preparation of a squadron of nine-and-twenty sail was at the same time rapidly progressing; the command was given to Marco Ruzzini;² and a reserve of six picked galleys, under the orders of Marco Morosini, was furnished with instructions to follow in the wake of the admiral, and to be in readiness to support him at the shortest notice. Ruzzini proceeded so far as Negropont, where he discovered a rich Genoese caravan of fourteen vessels, under the conduct of Nicolo de Magnere, bound for Caffa,³ on the point of putting out to sea. The

¹ Gallicciolli, *Memorie* (lib. i. c. 13).

² De Monacis, *contemp.*, lib. xii. (Add. MSS. 8574).

³ M. Villani (lib. i. c. 84).

proximate object of the present expedition to the Mediterranean was to retaliate upon the enemy for the fiscal exactions at Pera; and an admirable opportunity of chastising the more immediate offenders was now offered therefore to the Venetian commander. The latter at once ranged his forces in a line within a short distance from the roads, and thus cooped up his adversary in a position where he was obliged to give battle under great disadvantage. The combat which ensued was terrific but indecisive; and Magnere, considering that the final chances were against him, determined to stake the fortune of the day on an exquisitely daring manœuvre. Spreading every canvas, and calling all hands to the oars, the Genoese officer attempted by holding his course between the reefy shore and the Venetian line to gain the open sea. By this feat of desperate hardihood he partially effected his object; after a sharp struggle, his own and three other ships extricated themselves. But of the remainder, with the exception of a few which were thrown away on the rocks, all were made prizes. The booty was enormous; all discipline and subordination were at an end; and while Magnere was distancing Negropont, Marco Morosini and the other Venetian captains were absorbed in transferring the captured treasures to their own bottoms. Ruzzini, who had made several ineffectual attempts to induce his subalterns to restrain for the present their cupidity, and to engage in the pursuit of the fugitives, soon found it quite a hopeless task to overtake Magnere; and

he vented his spleen and chagrin by ordering all the plundered argosies to be set on fire.¹ The season was now too far advanced to admit the possibility of ulterior operations; and the disappointed admiral having handed over his prisoners to the Governor of Negropont, Tommaso Viaro,² set out on his return. But the last vessel of his squadron had no sooner disappeared below the horizon, than Magnere, having meanwhile received some reinforcements, retraced his steps, rescued all the prisoners at Negropont (October 24, 1350), and having bitterly resented the pillage and destruction of his convoy, quitted the island in triumph with an ample spoil and numerous trophies.³ Thus ended the campaign of 1350. On their arrival at Venice, Morosini and the other captains who were accused by their superior officer of having disobeyed orders, and having been instrumental in the escape of Magnere, were prosecuted and severely punished. Viaro, who was suspected of having been guilty of negligence in suffering the Genoese to surprise Negropont, was, upon his recal from office, similarly cited before the Court and impeached of a high misdemeanor. But the evidence adduced at the trial abundantly proved that the ex-governor, so far from being fairly chargeable with a dereliction of duty on that occasion, had exhibited in the face of danger exemplary judgment and intrepidity; and Viaro obtained his acquittal.⁴

¹ Caresinus, contemp. (420).

² Ibid. (fol. 420-1).

³ M. Villani (lib. i. c. 85).

⁴ Marin (vi. 94-5); Romanin (iii. 160).

The Republic, bent upon drawing the sword, now proceeded to contract alliances with Peter, King of Arragon,¹ and Johannes Cantacuzenos, Emperor of Constantinople, by the terms of which both those potentates engaged to furnish contingents; the War Department was reconstituted; the taxes on oil, wine, salt, and other commodities were augmented by one-third; and in spite of the remonstrances of the Holy See, which fervently desired a continuation of the crusade against the Turks, the Venetian relations with Genoa were definitively broken off. By the former Government letters of marque were issued on a scale, which would have struck even a Schiavo with astonishment, and might have silenced the detractors of Pietro Gradenigo; and a squadron of fifty-five sail, under Nicolo Pisani of San Fantino,² kept the sea. The enemy on their part were in somewhat superior force, under Paganino Doria. But the admirals strangely enough never confronted each other; and the campaigns of 1351 and 1352 dwindled into a series of piratical excursions, which reflected discredit on both the belligerents. The only noticeable advantage obtained on either side consisted of a successful attack, made by the Geonese in the autumn of 1351, on Negropont, which they contrived to hold from the middle of August till the middle of October, when they found themselves constrained to relinquish the posses-

¹ M. Villani (lib. ii. c. 27).

² *Memorie che possono servire alla Vita di V. Pisani, Nobile Veneto; Venezia, 1767, 8°.* Morelli (*Mon. Ven. di Varia Letteratura*, xv., 1796) calls the author "a most distinguished senator," but does not name him.

sion. This desultory and undignified species of operations, which exhibited fully as broad a departure from the canons of legitimate warfare as the reprobated practices of the pirates of Barbary or the sea-robbers of Narenta, was not without its feature of thrilling dramatic episode. There was a conjuncture, while both Republics were maintaining powerful armaments afloat, when both were by a singular fatality left entirely at the mercy of each other. Pisani, on the one hand, having missed Doria, of whom he was then in search, held his course along the Mediterranean, entered the Riviera, and committed terrible devastations on the enemy under their very eyes. But the admiral, apprehensive lest his adversary, of whose position he was ignorant, should surprise him and intercept his retreat, reluctantly refrained from attacking the city itself, and hastened to regain the open sea. Doria, in the meantime, not finding Pisani, ascended the Adriatic, and advanced without the slightest symptom of opposition so far as Parenzo on the Dalmatian coast, which he ruthlessly sacked and burned.¹ The reported proximity of the Genoese threw the population of Venice into the utmost trepidation. The city was shorn of its defenders. To the actual movements of the fleet there was no clue. The stand, which the Signory might be able to make against the invaders under present auspices, was exceedingly feeble. Such a contingency was totally unforeseen. All that the government could do was to prepare for the worst and

¹ M. Villani (lib. ii. c. 25).

to plant scouts at every commanding point, who might give immediate notice when they descried an enemy's sail in the offing. But these apprehensions proved themselves chimerical: for Doria, under the belief that Pisani was upon his track, thought it prudent to content himself with his meagre achievements at Parenzo, and bore off, to the inexpressible relief of the Venetians, in the direction of the Mediterranean. During the greater part of two years, these distinguished men¹ appeared to hold in the balance the destinies of their respective countries. But greater events were impending.

The ratifications of the triple convention against Genoa, between the Venetians, the Catalans, and the Greeks, had been already exchanged; and the footing on which that alliance stood furnished an excellent guarantee for its durability. The King of Arragon, on his part, was animated by the hope of making the coalition a vehicle for carrying out his project for wresting Corsica and Sardinia from the common enemy, while the Emperor of Constantinople was burning to resent the insults which the Genoese colonists of Pera had heaped upon his crown, and to shake off the incubus of Genoese terrorism.² The contingents, which each member of the League was bound respectively to provide, had been definitively fixed; Venice engaged to supply thirty-seven men-of-war, Arragon thirty, Cantacuzenos, eight or ten; and the spring of 1353 had

¹ Pietro Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 62 (King's MSS. 149).

² Lebeau (xx. 300-1).

barely set in, when the belligerents recommenced operations on a wider scale. In the new campaign, the charge of the Venetian fleet remained in the hands of Pisani; the Catalans were under the conduct of Pon-zio da Santa Paz. The former having quitted its winter quarters at Canea,¹ and having been joined in the Mediterranean by Santa Paz, the united armament made sail for Constantinople. It traversed the Grecian Archipelago, and passed unopposed through the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora; close under the Asiatic shore it descried the Genoese squadron of sixty-four galleys, commanded by Paganino Doria; but the latter, deterred by the force and rapidity with which the current was running through the straits, was unable to offer any resistance, and the Allies triumphantly entered the Chrysoceras,² where they joined the Greek contingent, consisting of eight galleys³ and a large number of small craft.

It was the afternoon of Monday, the 13th February.⁴ The daylight was ebbing perceptibly. Within a few hours nightfall was certain. The weather was lowering and squally; the wind, which had momentarily subsided, was again blowing almost a hurricane from the south; the waves were lashed by the gusts into foam; and at the present season of the year, there were tidal causes which materially added to the difficulties of a naturally intricate navigation. On these grounds it appeared to Pisani, that it was expedient to postpone any engage-

¹ Lebeau (xx. 311).

³ Villani, *ubi suprâ*.

² M. Villani (lib. ii. c. 59).

⁴ Varese (ii. 7).

ment till the following day. But Santa Paz was in favour of giving battle; his views were shared and seconded by the imperial admiral, Constantine Tarchaniota, who expressed a conviction that their vast superiority of numbers would insure an easy victory;¹ and Pisani ultimately suffered himself to be over-persuaded. The coalesced squadrons debouched therefore from the Golden Horn, and, disposing themselves in order, advanced to attack Doria, before the latter had time to collect his forces, and to complete his arrangements.

The action commenced two hours before dusk. It was marked by singular fierceness and truculency. The allied commanders sought in the first instance to segregate their adversary from those scattered portions of his armament which he had signalled to join him somewhat too late; and in this attempt they partially succeeded. The combat consequently soon assumed a very irregular character; the Genoese line was never formed; the Venetian and Catalan lines speedily found themselves broken; and the fighting was distributed over several points. Doria himself, who had taken up a secure position in a basin surrounded by shallows and breakers, was seen defending himself with desperate tenacity against three Venetian galleys, of which two were fastened on the prow of his flagship and the remaining one was clinging to her poop. In another direction, ten Genoese men-of-war, losing their steerage, and driven ashore by the current, were abandoned

¹ Sismondi (vi. 122).

by their crews, and left at the mercy of the enemy, who burned them to shells. In a third quarter, three of their companions shared the same lot.

The last straggling gleams of daylight had now disappeared; a winter's evening was already somewhat advanced; and the shades of night were beginning to mantle the horizon. As darkness gathered over the scene, Tarchaniota and his auxiliary squadron, which had already suffered severely, but which was of little use,¹ vanished mysteriously; the followers of Santa Paz, though brave and resolute under ordinary circumstances, were unequal to the crisis in which they found themselves placed; many of the Catalan captains fell into bewilderment; and the whole brunt of the battle was eventually cast on the Venetians. The spectacle which now presented itself was indescribably awful and impressive. The utmost disorder reigned throughout. Shrieks, groans and yells, curses, shouts and imprecations, were mingled in one deafening and unearthly din. Clouds of arrows were discharged at random. Missiles of every kind were launched without any special aim. Ships foundered; and hundreds of human beings were swallowed up by the waves, which they beheld for an instant only as they sank beneath them. Amid the impenetrable gloom in which the surrounding sea was gradually enveloped, the lurid glare of blazing vessels alone enabled the combatants imperfectly to distinguish friends from foes. Genoese boarded Genoese; Venetians

¹ Lebeau (xx. 302-3).

assailed their own countrymen with blind fury, mistaking each other for the enemy; and it too frequently happened that the bloodshed and carnage had proceeded far, before the frightful error was rectified. Through the entire night of the 13th, with very few intermissions, the struggle continued to rage. The first streaks of dawn on the succeeding day revealed a scene tragical and ghastly in the highest degree. Numberless corpses, in which animation had been extinct during several hours, were floating on the still boiling and crested waves. Wrecks, arms, wooden artillery, fragments of timber wrenched by drowning sailors from the sides of sinking vessels, studded a crimson sea.

It was now the morning of Tuesday, the 14th.¹ Both the belligerents were fairly worn out. The Catalans, who deserted their ground before daybreak, had been the first who retired. The Venetians, a portion only of whom had been actually engaged, soon followed their example; and consequently in strictness Doria remained master of the situation. But, in point of fact, the battle was nearly a drawn one, and the losses on the whole were equally balanced. The Allies missed twenty-six vessels and about 3,800² men, among whom were Inico da Priente, Santa Paz's lieutenant; Pancrazio Giustiniani, captain of the Gulf, Stefano Contarini, Tommaso Gradonigo, Giovanni Steno, Benedetto Bembo, and many

¹ Sismondi (vi. 125); Romanin (iii. 161).

² M. Villani (lib. ii. c. 60). Killed, 1,800: prisoners, 2,000.

other Venetian and Spanish patricians and officers of rank. Pisani himself was slightly wounded; and Santa Paz died not long afterward at Constantinople of a broken heart, it was said, at the rejection of his own strategical plans. The Genoese figures were found to be approximately similar. Thirteen galleys were ascertained to be missing,¹ several more had been totally disabled, and 700 persons of noble extraction² were numbered among the slain. Very few Genoese prisoners had been taken.³

At the close of the action on the 14th, Pisani retired from the straits of the Bosphorus, and having scoured the Mediterranean with those vessels which had involuntarily kept aloof in the recent struggle, and the crews of which were therefore perfectly fresh, repaired to Candia to give his troops rest, and to await reinforcements. The enemy, who were too much crippled to push their meagre advantage, or to engage in the pursuit, returned after a fruitless cruise in the Gulf of Adria to the Riviera, where Doria soon found that his political rivals had not been idle during his absence. The dear price, which had purchased an equivocal triumph,⁴ banished all thoughts of the ovation and thanksgiving which were usually celebrated on such occasions. The mind of the people was engrossed by their misfortunes; and the silence,

¹ Marin (vi. 100-4).

² Varese (ii. 263).

³ Romanin (ii. 167-8).

⁴ M. Villani (lib. ii. c. 60); Stella, *Ann. Genuenses*, fol. 1092 (Mur. xvii).

which reigned in the streets of Genoa, spoke a language more eloquent than words.

The news of the severe check given to the allied squadrons before Pera,¹ was received at Venice with the strongest manifestations of sorrow and anger. There was a disposition at first to suspect that Pisani himself was not wholly exempt from blame. But that blame rested somewhere, the Government was convinced. It was barely credible that the Coalition had been worsted by those Genoese whom the Venetians had so often vanquished single-handed; and Andrea Gradenigo, one of the advocates of the Commune, was at once sent to head-quarters to make all necessary investigations, and to bring back the culprits, if there were such, under guard. At the same time, the requisite reinforcements were despatched to Candia, and instructions were forwarded to the Admiral to resume the offensive without avoidable delay. The sole result of the inquiry was, that two Sopra-comiti were impeached by him for dereliction of duty. But the charge, being found untenable upon trial, was dismissed.

On the renewal of hostilities, the Arragonese squadron of two and twenty sail under Bernardo da Cabrera, the successor of Santa Paz, took the initiative by the blockade of Alguero, on the Sardinian coast, of which, in common with many other places on that seaboard, the Genoese had contrived to keep posses-

¹ Pugliola (fol. 427-8); Cantacuzenos, *Historia Byzant.* (lib. iv. ed. 1832).

sion. This step had the undesigned effect of creating in the mind of the Genoese Government a fallacious impression that, Pisani not having yet received his reinforcements, the Admiral was still unprepared to weigh anchor, and to leave Candia; and Antonio Grimaldi, to whose faction the disgrace of Doria had lent a temporary ascendancy, was promptly despatched to the Sardinian waters with a fleet of fifty-nine sail, carrying instructions from his Government to seize the opportunity which thus seemed to have arisen of throwing himself between Pisani and Cabrera, and of crushing the latter before the two armaments had effected a junction. The Spanish commander was overtaken by the enemy at an indented point of the northern coast of Sardinia, between Lojera and the Cape of Cagliari.¹ Obligated to give battle at a disadvantage, the Catalans performed miracles of valour. But the disparity of numbers was too great; the superiority was overwhelming; and the scale of victory was rapidly inclining to the foe, when a vessel, hoisting the Lion of Saint Mark, was seen to double the Cape. It was the flagship of Pisani. The whole squadron, bearing down with crowded canvas, was soon in view. The fortune of the day was instantaneously changed, and the battle recommenced in earnest. Grimaldi, flurried by the unexpected arrival of the Venetians, who had adroitly screened themselves from observation, no longer retained his composure. His troops, fiercely assaulted by the new-comers who, linking

¹ Sismondi (vi. 134-5); Romanin (iii. 169).

their vessels together with iron chains, presented to the enemy an impassable front, forgot their discipline. They were boarded on all sides. It became a hand-to-hand struggle. The Venetians and Catalans emulated each other in feats of courage and activity, while the sun, which was at their back, favoured their exertions and dazzled the eyes of their adversaries; and after a sharp resistance, the Genoese were overpowered. Out of fifty-nine galleys, Grimaldi saved eighteen only; and his loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was computed at between 4,500 and 5,000. Such was the *Battle of Lojera*, fought on the 29th August, 1353.¹ It was an action as honourable to the arms of Venice as it was fatal to the glory of her rival, and fatal to her power.

The loss of the battle of Lojera,² following at so short an interval the disputed and costly victory of the Dardanelles, fell like a thunderclap upon Genoa. The whole city was profoundly agitated by the intelligence. Every quarter and every street wore the same funereal aspect. Trade was paralysed. Factions became rampant and uncontrollable. All constitutional equilibrium was destroyed in a moment: the Doria and the Grimaldi vituperated each other in language saturated with the venom of party spirit. The existence of any common cause was forgotten in the blindness of furious malice and hysterical grief. The Government, the nobility, the entire people, writhed passionately under

¹ Pugliola, *Chronica*, 431; M. Villani (lib. iii. c. 79).

² M. Villani, *ubi suprâ*; Stella (*Annales*, 1092).

an anguish which could find no utterance, of a despondency which refused to be comforted. Messages of condolence from friendly neighbours met with no dignified response. The sympathy and proffered aid of Florence were treated with equal indifference. The heart of a proverbially proud commonwealth seemed to be dissolving itself in effeminate sobs and childish paroxysms of sorrow; and Italy and the world were permitted to see that the Genoese, if they were the rivals of the Venetians in wealth and in power, were not at least their rivals in fortitude. Apt perhaps to be intoxicated by success, though no stranger to the vicissitudes of fortune, a stranger hitherto to its more violent caprices, Genoa was now at length smitten on the brow by the iron finger of adversity; and because she had too little courage, too little constancy, too little union, not because she had too little strength, she was seen to sink beneath the shock.¹

A great and free people despairing of their country presented to the eyes of medieval Europe a somewhat unaccustomed spectacle and study. Such a despair was that which prostrated Genoa the Proud. The Government and the whole community were under the sinister influence of a spasmodic impulse and a morbid fascination; the dread of a Venetian yoke, the most abhorred of yokes, already haunted many minds; and by a resolution, not less precipitate and fatuous because it possessed unanimity, the vanquished Republic hastened

¹ *Istoria di Parma* (Murat. xii. 748); Vincens (*Histoire de Gênes*, i. ad annum).

abjectly to implore the protection of Giovanni Visconti, Lord and Archbishop of Milan, the greatest potentate in Italy.¹ In complying with her prayer, the latter realised the favourite dream of his ambitious reveries and the brightest vision of his fancy. Visconti was already paramount over the fairest portion of the Peninsula; and to become the Lord of Genoa, the master of the Riviera, and the second, if not the first, maritime Power in Europe, surpassed his most sanguine aspirations. The surrender of Genoa, subject to the enjoyment of her civil rights in their full integrity and the provision of the means for prosecuting the war against the Signory with unrelaxed vigour, was accepted without delay (October, 1353). Count Palavicini was sent by Visconti with a garrison of 700 cavalry and 1,500 infantry as governor of the City; and the requisite sums were simultaneously drawn from the Milanese treasury to defray the cost of a new campaign. This diorama seemed to shew how much dearer to Genoa was vengeance than honour or even than glory; it shewed how hatred of Venice had grown into an absorbing and enslaving passion, and how to the humiliation of that odious rival, she could consent to sacrifice five centuries of political freedom!²

But in the late battle the Genoese had lost the flower of their navy and their troops; and Milanese gold, the wages of shame, was not omnipotent. New

¹ Stella (*Annales*, 1092).

² *Vitæ Pont. Roman.* (Murat. iii. pt. 2, 608); Pugliola (431); M. Villani (lib. iii. c. 86).

resources were to be created; a new fleet was to be organized; new levies were to be made; and the Lord of Milan became sensible that it was of extreme importance to temporize. Such an object Visconti hoped to achieve by deluding the Signory with overtures for peace;¹ and as his deputy to the Venetian Government, he selected a distinguished individual, whom he had attracted to his brilliant Court by a liberal and flattering offer, and who at the present juncture happened to be resident at Milan. It was upon a man of letters, whom succeeding generations have revered as the regenerator of Italian literature, but who by no rare idiosyncrasy was pleased to judge himself almost greater as a diplomatist than as a writer, that his choice fell. It cannot be necessary to name the lover of Laura and the friend of Boccaccio. Notwithstanding his own whimsical foible, Petrarch, unapproached and inimitable as a sonneteer, was hardly of much promise as a negotiator; his mind, in which poetry and invention were such richly developed faculties, was deficient in world-wisdom, tact and common sense; he was selfish, pedantic, and vain; his eloquence, of which he had no contemptible share, was perpetually mis-spent upon parallelisms between antient and modern history, in which there was too often the fatal defect of a total absence of congruity; his political philosophy consisted in overlaying the shallowest commonplaces and the tritest maxims of government with sparkling sophisms and specious figures of rhe-

¹ M. Villani (lib. iii. c. 93).

toric. It was the misfortune of Petrarch, in common with many other great men, to apprehend imperfectly his mission and his gifts; and, turning aside too frequently from the path in which he distanced all competitors, he strove to excel in a sphere, for which he had scarcely more aptitude than the most obscure graduate of Padua University.

Between the Poet Laureate and Andrea Dandolo a certain intimacy had long subsisted. Already on the first outbreak of the war between Genoa and Venice, Petrarch had addressed to the Doge from Padua (March 17, 1351¹) a prolix epistle, abounding in parallels of prodigiously small pertinence from the pages of Ovid, Cicero, and Livy. "I am sensible, and strongly sensible, illustrious man," wrote the Poet, "of a great warning. If you ask me to call my feeling by its proper name, I dread exceedingly the gathering storms, and the signs of the times which we discern around us on every side.² But to pass in silence the general troubles of the human race, I, an Italian, come to a consideration of Italian quarrels. You, the two most powerful peoples, the most flourishing cities, in short, the two Eyes of Italy, are rising in arms. The age is ignorant, and inexperienced in the caprices of fortune, by which great empires were of old destroyed. Men promise themselves everything which they covet, and therein are very often deceived. Than

¹ *Opera Petrarchæ*, edit. Venetiis, 1501, folio; *Epist. Senilium* i. The letter is dated "Patavi, xv. Kal. Aprilis, 1351. See also edit. 1859, vol. i.

² *Epist., ubi suprâ.*

peace what is more pleasant, more happy, more sweet? Without peace what is the Life of Man but a perpetual pilgrimage of danger and fear? Do not, I beseech you, hide the truth from yourselves; you are waging war with a most intrepid and most invincible—what is worse, I say you are waging war with an Italian—nation! Would that Damascus or Susa, would that Memphis or Smyrna rather, had been the object of your hostility than Genoa! Would that you could fight against the Persians or the Arabs, against the Thracians or the Illyrians! What is to be the end of the war? Is it to close when you have conquered or when you have been vanquished? For the die of fortune is ambiguous. It cannot but be that one of the Eyes of Italy will be put out, the other darkened. For, indeed, to hope for a bloodless victory over such an enemy, beware lest it betoken a fatuous and fallacious confidence! In truth, you will see hereafter, magnanimous men and most potent peoples! For what I say to one I wish you to construe¹ as applying equally to both. Thou, who hast deserved to be the first Voice in the Councils and the Head of affairs, remember that whether glory or infamy be reserved for your country, the largest share of either will fall upon yourself. What labour has it not cost to make your power what it is? By what gradual steps have you ascended to the pinnacle on which you stand now? Your nation, if you know it not, traces back its fame to the most remote antiquity. Many ages ago, I find

¹ Epist., *ubi suprà*.

not only the City founded, but what you will still more greatly marvel at, I find a Venetian Duke mentioned by name. For the sake of charity, I beseech you with tears in my eyes to lay aside your arms, to give your hands to each other, and to exchange the kiss of peace. By the arts of peace you will throw open to you the sea and the mouths of the Euxine. So India, so Britain and Æthiopia, will be made to fear you. Farewell, O most excellent of Doges and of men.—Yours, and of your Republic the devoted, FRANCIS PETRARCH.”—Padua, the 17th of March, 1351.

The reply of Dandolo¹ was tardy, but flattering and encomiastic. “We have willingly received,” ran the Ducal epistle, “by the hands of the bearer your long-expected letter, at which we were purposing, indeed, to glance merely at present, and at a season of greater leisure to peruse diligently, had not the sublimity of the style carried us away. You may imagine how eloquent we deemed it, when we tell you that we read the whole incontinently with joy and delight. We admired as well the strength of a master-mind and the profundity of a high intellect as the savoury and soothing eloquence; and when we observe this combination of qualities, we can scarcely persuade ourselves that so manly and so religious a composition can have proceeded from any but a sacred bosom. God is witness, who has from all time and will ever preside over our fortunate destinies, that we cherished toward them

¹ Responsio Domini Ducis prædicti ad ultra scriptam epistolam. *Epistolarum de Rebus Senilibus* ii.

(the Genoese) a sincere and brotherly love which has not been reciprocated. To overlook, however, passed occurrences, we will follow the thread of present affairs. The aim of these Genoese is to snatch from us the most precious of all possessions—our liberty; and in meddling with our rights they drive us to arms. *Arma tenenti omnia dat, qui justa negat.* The quarrel is an old one. They have rendered the sea a hostile field for their own republic; and have stirred up the whole world and every nation against them, of whose manners this is an apt and brief sum: CONVENIRE NEGAT CUM ALIIS QUI MINIME CUM SEIPSO.¹ Thus we have undertaken war, merely that we may secure for our country, which we hold dearer than life, an honourable peace. Farewell, O most excellent of men! and rest assured that you are most dear to us; still dearer, however, if you would vouchsafe to favour us more frequently with like admonitions.—Venice, the 22nd of May, 1351.”

Thus the eloquence of Petrarch had met its full share of panegyric. But his arguments and his prayers remained equally unheeded.

The ambassador of Visconti reached his destination toward the end of January, 1354; he was in buoyant spirits, and sanguine of success. He had several interviews with Dandolo and the other members of the Executive. But all his anticipations were dismally falsified; and all the time-serving propositions, of which

¹ A keen satire upon the intestine discords of Genoa.

he was the bearer, were parried with adroitness, or rejected with unconquerable civility. On topics of literary or general interest he found Dandolo as genial and communicative as ever. But at official audiences no one was more obdurate, more punctilious, and more impassable than his noble correspondent. The Doge and the author of the *Mare Magnum*¹ were not indivisible. The envoy at length abandoned his barren and thankless task in sheer despair; and, after a stay of three or four weeks in the capital, he set out about the close of February on his return to Milan. If there was anything which had mortified Petrarch more cruelly than his recent rebuff, it was the character of the reception which he had experienced. He wished to be treated as Petrarch the Plenipotentiary, and still the Venetians affected to know him only as Petrarch the Poet-Laureate. This proceeding galled him far more than he was willing to confess. Of tributes to his talents and of adulation as the first man of letters in Italy, he conceived just now that he had had a surfeit; he looked in vain for some compliment to his profundity as a political sage or to his dexterity as a practical politician; and beneath the overstrained homage which was paid everywhere to his genius as well as in the laboured encomiums which were pronounced at every point on his last verses to the peerless Laura, he almost thought that he discerned

¹ "He composed," writes Sanudo (folio 628), "a work called *Mare Magnum*, on the origin of the noble Venetian families, from which it appears that he was of the Council of Ten." The *Mare Magnum* is lost.

an implied sneer at his first apprenticeship to the portfolio.

Undiminished as the hatred was which the Venetians nourished toward their fallen rivals, there was a marked inclination in many quarters to come to terms and to repose on a victory. The threatening attitude of Hungary,¹ the unquiet state of Dalmatia, the hollowness of the relations with the Byzantine Court, the enormous accession of strength which Genoa derived from her union with Visconti, and lastly, the pecuniary embarrassments which attended such a protracted campaign and such unprecedented disasters, and which raised the rate of interest from 2 to 37 and even 38 per cent.,² contributed to deter the more circumspect from perseverance in the war. But the Doge and his immediate supporters, whose Genoese antipathies were peculiarly strong, were, on the contrary, no advocates of peace, of such a peace at least as that which was offered to them by Petrarch and his employer. They said that it was probably not sincere, and that if it was sincere, it was certainly not honourable. If Genoa had coalesced herself with Milan, was it not open to the Signory to seek allies at Mantua, Ferrara, Verona, and Padua? Was there not every likelihood that the

¹ M. Villani (lib. iii. c. 67-8).

² Gallicciolli, *Memorie* (lib. i. c. 13).

In 1340 the rate was	.	.	.	19 per cent.
1343	"	.	.	18 "
1346	"	.	.	11 "
1350	"	.	.	2 "
1352	"	.	.	37 "
1353	"	.	.	38 "

new Emperor, Charles IV., would espouse with alacrity a cause which proposed as its aim the destruction of his most formidable competitor in the Peninsula? The line of argument seconded by the Doge prevailed ultimately. The idea of a pacification was therefore relinquished; and in conformity with the declared wishes of Dandolo, war was declared against Milan in the latter half of July, 1354.

Meanwhile Petrarch, since his diplomatic defeat, had continued to observe a moody silence. It was not till the 28th May that the discomfited Laureate addressed to the Doge a letter in which he recapitulated his old arguments against the profession of Mars with sundry new illustrations, but without any new force.¹ He intreated the Republic to pause before she again snatched from the scabbard her still reeking sword. He dwelled with pathos on the blessings and enjoyments of peace, and dilated by contrast on the horrors and miseries of war; and if his pacific counsels were hearkened to, he expressed himself prepared to hail in Andrea Dandolo a second Trajan. "Persuade not thyself that, if Italy perish, Venice will not fall: for Venice is part of Italy."

The answer of Dandolo,² which was written on the 13th June, was brief and expostulatory. The Doge averred that he was not a little surprised at the accu-

¹ *Opera Petrarchæ*, 1501. "*Nil audies novi*," such is the preamble, "*nil insolitus leges; sed ea tantummodo recognosces quibus jam sæpe aures tuas oculosque lassavi.*"

² *Opera Petrarchæ*, 1501 (*Epist. Senil.*)

sation which Petrarch threw in his teeth, seeing the temperate and polite answer which he had given to him on a former occasion, and the strenuous exertions which the Republic had made to facilitate the intercession of the Holy Father. At the same time, "Thou knowest," said the Doge, "on the testimony of thy own Cicero, that no death is worse than servitude, and that nothing is more hateful than disgrace, or more foul than the loss of freedom, when we are born to an inheritance of honour and liberty. Our liberty is a prize which it behoves us to keep and defend, and which we care not to outlive. What we were, such we remain—lovers of peace, saving always the reputation of our country, to which we and all our fellow-citizens are ready to sacrifice not only our gold and our silver, but our life. Farewell, O most eloquent man!—Venice, the 13th June, 1354."

With that rescript the correspondence dropped: nor was it ever resumed. It was only a few weeks later that the gauntlet was thrown down at the feet of Visconti (July, 1354).

Dandolo, however, was not legitimately open to the charge of having, in any spirit of wilfulness and spleen, or from a wanton love of bloodshed, spurned the proffered olive-branch. In point of fact, the hollowness of the late negotiation was already transparent when the Doge committed himself and his country to a continuation of hostilities. In March, 1354, three months before Petrarch put pen to paper, the new fleet of five-and-twenty galleys, built, equipped, and manned

with Milanese money,¹ had been launched from the dockyards of the Riviera ; and Paganino Doria, restored to popular favour, had again taken the command. In the course of April or May, while the Signory still saw room to cherish the hope of a settlement, Doria ascended the Adriatic, and ravaged Lesina and Curzola. The Venetian Government promptly despatched a small armament of five vessels under Marco Michieli to protect the Gulf ; and in the wake of Michieli followed Pisani himself with a powerful fleet of seventeen galleys. When the admiral reached the mouth of the Gulf, however, no enemy was in sight ; Doria seemed to have disappeared ; and the Venetian commander, having ordered Michieli to join him, and having received other reinforcements from Dalmatia, from Candia, and from Venice itself, which raised his squadron to an aggregate of forty-one sail, proceeded to shape his course for the Sardinian waters, in the expectation of falling in with the Genoese in the classic vicinage of Lojera, where he had beaten them the year before. But Doria, who had dexterously contrived to slip through his fingers, was still hovering in reality about the Illyric Islands ; and he impatiently seized the earliest moment for leaving his retreat and continuing his course up the Gulf. About the middle of August, he reached Parenzo, which he took and burned to the ground. The near approach of the redoubtable Doria struck the population of the Lagoons with dismay : all possible

¹ M. Villani (lib. iv. c. 22).

precautions were at once taken by the Government against the contingency of a Genoese invasion; a boom of the largest size was thrown across the canal at Lido; the militia of Venice and Chioggia, 3,600 strong,¹ were called out and divided into forty corps; Paolo Loredano was declared Captain-General of the city, with plenary authority; and peremptory instructions were sent to Pisani to return forthwith to the rescue of the capital. The aggressors, however, did not venture to proceed beyond the immediate theatre of their devastations; the Genoese commander, ignorant of the precise position of his adversary, was apprehensive of being intercepted at a point where no reinforcements could reach him, and where Pisani, on the other hand, would enjoy corresponding facilities for obtaining them; and, turning his back accordingly on the ruins of Parenzo, Doria leisurely retraced his steps.

These consecutive reverses of fortune severely tried the equanimity of the Republic. But there was no one upon whom they created a deeper impression than the Doge himself, who beheld with poignant anguish of mind, and, perhaps, not without some conscientious qualms, the degradation of his beloved country. In his uncompromising hatred of the Genoese, Dandolo was accused sometimes of having pursued, during his administration, with blind stubbornness, a policy involving sacrifices which neither the safety of the Republic nor her honour seemed to demand. But, nevertheless, he was a high-souled and ardent patriot.

¹ Romanin (iii. 172).

The humiliating catastrophes at Curzola and Lesina, in April, had preyed upon his mind, and had shaken severely a frame which was never robust. His health was already declining, when the news came in the following August of the destruction of Parenzo. This blow was too weighty to bear; and it broke a noble heart. A day or two after the receipt of the fatal tidings, his Serenity was seized with an illness from which he was never to rally; and after lingering three weeks, he expired on the 7th of September, 1354.¹ He had not yet completed his forty-fifth year.

Thus died in the prime of manhood the son of Fantino Dandolo of San Luca, one of the brightest ornaments of that remarkable era which had produced Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio. The talents and virtues of the late Doge had arrived at a fine though precocious maturity; his genius was appreciated and admired before he had passed the years of adolescence; and from the time when he quitted the university to that at which he was placed upon the throne, the highest and most flattering distinctions continued to be showered on him. He was the recipient of all honours, as he is said to have been the conqueror of all hearts. Procurator of Saint Mark at one-and-twenty,² Ambassador, Decemvir,³ at twenty-five, he was Doge at thirty-three. All the offices of the State were thrown open to a youth who had left college as it were but yesterday; and hoary-headed senators

¹ Sanudo (fol. 627).

² Sansovino (*Cronico ad An.* 1331).

³ Sanudo (fol. 628).

were obliged to uncover before one whose father they remembered as a boy. As a man of letters, Dandolo was lifted by his rank and affluence above the stinging privations of poverty and above the tyranny of governments. It was not his lot to be persecuted like Dante, or to be pursued by obloquy like Boccaccio. Everything that unbounded political influence, that domestic felicity, that a literary renown which Petrarch might envy, could give, were his covetable portion. But the gleams of sunshine became fewer and fewer in latter days; and a season of tribulation and bitterness came at length. The meridian and close of his career were painfully checkered by evils from which his earlier life had enjoyed a rare exemption. Pestilence, earthquake, famine, war, were misfortunes which in his time were poured out like vials of wrath upon the Republic; and they were accompanied too often by disgraces far worse than any misfortunes. The plague of 1348 was harrowing to his soul; the loss of the Battle of the Bosphorus wounded his pride to the quick; but the events of 1354 struck him prostrate, and severed the feeble link which attached him to life. He felt, then, that the end was not distant, and that death, when it came, would be welcome to him. To those who indulged in reminiscences of the past—who had known the man in happier times, when the brow of Dandolo was unclouded by care, and when, among the Peers of Venice, the graceful and commanding figure of the Count of Virtue stood conspicuous—that deathbed was indeed invested with no common impressiveness.

Literature was indebted to Dandolo in no trifling degree for the concise and veracious, though jejune narrative, which he left behind him as a contribution to the historiography of his country.¹ But the cause of Venetian jurisprudence was laid by him under even weightier obligations. The dry tone of his understanding, which was pronounced by some a blemish in the annalist, ceased at least to be a blemish in the codifier. His mind, if it wanted poetical fervour and pathos, if it was not happily gifted with imagination or eloquence, was luminous, methodical, and exact; and a new and enlarged edition of the Laws, which he had undertaken at the outset of his reign, and with the assistance of several eminent lawyers had brought to completion in five years, was a labour at once congenial to his habits of thought and agreeable to the course of his early reading. The Statute, in its amplified form, embraced all those judicial reformations which had been enacted periodically by various councils since the last consolidating measure of 1242, in continued amendment or elucidation of the laws affecting appeals, transfer, descent, and administration of property, dower, wardship, and widowhood, testamentary jurisdiction, and other germane matters; and the additions alone extended to seventy-seven chapters, forming a Sixth Book.² The work was published on

¹ The exordium was: "Ego Andreas Dandolo proposui sub brevi compendio provinciae Venetiarum initium et ipsius incrementum, et prout sub ducibus constitutis notabilia facta fuerunt, summatim enarrare."

² *Statuti et Ordini di Venetia*, Ven. 1477, folio; *Novissimum Statutorum Venetorum volumen*, Ven. 1729, 4°.

the 26th of November, 1346; and in an age when juridical learning was a rare accomplishment, it at once established the reputation of its authors, Dandolo and his coadjutors, as legists and legal antiquaries.

The obsequies of Dandolo were performed in Saint Mark's Cathedral, where his remains were deposited with imposing solemnity in a sepulchre adorned with carving in mosaic; and some verses composed by Petrarch himself, at the express desire of the Grand Chancellor of Venice, were afterward inscribed as an epitaph on his monument.¹ But a production, more worthy of the subject and of the writer, was that eloquent eulogium which the Laureate subsequently delivered to the memory of his friend. It was no niggardly praise, no faltering tribute, which the living offered to the dead. All bitterness and heartburning were banished, for a moment at least, from the thoughts of the Poet, and Petrarch dwelled only in the proud and happy retrospect of an intimacy of twenty years, when he wept over the early grave of the incorruptible statesman, the sage and zealous politician, the rarely endowed orator, the cultivator of learning for its own sake, the patron and ornament of literature, and the true lover of his country.

As a successor to Andrea Dandolo, the College of XLI. made choice (September 11,² 1354) of Marino Faliero of San Apostoli, Count of Valdemarino, a veteran of seventy-six. Like some of his predecessors, the new

¹ *Opera Petrarchæ*, 1501.

² Caresinus, contemp. (fol. 423).

Doge had been elected when absent. He was at this time Venetian Resident at the Legatine Court of Rome;¹ and it was necessary to send an extraordinary envoy, Stefanello, Secretary of the Ten, with a safe-conduct from the Lord of Milan, to apprise him of the decease of Dandolo and of his own elevation to power. At Verona the Doge was welcomed by a deputation of patricians, which had been sent forward to meet him, and to form his escort of honour. On the 4th October,² he arrived at Chioggia, where he found the great state-barge prepared to receive him and his suite, and to conduct them to the capital. As the Bucentaur neared its destination, the weather became so hazy that it was judged absolutely unsafe for a vessel of such draught to advance beyond a certain distance of Venice itself; and the Ducal party was consequently obliged to land on the Piazzetta in small boats. It was noted as a circumstance of sinister augury, that the gondola which carried Faliero himself, instead of drawing up as usual alongside the Riva Della Paglia, deposited its charge at a point exactly equidistant between the Red Columns. But this apparently trifling incident attracted very little notice and was quickly forgotten.

Faliero ranked as one of the oldest members of the Venetian public service. So far back as 1312, he had been among the electors of the Doge Soranzo;³ and

¹ Caresinus (423); Mutinelli (*Annali*, 161). The Pope, Innocent IV., was resident at Avignon.

² Sanudo (fol. 629).

³ Dandolo (fol. 411).

from that time, during a period of two-and-forty years, he had filled a succession of magisterial and diplomatic appointments. There was hardly any court in alliance with the Signory to which he had not presented credentials; and there were scarcely any political functions of which he had not had experience. The antient family to which he belonged had already given two Doges to Venice,¹ and it traced its pedigree in an unbroken line from the maritime Tribunes of the sixth century. From Charles IV. he had received the honour of knighthood; of the Bishop of Ceneda he held the fief of Valdemarino,² which conferred the title of Count. His skill as a diplomatist was exceeded only by his military talents; and his brilliant victory over the Hungarians at the battle of Luca, in 1346, placed the Count of Valdemarino in the first rank of Venetian generals. In disposition he was supremely arrogant, his temper was choleric and fiery to an excessive degree, and more than one anecdote was current of the complete mastery which this infirmity had over him. While he was Podesta at Treviso in 1339, there was a religious procession, at which the Bishop as well as himself was present; and the former having in some manner, as Faliero chose to conceive, rendered himself unnecessarily officious, the Podesta dealt him a sound box on the ear before a numerous assemblage of persons.³ Though well nigh an octogenarian, the Doge had contracted but a few years since a second marriage

¹ *Vide suprâ.*² Sanudo (fol. 774).³ Romanin (iii. 178). Compare Sanudo (*Vite*, 639).

with Lodovica Gradenigo, the daughter of an honourable and influential House ; and by this lady he was the father of two daughters, Lucia and Pinola.¹

The continuation of the Genoese war was a legacy which Dandolo had transmitted to his successor. It was fortunate that the price of money was not high :² for, as it not unusually happened, the Signory found itself at the last moment deceived in the alliances which she had sought to form with Spain and the Empire. The resources of the King of Arragon were directed into other channels by his ambitious schemes in Sardinia and Corsica. Charles IV., although he might be strongly desirous of curbing a Power which threatened to trench so seriously on his own prerogatives, was precluded by distractions of an analogous character from lending that active succour which he had partly led the Venetians to expect. The few minor Italian princes, who still remained independent of the authority of Visconti, but who eyed nevertheless with increasing alarm his rapid aggrandizement, were, by rendering assistance to the present cause, in great risk of compromising themselves gravely with Milan without the faintest prospect of being able to promote the interests of Venice.

Meanwhile, Pisani, having vainly searched for Doria in the Sardinian waters, determined to act upon intelligence which had just arrived by seeking the enemy in the neighbourhood of the Ionian Isles. This information proved itself to be correct. The Venetian

¹ Romanin (iii. 177).

² Gallicioli (lib. i. c. 13).

commander fell in with the Genoese fleet off Scio, and at once offered battle, which Doria, not having yet received his reinforcements from home, and being in a sheltered situation, thought proper to decline. Pisani proceeded to vent his disappointment by desolating the adjacent island of Santa Panagia, and afterward advanced so far as Cerigo with the design of intercepting the expected arrivals from the Riviera. The enemy's Government, however, had been forewarned of its danger; the anticipated prizes neglected to shew themselves; and the admiral soon found it necessary to seek quarters for the winter season. He fixed on Portolongo, opposite the island of Sapienza. It was near the beginning of November, 1354.¹

The increasing bleakness of the weather, which had driven Pisani into Portolongo, obliged Doria to adopt a similar precaution; and he was on the point of retracing his steps when he was apprised that his antagonist was in a position which offered unusual facilities for assailing him at a disadvantage. This report having induced him to change his plans, the admiral presented himself unexpectedly, on the 4th November,² before the roads of Portolongo. Of the Venetian fleet, it happened that some vessels were being refitted, while others were laid up in dry dock; and a portion only, amounting to twenty galleys under Nicolo Quirini, who was stationed by his superior officer in charge of the

¹ Caresinus (fol. 424); M. Villani (lib. iv. c. 32); P. Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 67 (King's MSS. 149).

² Pietro Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 67 (King's MSS. 149).

roadstead and port, was immediately available for active service. The Captain-General therefore was proof against all the provocations which were offered to draw him into an engagement; and Doria was beginning to despair of success. But a brilliant manœuvre quickly altered the aspect of affairs. By a rapid and masterly movement, Giovanni Doria, Paganino's nephew, suddenly penetrated with a detachment of thirteen galleys between the Venetians and the littoral to the very extremity of the harbour; and thus throwing himself behind Quirini, burst upon him with fury in the rear, while his uncle concurrently attacked him in front. The double shock, for which Pisani and his lieutenant were alike unprepared, produced a complete collapse; the Venetians were enveloped by vastly superior numbers; there was no action, hardly any struggle; many threw themselves into the water in a fit of terror, and were drowned in the attempt to reach the land. The Venetians sustained not a defeat, so much as a total discomfiture. 450 were killed; an enormous number of prisoners, loosely calculated at 6,000,¹ and a highly valuable booty in prizes and stores, were taken; and the Captain-General himself, his son² Vet-tore, his lieutenant Quirini, a few other officers, and about 1,500 seamen, effected a narrow escape to Modon, whence they returned home. Both Pisani and his subordinate were impeached by the advocates of the Commune, and were convicted of high misde-

¹ "5,860," says Villani, *loco citato*.

² *Memorie di Pisani*, 3; Cigogna (*Iscrizioni*, i. 180).

meanors. The former was mulcted in the sum of 1,000 lire, and disqualified from holding hereafter the supreme command of the Venetian forces by land or by sea. The latter was condemned to pay a similar amount, and to be deprived of all public employments for six years.¹

But the demeanour of the Venetians after the battle of Portolongo² afforded an impressive and admirable contrast to the conduct of the Genoese after the scarcely more disastrous battle of Lojera. Upon the arrival of particulars of this overwhelming calamity, the heart of the Republic was swollen by grief, almost to bursting. There were few patrician households which did not mourn the loss of some ornament or prop; there were few countenances in which a tale was not legible of bereavement or separation. The dungeon had become the lot of those whom the waters spared. Yet the whining and abject cry of despair, which had resounded in the Genoese streets, was not suffered here to escape from the lips: nor was there to be witnessed that unmanly and crouching spirit which had tempted the people who constituted the other Eye of Italy to court servitude, and to walk in gilded fetters; and under the blessed auspices of a concrete and stable government, Venice surmounted without a riot a crisis greater than that, which had elsewhere so lately been the forerunner of a revolution.

Immediate directions were now given that the clergy

¹ Sanudo (fol. 774). Vettore Pisani was acquitted.

² See Varese (ii. 275).

of all the dioceses should chaunt the requiems of those who had fallen at Portolongo ; and a sum of 5,000 ducats was at once sent to Genoa to alleviate the sufferings of the captives. Applications were addressed forthwith to the municipalities of Padua, Ferrara, Mantua, and Verona for paid contributions of troops, arms, ships, and stores of every description ; and a circular was prepared for transmission to all diplomatic and consular authorities abroad, in which they were exhorted to be of good courage, to abstain on every account from compromising the honour of their country, and not to despair of the Venetian Republic.¹

Meanwhile, Venice was in no immediate peril ; the winter had now fairly set in ; and all operations on the part of Genoa were understood to be suspended till the spring.

In the beginning of January, 1355, the Emperor Charles, who had entered Italy in the preceding October,² was crowned at Milan. That prince proved himself of greater utility as a mediator than he had proved himself as an ally ; and through his agency an armistice for four months was effected between the belligerents, professedly preparatory to the conclusion at the earliest moment of a definitive peace (January 8, 1355³).

The complexion of foreign affairs in general was at the present juncture far from being satisfactory. On the Dalmatian, Istrian, and Slavonian frontiers,

¹ Romanin (iii. 181).

² Sismondi (vi. p. 223-4).

³ Caresinus (fol. 424) ; Varese (ii. 278).

the Hungarians still preserved a menacing and ominous posture. It had been found necessary to set six additional Proveditors over those provinces. It was true that the convention of 1348, between Louis and Faliero's predecessor, expired not in strictness till 1356; but the restless ambition of the King, coupled with the traditional disaffection of Zara and the other colonial dependencies of the Republic on that coast, reduced war to a contingency which might arise from day to day.

At Constantinople, a Greek revolution, of which a Genoese, Francesco Cataluzzo, was the hero and the master-spirit, had recently (January, 1355¹) seated a Palæologus on the throne of Cantacuzenos, the steady, though feeble ally of the Signory; to the new Emperor, whose sister he espoused, Cataluzzo was in a position to dictate his own terms; and at a moment when the continuance of Cantacuzenos in power would have been of incalculable service to the Venetians, this change of government, with its Genoese predilections, was singularly inauspicious and unseasonable.

Lastly, the Spanish connexion, from which it had been hoped at one time that mutual advantage would accrue, was now virtually dissolved. The King of Arragon, although he had shown himself of some value as an occasional auxiliary, was not in command of resources, which might have enabled him at once to cope with Genoa, and to pursue his visionary projects of territorial conquest in Sardinia: nor was

¹ Sismondi (vi. 143).

he altogether satisfied, perhaps, by the manner in which the Venetians had fulfilled their share of the contract, as seconders of his claims. If he was taunted with being an insincere and faltering ally, there was more than a possibility that he might find room to recriminate.

The sole quarter, however, from which any absolute danger was to be apprehended, was Genoa; and even in that direction all immediate fears were removed by the provisional truce of the 8th January last.¹

The armistice had not been violated by either of the contracting parties, and the negotiations for peace were progressing in a favourable manner, when an event of a totally unexpected nature occurred in the very heart of the Dogado, under the eyes of all Venice. On Carnival-Thursday, the 2nd April, 1355,² the pompous and mystical immolation of the ox and twelve boar-pigs, which symbolized the Patriarch Lupo of Aquileia and his twelve canons, was celebrated in the usual manner on the Piazza; a brilliant assemblage of persons was present; the Doge and his court viewed the spectacle from one of the windows of the palace; and in the evening a splendid entertainment was to be given by the Dogarressa, the fair Gradenigo, at Saint Mark's, to all the beauty and fashion of the metropolis. In the midst of the ensuing festivities, a knot of libertines of rank

Caresinus (424).

² Caresinus (424); Sanudo (631-2-3-4); Mutinelli (*Annali*, 162); Romanin (iii. 181, *et seq.*)

who had formed a circle round some of the maids of honour, rendered themselves conspicuous by their noisy and boisterous behaviour; and some of them were observed to indulge in certain indecorous levities toward the ladies of the Dogaressa's suite. This circumstance attracted the notice of the Doge; and the latter, with an ebullition of indignant wrath, which belonged to the individual, rather than to the epoch, singled out one of the culprits, named Michele Steno, who was probably not more in fault than any of the others, and directed his instantaneous exclusion.¹ The order, which was executed by the body-guard in waiting somewhat more roughly perhaps than the occasion warranted, stung the pride of Steno to the quick; and various expedients for vindicating his injured honour, or for gratifying his burning resentment, crowded in succession upon his heated and whirling brain. At length an idea flashed across him, which appeared supremely felicitous.² Steno, accompanied by some sympathizing friends, as he passed through the apartments, scrawled in some of the corners and niches which were nearest his hand, the words—MARIN FALIER DALLA BELLA MUJER; LU LA MANTIEN, E ALTRI LA GALDE.³

¹ The present version of a well-known story is founded upon Romanin and the most reliable of the old historians (Caresinus, Dolfino, De Monacis, Trevisano, Antonio Morosini). Some of the incidents which are found in modern writers are suspected to be purely apocryphal. The reference to Romanin is iii. 182, *et seq.*

² Lorenzo de Monacis, contemp. Hist. (Add. MSS. 8574).

³ "Marino Faliero of the beautiful wife; he maintains her, but others enjoy her."—Romanin (iii. 182).

On the morning after the ball, this lampoon was discovered, and the illustrious rank of the personage at whose domestic circumstances it was intended as a sneer, invested it with the strongest features of interest and curiosity. Whatever share the other gallants might have had in the affair, the authorship of the squib was fixed upon Steno. The culprit was arrested and brought before the Forty; and after the usual process of examination, he was sentenced, on account of his youth, and the provocation under which he acted, merely to eight weeks' imprisonment, followed by a twelvemonth's exile. The lenity with which the gross affront of which he had been the object was thus visited, exasperated Faliero, if it was possible, more than the affront itself. He demanded in an imperious tone, that the verdict of the Forty should be quashed, that Steno should be cited before the Ten, and that the latter, treating the misdemeanor as high treason, should record a sentence, if not of capital punishment, at least of perpetual banishment. The Decemvirs, however, chose to view the matter in the more venial light; the years of the delinquent, which numbered hardly five-and-twenty, were pleaded in extenuation of the fault; the Doge was not left unreminded, perhaps, that by a leading clause of the Promission, it was declared that there was one law only in Venice for his own serene person and for the poorest fisherman of San Clemente; and Faliero, impotent before a tribunal which was not to be cowed by a box on the ear, vented his ire and disgust in curses on patricians and bureaucrats.

It happened on the next day¹ that a Noble, named Marco Barbaro, had occasion to pay a visit to the dockyard, and to request some favour of the Masters of that establishment, which the latter, on the plea of inability, excused themselves from granting. Hereupon, Barbaro desired an interview with Stefano Chiazza, called *Gisello*, the Admiral of the Arsenal, to whom he made known his wishes without any better fortune. This second rebuff, which gave additional umbrage to the patrician, bred high words between him and *Gisello*, a person of considerable influence and popularity, but a commoner by extraction; and, at length, Barbaro in a burst of passion struck the functionary a blow in the eye with his clenched fist. A ring on one of the fingers of the assailant was driven by the impetus into the lid, and created a gash from which the blood freely flowed.² The Admiral, reddening with shame and rage, and wrought to frenzy by so flagrant an indignity, hurried with the blood unstaunched and still trickling from the lacerated organ to lay his complaint before the Doge himself. Faliero, who was naturally prepossessed in favour of any fellow victim of class influence and arrogance, listened with unwonted condescension and patience to the recital of *Gisello*, to whom he offered his cordial sympathy. But when the sufferer spoke of redress—"How," cried the old man, vehemently, "can I obtain justice for others, when it is denied to me, the Doge? See how tenderly they have treated

¹ Sanudo (332).² Sanudo, *ubi suprâ*.

that ribald fellow Steno !” At this sally, the Admiral muttered between his teeth : “ *But wild beasts we bind ; and if we cannot bind them, we slay them.*”¹ The words were not lost upon the Doge, who, as if in a soliloquy, said, in a half whisper : “ How might such a thing be done ?” Gisello startled his companion by signifying that it was feasible. A glance was now sufficient to assure the first magistrate of Venice that he and his visitor thoroughly understood each other. They discovered that they had a common wrong, the overbearing insolence of the aristocracy, and a common cause, its total annihilation. An exchange of confidence and a mutual pledge of secrecy succeeded. The outline of a plan for the subversion of the Constitution was sketched then and there. Various points of a preliminary character were discussed in an undertone ; and that very night (April 3-4) the first foundation was laid in one of the private chambers of Saint Mark’s of a great conspiracy. The Republic was to be entirely remodelled in its internal organization ; once more, after the lapse of centuries, supreme unlimited power was to be vested in the Doge ; the sceptre of the Badoeri and Sanudi was to be restored to the third Faliero ; the days of Venetian autocracy were to return. The scheme was at present sufficiently crude and embryotic ; but Faliero had committed himself irrevocably to an undertaking of which it was impossible to fathom the issue, in concert with a person whom he knew only in his

¹ Romanin (iii. 184).

official capacity, and with whom he had probably not exchanged six sentences in the whole course of his life. The brain of the Doge was feverish and giddy with excitement. He had already lost his temper, and he was beginning to lose his head.

But the movement soon took its ramifications. Each of the principals hastened to seek partizans among such as were known to share their disaffection to the Oligarchy. His Serenity sent for his nephew Bertucci, who was an inmate of the palace,¹ and disclosed to him his project, into which the misguided young man plunged with blind enthusiasm. Gisello similarly communicated, not naming his confederate, with his son-in-law BertucciI sraello, a seafaring man; Filippo Calendario, and his son Nicoletto,² the former a lapidary of San Severo, and also a member of the nautical profession;³ Giovanni Del Corso; Beltramo di Bergamo, a skinner; and about twelve others, who cherished on various grounds an animosity toward the Decemviral government.

The plot was hurriedly matured: for success depended on the celerity of its execution, and the fitful impatience of Faliero brooked no delay. It was arranged that the two Calendarii, the Bergamasque skinner, and the other accessories should be distributed over the City; that each should enlist under some specious subterfuge the services of forty fol-

¹ Sanudo (*Vite*, 332). In the MS. copy of Lorenzo de Monacis, in the British Museum (Add. MSS. 8574), all these details are omitted; and a similar lacuna occurs in the printed copy of 1758.

² Caresinus, contemp. 224.

³ Nicolo Trevisano, contemp.

lowers,¹ who were to be kept till the last moment in profound ignorance of the object for which they were hired; and that the stroke of State should on no account be deferred beyond Wednesday, the 15th of the current month; at a fixed hour on that day, the tocsin was to be rung as a signal to converge to the Piazza; a false report of the arrival off Lido of a Genoese fleet was to be industriously spread;² and all members of the obnoxious order, as they thronged without distrust and without weapons to the public square to ascertain the truth, were to be despatched, amid cries of *Viva Il Principe Faliero!*³ by six hundred and fifty poignards.

Till the decisive day, the instinct of self-preservation, if no other motive, enjoined the observance of the utmost caution. At the same time, various artifices were employed to advance the scheme or to disguise its existence: Gisello was summoned to the presence of the Doge, at the desire of Barbaro, who alleged that the Admiral had threatened his life,⁴ and received a severe rebuke "for having presumed to insult a patrician." At night, parties of plebeians in the pay of Faliero, but who neither knew nor cared to inquire whose instruments they were, paraded the streets, and, stopping in front of every respectable house, addressed coarse conversation or obscene proposals to the female inmates; and then, decamping with ringing

¹ Mutinelli (*Annali*, 162).

² Matteo Villani (lib. v. c. 13).

³ Romanin (iii. 185), compared with Villani, *ubi suprâ*.

⁴ Romanin, *ubi suprâ*.

peals of laughter, bawled at the pitch of their voices: *Bravo, Contarini!* or, *Well done, Gradenigo!* for the purpose of bringing time-honoured names into infamy and odium. These outrageous disturbances were soon checked by the Ten; and on Monday, the 6th April, several of the roisterers were arrested. But their offence was not thought to amount to anything beyond a nocturnal frolic; and the culprits were allowed to escape with a mild punishment.

The 15th April was now at hand. The crisis approached. The stroke was to be consummated. Nothing had yet transpired which could awaken the distrust of the intended victims, or could darken the sanguine hopes of the feigned restorers of popular government.

Beltramo the skinner had a noble patron; his name was Nicolo Lioni.¹ For this gentleman the dealer in peltry had conceived that sort of regard which is apt to spring up between the recipient of important favours during early struggles and his benefactor.² Though not a man who had proposed to himself for his guidance any exalted standard of moral rectitude or purity, the Bergamasque had not hardened his nature against the kindlier instincts of humanity: he had a heart and a speaking conscience; he was susceptible of gratitude; and it grieved him to reflect that one, to whom he was bound by cliental relations, might probably share the fate of his class. He determined to try if it was possible to forewarn his patron without

¹ Sanudo (332).

² M. Villani (lib. v. c. 13).

prejudicing his cause ; and on Sunday night (April 12) he repaired with this object to the dwelling of his old friend and protector. After some introductory conversation, the skinner darkly insinuated “that it might be well if the Signor refrained from stirring abroad on the morrow.” The Patrician started at words so pregnant with meaning and so prefigurative of peril. It was evident that some terrible secret lurked in the bosom of Beltramo. He demanded an explanation of the innuendo. His monitor reiterated his warning merely ; he declined to enter into particulars. But the worst suspicions of his patron were awakened ; he deemed it his duty to persevere ; and he apprised his visitor that he must consider himself a prisoner on parol, until he had had time to institute certain inquiries.

Lioni ran to Saint Mark’s, where he obtained a private audience of Faliero. He disclosed to the First Magistrate the mysterious warning which had been addressed to him ; he suggested that it seemed to him to point obliquely at some secret movement of a seditious or revolutionary character ; and he respectfully desired to be furnished with the opinion and instructions of his Serenity on the subject. To his astonishment, the Doge after a pause treated his fears¹ as chimerical and visionary ; and he prayed him to dismiss from his thoughts the idea by which he was possessed. But whatever vices might be chargeable upon Faliero, hypocrisy was not among them. His

¹ M. Villani (lib. v. c. 13).

confused manner, his stammering tone, and his air of forced gaiety, created painful misgivings in the breast of the nobleman whom he was vainly essaying to reassure; and Lioni, taking leave, returned to his own house, accompanied by Giovanni Gradenigo of San Polo and Marco Cornaro of San Apostoli, at whose residences he had called on his homeward route.

Beltramo was then examined anew. At first, he sturdily adhered to his original resolution, and remained impassable. But under the pressure of an importunacy, in which bribes and menaces were alternated, he ultimately yielded. The skinner unmasked to his petrified interrogators the whole machinery of the Plot. He made a single reservation only; but it was an important one. He abstained from inculpating Faliero.

The weighty and momentous intelligence, which Lioni and his two companions lost no time in carrying to the Ten, was, as it happened, merely corroborative of a slightly antecedent report precisely to the same purport made to the Council by Giovanni and Giacomo Contarini, whose informant was Marco Nigro of Castello. There were circumstantial indices of an obvious nature which at once directed suspicions to a high quarter. The chiefs of the Tribunal summoned its members¹ forthwith to an extraordinary sitting in the Sacristy of the Monastery of San Salvatore,² but Nicolo, the

¹ Among them was Nicolo Trevisano, the author of the work known as *Cronaca Trevisana*.

² Romanin (iii. 186).

son of Marco Faliero, the Doge's brother, *received no invitation to attend*.¹ The proceedings were of the most prompt and energetic description. The Forty, the Avogadors, the Signori di Notte, the Capi de' Sestieri, and other civil functionaries, were desired to assemble, and to hold themselves in readiness for any emergency. Calendario and his son, his son-in-law Israello, Giovanni del Corso, and others to the number of twenty or upward, were arrested. The Palace of Saint Mark was surrounded by guards; and it was ordered that *no one* should be suffered under any pretence to quit the building. The Militia was called out; instructions were transmitted to Chioggia for farther reinforcements; and the musters had soon reached between 6,000 and 7,000 men. All persons of equestrian rank were not authorized only, but advised to wear arms. On Monday, the 13th April, Marco Cornaro of San Apostoli received his commission from the Ten as Captain-General of Venice.

The trial of Calendario and his minor accomplices occupied a very brief space. On the same day, (April 13) the lapidary himself, his son-in-law, Del Corso, and seven more, were sentenced to death and hanged at the casements of the Palace. Bertucci Faliero was imprisoned,² and Nicoletto Calendario was banished, for life. A few others, whose complicity was less heinous or capital, were punished less severely. The names of some, whose conduct excited distrust,

¹ Sanudo (333); Romanin, *loco citato*.

² P. Dolfino, *Annali Veneti*, p. 68 (King's MSS. 149).

but against whom no conclusive evidence was forthcoming, were enrolled in a *Register of the Suspected*. Lastly, several, whose innocence was established beyond doubt, were unconditionally set at liberty.

But the demands of justice were not yet satisfied, and the law claimed a larger sacrifice, a nobler victim. The process against Marino Faliero followed. On the morning of Thursday, the 16th April, the old man was led from his apartments, attired in his robes of State, to the Great Council Chamber, where he was confronted with his accusers and his judges. The Bench was composed of the six Privy Councillors, nine of the Decemvirs, and a Giunta of twenty Sages, which had been specially convoked to meet the extreme gravity of the occasion. The latter had a deliberative voice merely and no vote.

The articles of arraignment were no sooner read than Faliero made a candid and unreserved confession. He avowed all.¹ He stigmatized himself as the worst of criminals, and as one deserving of the highest penalty which it was in the power of the laws to inflict.² Without farther preamble it was then put to the vote, whether the accused should suffer death. Five of the Privy Council, and the nine Decemvirs, recorded their suffrages in the affirmative. It was a majority of fourteen to one. One voice alone, it seemed, asked mercy for him who had in the eyes of the aristocracy aggravated the crime of treason by

¹ M. Villani (lib. v. c. 13). "Il Doge nol seppe negare."

² Romanin (iii. 184, n. 1).

fraternizing with tradesmen and plebeians. After the delivery of the verdict the condemned was led back to the Palace. It had been ordered that "Marino Faliero, being convicted of conspiring against the Constitution, should be taken to the head of the grand staircase of Saint Mark's, and there, being stripped of the ducal bonnet and the other emblems of his dignity, should be decapitated."¹ The sentence was one which could not fail to strike an icy chill into every heart. But it was received by the Doge with a placid equanimity worthy of the Hero of Luca.

The execution took place on the following morning at the hour of tierce.² Giovanni Mocenigo, the senior Privy Councillor, followed by his five colleagues, the Decemvirs, the Advocates of the Commune, and the other great officers of State, advanced to meet his Serenity, who had been conducted under guard from his own apartments to the Great Council Saloon. Forming a circle round him, they escorted him to the fatal spot which had been selected for the horrid catastrophe. A stupendous concourse of persons of all conditions had congregated to witness the spectacle. A gloomy and awful stillness reigned throughout the Piazza. The Doge, amid a silence in which a whisper or a sigh would have been audible, implored the forgiveness of his countrymen, and extolled the equity of the doom which he was about to undergo. He was then uncrowned and disrobed. A black cap was substituted for the berretta, and a cloak of the same

¹ Villani, *ubi suprâ*.

² Sanudo (*Vite*, 334).

colour was cast across his shoulders. At an appointed signal he laid his head on the block, and at a single stroke the executioner severed it from his body. Immediately after the removal of the latter, the doors of Saint Mark's were thrown open; and the crowd entered in wild disorder, eager to catch a glimpse of the mutilated corpse, which was there exposed to view preparatory to burial (Friday, April 17¹).

Thus miserably perished, at the ripe age of seventy-seven, one of the greatest soldiers and statesmen whom Venice could boast; that same Faliero who during two-and-forty years of public services had earned as Count of Valdemarino a splendid and enviable reputation. Such was the ignominious fall of a man, whose versatile talents had enabled him to shine in every branch of official life, and whose uncontrollable passions brought his white hairs before the close of seven months from a throne to a scaffold. Faliero had survived most of his early friends, if not his domestic happiness; it was ruled that he should survive his honour also. He lived to see the day when a great name had become the byword of scoffers, and when his brother's son had been branded as a felon. The cup of bitterness could hardly have been fuller. It was now that men recalled to memory the unlucky omen of the 5th October, 1354, and that prophets of evil might lift their heads and point to the fulfilment of the presage conveyed in the disem-

¹ P. Dolfino, *Annali Veneti*, p. 68 (King's MSS. 149); Caroldo, *Historia di Venetia*, lib. viii. p. 25 (King's MSS. 147).

barkation of the new Doge Faliero between the Red Columns.

The Ducal remains were interred without any mark of pomp at San Giovanni e Paolo, behind the monastery, and in the direction of the Chapel of Santa Maria della Pace; and from a mixed motive of delicacy and pride the Ten directed their secretary to omit all direct allusion in the books of their transactions to his sentence and execution. The words LET IT NOT BE WRITTEN formed the sole clue afforded by the *Misti* to a great crime and a great tragedy.¹ The effigy of Faliero found its place after the sepulture in the Hall, where the portraits of all his predecessors were hung. It was not till twelve years posterior to the event which has been narrated that the Ten, by a decree dated the 16th March, 1367,² caused it to be cancelled, and a black crape arras to be substituted, surmounted by the words—HIC EST LOCUS MARINI FALETRI DECAPITATI PRO CRIMINIBUS.

Three centuries had passed away, when some labourers digging near the spot accidentally exhumed a sarcophagus. The discovery did not at the moment attract much curiosity, but the sarcophagus was eventually opened, and it was then found to contain *a skeleton with the skull placed between the knees*. This peculiarity was designed to indicate that the person, whose spirit was once dwelling in the now uninformed clay, had died by the hand of the executioner; and if any doubt still remained, the half-defaced inscription on

¹ Romanin (iii. 191).

² Ibid.

the urn served to shew that the bones of the unhappy Faliero were there !

The title of Valdemarino suffered attainder, and his vast property, with the exception of a sum of 2,000 ducats which was reserved for the family, was sequestrated. In consideration of the important, though involuntary share which he had borne in the detection of the late plot, Beltramo the skinner advanced a preposterous claim to the forfeited estates and the dormant title.¹ But a less exalted estimate of his merit was formed by the Decemvirs, who awarded him simply an annuity of 1,000 ducats and the liberty of wearing arms. The indignation of the peltry-merchant at this unhandsome treatment was unmeasured, and his conduct became so outrageous at length that the Ten, unable to argue him into reason, adopted the alternative of throwing him into gaol. He was speedily liberated, however, and relegated to Ragusa. The petition of Beltramo for licence to wear arms proves that he had fallen into considerable odium ; and it is said that he was eventually assassinated by one of the conspirators whom he had denounced, and that he thus met the fate of a renegade.

To Marco Nigro of Castello the Government granted a pension of 100 gold ducats and the privilege of wearing arms ; and a few others, who were thought to have deserved well of their country, were recompensed with similar liberality. It formed no part of the Venetian policy to discountenance informers or

¹ Sanudo (638).

to be parsimonious in the distribution of secret-service money.

The Republic sending her Prince to the block on a charge of high treason, after a regular trial, was an anomaly in the Venetian Annals. There had been examples, indeed, of Doges, who were butchered on the steps of the throne, or at the foot of the altar, by an infuriated mob. There had been Doges who were condemned by the popular voice to perpetual exile, or to cloisteral solitude. But the case of the unhappy Faliero stood alone; and for the earliest instance of a Doge of Venice being tried for his life by those who had constituted themselves his peers, the thrilling tragedy of 1355 alone can be quoted.

It is singular that one of the ramifications of the Faliero conspiracy should have remained undisclosed till several years later. It came to the knowledge of the Signory only in the beginning of 1361 that Pietro Badoer, who was Duke of Candia while Faliero sat upon the throne, and who was now occupying a high military post in the island, had employed at the time certain expressions which implied a treasonable sympathy with the Doge; and injunctions were consequently addressed to Marino Grimani, actual Duke of Candia, and one of his Privy Councillors, Vettore Trevisano, to investigate the matter. The inquiries of Grimani and Trevisano, which they were desired to prosecute with secrecy and caution, established two points.

It appeared, that in the first year of his government

(1355), and posterior to the execution of April, Badoer and several noble Candiots were returning from the Feast of San Lazaro, and that the Duke was ascending the stairs of the Palace, where all that chose were drinking and carousing freely, when he overheard some one mention the name of Marino Faliero. "What are you saying about my lord Marino Faliero?" at once cried the Duke.¹ "He was my intimate friend; and I was at Venice when he became Doge. If I had been there, when *that affair* took place, and he had sent for me and said, 'Piero, I intend to give you Valdemarino, and to make you a great Don, how could I have said 'Nay'?' Moreover, Badoer was reported to have added: "Yes, indeed, *if I had been there*, and he had sent for me at the moment, I would have certainly brought 200 men to his cause; and if he had given me a day's notice, I would have brought 1,000."

The second point, which was elicited, was that about eight months afterward, Caterino Badoer, the brother of Pietro, was frequently in the habit of calling on the latter, and of tempting him in such words as these:—"My lord, you might, if you choose, be absolute master here, in the teeth of Venice; and I would bring to your standard 2,000 men, 4,000 men, in fact, as many as you might think proper." But the Duke² answered always, "that he had no mind that way."

¹ Documenti sulla Congiura di Marin Falier (presso Romanin, *Docum.* iii. 397-8).

² Cornaro, in his *Creta Sacra*, 1755, 4^o, does not give the name of the Duke of Candia for 1355. But (ii. 315) he states that Badoer was Duke (perhaps for the second time) in 1358.

These papers, transmitted to Venice by Duke Grimani, were thought sufficient, even at that distance of time to criminate the accused; a prosecution was set on foot; and sentence was recorded. But on the precise nature of the latter, the archive, from which the foregoing particulars are derived, is silent.

CHAPTER XIX.

A.D. 1355—1379.

Giovanni Gradenigo, Doge (April 21, 1355)—Treaty of Peace with Genoa (June 1)—Exclusion of the Venetian Flag from all the Ports of the Black Sea except Caffa—Altered Character of the Relations with Hungary—New War with that Power (1356)—Siege of Treviso—Loss of Dalmatia—Futile Negotiations with Padua—Death of Gradenigo (August 8, 1356)—Election of Giovanni Dolfino (August 13)—Retreat of Louis from Treviso—Conclusion of a Truce (Nov. 16, 1356—April 9, 1357)—Differences in the Venetian Senate touching the Prosecution of the War—Triumph of the Peace Party—Ratification of a Treaty by which Venice retains the Trevisan and cedes Dalmatia (Feb. 18, 1358)—Peace with Padua (June 7)—The Republic commits herself by demanding Investiture of the Trevisan by Charles IV., who refuses the Request—Death of Dolfino (July 11, 1361)—Enactment of a Sumptuary Law in the preceding year (May 21)—Anomalous Election of Lorenzo Celsi (July 16)—Character of the new Doge—Anecdote of Marco Celsi—Festivities at Venice on the occasion of the Visits of the Duke of Austria and the King of Cyprus (September—December)—Remarks on the Venetian Government—Enjoyment of Tranquillity (1361—3)—Rebellion of Candia (1363—6)—Internal State of Candia—Share of Venetian Settlers in the Revolt—Proximate Causes of the Movement—Its eventual Suppression—Luchino del Verme and Petrarch—Demolition of the Fortifications in the Island (1366)—Previous Death of Celsi (July 18, 1365)—Singular Revelation respecting him—Marco Cornaro, Doge (July 21)—Petrarch—His Bequest to the Republic (1362)—Liking of Petrarch for Venice and the Venetians—His Opinions about the Averroesian School of Philosophy—His Adventure with an Atheist—Short Administration of Cornaro (1365—8)—Incipient Backwardness of Venice to fight against the Turks and its political Cause—Person and Character of Cornaro—His Death (Jan. 13, 1368)—Continued Decline of the Ducal Authority—Constitutional Changes—Andrea Contarini, Doge (Jan. 20, 1368)—Singular Episode connected with his Election—Difference with Trieste (1368)—Alliance between Trieste, Austria, and Aquileia—Defeat of the Austrian Army by the Venetians under Taddeo Giustiniani (Nov. 10, 1369)—Submission of Trieste (Nov. 18)—Treaty between Venice

and Trieste (Nov. 28)—Peace between Venice and Austria (Oct. 20, 1370)—Fresh Breach with Francesco da Carrara (1371-2)—Discovery of a Cornarese Conspiracy at Venice (May, 1372)—War with Carrara (November)—Coalition between the latter and Louis of Hungary—Treaty of 1373, by which Carrara pays the Expenses of the War—Scarcity of Money at Venice—Interest at 20 per cent.—Death of Petrarch (July 18, 1374)—Venice at Peace (1373-6)—Improvement of her Relations with England and other Countries—Formation of a Secret League between Hungary, Naples, Padua, Genoa, Aquileia, Austria, and Ancona against the Republic—Introductory War with Austria (1376)—The Venetians make Sacrifices to obtain Peace (October, 1378)—First Employment of Cannon by the Venetians in this War—Sir John Hawkwood—Quarrels with Genoa (1373-6)—Preparations of Venice for War (1379).

ON the day following the decapitation of Marino Faliero, the Great Council, having assembled (April 18, 1355),¹ decreed the registration on its Minutes of the ensuing constitutional formula:—"The Ducal throne having fallen vacant by the death of Marino Faliero, Doge of Venice, lately beheaded for conspiring the ruin and destruction of the City of Venice and its people, this Council was convened for the purpose of taking the necessary steps for the election of the future Doge."² On Sunday, the 21st April,³ the Conclave of Forty-one brought its deliberations to a close; and Giovanni Gradenigo of San Polo, one of its own members, and a veteran of seventy,⁴ was proclaimed the successful candidate. Gradenigo was the maternal grandson of the Doge Giovanni Dandolo, who had reigned from 1280 to 1289. He was a person of superior acquirements and of great legal erudition. But he is said to

¹ Sanudo (*Vite*, 635).

² Romanin (iii. 193).

³ Caresinus (*Dandoli Cont.* 425); Pietro Giustiniani, *Cronica*, p. 104 (King's MSS. 148).

⁴ Sanudo (*Vite*, 630).

have displayed parsimonious habits and eccentric ways. His nose was so big, that he was familiarly known as “Nosy” (*Nasone*), and people used to remark, that his slouching gait, and his blunt, awkward manners, reminded them strongly of his grandfather.¹ He was the same nobleman who, in conjunction with Nicolo Lioni and Marco Cornaro, had contributed so importantly to the frustration of the recent conspiracy.

The first business of the new Gradenigo Ministry was to lift the drag-chain of the Genoese negotiation, which had been suspended during the last few months. Considerable difficulty and delay were experienced in the mutually satisfactory solution of certain points connected with the award of indemnities, and the disposal of prisoners. The Genoese, plenipotentiaries exhibited at first an exacting and dictatorial spirit. The representatives of Gradenigo, Benintendi da Ravennani and Raffaello Caresino, two illustrious names in contemporary literature—the former Grand Chancellor of Venice, the latter Ducal Notary—carried instructions to be exceedingly firm; and although the four months’ truce had expired in April, the signature of the treaty at Milan was not completed till the 1st of June.² Under its provisions: the Mediterranean from Porto-Pisano to Marseilles, and the whole course of the Adriatic, are closed against Venetian and Genoese men-of-war respectively. 2. In the event of the outbreak of hostilities between Genoa and Pisa, or

¹ Sansovino (*V. D.* xiii. 570).

Sanudo (*Vite*, 639).

between Venice and any of her Dalmatian settlements, the Venetians are to be permitted to touch at Genoa alone, and the Genoese at Venice alone. 3. A mutual and immediate cessation of offensive operations is secured. 4. The Venetians are prohibited from trading with Tana for three years. 5. A claim for damage inflicted on either side in contravention of the treaty is admissible. 6. The scale or amount of reciprocal indemnification for losses accruing from seizures and other causes since 1299, is to be submitted to the arbitration of the Visconti. 7. An exchange of prisoners without ransom is effected.¹ 8. A sum of 100,000 gold florins is contributable by the contracting parties, in equal proportions, for deposit at some neutral point, as a bond for the execution of the compact. There was a supplemental clause, that if the King of Arragon and the Duke of the Archipelago gave their coherence on or before the 28th September, those potentates should be recognizable as parties to the agreement.² On the same day, a separate peace was signed between the Republic and the successors of Giovanni Visconti. It was stipulated that the ratifications should be exchanged within forty days from that date.

The exclusion of the Lion of Saint Mark from Tana, or Azoph, and all the other Euxine ports excepting Caffa, where the Republic was still allowed to have a counter, was a serious blow, though one of transient duration, to the commerce of the Signory

¹ Sanudo (fol. 639).

² M. Villani (lib. v. c. 45).

with the Black Sea; and it was a circumstance of aggravation, that it was so closely preceded by that unlucky revolution of January, 1355, which elevated a Genoese emperor to the Byzantine throne. The June treaty, however, was no sooner ratified, than the Government of Giovanni Gradenigo hastened to create an approximate equivalent for the loss by improving the Venetian relations with Flanders, Egypt, Barbary, and the Grand Khan; and by the grant of fresh charters, or by the amplification of existing immunities, the important and extensive trade with those countries was placed on a footing of increased stability. The month of June, 1358, when the inhibition was calculated to expire, was a date which circumstances invested nevertheless with no ordinary interest.

The year 1345 had opened a new era in the relations of Venice with Hungary, and in the Dalmatian policy of the Signory. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, indeed, the Republic is already found repelling the periodical irruptions of the Solomons and the Lladislai; and even vindicating, at heavy sacrifices, her prescriptive right to that invaluable Adriatic seaboard, of which she was so intelligibly jealous. The pretensions of the early Hungarian kings ostensibly amounted to nothing beyond the invited assertion of an occasional protectorate over the towns scattered along the Dalmatian littoral: nor was Venice strong or injudicious enough to attempt the subjugation of a territory to which she enjoyed no more than the shadow of a possessory title. A few miles inland lay

a region subject to petty chieftains, who lived by war and rapine, and who substantially acknowledged no suzerain. Their feudal ties were weak and brittle. But time wrought a great change. The Venetians as well as the Hungarians grew more aspiring. The former began to covet a country of which they had held the sea-margin from an epoch immemorial. The latter in their career of conquest, having gradually rendered themselves masters of the interior, were becoming sensible of the enormous advantages which would attend the incorporation of the coast. Hungary, populous, rich in pastures, advanced in agriculture, abounding in military resources, not deficient in industrial labour, was feeling the three wants of a progressive civilization—ports, shipping, and commerce; and she naturally looked toward Dalmatia. Under such circumstances, it seemed to require only that the crown of Saint Stephen should descend upon the brows of a prince of enterprising spirit and soldierlike qualities, to render Venetian Dalmatia the theatre of a protracted and bloody struggle between two great Powers; and such a prince at length appeared in the person of Louis, the brother of the hapless Andrew of Naples.

The attack upon Zara in 1345–6 had been a miscalculation and a failure; undertaken at a period when Louis was young and inexperienced,¹ it was as unsuc-

¹ Assedio di Zara, anno 1346, scritta da un contemporaneo (Morelli, *Monumenti Veneziani di Varia Letteratura*, Ven. 1796, 4°). The King was only twenty-four.

cessful as it was premature. The royal troops were worsted at Luca in a memorable battle by the gifted and ill-starred Marino Faliero ; and Louis was ultimately compelled by pressure in another direction to accede to the eight years' treaty of August, 1348. But the design which lay next his heart, and which he seemed to accept as a tradition of his crown, was suspended, not abandoned ; and he no sooner found himself released from his Neapolitan engagements than he returned with the impatience of a zealot to his scheme for the extension of the Hungarian frontier toward the Adriatic.

The formal declaration of war against the Signory dated back so far as 1353. But it was not till May, 1356,¹ that the barons and freemen of Hungary met their monarch in council at Sagabria,² on the Slavonic borders, where the dispositions for the forthcoming campaign were concluded. Alliances had been already contracted with the Counts of Goricia, with the Patriarch of Aquileia, and with the Lord of Padua, Francesco da Carrara,³ the last of whom pledged himself to remain neutral and to discharge the functions of a commissary-general ; and a secret negotiation was opened with Genoa with a view to create a naval diversion in the Adriatic. It was decided that operations should be undertaken on a grand scale, and that while the bulk of the royal army entered the Marches through the Frioul, and laid siege to Treviso, the sole

¹ Sismondi (vi. 280).

² M. Villani (lib. vi. c. 36).

³ Bonfinius (*Res Ungaricæ*, Dec. ii. lib. x. 350).

possession of Venice on the *Terra Ferma*, the remainder, distributed in detachments over Dalmatia, should attempt the reduction or alienation of that province. In pursuance of the strategical plans which Louis had formed at Sagabria, the advanced guard of 4,000 cavalry under Conrad de Wolfast, Ban of Croatia, was immediately pushed toward the theatre of war.¹ By forced marches, the Ban reached the Italian frontier; and on the 28th June he halted under the walls of Treviso.² Louis himself was not far behind him. The latter easily rendered himself master of Sacile;³ after a three weeks' siege,⁴ he took Conegliano, ten miles from Oderzo, on the 12th July.⁵ At Asolo, he overcame the resistance of Giovanni Foscari, the Venetian podesta. At Serravalle he similarly forced Nicolo Michieli to tender his submission.⁶ Before the beginning of August, the Hungarian forces were completely concentrated in front of Treviso. They were estimated at upward of 40,000.⁷

Meanwhile the Venetian Government was not wanting in alertness and activity. Large additions had been made to the garrison of Zara, which was plentifully victualled;⁸ and successful advances were made to the Emperor of Servia for the purchase of Chisa in his dominions.⁹ On the 28th June,¹⁰ a decree of the

¹ Sismondi (vi. 283).

² Ibid.

³ Romanin (iii. 198).

⁴ Sanudo (*Vite*, 640).

⁵ *Hist. Cortus.* (lib. xi. ch. 8). M. Villani (lib. vi. c. 52); Sanudo (*Itinerario*).

⁶ Sanudo (*Vite*, 640).

⁷ Villani, *ubi suprâ*.

⁸ Wilkinson, *ubi infrâ*.

⁹ Wilkinson (*Dalm. and Montenegro*, ii. 275).

¹⁰ Romanin (iii. 198, and note 3).

Great Council authorized the institution of a new Board of War. A large body of troops was despatched to Treviso under three proveditors, Giovanni Dolfino, Marco Giustiniani, and Paolo Loredano, to the succour of the Podesta Fantino Morosini.¹ All the suburbs of the town which were thought incapable of defence, and which might serve on the other hand as so many advanced posts to a besieging enemy, were destroyed.² Six other proveditors were sent to various parts of Dalmatia, Istria, and Slavonia, to examine and strengthen the fortifications at every assailable and defensible point,³ and, as a precaution against any breach of faith on the part of Genoa, the Captain of the Gulf was efficiently reinforced.⁴ Of the confidential correspondence between Padua and Sagabria, the Venetian Government pretended to harbour no suspicions. It was obvious that, so soon as offensive operations had commenced in the Peninsula, the active friendship and assistance of Padua would become of paramount utility and importance; and an energetic attempt was now made (July 1), in consequence, to prevail on Carrara to coalesce with Venice against the common enemy. But the representative of the Doge, Luigi Vitali, was of course unable to extract from a man, who had actually thrown himself into the arms of Louis, and who probably surmised that the Signory had more than an inkling of the truth, any definite or ingenuous avowal of his intentions. He could only

¹ Romanin, *ubi suprâ*.² Sismondi (vi. 283).³ Romanin, *ubi suprâ*.⁴ Romanin, *ubi suprâ*.

be persuaded to deal with generalities of the vaguest kind. An Hungarian invasion was assuredly a prospect to be dreaded. The projects of Louis were beyond doubt to be treated with distrust. Speaking in the same sense, he entertained toward the Republic the highest sentiments of friendship and esteem. Vitali pressed him to be a little more explicit. Carrara then (July 4) formally advanced, through his own diplomatic agent, the exorbitant demand, that the Signory should raise 3,000 troops, should obtain the co-operation or neutrality of Verona and Ferrara, should subsidize him to the amount of 8,000 ducats *per mensem*, and should guarantee the integrity of the Padovano. On these terms he was prepared to enter into the proposed alliance. The Doge replied, through Vitali, that his Commune had no objection to exert its best influence in securing the cohesion, or at least the neutrality, of La Scala and Este, that it consented, in addition to the troops which had been already shipped to Treviso, to take into pay 1,000 *borbute* (men-at-arms) and 1,000 foot, for the protection of the respective States; and that, in the approaching contest, every care should be taken that the Padovano suffered as lightly as possible. As to the subsidy, however, Vitali was instructed to intimate that present circumstances, at all events, rendered such a measure absolutely out of the question. The rejoinder of Carrara was lame and evasive; he muttered monosyllables; and the Republic at length plainly perceived that the whole brunt of hostilities was destined to fall

upon her own shoulders. After a second and a third essay in fact, which were equally ineffectual, Marino Morosini, Podesta of Padua, received his recal; all commercial intercourse with that State was strictly interdicted; a militia force under the Proveditor Marco Giustiniani was ordered to devastate the Padovano; and the exasperated Government left no means untried of exciting against the trimming and vacillating Carrara the formidable power of the Scaligers.

The war between Venice and Hungary was presenting this phase when, on the 8th August, 1356,¹ the Doge Gradenigo breathed his last, having occupied the throne rather less than fifteen months. The critical complexion of foreign affairs demanded in the choice of his successor the union of the highest qualities of statesmanship; five days after the decease of Gradenigo, the College of Electors communicated in the usual manner its solemn decision in favour of Giovanni Dolfino, one of the three Proveditors at Treviso (August 13²).

Treviso, situated at the confluence of the Silis and Piave, enjoyed at this period the reputation of being a massive and all but impregnable stronghold; it was encompassed on all sides by a broad and deep moat; and all the resources of the engineering art, such as it was known in the middle ages, were carried to singular perfection in the fortification of its ramparts. Louis, after a short siege, found to his cost that his success

¹ Caresinus, contemp. (416).

² Ibid. (417); Sanudo (*Vite*, 641).

by no means corresponded with his expectations. His commissariat, for which he was indebted in a leading measure to the zeal and good-will of Carrara, who had at length unmasked himself, was sufficiently well provided; but his loss both in men and in material of war was excessively severe. The composition of his army, moreover, was purely feudal; and for his levies he entirely relied on the loyalty of the great vassals of the Crown. The latter in their turn were not in a position to bind their dependants to any but a specific and limited period of service; and so much delay unavoidably arose in the march from point to point, that that period had for the most part already expired or was on the eve of expiration. This circumstance tended to spread impatience and discontent through the ranks; and the King was constrained, sorely against his will, to withdraw the bulk of his troops from Treviso in the course of August, with the reservation only of a sufficient force of fresh soldiers to form the siege. It was not in a particularly happy mood, therefore, that the King received the Venetian ambassador who waited on him to announce the change of government, and to solicit in the name of the Signory a safe-conduct for the new Doge. When the news of the election of Dolfino first reached the Hungarian camp, Louis was heard to say to those about him that they would now number among their prisoners the chief magistrate of the Republic; and his majesty appears to have harboured some thoughts of withholding the safe-conduct. But the courtesy, with which the demand had been preferred, disarmed

the royal resolution, and he graciously assented to the wishes of the Venetians.¹ The Proveditor safely reached Mestra, where a deputation from Venice was in readiness to receive his Serenity. On the 25th August, the Doge and his suite made their entry into the capital; and Dolfino, having been formally installed, at once assumed the entangled reins of government. The Doge Dolfino was a nobleman who had won equal distinction in the profession of arms and in the arena of politics. In person he was, like his predecessor, peculiar. A pad over the socket of one of his eyes, of which he had been deprived by a casualty during his late residence at Treviso, lent to his exterior an aspect which was neither graceful nor prepossessing.²

The Venetians, who had viewed with considerable dismay³ the host which Louis led into Italy, and of which a single division was equal to their whole army, were indescribably relieved, when they discovered that the feudal military organization, while it had in so striking a measure its element of strength, was not without its element of weakness. For it became an ascertained fact that the King, thwarted in his probable anticipations of taking Treviso by a surprise, would not have it in his power to assemble under the walls

¹ Galeazzo Gataro, *padre*, 55, and Andrea *Figlio*, 56 (Murat. xvii.); Ad. *Hist. Cortus. Addit. Secundum* (Murat. xii.); Pietro Dolfino, *Annali Veneti*, p. 70 (King's MSS. 149); Sanudo (fol. 642).

² Sanudo (fol. 652). The wood engraver, Antonio Nani, in his *Serie de Dogi di Venezia intagliate in rame*, Ven. 1840, folio, takes no notice of this circumstance.

³ M. Villani (lib. vi. c. 54).

more than 5,000 men at one time, and with such a force the Republic, animated by the precedent of 1346, did not despair of being able to grapple successfully. At the same time, she observed with uneasiness the arrival of contingents in the Hungarian camp from Milan and Verona, which too clearly denoted the existence of a secret understanding between Louis and some of the Italian princes.¹

During the remainder of the summer and through the autumn of the year 1356, the belligerents continued to maintain the struggle with varied and changeful fortune. But the first symptoms of returning winter rendered both parties naturally desirous of suspending hostilities till the spring; the measure, as a prelude to a definitive pacification, was warmly seconded by the Holy See, which treated the dissensions of Christendom as so much vantage-ground given to the Turkish power;² and an armistice was concluded from the 16th November till the 9th April, 1357,³ by the terms of which the King retained all his acquisitions in the March till the resumption of the offensive. His allies, the Patriarch of Aquileia, the Count of Gorizia, and others, were included in the operation of the truce.

At the close of the Passover, the horrors of war were renewed. Venice, on her part, returned to the field with an impoverished treasury and a temper soured by the unfading recollections of Portolongo,

¹ M. Villani (lib. vi. c. 55).

² See Villani, c. 60.

³ Sanudo (*Vite*, 642).

and an apparently interminable series of loans and conscriptions. The political prospect had become extremely gloomy and discouraging; and the Venetians began to perceive, that the struggle into which they had entered was far more arduous than they had calculated. Hostilities were unhappily not confined to one side of the Adriatic.¹ Louis was wielding a double-bladed sword.² While, in conformity with the principles of feudal service which were as eminently favourable to the supply of fresh relays of troops as they were inconsistent with the concentration of large masses of men on a single point, the besieging forces before Treviso was constantly relieved, Hungarian arms, Hungarian gold, and Hungarian intrigue were mining their way in another quarter; and Dalmatia was all but lost. In the Trevisan, Castelfranco, Oderzo, Noale, and Mestra only remained true to the Signory. The submission of the rest was believed with some reason to be due to a want of firmness and nerve, if not of common courage, on the part of their defenders: for to the authorities of those four towns, which made a successful stand against Hungary, an intimation had been sent that, "if they yielded, their heads would answer for it;" and it was probable that if the menace which was so seasonably directed to them had been directed to all, the province might have been saved. The precautions which the Government of Venice had used against contingencies were most

¹ *Hist. Cortus.* (lib. xi. ch. 8).² *Pugliola (Chron. 446).*

elaborate and complete, and the severity with which it visited the offenders, who forgot their duty or betrayed their trust, was perfectly legitimate and justifiable.¹

Meanwhile, Louis continued to date his despatches from Zara, which had been betrayed (September 2, 1356²) into his hands by the Abbot of the Monastery of San Grisogono. The conduct of the Venetian war was still delegated to his lieutenants; and the progress of the Hungarian arms was already but too triumphant. With the exception of Castelfranco and the three other places which defied the enemy, especially of Noale, where Giovanni Giustiniani held his ground heroically, until he was starved out, the entire Venetian dominion on the mainland, as well as on the opposite shore of the Gulf, was wrested from the grasp of the Republic: while the condition of Treviso itself was growing week by week more and more hopeless. So imminent and so inevitable at last seemed the fall of the town, that the inhabitants began to embrace every opportunity of making their escape down the Silis to the Lagoon, where they were treated by the Venetian ladies with the utmost humanity and kindness, and in cases of necessity became recipients of charitable donations from the public purse. Among the number who fled to the Island-City was the Bishop of Treviso himself, Azzo di Maggi, who came to seek an asylum and to find a deathbed.

¹ Romanin (iii. 200, 202).

² Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 643).

The Venetian Government now found itself in a veritable dilemma, and it was for some time absolutely puzzled how to proceed. There was, as it usually happened, a War-Party and a Peace-Party. The former, which reckoned among its numbers the Doge himself and a fair proportion of influential politicians, enunciated the opinion that, although it might be granted that the finances were disordered, and that success had not yet crowned their efforts, it was wiser to take high ground and to make no concession whatever. If they persevered, they were allowed to hope that fortune would smile upon them at last : for it was rarely that she had been known to forsake the Lion of Saint Mark. The resources of the Republic, were they not vast ; and the present cause, was it not a cause in which all Venetians should unite to serve their country ? To dream of sacrificing Dalmatia, was madness. It was a course which was alien alike from the dignity and interest of Venice. Her Adriatic provinces had ever been dear to her, and their preservation was now as material to her policy as it was indispensable to her commerce. It was idle to prate of the engagement of the King of Hungary, on the cession of those territories, to offer no impediment to trade, and to discountenance piracy. Dalmatia surrendered, they were at his mercy. It would be too late *then* to talk about promises and undertakings !

On the other side, it was pleaded with equal plausibility that the expenses of the war had already

imposed burdens on the people which it was beyond their power to bear; that a feeling of angry discontent was very widely diffused; and that a new campaign, with its inseparable adjuncts of new taxes and new levies, was emphatically out of the question. It was painful to lose Dalmatia, certainly; but the plain truth was that Dalmatia *was already lost*; and an honourable compromise, by which the integrity of the possessions on the *Terra-Ferma* should be secured, was undeniably preferable to a continuation of hostilities, by which farther disgraces and misfortunes merely were entailed. They were asked to exercise an option between two evils: War and Peace; and Peace was the lesser.

It was possible that the latter view was less chivalrous; but there could be small doubt that it was practically sounder. It was not against Louis alone and his jackal Carrara, unluckily, that the Venetians were obliged to guard. The sincerity of the Genoese policy was always gravely to be mistrusted; it was well known that the King had been long endeavouring to tamper with Genoese honour; and the advices, which had been lately transmitted from Candia of the internal state of that island, were far from being satisfactory. It was borne in mind, moreover, that the old year 1357 was approaching its close, and that in rather less than six months the Black-Sea trade would be again thrown open to Venice; and there was room to cherish an expectation that under brighter auspices the Republic might be enabled to reconquer the line of

coast which its geographical situation rendered so precious, and which four centuries of possession rendered so dear. Finally, between the March of Treviso and the Dalmatian littoral, between a territory contiguous to the lagoons and one separated from them by a wide gulf, there could be no choice. It was of vital essentiality that the former should belong to Venice, or at least should not belong to Hungary. Nevertheless, it was a hard struggle between conflicting passions and instincts; it was a trial of Venetian prejudice and pride, which wrang and embittered many patriotic hearts; and there was a lengthened and obstinate discussion among the Committee of Seventy-five Patricians who had been specially appointed to deliberate upon the momentous question, before it was decided that a pacification on terms which the King himself had named, should be accepted.

The conditions dictated by Louis were: 1, that the Republic should retain the Trevisan; 2, that she should renounce all titular¹ and possessory title to Dalmatia and to the whole line of coast, with a very few exceptions, from Quarnaro to Durazzo, and should recall her consuls; 3, that she should give up within three weeks the isolated places which remained in her hands in Dalmatia; 4, that the King should on the other part surrender all the conquests which he had achieved in Italy; 5, that he should guarantee to

¹ M. Villani (lib. viii. c. 30); P. Dolfino, *Annali Veneti*, p. 70 (King's MSS. 149).

Venice the full and undisturbed enjoyment of her commercial privileges in his new territory; 6, that he should suppress piracy to the utmost extent of his power. The treaty, which purported to be contracted between the King of Hungary, the Patriarch of Aquileia, the Lord of Padua, Albert and Maynard, Counts of Goricia, the Bishop of Ceneda, the Counts of Collalto, the Cities of Feltre and Belluno, and all others, the subjects, liegemen, and followers of Louis, on the one part, and Pietro Trevisano, Giovanni Gradenigo, and Benintendi da Ravegnani, Grand Chancellor of Venice, Syndics and plenipotentiaries of the Doge, on the other part,¹ was signed and sealed on Sunday, the 18th of February, 1358.² Its provisions, while they put an immediate term to the Hungarian war, shielded, for the present at least, from Venetian vengeance Francesco da Carrara.

The hour of retribution was postponed indeed; and peace with Louis was the forerunner of peace with Padua. Carrara was invited to pay a visit to the Venetian metropolis, where he might have an opportunity of superintending the details of the negotiation

¹ Sanudo (*Vite*, 651) gives the text of the document.

² "Cette même année," writes Sismondi (vi. 342), "fut signalée par le grand nombre de traités de paix qui furent conclus presque en même temps dans toute l'Europe. L'Angleterre fit la paix avec l'Ecosse, et le roi David Bruce fut relâché de sa prison; le roi Jean de France, prisonnier à Londres, conclut aussi avec Edouard III. d'Angleterre un traité qui ne fut pas ensuite accepté par son royaume; Pierre le Cruel de Castile fit la paix avec Pierre le Cérémonieux d'Arragon; la république de Vénise avec le roi d'Hongrie; les Visconti avec la ligue des seigneurs de la Vénétie; le roi Louis de Naples avec son cousin le Duc de Duras; enfin, les Perousins avec les Siennois."

in person. He resided in a palace which he owned, contiguous to the Church of San Polo.¹ The Signory, recovering by a convulsive and almost choking effort her wonted serenity of aspect and suavity of demeanour, consented to shake hands with her bitterest enemy over rivulets of patrician blood, and over the broken sceptre of Dalmatia; and a compact regulating the trade in salt, and disposing of all other points, was solemnly ratified on the 7th of June (1358²).

An amusing and illustrative anecdote is related in an almost contemporary historian³ of this war between Venice and Hungary. While Louis was commanding in person before Treviso in 1356, he was in the habit of spending the summer evenings on the banks of the Silis, at some distance from head-quarters; and there he was accustomed to read despatches, and to transact in solitude any business which he might happen to have before him. A Trevisan, named Giuliano Baldichino, noticing this practice, conceived an ingenious plan in his own mind for making the King prisoner, and delivering him into the hands of the Signory; and he told the municipal authorities of the city that he would accomplish the feat for 12,000 ducats, and the Podestat of Castelfranco. The Proveditors of Treviso referred him to the central government; and he accordingly presented himself to the College. But

¹ It was the same house which the Commune of Venice presented to his father in 1348. It cost the Republic 5,000 florins. See *Hist. Cortus* (lib. ix. ch. 16.)

² Romanin.

³ *Ad. Hist. Cortus. Addit. Secund. 949-50.*

upon being interrogated, he declined to explain the method which he purposed to employ; and he was dismissed as an impostor or a madman. After the conclusion of peace, however, an account of this strange affair having reached the ears of Louis, his Majesty begged the Republic to send Baldichino to him, as he wished very much to have an interview; and the travelling expenses of the mysterious individual were paid to Buda. He gained immediate access to the royal person. Presenting his credentials, he awaited the result in silence. The King hastily ran his eye through the document, and said, with an arch smile: "Are you the same who wished to deliver us dead or alive to the Venetians, had not your terms been rejected?" Throwing himself on his knees, Baldichino replied: "Most Serene Prince, I am." "Let me know, then, I beg of you," continued Louis, "how you meant to compass this matter?" The Trevisan unfolded his plan. He stated that he had designed to conceal himself among the rushes of the Silis, to watch his opportunity when the King turned his back to the river, to cast a rope round his neck, to drag him through the water to the opposite bank, and if he resisted, to strangle him with the noose. Louis expressed himself much diverted by the recital, and in great admiration of the audacity of the projector of such a scheme; and Baldichino was sent back with a present of horses and birds.

The late reconciliation was of the shallowest and most time-serving kind. Events succeeded which

shewed how readily the smothered flame might be rekindled. Carrara, restless, turbulent, wantonly aggressive, shortly commenced the erection of two fortresses: one on the Bacchiglione toward Chioggia, the second on the Brenta in the direction of the capital itself. To the former he gave the name of Castelcarro: the latter was christened Castelnuevo.¹ The step, which was fairly interpreted by the Signory as an implied or constructive menace, gave deep offence. But no explanation was demanded, and no notice was directed to the circumstance, beyond the creation as a counterpoise of a similar work of defence at Lizza-Fusina, in the vicinage of San Ilario. At this natural precaution, the Lord of Padua was immoderately incensed. He angrily declared that Lizza-Fusina was within his boundary; and he protested that the Venetians had no right to establish fortified lines at that point. Unable to procure redress, Carrara lost no time in strengthening his position by adding to the defences of Saracinissa, Santa-Croce, and other places; and a tendency on the part of the two States to drift into war became more and more apparent (1360). The embroilment, however, was saved from reaching a critical stage by an almost mutual backwardness to resume the offensive under present auspices. The Republic, harassed by pecuniary difficulties, and too full of the reminiscences of 1358, was not disposed, in the absence of the severest provocation, to draw the sword in such a cause. Carrara, viewing

¹ And. Gataro (Murat. xvii. 60-1).

with uneasiness the projects of the Visconti, was dissuaded, on calm reflexion, from entangling himself, till a better opportunity offered, in a quarrel which might not impossibily eventuate in an alliance between Venice and Milan, and in a partition of the Padovano. The Government of his Serenity gratified its spleen by ordering the Paduan delegates, who had been sent to parley about the point in agitation, to quit the Dogado: while the Carrarese, once more fixing on his visage the mask which he had partly raised, nursed in moody silence his deferred vengeance, and contentedly allowed the debt of unglutted hatred to accumulate.

The evacuation of Dalmatia under the treaty of February, 1358, naturally enhanced in the eyes of the Republic the value of those dominions which she still retained. At the close in 1339 of the war against the Scaliger, a treaty of partition was concluded; and the Trevisan was allotted to Venice. The validity of that treaty had never yet been disputed. The legitimacy of that cession was still unimpeached. But recent events left the Signory in a nice and sceptical humour. A delicate question arose in her mind, whether there might not be some flaw in the title of La Scala, of whom by a legal figment she pretended to hold. It was thought possible that the original usurpation of the Duke of Verona carried with it a heritable taint; and in a strange fit of nervous tremor, it was determined to seek a new investiture at the hands of Charles IV., with whom sufficiently amicable relations

had been hitherto maintained. The notions which were received in that age of the law of possession, were here contemplated in a strained form, and through a feverish medium. The spirit of feudalization had seldom been presented under a more curious phase, and the theory of capital tenure had rarely been illustrated in a more singular manner, than when the Venetian ambassadors, Lorenzo Celsi, Marco Cornaro, and Giovanni Gradenigo, waited upon his Majesty to prefer the request. Charles did not choose to wound the sensibility of his visitors by a flat and churlish refusal, but he posed them by annexing to compliance with their prayer certain exorbitant demands, which amounted to the same result. Thus the Republic compromised her dignity, and committed herself in the eyes of her Trevisan subjects, without serving in the remotest degree her material interests in the desired quarter. The right of conquest was the basis on which she had founded her occupation of the March down to the present date, and it was one which was thoroughly consonant with the spirit of the times. It was this basis and that right, upon which she was now obliged to fall back. The whole affair of the embassy, whether it originated with the Quarantia, the Decemvirs, or the Doge himself, appears to have been an error of sense or an error of judgment. It was only hard to say whether Venice in giving the Emperor the vantage-ground, or the Emperor in neglecting to seize it, was guilty of the greater folly and the more egregious blunder!

The Doge Dolfino, the short annals of whose reign

had been uniformly calamitous, did not live to witness any new troubles which the signs of the times might prognosticate. Dolfino, a true soldier at heart, was known as one of the most consistent members of the Venetian War-Party. He was aware to the full extent how ample and elastic were the resources of his country. He was always averse from any measure dictated by unworthy motives, which tended to sully her honour or to sacrifice her prestige; and it was with almost insuperable reluctance, and with the acutest pain, that he had put his sign-manual to the lamentable treaty of 1358. The Doge expired at eight o'clock on the morning of the 11th July, 1361.¹ It is said that Dolfino had latterly experienced the almost total loss of his eyesight. He had become partially blind even prior to his elevation.²

The recent wars with Genoa (1353-4-5) and Hungary (1356-7-8) had superinduced a scarcity of money and a dearness of prices; and the times were pronounced to be bad. Yet this distress was insufficient to check the progress of luxury among the higher classes, who were less sensible of the pressure; and it was thought necessary in 1360 to enact a Sumptuary Law. The measure, which had been preceded by one of a similar character in 1334,³ was the second step which the Venetian Senate had taken in that direction. The effect of the new legislation⁴ (May 21) was to limit the amount of marriage presents,

¹ Sanudo (*Vite*, 644).

³ Romanin (iii. 347).

² Ibid. (652).

⁴ Romanin (iii. *Documenti*)

to keep within more moderate bounds the taste for jewellery and the extravagant love of personal decoration, and to forbid parents to take their sons and daughters of tender age to parties and wedding-suppers, where the young ladies more especially imbibed precocious notions respecting pearl-earrings and jewelled headdresses. Spinsters were not unreasonably asked to restrict themselves to thirty pounds' worth of ornaments; and they received an encouragement to marry at the earliest opportunity by the privilege which they thus acquired of more than doubling their stock. From these provisions the Doge, the Dogaressa, and the Ducal family, were expressly exempted; and their operation extended neither to soldiers, judges, nor medical practitioners, who were permitted to dress themselves as they pleased.¹

To the throne vacated by Dolfino, no fewer than four competitors aspired. The proposed candidates were Pietro, the son of the former Doge Bartolomeo Gradenigo; Leonardo Dandolo of San Luca, the son of the illustrious Andrea;² Marco Cornaro of San Apostoli; and Andrea Contarini, one of the Procurators of Saint Mark. The Conclave was debating the rival claims, when a rumour was circulated in the courtyard of the Palace, that Lorenzo Celsi, recently appointed Captain of the Gulf, had made prize of some Genoese corsairs on the Cretan coast.³ A popular expedient was thus suggested to the Forty-one of solving the difficulty

¹ "Item licet cuilibet militi, judici, vel medico conventato posse portare quicquid voluerint in suis personis propriis."

² Caresinus (438).

³ Sanudo (fol. 653-4).

under which they were labouring ; and, setting aside all the names before them, they enthusiastically accorded their votes to the triumphant Celsi (July 16, 1361¹). Until the new Doge arrived from Candia, Marco Soranzo, the senior Privy Councillor, exercised in the usual manner the functions of Viceregent.

The reported victory over the pirates was in due course discovered to be a hoax.² It was a piece of intelligence, which some of the Doge's political supporters had probably fabricated for the purpose of tickling the popular ear. But there was more than one account on which the College did not choose to stultify itself ; and the somewhat droll incident, which had led to the election, was not suffered to affect its validity.

The successor of Dolfino was fifty-three years of age ;³ and his father, Marco Celsi, a venerable and respected patrician, was still living. Celsi had been at one time Podesta of Treviso, and he was a distinguished officer of the Navy. But he was principally known as a gallant and dashing captain of cavalry, in which capacity he had won considerable renown during the recent Hungarian war. His latest employment was as a member of the embassy to Charles IV., a year or two before. Raffaello Caresino, who was Celsi's Chancellor, describes him as a magnanimous and patriotic personage ;⁴ but he is said to have been of an imperious

¹ Caresinus, contemp. (fol. 428).

² Sanudo (fol. 654).

³ Sanudo (*Vite*, 660).

⁴ Caresinus, contemp. (428) ; Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 71 (King's MSS. 149).

and haughty temper. A fondness for animals and birds formed one of his characteristic traits. In horse exercise he particularly delighted; and he prided himself on the possession of the finest stud in Venice.¹ It was on horseback that he made his entry into that capital on the 21st August, 1361, and the twelve noblemen who composed his train were also mounted.

Almost immediately after the change in the Government, a vacancy occurred in the Procuratorial department; it was supplied by the appointment of Lorenzo's father.²

Contrary to the practice which obtained at some other courts of this age, it was the etiquette of that of Venice that all should uncover in the presence of the Chief Magistrate. To such an observance the elder Celsi felt, under the peculiar circumstances, an instinctive repugnance.³ He argued that the primary law of Nature made the child inferior to the parent. In the prince who now sat upon the throne, he saw only the son, whom he had nurtured and from whom he conceived himself entitled to expect reverence; and he sturdily resisted all invitations to conform to the secondary law of comity. Hereupon Lorenzo devised a felicitous expedient, which at once saved his father's scruples and vindicated his own dignity. In the centre of the berretta he artfully inserted a small carved image of the Passion; and old Marco was persuaded to pay

¹ Sanudo (fol. 660).

² Sansovino (*Cronico Veneto*, 1663, *ad annum*).

³ Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 71 (King's MSS. 149).

to the wearer of the Crucifix the homage which he had bluntly denied to the wearer of a crown.¹

The early days of Celsi were days of rejoicing in honour of two great personages, who paid visits to the Capital in the course of the same year. The first was the Duke of Austria, who arrived at Michaelmas. On learning his approach overland, and his friendly intentions being ascertained, the Signory despatched to Treviso a sufficient number of gala-barges to bring him and his numerous cavalcade down the Silis so far as San Giacomo Del Paludo, at which point it had been arranged that the Doge, with a suitable train of senators and patricians, should meet his Highness in the Bucentaur. The Duke entered Venice on the 29th September,² accompanied by no fewer than two hundred gentlemen-at-arms and thirty noblemen of his court, and bringing in his suite two of the three members of the Venetian Legation to Germany in 1358, Marco Cornaro and Giovanni Gradenigo, who had been detained on their homeward route without his cognizance, by the Castellan of Tench, in retaliation for certain injuries inflicted upon him during the Hungarian war, and for whose enlargement their Government had vainly interceded. The new-comers were accommodated in the vacant palaces of Leonardo Dandolo, Duke of Candia, and Andrea Zane, Podesta of Treviso,³ both of which were at San Luca, on the Grand Canal. Their stay extended to six days.⁴

¹ Sanudo (654-655).

² Sanudo (fol. 654).

³ Sanudo (655).

⁴ Ibid.

Celsi conducted his distinguished guest to all the noteworthy objects of his metropolis. His own matchless stud was hardly overlooked; and the noble pair were seldom seen except on horseback. On the 5th of the following December,¹ Pietro Lusignano, King of Cyprus and Jerusalem, reached the Lagoon by sea. His Majesty was similarly fêted. At his departure, on the 27th of the month,² Lusignano was escorted by the Doge to Malghera. The King was contemplating the organization of a new crusade, and he afterward bent his steps toward Avignon,³ in the hope that he might create in the breasts of the French monarch and His Holiness a more favourable impression than he had been able to create on the Government of his Serenity, which was in no humour for incurring fresh financial responsibilities in any visionary undertaking.

Yet the collective cost of these two celebrations was computed at 10,000 ducats;⁴ and there were members of the War Party who might reasonably ask why, if the Republic was really capable of launching into such expenditure upon comparative frivolities, she was so lately required to accept a peace which weakened her moral and material influence over a hundred leagues of the Illyrian coast, and to sign a treaty, the remembrance of which ate like a canker into the heart of Dolfino, and hastened his end?

Venice was no longer mistress of Dalmatia and the

¹ Sanudo (fol. 655).

² Sanudo, *ubi suprâ*.

³ Froissart, by Berners, edit. 1812, i. 275.

⁴ Sanudo (655).

Illyric Islands. But she was mistress of vast material resources, and of the finest marine and most concrete government in the world. Her constitutional stability and centralization were to Genoa untranslatable cyphers, and enigmas which baffled solution. Her naval strength was a glorious faculty, which Louis of Hungary coveted in vain. If she was true to herself, she was a match for combined Europe. There was no Power which was exhausted with so much difficulty, or which rallied with such astonishing rapidity and ease. No adversity shook her fortitude, or palsied her courage. She succumbed sometimes indeed; but from every fall she rose, like a second Antæus, with renewed vigour. She was the indestructible Hydra of medieval Italy. Even to her contemporaries she was a riddle and a paradox; her political philosophy was an occult science. The craft and subtlety of her statesmen were new in the history of modern governments; and in common with all novelties in human combinations, they were thought by some to carry a certain heretical taint. They thus met a liberal share of detraction and scepticism; but they received a still more ample share of encomium. The ignorant decried them, the speculative admired them, the judicious studied them.

It was a fine spectacle, and one of which Venice herself was the great archetype, in which a purely maritime country, setting aside its national traditions and specialities, was seen to collect its troops, to instil into the militiamen of the Six Wards and Chioggia the same martial enthusiasm, which inspired the souls of

the archers of England and the halberdiers of the Rhine, and to meet in the battle-field the first military power in Christendom, and the greatest of the early Magyar kings!

The Signory, sensible of a humiliating check, but not enfeebled, far less subdued, now seemed left, however, in the enjoyment of tranquillity. With Genoa and Hungary she was at peace, and the Genoese Counter-Revolution of November, 1356, in producing a breach with the Visconti, broke a dangerous coalition. Her differences with the Scaligers touching the navigation of the Po were adjusted (July 3, 1362). Her quinquennial treaty of commerce with Constantinople was renewed (March 15, 1362). Her rupture with Carrara was amicably closed, and the troublesome litigation regarding the proprietorship of San Ilario had been permitted to terminate in a compromise (July 6, 1363). With Tartary, Egypt, and other European or Asiatic States, whose manifold wants were the sinews of her trade, her relations had never been more firmly established. In the Levant, her position was strengthened by a matrimonial alliance (August 19, 1363) between the Doge's daughter and the son of the Hereditary Duke of the Archipelago.

It was so far, therefore, at an auspicious point of time and at a juncture rendered favourable by the absence of other pressing affairs, that the long fore-shadowed troubles in Candia broke out at last.¹

¹ Letter of Petrarch to Fra Bonaventura (*Opera*, 1501; *Epist. Senilium*, ix. lib. 4); Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 72 (King's MSS. 149).

Candia, since the epoch of its imperfect subjugation by the Signory, had been the peculiar seat of political distempers and intestine broils. Of late years, in truth, instances of open rebellion had become somewhat more rare. But the radical feeling of discontent and restless hankering after change were by no means allayed: while the sources of domestic feuds and dissensions, so far from having decreased, had multiplied. To the malevolence and acerbity which the Candiots had always entertained toward *Colonia Venetorum* were superadded the fierce hatred and jealousy which had recently arisen between the latter as followers of the Roman ritual, and the former as disciples of the Byzantine communion. The Calergi and other great Greek families, which had established themselves in the island during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, carried with them all the vices, without many of the virtues, of their countrymen. They shewed themselves for the most part exclusive, insolent, intolerant, and blood-thirsty. They were perpetually plotting or conniving at plots; and they had in an eminent degree the itch of intrigue. They prostituted their influence, which was collectively large, to the fomentation of discord and party-spirit. Many of them were revolutionary propagandists and phrenzied agitators, who organized themselves into secret societies, at the meetings of which the measures of the Ducal government were advisedly misconstrued, and its motives malignantly traduced. Unhappily, these Clubs were not exclusively composed of Greeks or Candiots.

Among their most active members they counted several Venetian malcontents, who had caught the dangerous infection, and had been contaminated by the preachers of sedition. Among these misguided accessories were Tito Veniero, an officer of the Navy, who had been violently piqued at the preference shown to Donato Dandolo in a recent promotion; his brother Teodoretto; Marco Gradenigo *Spiritello*; Marco Gradenigo *Bajardo*; Tito, Francesco, Antonio, and Leonardo, Gradenigo; Francesco Mudazzo; Michele Faliero; and many others who, from more or less personal motives, were unceasing in their declamations and cabals to animate their compatriots with the desire of independence.

The proximate cause of the insurrection, which had for some time been ripening and gathering to a head, was a tax, which the Duke Leonardo Dandolo had been advised to levy on the proprietors for the repair of the Port and Docks at Canea. Against this legitimate impost the Venieri, Gradenigi, Calergi, and others, raised a vehement outcry; and it was to no purpose that they were warned to beware of the consequences of disorderly proceedings. They demanded, in language which could not be mistaken, permission to send a deputation of twenty sages to Venice, who might lay their grievance at the foot of the throne; the alternative, and the sole alternative, was open revolt. Upon the delivery of this virtual challenge, one of the Privy Council of the Duke inconsiderately twitted the bearers of the message with a doubt of the

existence of so many wise men among their body; no attempt at conciliation or calm reasoning was vouchsafed; and that insulting taunt gave, as it were, unity of form to an agglomeration of volcanic atoms. There was an instantaneous call to arms. The Palace was assailed by a furious rabble, whose efforts were directed by numerous ringleaders. The solid strength of that edifice mocked, indeed, every attempt to force a passage through the gates; but an entry was effected from the roofs of the contiguous buildings; the terror, confusion, and dismay, were excessive. Tito Veniero, pitching his voice in the highest key, was heard among the crowd shouting: *Muora Il Traditore*. It was without any success that Dandolo, preserving his collected demeanour, commanded the insurgents to disperse, and threatened recusants with the penalties of the law; the uproar increased; the palace was soon in the hands of the malcontents and their partizans; and the Duke and two of his Councillors, who were in attendance, had the narrowest escape from being torn piecemeal by a rabid mob. By the strenuous exertions of some of their friends, they were conveyed, however, to places of security.¹

Candia was now a prey to anarchy. There was a panic throughout the island. All occupations were suspended; and all repose or tranquillity was at an end. The loyal Venetians, merchants, civil functionaries, mariners, operatives, who thronged on hearing the tumult to rally round the Duke, only came to find

¹ De Monacis, fol. 88 (Add. MSS. 8574).

themselves the victims of premeditated treason and the inmates of dungeons. They were overpowered, seized, and incarcerated.¹ Even a worse fate awaited many who had remained in seclusion at their country villas and who had stood altogether aloof. They were dragged from their places of retirement by the Greeks, and massacred in cold blood. The house of Andrea Cornaro at Mopsila, of Gabriello Veniero at Pulea, of Marino and Lorenzo Pasqualigo at Melissa, of Lorenzo Gritti at Pestria, as well as the dwellings of Zanachi Giustiniani, Leonardo Abramo, and numerous others, were entered by the minions of the Calergi, who butchered the proprietors, and pillaged the premises.² It was a reign of terror in Candia.

The revolt spread with electric rapidity. Canea, Rettimo, Sitia, and other fortified points, rose against the constituted authorities.³ The capital itself was confided to Tito Veniero; and a new general government under the auspices of Marco Gradenigo Bajardo was proclaimed. The Rebels consummated their flagitious crime by pulling down from all the flagstaffs the Lion of Saint Mark and by substituting the Banner of San Tito, the Guardian-Saint of the Candiots.

Meanwhile, the Doge Celsi had been placed in possession of all the facts. The Venetian Executive was naturally loth to employ the argument of the sword or to commit the Republic to a new Colonial War, until it had convinced itself that milder expedients were of no

¹ De Monacis (fol. 88).

² Sanudo (*Vite*, 656).

³ De Monacis (fol. 86).

virtue ; and two numerous and influential deputations were accordingly despatched to remind the Candiots of the uniform kindness which they had experienced at the hands of the Signory, to impress upon them that the tax, of which they complained as an undue hardship, was designed exclusively for their own benefit, and might therefore in fairness be exclusively borne by themselves, and to inculcate upon them the fatuity of resistance. The chief of the second legation, the Procurator Andrea Contarini, whose commission was dated the 12th of September, 1363, carried letters-patent from his Serenity to the principal landowners and feudatories, as well as secret instructions to the Duke and his local representatives. In a despatch addressed to Vettore Pisani, Governor of Canea, that functionary was emphatically enjoined to use his best co-operation, if it became unavoidable, in the coercion and chastisement of the rioters. This gentle and reiterated appeal of the mother-country in the interest of peace was lost upon hearers deafened to reason by an absorbing hallucination, and besotted by a few deceptive successes. The recollections and admonition of the Government of his Serenity were alike ridiculed ; its clemency was spurned ; and Contarini and his associates executed their mission at the imminent hazard of their lives.

The Signory, perceiving that her pacific advances were slighted and abused, proceeded forthwith to alter her tactics and to shift her ground. She saw that harsher measures were indispensable ; and such mea-

tures were soon in a forward state of preparation. The necessary troops, 1,000 picked cavalry, and 2,000 picked foot from Lombardy and the Romagna, had been procured. A squadron of thirty-three galleys, independently of transports, was almost complete in its equipments. A circular¹ was sent to several European Powers—among others to Louis of Hungary, Joan of Naples, and the Genoese—praying them to abstain from lending the rebels any countenance or aid; and this demand was met on all sides by an affirmative response. The choice of a generalissimo appears to have constituted a source of some perplexity, till Petrarch, who was now sojourning at Venice, suggested the great Veronese Condottiero, Luchino Del Verme, whose acquaintance he had formed at the Court of Visconti;² and the poet was asked to second the invitation of the Government to his distinguished friend. Petrarch wrote accordingly,³ and Del Verme was appointed⁴ (March, 1364). Shortly after his arrival, the general reviewed the mercenaries on the Piazza. On the 9th April, Pietro Morosini received his commission from the Doge as Governor-General of Candia in the room of Leonardo Dandolo; and on the following day, the expedition started from San Nicolo Del Lido under

¹ De Monacis, fol. 87 (Add. MSS. Brit. Mus. 8574).

² It was for this eminent soldier that Petrarch wrote the Treatise *De Officio et Virtutibus Imperatoris* (*Opera*, 1501).

³ This letter is not in the folio of 1501; but there is an allusion to it in one written to Fra Bonaventura on the 7th December, 1363, from Venice.

⁴ On the 1st April, 1364, we find Petrarch writing to Del Verme from Padua concerning “quæ summo duci sint necessaria,” *Epist. Senilium* (lib. iv. epist. 1).

the conduct of Domenigo Michieli of Santa Fosca.¹ It was not till the 7th May that Del Verme and his 3,000 Venturi, having sailed day and night, reached Fraschia, seven miles from Canea.²

In this interval, several potent agencies had been concurring to breed disunion among the insurgents, and to produce a tendency toward a counter-revolution. Many of the Venetian renegades, weighing the chances of success against the chances of failure, and finding that the latter preponderated exceedingly, began to stand shyly aloof, and to speak of a return to loyalty. Many who were no lovers of bloodshed were disgusted and alienated by the barbarous excesses of the Greeks, who were animated by a rabid Caloyer, named Miletos.³ Others, appreciating the hopelessness of the prospect, counselled a tender of the island and their own liberty to Genoa; and such an offer was actually (May 1, 1364) made to that commonwealth in the name of the Calergi and other political visionaries and fanatics. Comparatively few of the ringleaders, who had implicated themselves, perhaps, too deeply to recede, continued to propagate their inflammatory doctrines; but they succeeded in retaining in their service a considerable number of adherents by persuading the latter that their situation was not less desperate and forlorn

¹ These details are found, for the most part, in Lorenzo de Monacis, fol. 88, *et seq.* (Add. MSS. Brit. Mus. 8574), or in the printed copy of 1758, edited by Flaminio Cornaro; and in Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 72, *et seq.* (King's MSS. 149).

² De Monacis, fol. 89 (Add. MSS. Brit. Mus. 8574).

³ Lebeau (xx. 416).

than their own. When the fleet of Michieli arrived at Frascia, however, in the first week of May, the cause of disaffection had sustained from schisms and secessions no trifling moral damage.

The success of the Condottiero answered the most sanguine expectations of Petrarch and his other admirers. After an obstinate but brief resistance, Canea was the first to yield; and the example of the capital was contagious. The other places in the island hastened for the most part to offer their submission; and a few fastnesses only in the more inaccessible districts remained. Tito Veniero and his brother fled to Stromboli, the sequestered retreat of the Calergi; but the bulk of the insurgents took refuge in Scio, where they believed themselves safe from pursuit. Leonardo Gradenigo and Zanacho da Rizo fell into the hands of Del Verme or his officers, and were decapitated on the spot. Giovanni and Pietro Gradenigo were massacred by the country-folk. A price was set upon the heads of those who were known to be lurking in concealment.

“It was on the 4th June,” Petrarch, again at Venice, writes to his friend Pietro Bolognese, rhetorician, under date of the 11th August, 1364,¹ “at about the sixth hour of the day, as I was standing at my window enjoying the prospect of the open sea, in company with my old Frate, the present Archbishop of Patrasso, that one of the vessels which they call *galleys* enters

¹ *Epistola ad Petrum Bononiensem rhetorem, de Victoriâ Venetorum.* (*Epistolarum Senilium*, lib. iv. ep. 3; *Opera*, 1501).

the mouth of the port under full play of oars, and arrests our conversation. We at once augur good news of some sort or other. The masts of the ship are garlanded with flowers, and on the deck we can just discern youths of a gladsome countenance crowned with green branches, who are flourishing flags over their heads, and saluting their country as yet ignorant of the truth. An innocent impulse of curiosity brings the whole City down to the sea-shore.¹ As we draw nearer to the object, we see hostile standards trailing from the poop in the water, and it becomes impossible to doubt that the galley is a herald of victory. When the ambassador steps out of the vessel, the facts speedily transpire. The enemy has been conquered, slain, captured, put to flight; the citizens of the Republic have been rescued; the Cities have returned to obedience; the yoke has been again riveted on Crete; the victorious sword has been sheathed. The Doge Lorenzo, called truly *Celsi*, a man who, unless my partiality for him blinds me, is for his magnanimity, the suavity of his manners, his study of virtue, and, above all, his singular piety and warmth of affection, worthy of all commemoration, has ordered, before all other things, a thanksgiving to God."

Petrarch proceeds to describe the religious ceremonies in the Basilica, "than which," he says, "nothing, as I conceive, could be finer. Not only the native clergy, the government, the people, but foreign prelates and notabilities who are attracted or

¹ "Ad littus e tota urbe accursum erat."—*Epist. ubi suprâ.*

detained here, were present." Spiritual duties having been discharged, festivities succeeded. "The crowd was stupendous; there was not an inch of ground unoccupied. Yet," he tells Bolognese, "there was no confusion, no tumult, no ill-humour; all was agreeable, joyous, and smooth. There was magnificence without any breach of decorum, or of sobriety of behaviour. The games were held on the Square of Saint Mark, to which I question whether the world can shew anything at all equal." Of Tomaso Babasio, a Ferrarese, who had come to take part in the tournaments, and who afterward won the second prize,¹ the poet writes:—"Babasio who, to make him known to posterity—if indeed among them my name receive any lustre, or my word any credit—is to-day in Venice what Roscius was in olden time at Rome; to me he is as dear as was the other to Cicero."

"All classes, all ages, all professions," continues Petrarch, "were here to be seen. None were wanting. The Doge himself, and an enormous assemblage of persons, viewed the sports from an elevated platform in front of the church of Saint Mark, near the spot where the four bronze gilt Horses, of antient and excellent workmanship (whoever the author may have been), are placed. I, myself, invited as a guest, sat on the right hand of the Doge, and to screen the spectators from the heat and glare of the summer sun, an awning was spread over the stand. After the second day, I grew weary of the sights, and absented myself

¹ Mutinelli (*Annali*, 176).

on the well-understood plea that I was too busy to attend."

The galley of Soranzo thus arrived with its welcome tidings after a swift passage of eighteen days. The popular joy was effervescent. To the victorious general whom, in a letter dated the 11th June, 1364,¹ Petrarch hails as "the Cretan Metellus or the Veronese Scipio," a pension of 1,000 ducats was accorded. A triduan jubilee was decreed. "The jousts," says Sanudo,² "were held on the Piazza, but the festive boards were laid out in the mansion of the late Andrea Dandolo at San Luca, on the Grand Canal." The King of Cyprus was at this point of time returning to his dominions from France through Venice. Lusignano was persuaded to participate in the tournament; and he tilted with Luchino's son, Jacopo del Verme.³ By the athletic exercises and manly sports, in which the merchants of Venice delighted and excelled, Petrarch was particularly edified and charmed. For they denoted a chivalrous spirit, which the Laureate had deemed almost foreign to the Venetian character. The passages of arms on the Rialto demonstrated to him that the great people, among whom he had spent so many happy autumns, were no strangers to the martial predilections of the epoch, or to the generous and wide-spread influence of the Crusades.

¹ Ad L. del Verme gratulatio velocis incruentæque victoriæ (*Epist. Sen. lib. iv. ep. 2, Opera*, 1501).

² Sanudo (fol. 659).

³ Ibid. "The first prize," says Mutinelli, *ubi suprâ*, "was awarded to Pasqualino Minotto, a Venetian, the second, to the Ferrarese Babasio."

They served to convince the poet that there were seasons, at which the Ziani and the Tiepoli could wake from the day-dream of sordid commercialism, and forget the current rates of exchange on the Broglio or the price of Egyptian wheat; and when the members of the oldest aristocracy in Europe, encasing in steel their stalwart forms, could hold the lists against all comers!

But this glorification proved itself, after all, sadly premature. The breath of disaffection had been shortened, but it was not stifled. The Venetian ingredient in the rebellion was now comparatively small and insignificant; but the two Venieri and a few others still remained in the field: while the Calergi and the rest of the Greeks felt that they had too weighty interests at stake, or too slender a chance of mercy, to abandon lightly their high though insecure ground. Their policy and desire were to withdraw their island from the spiritual dominion of Rome and from the temporal sway of Venice; and they no sooner rallied from the somewhat staggering blow which the tergiversation or defeat of their Venetian accomplices had given to their courage, than they prepared, in concert with the brothers Venieri, to erect once more the standard of revolt.

The Republic, mischievously ensnared by the precipitate mission of Soranzo, perceived now with inexpressible vexation that her Sisyphean task was about to recommence. But the second act of the terrible drama was conducted on a different plan. Fresh troops

were shipped, and fresh proveditors were appointed (March 15, 1365). The most rigorous measures and the most unsparing severity were sanctioned. The voice, which had at first studiously modulated itself to accents of persuasion, awakened in tones of thunder. The Rebels were hemmed in and beleaguered by land and sea. Francesco and Antonio Gradenigo, Teodoro Veniero, and Marco Avonal, were captured and beheaded. The revival failed at every point. Sitia submitted (August 13, 1365). All the other haunts of treason and sedition were again recovered. Finally, on the 12th April, 1366, fell Anopoli, the last refuge and hope of the insurgents; and Georgius and Johannes Calergi, and Tito Veniero, who were found crouching and huddled together in a cave, were sent to the block. At the same time, the Executive Government of Candia was placed on an altered footing. Her walls were dismantled. Her strongholds were demolished. Every vestige of fortification was obliterated. Experience had taught the Republic that her best guarantee for the preservation of the colony lay in the defencelessness of the landowners and native nobility, and that the risk of external aggression was trivial in comparison with the danger arising from internal distempers.

The extinction of the Great Cretan Rebellion of 1364-5-6 was shortly preceded by the death of Lorenzo Celsi, which had occurred quite suddenly on the evening of Friday, the 18th July, 1365.¹ Celsi was in

¹ Sanudo (*Vite*, 660).

his fifty-seventh year. In person he was tall and athletic, and of a robust constitution. He appears to have been not less passionately fond of falconry than of riding. He often, too, whiled away a spare morning at the Mint, where he amused himself by watching the coining process. He was liberal to profusion, and princely in his tastes.¹ But his temper, like that of the unhappy Faliero, was hot, irascible, and overbearing; his disposition was not less aspiring than generous; and it was with unfeigned disgust and intolerance that he viewed the consistency of aim with which the Oligarchy had stealthily robbed the Ducal Prerogative of its primitive amplitude. By nature the son of the old Procurator Marco was as open and reckless as he was impetuous and choleric; the conditions of the Coronation Oath were repeatedly set at nought; and the Doge cared not to disguise his intention of carrying his reforms beyond the arrangement of his bonnet or the etiquette of his court. The notice of the Ten was unavoidably drawn to the constitutional anomalies and irregularities of which the Head of the State was constantly guilty; and it seems that a serious inquisition into the matter was already meditated when the object of suspicion was so abruptly removed by death.² It was then thought inexpedient to pursue the matter any farther, and the entries in

¹ Sanudo, *ubi suprà*.

² Nota che, se non moriva Lorenzo Celsi Doge, il quale avea 57 anni, e avea Dogato anni 4, *facera la fine di Marino Faliero Doge*, come ho veduto in una Cronica antica scritta.—Sanudo (*Vite*, 661).

their minutes relative to this singular affair were subsequently ordered by the Decemvirs to be cancelled.¹ On the 30th July, 1365, the Ten decreed that the new Doge shall be bound "to declare publicly at the first meeting of the Council that his predecessor was unjustly accused after his death of offences committed against the honour of the Commune of Venice, which charges upon examination *had proved to be false!*" The precise character of the charges which it was designed to prefer against Celsi is not found stated.

Three days after the decease of the Doge Celsi, that Marco Cornaro who had acquired celebrity ten years before by his leading participation in the events of April, 1355, was proclaimed his successor (Monday, July 21, 1365).

In the course of the passed few years, Petrarch had paid three or four visits to the metropolis. One of the latest occasions on which he honoured the City with his presence was in June, 1362, the year of the plague.² In its ravages the epidemic had been devious and sporadic; Venice herself enjoyed at present an exemption from the scourge; and thither consequently came Petrarch, in search of repose, from Padua, which had been already attacked. The Laureate was a lover of literature, and possessed what

¹ Romanin (iii. 251-2).

² The letter of Petrarch to Boccaccio, dated Venice, 8th September (1363), refers to this event. It is entitled, "*Ad Joannem Boccacium de hac peste ultimæ ætatis, et astrologorum nugis,*" and occupies nearly ten closely-printed columns of the folio of 1501 (*Epistolarum Senilium*, lib. iii. ep. 1). Petrarch returned to Venice on the 24th January, 1366 (*Epist.* edit. 1859).

was then considered a liberal tincture of antiquarian lore. His collection of books, which was acquired more frequently by donation than by purchase, had insensibly accumulated; in the estimation of the bibliomaniacs of that age, his library ranked high; and it afforded him a constant source of comfort and amusement. But, on the other hand, it was an unceasing care. He was in perpetual dread of losing his treasures by some unlucky fire, by damp, or by dry-rot; and as he grew older and feebler in health, he became solicitous of finding some repository, where they might be placed beyond the reach of all such casualties. In a conversation which he had once had with Giovanni Boccaccio, he spoke of bequeathing his acquisitions to some religious fraternity; but that notion had been abandoned, and a new idea suggested itself, upon which he formed a resolution to act forthwith. He determined to bestow them upon the Venetians, and to make the blessed Evangelist Saint Mark his literary heir. Having communicated on the subject with the Government of Lorenzo Celsi, he announced that, if safe and suitable accommodation was provided for his books present and future, and the Signory entered into an engagement to abstain from selling or dispersing them, he was prepared to confide and bequeath them unreservedly to the Republic. The Procurators of Saint Mark, to whom the point was referred for decision, reported favourably; on the 4th September, 1362,¹ the Great Council, in concert with the Forty

¹ Sanudo (*Vite*, 660); Morelli (*Operette*, i. 5).

and the College, decreed the acceptance of the gift on the specified conditions, *in honour and memory of himself* (Petrarch), *and for the delectation of the ingenious and of the Nobles of this city*;¹ and until a separate receptacle could be set apart for the collection, it was provisionally lodged in a loft in the roof of Saint Mark's Church, where the procuratorial² archives used at that time to be kept. Of this first contribution to the Public Library, which consisted of some interesting MSS. and a few Hours, it is questionable whether any vestiges whatever be extant. The Latin poem on the Marian Games by Pace Del Friuli, written about 1300, and dedicated to the first Gradenigo; the Latin version of the *Terapeutica* of Galen; and a French missal of the twelfth century, which there is an inclination to identify among a few others as remnants of the library of Petrarch,³ are of doubtful genuineness. Neither the *Dante* which Boccaccio presented to his friend, nor the copy of Quinctilian *De Institutione Oratoriâ*, which the Poet himself discovered at his birth-place in the winter of 1350, are known to have survived the ravages of time. It is pleasanter to think that the volumes may have been stolen or destroyed, than to believe that they were scattered or sold.


In the summer of 1363, Boccaccio joined the Laureate, and that illustrious pair spent together delight-

¹ Romanin (iii. 227).

² Morelli (i. 6).

³ Morelli (i. 7). He seems to establish that in point of fact the number of books which *actually came to the Republic was exceedingly small*, and that many volumes, after going through various hands, at length found their way into the Public Collections of Rome and Paris.

fully the months of June, July, and August. Petrarch was fond of Venice, and in the main, he was partial to the Venetians. He was attached to that insulated oasis by the choiceness of the site, by the sense of security, by the comparative salubrity and freedom from malaria, by the cheerfulness and amenity of the prospect which he enjoyed from his windows on the Riva degli Schiavoni, by the genial character of the people, and by the constant whirl of pleasurable excitement.

VENETIAN SHIP OF 1366.¹

“From this port,”² he writes, “I see vessels de-

¹ This representation is copied from Zanetti, p. 40.

² Campbell (*Life of Petrarch*, ii. 249).

parting which are as large as the house I inhabit,¹ and which have masts taller than its towers. These ships resemble a mountain floating on the sea; they go to all parts of the world amidst a thousand dangers; they carry our wines to the English, our honey to the Scythians, our saffron, our oils, and our linen to the Syrians, Armenians, Persians, and Arabians; and, wonderful to say, they convey our wood to the Greeks and Egyptians. From all these countries they bring back in return articles of merchandize, which they diffuse over all Europe. They go even as far as the Tanais. The navigation of our seas does not extend farther north; but when they have arrived there, they quit their vessels, and travel on to trade with India and China; and after passing the Caucasus and the Ganges, they proceed as far as the Eastern Ocean." But the civil liberty of the Venetians he neither understood nor appreciated; he decried it as the wellspring of a licentious and demoralizing liberty of thought and speech; and their schools of disputation, which were strongly tainted by the Averrhoesian tenets, he barely tolerated. "These free-thinkers," he says, "had a great contempt for Christ and his Apostles, as well as for all those who did not bow the knee to the Stagyrte. They call the doctrines of Christianity fables, and hell and heaven the tales of asses." In former days, the Philosopher of Arezzo had felt peculiar chagrin when he found that the Signory was not prepared to glorify

² Sanudo (fol. 775). On the Canal Grande at the Palace of the *Two Towers*.

him as the Prince of Diplomatsists as well as the Prince of Bards; but he could now afford to smile at the pedantic and puerile flippancy, which solemnly adjudicated the Aristarch of letters¹ *a good man, but illiterate.*² Petrarch, at this stage of his life, appears to have occasionally indulged in curious freaks, and to have been betrayed by his prying nature into droll weaknesses; and a diary of his residence on the Riva degli Schiavoni at the *Palace of the Two Towers*, which was now assigned to his use as the benefactor of the Republic,³ might have presented some interesting details. In one of his letters to the author of the *Decameron*, he retails a protracted dialogue which he had had with a celebrated atheist and blasphemer at Venice. He concludes by narrating how he ejected the unbeliever from his house.

The administration of Marco Cornaro, though brief, was not devoid of incident. That administration had during its continuance in power the gratifying task of pacifying Candia: while the metropolitan improvements, so long suspended, were resumed on a scale and with an activity, which were highly creditable to the Government of the Doge. At the same time, the Republic participated to some slight extent in a new Crusade

¹ Campbell (ii. 276).

² *Vita Fr. Petrarachæ a Hier. Squarzacico compòsita* (Op. 1501).

³ Squarzacicus (*Vita Petrarachæ*). "He dwelled," as he tells us himself, "in the *Two Towers*, where Luca de Molino, the son of the late Andrea, lives now, and every kind of honour was offered to him, which he declined, because 'nothing was more repulsive to him than pomp.'"—*Ubi suprâ*.

against the Sultan Amurath. But since the rapid aggrandizement of the Hungarian kingdom had threatened to develop such mischievous results, the fact was that Venice began to respect Turkey as a valuable counterpoise and as it were barrier to Magyar ambition ; and on this account her appetite for Moslem blood was growing much less keen.¹

Cornaro who, when he mounted the throne, was already an octogenarian, survived till the 13th January, 1368. The successor of the magnificent and ambitious Celsi is represented also to have been of a powerful build and of a commanding presence,² though from age slightly stooping in his gait, and of polished and courtly breeding. His worldly means were not large, and he had married a commoner ; and these two circumstances, taken into connexion with his very advanced years, had operated so strongly on the minds of some of the Electors in 1365 that out of one and forty votes he received only twenty-six. Yet, being the first Prince who, after a protracted interval, had been enabled to cultivate with any assiduity the arts of peace, and to promote the material interests of his country, his memory was cherished by the Venetians.

In the nineteen or twenty years antecedent to the death of the Doge Cornaro, changes had been wrought in the Venetian Constitution almost of equal con-

¹ Lebeau (xx. ch. 115, edit. 1836).

² Sanudo (*Vite*, 662): "Fu di gran prudenza, e grande di persona. Avea bella faccia e presenza."

sequence to those which were effected in the half-century prior to 1339.

The times were altered for the better, perhaps, since the First Magistrate of Venice was permitted to enjoy all the latitude and licence of unfettered power, to deride every constitutional restraint, to trample on the liberties of his country, to burn monks for keeping mad dogs, to crush the independent action of the clergy, to raise himself to the throne, polluted perchance by the blood of his predecessor, on the bucklers of an armed faction, to hold his dignity at his pleasure or at their caprice, and, after a lengthened reign, to descend from his curule chair, and to resume the pursuits of horticulture, or by penitent abnegation to soothe the qualms and twinges of a wounded conscience. He was no longer a Unit with cypher Councillors and a slavish Convention; but he was the central figure and pivot of a system, in which he was scarcely a free or independent agent. His hereditary instincts were silenced, and his aristocratic attributes were fast becoming mere matters of history or oral tradition. The Idol of Monarchy was thrown down from its antient pedestal, and in its room was set up that Idol of Oligarchy, which had drunk the blood of a Faliero, and was not very far from demanding the blood of a Celsi.

The innovations which were made in this branch of the Constitution by a cumulative process between 1172 and 1339 may be treated as having been more numerous than important; those which found their

way into the Promission from 1339 to 1368 were more remarkable, on the contrary, for their importance than for their number. At various epochs, clauses had been inserted in the Oath, which prescribed, vaguely enough, that the Doge should not overstep the legitimate bound and compass of his jurisdiction, which restrained the corrupt dispensation of justice and patronage, and which narrowed, in many particulars, the basis of the prerogative, and swept away certain insufferable abuses which had furtively crept into the practice of the Crown. But it was reserved for other men, and for another generation, to declare that¹ the Doge was incapable of renouncing his office without the concurrence of his Privy Council and a majority in the Great Council (1339); which denied his competence to give decisive answers to any one on affairs of State, and to receive foreign envoys (1339), or even his own ambassadors returning from missions abroad (1354), in the absence of a certain proportion of the College; which required that, at the invitation of the Great and Privy Councils, he should be prepared to abdicate within three days under penalty of forfeiture of his property (1365); and that he should dispose of all the family estates upon his accession to power (1368²). A most novel and curious restriction,

¹ Romanin, *passim*.

² But it was not merely by the reforms which the Promission itself underwent, that the authority of the Crown was diminished. For the development of the administrative system, and the complete revolution which had been silently accomplished in the Executive Government of Venice, necessarily operated in the same direction. The Communal

trenching not so much on the political power of the Crown as on the political freedom of the nobility, was now introduced into practice. This disability, which was directed against the constitutional mischief calculated to arise from a refusal, under an endless variety of frivolous subterfuges, to accept the proffered berretta, was not embodied in the Promission of 1368; but it was conceived and exercised for the first time in the case of the Procurator Andrea Contarini, who was chosen by the unanimous suffrages of the Forty-one on Monday evening, the 20th January, to replace the defunct Cornaro. Contarini, on being apprised of his election by Vettore Pisani¹ and fifteen other deputies who came to seek him at his farm at Gamberere, on the Brenta (where he was engaged in grafting his espaliers and in tying up his vines), declined to undertake the responsibilities of office, alleging that while he was formerly in business as a merchant in Syria a soothsayer had augured "that if he ever became Doge of Venice, Venice in his time would experience untold disasters." Nor could he be persuaded to submit until a more peremptory message, coupled with a hint as to the sequestration of his property in the event of contumacy, had been conveyed to him by one of the Avogadors. The

Bench (*Giudici del Comune*), the Avogadors, the Criminal Quarantia, the Sages of the *Terra Ferma*, the Board of Trade, the Comptrollers of the Fisc, Mint, and Customs, the Senate, the Chancery, the Committee of War, and lastly, the Council of Ten, tended each, in its respective way, to control the power, in the exercise of which the Doge had originally had neither rival nor partner.

¹ *Mem. di V. Pisani* (30-1).

new Doge, who had so reluctantly torn himself from his rural retreat, accompanied Pisani and the rest of the deputation to Chioggia; at that port the august party took gondola for San Clemente, where the Buc-centaur was in waiting; and Contarini and his retinue entered Venice amid the joyous acclamations of the people on the afternoon of Monday, the 27th January, 1368.

The gloomy vaticination of the Syrian Dervish, which had ostensibly formed the main ground of Contarini's backwardness to assume the reins of government, was not slow to receive what might appear to credulous minds a striking fulfilment. The first year of the new administration was a year of new troubles. The revolt of Candia was closely succeeded by the revolt of Trieste, which had been a Venetian fief and tributary since the time of Arrigo Dandolo (1202), but which, at the secret instigation of the Dukes of Austria, had been constantly, though more particularly of late years, attempting to shake off its insular yoke. It happened in the autumn of 1368, that one of the vessels attached to the Gulf squadron captured and towed into the port of Trieste a local smuggler, laden with salt which had not paid duty. In the night-time, a successful attempt was made to rescue the contrabandist; and in a deadly fray between some of the inhabitants and the crew of the coastguard vessel, the sopra-comiti of the latter and several other Venetians were killed. This catastrophe made the delinquents tremble for the consequences; the vengeance of the Captain of

the Gulf or of the Republic herself was reasonably dreaded; and in anticipation of such a result, the municipal Council sent simultaneously a demand for pardon to Venice and a prayer for help to Vienna. The Government of the Doge, which had long desired to consolidate its position in this quarter, agreed to overlook the offence upon certain conditions, which Contarini enumerated through the medium of his envoy, Luigi Faliero (August, 1368). But advices of a different complexion had been already transmitted from Vienna. In reply to the note addressed to him, the Duke earnestly dissuaded the Council from submission, and promised it, in case of necessity, his active and prompt assistance against the Signory. A choice thus lay between two courses; the Council adopted the more hazardous; and Trieste threw itself into the arms of Austria. To get rid of the Venetian ambassador was no difficult task. A quibbling objection was raised to the terms which that functionary had brought; he was told that the Council preferred to incur all the risks of a war to the degradation "of hoisting on holidays the Lion of St. Mark;" and Faliero, after experiencing the most insulting treatment, made his exit from the town at the peril of his life. The gross affront offered to the Republic in her representative, and the knowledge of the rank duplicity of Trieste, hurried the affair to a climax; the mediation of the Emperor Charles was of no possible avail; and war became the sole alternative (Sept.—Oct. 1368). In addition to Austrian co-operation, Trieste was soon

allowed to look upon Aquileia as an ally; but the activity and resources of Venice rendered her more than a match even for such a coalition.

The hostile operations had commenced late in the year; and nothing of consequence was done till the spring of 1369. The blockade of Trieste was then regularly formed. But the fighting between the Venetians and the Austrians was confined throughout the summer and autumn to harmless and indecisive skirmishes; without a collision, however slight, hardly a day passed. Toward the return of winter, the Patriarchal contingent not having yet arrived, the Venetian Proveditor, Taddeo Giustiniani, thought the season too far advanced to delay any longer in bringing the Austrian Commander to an action. On the 10th November,¹ a battle was fought, in which the Austrians were totally defeated with the loss, in officers and persons of quality alone, of six hundred and fifty;² and the moral depression produced by this master-stroke, together with the increasing pressure of famine and the approach of severe weather, drove the Triestines to a capitulation eight days later (November 18³). On the 28th of the same month,⁴ a treaty of reconciliation was concluded, by virtue of which the Republic was restored to her rights over the city and its district, and the former swore renewed and inviolable fidelity to its legitimate suzerain. On the 20th October in the following year, peace was signed between Venice and Austria after a

¹ Caresinus, contemp. (fol. 433).

³ Caresinus, *ubi suprâ*.

² Sanudo (*Vite*, 671).

⁴ Caresinus.

tedious negotiation, by which the latter relinquished for ever all her claims upon Istria, in consideration of the payment of 75,000 ducats by three instalments. The ratifications were exchanged at Vienna, and the instrument was published in the course of November, 1370. To obviate the recurrence of a Triestine insurrection, Venice at once laid the foundations on a commanding site of a new fortress, which she christened *the Castle of San Giusto*.

But a new breach with Francesco da Carrara was impending; and the pacification with Austria was well-timed. In contemptuous disregard of the reiterated appeals of the Signory, this prince, not less audacious than wily and treacherous, had continued not only to preserve his menacing attitude, but to construct new palisades and earthworks of defence at Oriago and Moranzano toward the lagoons.¹ The Venetians bitterly complained of this manifestly hostile and aggressive policy;² they felt that these gigantic preparations on the skirts of the Marshes could injure no other Power, and therefore could threaten no other Power; and they repeatedly urged Carrara to weigh the propriety of a disarmament. But the latter offered nothing but compromises; a few towers merely were

¹ *Hist. Cortus. Addit.* (ii. 983).

² A circumstance is related in the *Hist. Cortus. Addit. Primum*, 965-6, which illustrates the relative posture of affairs about this period. A Venetian, having seduced a married woman of that city, eloped with her to San Ilario; they were pursued; the Podesta of Padua, asserting that San Ilario was within his jurisdiction, ordered the Venetian officer of justice to be decapitated, and the Republic obtained no redress, Carrara justifying the Podesta.—Sanudo (*Itinerario*, 22).

dismantled; and the Government of Andrea Contarini, having crushed the Candiot and Triestine seditions, and considering that the Treaty of February, 1358, was nullified by the acts of the Lord of Padua himself, determined, in spite of the strenuous opposition of a certain party in the Councils, to postpone no longer the blow, which it had for some time meditated (1371). The requisite measures and financial resolutions were immediately adopted. Fresh Proveditors were commissioned; three thousand Venturi were taken into pay; and the first draught of troops had already effected its landing on the prospective theatre of hostilities, when a concerted movement was made among the other Italian Powers, seconded by Hungary, to prevail upon the belligerents to submit their disputes to arbitration. The trick was sufficiently shallow. But Venice, though ready at all points, was unwilling to incur the odium of wantonly flinging away the chance of peace; Carrara, whose preparations were still incomplete, and who was in secret correspondence with Louis on the subject of an Hungarian invasion of the Venetian territories, was only too happy to embrace the prospect of a respite; and an armistice for two months was mutually conceded. The arbitrators, of whom five were Venetians, and five were Paduans, wasted their time, however, in idle cavilling and word-catching; the latter appeared to have no other mission in reality but to temporize; and the truce expired resultlessly. The Lord of Padua found himself reduced, nevertheless, to a puzzling predica-

ment; the expected succour from Hungary had not yet arrived; Louis promised much, but his promises were not yet fulfilled; and Francesco began to be diffident of his capacity to grapple singly with the Power, which had so lately crippled Austria and prostrated Trieste. But he was seldom at a loss for expedients. In order to create a diversion for a moment from the Padovano, and to give the Hungarians time to join him, the Carrarese conceived a design hardly paralleled in its atrocity and turpitude.

There was a certain friar at Venice, named Benedetto degli Eremitani, or of the Order of Hermits.¹ This ecclesiastic, who appears to have been a man of venal and chicaning character, Carrara made his tool. Benedetto was hired to bribe certain members of the Pregadi and other Councils, and to plan the murder of three patricians, who were thought to be most inimical to the Lord of Padua, Lorenzo Dandolo, one of the Chiefs of the Forty,² Pantaleone Barbo, and Lorenzo Zane; while his employer sent some bravoës under two confidential agents, Nicolo Vignoso and Bartolomeo da Gratario, to carry out his views, as well as at a suitable opportunity to set fire to the residences of other noblemen more or less antagonistic to his interest, and in the confusion to poniard the proprietors. Vignoso and his crew came to Venice without suspicion in the beginning of May, 1372, and took up their quarters in different localities, where they were in least danger of being observed;³ the details of the plot were

¹ Navagiero (fol. 1053).² Sanudo (fol. 776).³ Ibid. (fol. 672).

rapidly shaped and matured ; and the diabolical scheme was on the eve of execution when, at the last moment, it was frustrated by the revelations of two courtezans,¹ who were cohabiting with some of the bravoos at a house of ill-repute kept by an old procuress,² called *La Gobba*. These women from some paltry motive turned evidence against their paramours ; and in the course of the first week in May,³ the secret was divulged to the Decemvirs. The informers were detained. Vignoso, Gratario, Gobba, and her son Bartolomeo⁴ who, as it appeared, had been the medium by which the cut-throats were familiarized with the persons of their intended victims, were immediately traced to their haunts ; and the truth was wrung from the two former by torture.⁵ The wretched miscreants criminated their employer, and mentioned by name those whom the Carrarese had employed them to corrupt. These were Pietro Bernardo, Privy Councillor ;⁶ Luigi Molini and his son-in-law⁷ Leonardo Morosini, members of the Pregadi ;⁸ and Marino Barbarigo, one of the Chiefs of the Forty.⁹ The accused were forthwith taken into custody by a special warrant from the Ten, and were put to the question. A full avowal of the black charge was extracted. The affair was speedily ventilated. Conjecture was at once rife. Sundry

¹ Romanin (iii. 244).

² Sanudo (*Vite*, 672). These details are found, with some variations, in G. Gataro (fol. 85).

³ Compare Caresinus, contemp. (434) with Sanudo, *loco citato*.

⁴ Caroldo, *Historia*, lib. viii. p. 214 (King's MSS. 147).

⁵ Sanudo, *ubi suprâ*.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Romanin (iii. 244).

⁹ Sanudo, *ubi suprâ*.

thrilling tales stole into circulation. It was studiously reported by some, who could desire no better opportunity of bringing the Carrarese into odium, that every cistern in the capital had been poisoned; and soldiers were actually stationed at the reservoirs and wells to prevent the public from partaking of the infected water. Others, shuddering with fear, asseverated that a dark conspiracy had been set on foot for destroying the Signory and reducing Venice to a heap of ashes. The alarm became almost a panic. The Civic Guards were doubled. Patrols were directed to pace the streets; and the water-police were enjoined to exercise the utmost vigilance. Persons were forbidden to leave their houses with weapons in their hands or at their sides. All ingress into Venice and egress from the City were jealously watched.¹

The arrest of Vignoso and the other emissary of the Carrarese was followed by that of their subordinate accessories. The treatment which they experienced was condignly summary. Vignoso was decapitated. His colleague was condemned to ten years' imprisonment, preparatory to transportation.² The rest suffered according to their supposed degrees of complicity. Some, after being dragged at horses' tails through the streets,³ were hanged between the Red Columns, and then quartered (May 10⁴). Nor in dealing with the implicated patricians was the Decemviral Council less inexorably severe. Bernardo was

¹ Romanin (iii. 244.)² Ibid. iii. 244-5.³ Sanudo, *Vite de' Duchi* (A. Contarini).⁴ Caresinus, contemp. (434).

sentenced to a year's imprisonment and to perpetual exclusion from all the Councils. Barbarigo, Molini and his son-in-law, and the Friar, were incarcerated for life.

This villanous attempt at assassination and incendiarism fired the blood of the Venetians; the most furious indignation was manifested against the real author of the crime; hostilities were expedited; and the Venetian troops under Reniero del Guasco, a Sienese soldier of fortune, whom the Republic had taken into pay, having destroyed all the fortifications contiguous to the lagoons, penetrated into the Padovano (November, 1372), and spread desolation through the entire district. Del Guasco established his headquarters at Monte-Albano.

But the Signory was not fortunate in her generalissimo. The Sienese proved himself less docile and amenable than the illustrious Del Verme; a difference arose between him and one of the Venetian Proveditors, Domenigo Michieli, in consequence of his wish to cross the Brentella and besiege Padua itself, in opposition to the views of the Proveditor; and Del Guasco, toward the close of 1372, threw up his command. This untoward proceeding, which drew upon Michieli a stern rebuke from the Senate, and procured that officer his recal and a heavy mulct, occasioned considerable inconvenience and delay; the vacancy was not supplied till the 3rd of March, 1373; and the Paduan general, taking advantage of the weakness and embarrassment of his adversary, attacked Monte-Albano,

burned a portion of the encampment, and carried fire and sword to the very ramparts of Treviso.

Additional encouragement was afforded to the enemy by the near approach of 5,000 Hungarians under the conduct of the King's nephew, Stephen, Waiwode of Transylvania. It was the aim of the Paduans to effect at the earliest moment a junction with the Waiwode, and to seek to crush the Venetians by a combined movement; and to support this strategy the Carrarese himself left his capital on the 6th of May (1373), at the head of about 1,500 cavalry.¹ To avert such a peril as that which now appeared imminent, the Venetian Proveditor in charge at Monte-Albano, Taddeo Giustiniani, who had already earned laurels by his victory over the Austrians in 1369, attempted to throw himself between the two armies, with a view to beating them separately. For this purpose he shifted his position with great rapidity, and posted himself at Narvesa, near the banks of the Piave. It was a daring manœuvre; and it did not succeed.² In an engagement which seems to have taken place about the 12th of May between the Hungarian van, 1,000 strong, and such of his own forces as in the celerity of his movements he had been able to bring up, the Venetian, after making a gallant stand and rallying twice, experienced a sharp repulse. Many lives were lost; many prisoners were taken;

¹ Gataro (*Ist. Pad.* 162).

² Gataro, *Compendio della guerra di Chioza scritta da D. Chinazzo* (Add. MSS. Brit. Mus. 8583, fol. 7).

and Giustiniani himself was in the number of the latter. The gallant Proveditor was sent to Padua, where he met with no ungentle treatment; and by his eloquent representations of the resources of his country the Carrarese was persuaded to offer terms to the Doge.¹

Before it entered on the discussion of a question of such gravity, the Great Council resolved to exclude from its deliberations all persons below the age of thirty; and those who came within that category were desired thereupon to withdraw.² The order was murmuringly obeyed; a strong feeling of disgust was excited; and the eliminated patricians remained in the exterior vestibule, where they indulged in loud and indecent clamours. "We all know perfectly well," they bawled outside the door of the saloon, "why you seek to shut us out. It is only because you want to patch up a peace with the Carrarese against our will and without our consent, in deference to the King of Hungary! But you shall not do it!" The Council, scandalized at this unbecoming and indiscreet conduct on the part of their younger colleagues, addressed a complaint to the Senate; and some examples having been made of the most culpable among the riotous legislators, the rest returned to good behaviour; and after a short interval, the temporary decree of exclusion was revoked. Their suspicions touching the object of the extraordinary step,

¹ Romanin (iii. 243-4); Bonfinius (*Res. Ungaricæ*, Dec. ii. lib. x. 354).

² A. Gataro (*Ist. Pad.* 154); G. Gataro (folio 153).

which had so sharply wounded their sensibility, proved themselves after all to be totally unfounded. For the answer conveyed through the Doge was that the Republic would not sheathe her sword, unless the Lord of Padua should agree to bear the expenses of the war, to cede Curano and Oriago, to demolish all the remaining forts and earthworks which menaced the security of the Signory, or trenched on her domain, replacing the same at no future time, and to ask pardon in person, or by substitute, of the Doge.¹ Francesco, knitted in close alliance with Hungary, and in daily expectation of the arrival of the Austrians, who had pledged themselves to give him their active and zealous support, was not unintelligibly amazed at these conditions; and he at once threw back his half-withdrawn stakes into the lottery of war. Operations recommenced forthwith. At Fossa-Nuova, a second defeat was sustained by the arms of the Republic.²

But this double disaster, so far from disheartening the Ducal government, stimulated it to fresh exertions. The army of the Padovano was powerfully reinforced; and a new generalissimo, Pietro dalla Fontana of Santa Maria Zabenigo,³ assisted by Leonardo Dandolo as Proveditor,⁴ was placed at its head. Fontana inaugurated his assumption of the command by a spirited address to the troops; and having distributed through the ranks spiked clubs and long barbed

¹ Romanin (iii. 244). See also Galeazzo Gataro (fol. 131).

² Romanin (iii. 244).

³ Gataro, contemp. (*Ist. Padov.* 158).

⁴ Navagiero (fol. 1054).

poles, which were peculiarly calculated to make havoc among the Hungarian cavalry, he led his soldiers against the victors of Narvesa (July 1st, 1373). The result of this novel and ingenious stratagem was surprisingly signal. The Waiwode and his mounted followers were astonished at the apparition of a legion of club-men and pole-bearers; before they could reach their antagonists with their swords, or even with their lances, their horses were killed under them; the Hungarians were thrown into a confusion from which they could not rally; and their rout was complete. Stephen himself, the bulk of his officers, and about 1,200 men, were captured¹ in the action, and removed under escort to Venice, where they found every kindness and attention. Apartments were assigned to the Prince in the Palace; his companions in misfortune were lodged at San Biagio;² the best medical and surgical aid was procured for the sick and wounded; and to each of the humbler prisoners a ration of four loaves of bread was daily allotted.³

The gratification of the Signory at the issue of the second battle of Fossa-Nuova was intense; a jubilee and thanksgiving were ordered; and the Venturi received double pay. The event hastened the close of the War in dissolving the Hungaro-Carrarese coalition, and in exposing Padua to the triumphant Fontana. Louis, ceaselessly importuned by his brother to accelerate the exchange of prisoners, which alone could

¹ Bonfinius (*Res. Ungar. Dec. ii. lib. x. 354*).

² Romanin (iii. 244-5).

³ Romanin, *loco citato*.

restore the son of the latter to liberty, and inspired by the parent of Stephen with an incipient distrust of the ambition and ulterior views of the Italian prince, now wrote to Carrara, signifying his intention of concluding peace with the Venetians. The Paduan found himself forsaken and without a friend. He felt that he had been betrayed by Hungary. Family treason and popular discontent assailed him at home. He had discovered a plot, which his brothers Marsilio and Nicolo were forming against his life, and of which he suspected the Venetian Senate to have some cognizance. It was under such pressure that he embraced in September the terms which he had spurned in March.¹ A select and mixed commission was appointed to determine the boundary line between Venice and Padua; Carrara engaged to take part with the Signory in any future Austrian War; and a space of fifteen years was allowed him for the payment of the 290,000 ducats, at which the Venetian Government assessed its disbursements. The captives were released on both sides; and the Waiwode of Transylvania was exchanged for the Proveditor Giustiniani² (November, 1373).

In the course of her arduous struggle with Louis, which culminated in the celebrated Treaty of 1358, the Republic was fortunately enabled to contract her loans at an uniform rate of seven per cent., which was probably considered cheap. But an almost consecutive

¹ Andrea Gataro, contemp. (*Ist. Padov.* 193-4-5-6); *Hist. Cortus. Addit. Secundum*, 983; *Chronicon Regiense*, contemp.; Murat. xviii. 81.

² Galeazzo Gataro *Padre*, contemp. (folio 197).

series of hostilities from 1356 to 1373 produced a certain commercial stagnation; the Venetian market became less elastic; money grew scarcer and dearer; and in the Carrarese war just terminated the price had gradually risen from seven to twenty per cent. This exorbitant scale of interest naturally rendered the pacification of September, 1373, as agreeable to the Government as it was popular among the more heavily-taxed portion of the community.

The treaty having been signed on the 22nd September, the ceremony of asking pardon of the Signory, conformably with one of its provisions, was performed by Francesco Carrara *Novello* as the proxy of his father. The young man, who had started from Padua on Tuesday, the 27th September,¹ brought with him the now venerable Petrarch, who had, at the earnest desire of Francesco the Elder, unwillingly agreed to accompany his son on such an equivocal errand.² On Sunday, the 2nd October,³ the Prince and the Bard were ushered into the Great Council Saloon, where it had been arranged that the formality should take place. Both made a profound obeisance as they approached the throne, on which the Doge sat in State surrounded by the peers and senators of Venice. Appearing once more after a long interval in his favourite character as the apostle of peace, the Laureate proceeded to deliver a florid and elaborate oration in advocacy of concord among mankind; and at its conclusion, his

¹ A. Gataro, contemp. (*Ist. Padov.* 195).

² Galeazzo Gataro (fol. 195). ³ Gataro, *ubi suprâ*; Sanudo (*Vite*, 677).

companion sinking on his knees, demanded forgiveness of Contarini and the Republic.¹ His Serenity benignly replied in set phraseology, that the Venetians freely and joyfully condoned the grave offence; and in adding, *Go, and sin no more, neither thou, nor thy father*, he begged the suppliant to rise and be seated. Petrarch, who was now in his 69th year, did not long survive this embassy; and his rhetorical diatribe in the Great Council Hall against war became appreciable as a valedictory address to Venice and to Italy. He expired somewhat suddenly on the 18th July, 1374.² Not Arezzo, his natal place, but Arquà, where he died, holds his ashes.

The Republic was now permitted to enjoy a transient repose (1373-6); and her rulers again sedulously applied themselves to the advancement of her internal welfare and the consolidation of her foreign relations. Her outstanding treaties with Britain, Egypt, and Constantinople were renewed; and the position of her subjects in those countries was secured and ameliorated. In 1374, England and Portugal were summoned to give satisfaction for injuries sustained by Venetian merchantmen. About the same time, certain impediments to the commercial intercourse with Verona were removed by diplomacy; the pretensions to the dominion of the ocean were vindicated against the tentative

¹ Pancrazio Giustiniani (*De Venetæ Aristocratæ Gestis Liber*, sign. c. 4; Ven. 1527, 4o).

² *Ad. Hist. Cortus. Addit. Secundum* (984); *Vita Clarissimi viri Francisci Petrarchæ per Hieronimum Squarzacicum Alexandrinum composita* (Opera, 1501).

encroachments of Ancona, Fermo, and Ascoli; and to a communication from the Pope, touching the free navigation of the Gulf, an answer was returned, "that Venice, not being an agricultural country, depends entirely upon her external resources; that ships are her caravans and the ocean her highway; and that it is not only essential to her own vital interests that the sea should be under the protection of the Lion of St. Mark, but that the suppression of piracy and smuggling, in which she spares no expense and labour, is in point of fact a matter in which the whole commercial world is concerned."

It seems to be demonstrable that the supreme and exclusive jurisdiction claimed by Venice over the Adriatic, its littoral, and the circumjacent waters, though possibly recognised by no parchment, was tacitly admitted and allowed from the earliest times on grounds of expediency; and that from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century, such a jurisdiction formed part of the Common Law of the high seas. The right was envied in many quarters, and continually invaded. But it was never successfully disproved, and seldom successfully withstood.

The struggle between the old medieval forms and the modern constitutional theories of government, the crudeness of political science, the imperfect recognition of public and private right, and the conflict and uncertainty of dynastic claims, kept Europe during the fourteenth century in a constant state of perturbation. It was an unhappy phase of an inchoative civilization,

which was throwing the Signory into perpetual collision with those neighbours, whose system was military and essentially aggressive.

Venice was emphatically a maritime Power. But she had not merely maritime interests to consider and protect. The territory, which she had acquired by treaty in 1339, was now hardly less material to her political integrity than Trieste was material to her commerce. Both the Province and the Port were therefore preserved at every cost. In 1369, the latter was reconquered in defiance of all the forces of Vienna and all the arts of Paduan chicanery. Eleven years before, Dalmatia itself had been sacrificed to the retention of the March of Treviso.

But Louis was perfectly aware, that Dalmatia had not been surrendered without an acute pang; and he was conscious that the opportunity, not the inclination, was wanting to wrest from his grasp the province which he so dearly prized, and which he had so dearly won. That occasion seemed to be even now at hand. The Republic was at peace with all the world. By the Treaty of 1373, she had closed the Carrarese war on advantageous terms, and had secured for herself three years of profound repose, during which she had been untiringly engaged in developing her resources, and promoting her internal prosperity; and it was to be more than suspected that at no distant day Venice would overtly essay the reconquest, to which she was known to be already preparing the way by intrigue.

The King was no longer what he had been in 1356.

Twenty years had brought with them grey hairs and an impaired constitution. His own life was uncertain. He was unable to answer for his successors. It was on this account that he had been indefatigable in stirring up the old enemies of Venice against her, and in creating new ones. It was on this account that he had supported the unfathomable and inscrutable Carrara, and had favoured the designs of Austria upon Trieste. Louis felt that it was fatuous to await, under the shadow of a false security, a blow which, come when it might, was as certain as destiny. It was necessary to parry it by a counter-plot; and it appeared to him that the sole method by which such an object could be compassed, was the pursuit of a policy of extermination. He was convinced that, in the heart of her capital alone, Venice was to be conquered, and that in Italy only Dalmatia was to be preserved. Such sentiments the Hungarian monarch employed in reasoning with himself; and such maxims, conveyed in the most emphatic and unvarnished language,¹ soon found their way into the pages of his confidential correspondence with Vienna, Padua, and Genoa. To Leopold who, by the death of Albert, had become sole Duke of Austria, the proposition for fattening his hungry troopers upon the smiling plains of Lombardy could not but be acceptable; and against that temptation the treaty of 1370 and the 75,000 ducats

¹ Gataro, contemp. (*Ist. Padov.* 147, 153), gives the text of two letters written by Louis to Carrara. The first is dated the 7th of February, 1374. The second is without date; but it was delivered to the Lord of Padua on the 4th of April in the same year.

weighed as a straw in the balance. To such a project Genoa was no prudish or unwilling listener; and in the course of 1375, the first outline was sketched of a league between Hungary, Genoa, and the Carrarese “for the destruction and humiliation of the Commune of Venice and all her allies.”¹

Venice was too great not to have many enemies. Surrounding nations naturally viewed with malice and heartburning in so small a city so powerful a commonwealth. It roused a prurient jealousy to see the empire of the Venetians, in apparent defiance of adversity, prosper and increase. Above all, it violently excited their spleen to observe that the Republic, not content with building the largest ships, with employing the ablest seamen, and with asserting a naval supremacy which was not less anomalous than offensive, was beginning to obey the dictates of an insatiable ambition by competing for military glory and territorial aggrandizement with the Turk and the Magyar. It was not that Venice was peculiarly perfidious in her statesmanship: for none of her contemporaries was more rigidly observant of diplomatic and other engagements. Nor was it that she was more unscrupulously aggressive in her policy than others: for her possessions were held, for the most part at least, by unusually legitimate titles. But the truth was, that she was too great, too opulent, and too proud.

¹ Letter of the King to Carrara, 7th February, 1374.—A. Gataro, *loco citato*; Galeazzo Gataro *Padre* (fol. 235).

Neither Padua nor Genoa, however, threw down at present the gauntlet to the Republic. The former still thought it prudent, in the absence of any certain intelligence respecting the advance of the Hungarians, to save appearances by professing amity and peace. No indications of a marked kind had yet manifested themselves of a breach between Venice and the oldest of her antagonists; and Genoa was a prey to twenty factions. Hungary itself was obliged to keep a vigilant eye on the Sultan Amurath and his Tartar allies; and Dalmatia, groaning under a taxation¹ which made the Venetian rule appear the mildest of pastoral institutions, also occupied to a large extent its attention and resources. In the spring of 1376 Austria therefore took the field alone. In the middle of March,² Duke Leopold penetrated, with 4,000 cavalry, exclusive of foot,³ through the unguarded Pass of Quer, into the Trevisan, and, establishing his head-quarters in the Bishopric of Feltre,⁴ committed dreadful ravages over the whole country.⁵ This inexcusable perfidy, of which the Signory had received some previous intimation from the Count of Collalto,⁶ did not take her

¹ Wilkinson's *Dalmatia and Montenegro*.

² *Ad. Hist. Cortus. Addit.* (ii. 984).

³ Gataro (*Istoria*, 222).

⁴ Gataro (224).

⁵ Gataro (226).

⁶ When Louis of Hungary unsuccessfully besieged Treviso (in 1357), Collalto had served under him with great distinction, and it is to the sagacity of that Prince that the Count's subsequent line of politics may be referred. "I have an esteem for you, Collalto," said the King to him one day, after his retreat to Buda; "remember the advice which I am going to offer. Never be guilty of quarrelling with neighbours who are more powerful than yourself, under the hope of being assisted by a distant

altogether by surprise, and she was consequently on the alert. The Austrian possessions in Venice were seized as a material guarantee, and the persons of their owners were detained in hostage. Troops were transmitted with all possible expedition to Treviso; and the Proveditors in charge were empowered to adopt any measures and to incur any outlay, which might be requisite in the defence of that position. Other places in Istria and the Frioul were strengthened and reinforced with similar despatch. Urgent messages were directed to Verona, Ferrara, Milan, and Padua; and Carrara was reminded of the obligations which the treaty of 1373 imposed upon him. To this quadruple appeal the Marquis of Este alone returned a straightforward and practical response. The answer of the Carrarese, who was at a loss how to act, was shuffling and self-convicting; while from the Visconti hollow promises only were elicited.

The Venetians, however, in concert with a few auxiliaries under Simone Schiavo whom Este had placed at their disposal, behaved, on the whole, with exemplary bravery and devotion; and the faithful Collalto also rendered some service to the Republic. At Treviso itself, the Podesta Pietro Emo and his proveditorial staff maintained their ground with unconquerable pertinacity; and Marino Soranzo, advancing with a detachment of troops as far as Feltre, made

ally. It is quite as dangerous as having your house on fire, while water is out of reach." The Count perceived the wisdom of the aphorism, and from that hour attached himself firmly to Venice.—*Sketches from Venetian History*, 1831, vol. i. p. 288.

himself master of the town and important defile of Quer, or Guero, and thus cut off the Austrian line of retreat (June, 1376¹). But by an unaccountable piece of negligence, the Venetian officer subsequently allowed his prize to slip through his fingers; the defile, which was of the highest strategical value, was recaptured by the enemy, who planted at that point two strong redoubts with guns; and the Government of Contarini, incensed at the carelessness of Soranzo,² punished him by fine and temporary exclusion from employment (July 10, 1376). The assault upon Quer was remarkable, if on no other account, for the first use in Italy of *bombards*, a new species of projectile, which was loaded with gunpowder, and from whose bore were launched with incredible force, stones and other missiles. Thirty years before, the bombard, or cannon, had been already introduced into the English artillery-service by Edward III.; but the properties of gunpowder were familiar to the Moors, the French, and the Spaniards at least in the previous century.³ It is therefore an erroneous supposition that its employment at Crecy in 1346 dated a new era in the annals of European warfare. "It is," says a writer, who was almost a contemporary of the events he describes,⁴ "a great

¹ A. Gataro (*Istoria*, 224).

² Redusio (*Chronicon Tarvisinum*, Murat. xix. 735); *Hist. Cortus.* (xii., note 15).

³ Filiasi, *Ricerche*, 225; Zanetti, *Origine di Alcune Arti*, 35.

⁴ Redusio (*Chronicon Tarvisinum*, fol. 754). "Quibus quidem bombardis tunc lapides eructantibus homines putabant desuper Deum tonare." Petrarch (*Opera*, 1501) speaks of the use of bombards as early as 1343. *De Remediis Utriusque Fortunæ*, lib. i.

instrument of iron, with a hollow bore in its whole length, in which a black powder, made of sulphur, saltpetre, and charcoal, is placed, and above that powder a round stone; and then the powder, being ignited through a touchhole, the stone is discharged with enormous force."

Immediately after the vexatious and mortifying loss of Quer, the Signory determined to open operations on a larger scale, and to bring into play that novel arm of the military service, the *Venturo*; and Nicolo Morosini was despatched with all speed to Faenza to engage Sir John Hawkwood and his *Tard Venùs*. This celebrated Soldier of Fortune was a native of Heddingham, in Essex. His father was a tanner; and it is said that the son was originally bred to the needle. But he soon relinquished in disgust that ignoble calling, and adopted the lucrative profession of arms, in which he had won spurs and a world-wide fame. The demands of Sir John, who was at this moment profitably occupied in quelling a rebellion in the Ecclesiastical States, were thought, however, too exorbitant; and in his stead Morosini procured the services of Jacopo Cavalli, a Veronese Condottiero and his company¹ at a monthly stipend of 700 gold ducats.² These costly preparations, which sounded the shrill key-note of war, broke the more than suspicious reticence of the Carrarese; and that refined hypocrite and polished dissembler at once sought to divert the threatened

¹ Gataro (226).

² Romanin iii.

storm from his own territories by volunteering (August 6¹) to guard the Pass of La Scala with 400 horse and 300 foot.² Otherwise the enlistment of the Cavalli Company did not seem to bring any commensurate results. The only mentionable exploit was the bombardment of San Vettore in August. During the rest of the year, hostilities were conducted with fluctuating and nearly-balanced success. Cavalli, though sufficiently intrepid and active, appears to have been somewhat of a loiterer, and to have wasted a good deal of time in reconnoitring ground for battles which were never fought, and in surveying sites for redoubts which were never used. The Company were dissatisfied with the Government, and the Government was dissatisfied with the Company. In September, the former demanded double pay and the full licence of rapine, before they would storm Feltre; but the Senate refused both the one and the other,³ and got rid of the mercenaries at the earliest moment.

The sole means, by which the Austrians could have hoped to hold the Trevisan through the winter, was by gaining a great victory or by reducing Treviso itself; and no such good fortune was in store for them. Treviso remained impregnable; the Veronese general disputed with them every inch of ground, and turned every strategical mistake to advantage; as the cold weather set in, food and forage fell short; the intense frost in the beginning of the year had already carried

¹ Romanin, iii.

² Ibid.

³ Redusio (fol. 755).

off a large number of troops;¹ and on the whole Leopold thought it the wisest plan to solicit or accept, in the latter half of October, the intercession of Louis with the Republic. The Doge and his advisers, deciphering the signs of the times, and divining the true nature of the war which was being waged against their country, prudently resolved not to let such an opportunity slip of withdrawing from a comparatively puny contest, in order that they might hold themselves in readiness for the far greater struggle, which it foreran and prefigured; and an armistice, by which both belligerents retained their respective conquests, was arranged on the 3rd November till Whitsuntide following, then terminable, or by mutual consent capable of extension till Pentecost, 1378.

Long antecedent, however, to the last-named date, the political horizon had assumed an aspect, and a multiplicity of circumstances had manifested themselves, which rendered the Contarini administration and the Senate excessively solicitous to eliminate Austria from the list of their open enemies; and all the arts of Venetian diplomacy had been therefore directed to this point. In the autumn of 1378, a second treaty was solemnized between the Signory and Duke Leopold, by which Venice set at liberty her hostages, released the Austrian property from sequestration, and gave up all the acquisitions of Austria in Feltre, as well as the fortress of San Vettore. These were hard terms; but they were the best which she could obtain. On

¹ Sanudo (677).

Tuesday, the 19th October, peace was proclaimed at all the markets and churches of Venice and Treviso.¹

The reconciliation with Austria was certainly most opportune. For the symptoms, which portended a coming tempest, were daily growing more grave and unmistakeable. The motives, which actuated the Venetian policy toward Austria, will be elucidated by a general survey of the events which were influencing the Republic in other directions.

The island of Cyprus, so choicely situated as an emporium and station for the commerce of the Mediterranean, was a spot on which both the Genoese and Venetians had cast for some time a greedy and longing eye; and the equipoise established by the reciprocal jealousy which was entertained of such an acquisition by the rival Powers had alone perhaps arrested the downfall of the feeble dynasty of the Lusignani. The trading entrepôts formed by the emulous Commonwealths at Nicosia and Famagosta, the two capitals of this tiny monarchy, enjoyed approximately similar privileges; but it was rarely that the reigning king was sufficiently strong or sufficiently judicious to refrain from patronizing one settlement in preference to the other. The predilections of the late prince, Peter I. had been Genoese; and throughout his reign, more especially toward its close, the Genoese Factory obtained a marked ascendancy in the Island. At his decease, however, the crown devolved upon a minor, who fell under the tutelage of his uncles; and the latter at

¹ Redusio (fol. 756); Gataro (*Istoria*, fol. 227).

once betrayed an equally decided bias to the Venetians. At a banquet which was held at Famagosta after the coronation of the Boy-King, a question of etiquette was raised between Doria, the Genoese consul, and Malipiero, the Venetian Bailo, as to which should sit at table on the right hand of Peter II.; this disputed point of precedence begat high words; and words led to blows, and blows to bloodshed. The Regency had delivered its award in favour of Malipiero; the Cypriots soon espoused the same cause; and a riotous multitude, pouring into the dining-hall, proceeded, among other acts of violence, to throw Doria and several Genoese, who had been previously engaged in pelting the Venetians with bread and meat,¹ out of the windows.

The resentment of the outraged country was keen and prompt. A Genoese fleet, under the brother of the Doge Fregoso, disembarked 15,000 men on the island, entered into occupation of Famagosta, levied enormous contributions, and concluded by laying the crown under an annual tribute of 40,000 florins.² This melodramatic incident was the source of much scandal and recrimination; but a crisis was happily avoided. For Venice, not unconscious of the critical phase into which events were passing, was unwilling to compromise herself by any ill-advised step: while Genoa, whose share in the secret coalition was already marked out, had the

¹ Sanudo (fol. 678). "Our consul," relates the same writer, "was attired in a scarlet robe, lined with miniver, which reached to the ground; and so were all the other Venetians."—(fol. 678).

² Vincens (*Hist. de Gènes*, ii. 8).

best of reasons for not desiring to enfeeble her resources by a premature and unseconded effort; and the result was, that conciliatory messages were exchanged. The rescript of Contarini to the note of the Doge Fregoso bore date the 6th September, 1376. The diplomatic branch of these transactions was conducted upon the part of the Republic by Marco Giustiniani of San Polo; and the relation of his embassy, which this gentleman was invited, when he returned to Venice in the course of 1377,¹ to deliver before the Senate, forms the earliest instance of a resort to a custom which, happily for the cause of historical literature, was subsequently observed with peculiar strictness. When their Annals shall hereafter be re-written on truer foundations, not only Europe, but Asia, will find that there is no source to which they are more deeply indebted than the *Relations of the Venetian Ambassadors*.

But a second cause of offence was speedily super-added to the former; and it constituted a grievance which, occurring at a point of time when the measures of the Triple League were more ripe for execution, Genoa knew how to turn to good account.

Tenedos, lying in the Archipelago at an easy distance from the Chrysoceras, was a prize which the Venetians, more especially since the decline of their political influence at Constantinople, had ardently coveted. During the last Genoese war, and so far back as 1355, the Signory demanded leave to occupy Tenedos provisionally, as a military station, on payment of 2,000

¹ Romanin (*Stor. Docum.* iii. 256).

ducats; but the Byzantine Government of that day declined the assumedly insidious proposal. Again, in 1363 or 1364, the negotiation recommenced, but without the slightest success; and from that time the affair remained in abeyance till 1375, when an opportunity was taken to moot once more the cession of Tenedos, for which the Doge offered 3,000 ducats and the redemption of the imperial crown-jewels from pawn.¹

The throne of Constantinople was filled at this juncture by Calojohannes V., whose monstrous inhumanity was eclipsed only by the hebetude of his intellect and the penury of his finances. This prince, after making the circuit of Europe in the vain quest of allies against the Turks, returned to his capital to punish a conspiracy against his throne and his life in the heart of his family by depriving his heir Andronicus of his eyesight, and throwing him into a dungeon. But at the end of two years, the Genoese of Pera favoured a revolution, by which the elder Palæologus was deposed, and Andronicus, restored to freedom, was elevated to power (August 1, 1376²). For this service the factory dictated its own requital; imperial gratitude involuntarily evinced itself in a chrysobole, by which Tenedos was transferred to the Doge and Commune of Genoa. But an unforeseen difficulty supervened. The Greek governor of the island, ignoring the succession of

¹ The Emperors of Constantinople appear to have been not unfrequently in the habit of pledging their jewels.—See *Sanudo* (fol. 773).

² Chinazzo (*Guerra di Chioza*, 711).

Andronicus, resisted the formal summons to surrender his trust; and the Tenedots, arriving at a sense of the danger of their situation, formed, at the instigation of a Venetian merchant, Donato Trono,¹ the hazardous and decisive resolution of placing themselves under the protection of the Lion of Saint Mark.² A collusive understanding was thence assumed to exist between the Governor of Tenedos and the Venetian admiral on the station; and on the motion of the Genoese, the Emperor made reprisal by incarcerating Pietro Grimani, the Bailo, and all the other subjects of the Republic at Constantinople.²

The formal acceptance of Tenedos, which appeared to be tantamount to a declaration of war against Genoa, and the reference to arms of the outrage offered to its representative, were points on which the Venetian Senate was slow to arrive at a decision; and an endeavour was made in the first instance to feel the temper of the rival Commune and of the Byzantine Court. But the offices of diplomacy were of small avail; the question only became more entangled and less susceptible of a bloodless solution; the escape of Calojohannes from prison, through the instrumentality of some Venetians³ who bribed his guards, imparted fresh bitterness to the irritation of Genoa and Andro-

¹ Chinazzo (fol. 712).

² A. Gataro (fol. 229).

³ A romantic adventure, of which Carlo Zeno, a Venetian, is the hero, is related by some historians in connexion with the escape of the Emperor. But it is not found in Caroldo, or any of the Byzantine annalists, who could have had no interest in suppressing it, or in Redusio and others; and it is discredited by Romanin.

nicus ; the former Government, while it professed in courteous phraseology a regret for the share, if any, which its compatriots had borne in the outrage upon Grimani and his fellow-citizens, definitively refused to listen to any proposition for the relinquishment of Tenedos ; and the option of peace or war existed at length no longer.¹ The Venetians clenched the matter by sending a garrison to Tenedos, accompanied by a Bailo Antonio Veniero, and an official staff ;² and a Græco-Genoese squadron, which attempted to effect a landing, was driven back with great slaughter.³

While Genoa, ulcerated by a score of petty factions, was grimly calculating the chances of the Triple Alliance, and was planting by anticipation the flag of Saint George on the tower of the Campanile, Venice, profoundly sensible of the danger which impended, was beginning to bristle with arms, and to reverberate with martial sounds. The preparations of the Government of Contarini were on a commensurately ample scale. A new loan was contracted under the sanction of the legislature. A promise of assistance was obtained from the Marquis of Este. An alliance, offensive and defensive, for four years was formed with the Lord of Milan ; and the daughter of Barnabo Visconti was affianced, through the medium of the Venetians, to the young King of Cyprus. Proveditors were appointed

¹ Chinazzo (*Guerra di Chioza*, 713) relates that Carrara, in anticipation of war, bought up sufficient provisions and salt in the Venetian market for five years.

² Andrea Gataro *Figlio* (fol. 230).

³ Chinazzo (fol. 712) ; Galeazzo Gataro *Padre* (fol. 230).

to report upon the affairs of Treviso, Padua, Romania, Genoa, and Istria; and others were charged with drawing up statistical tables of the public income and expenditure.¹ The fortification of the March of Treviso, and of the lagoons, was prosecuted with redoubled activity. Venturi were enlisted. All persons liable to serve in the Navy were ordered, under penalty of fine and imprisonment, to inscribe their name on the registers opened at the Chamber of Armaments, and to indicate the galley on which they desired to embark. These lists were distributed into classes; and the first, second, and third divisions were at once called out on active duty. On the 20th April, 1378, Carlo Zeno, a patrician who had gained a high reputation in various capacities, and who had just been recalled from the Trevisan, where he was conducting some military operations of minor importance, received the responsible appointment of Bailo and Captain-General of Negropont; and two days later, Vettore Pisani was invested in the Basilica with the supreme command of the fleet by the Doge himself. "You," exclaimed Contarini, in delivering to the admiral the great banner of Venice, "are destined by God to defend with your valour this Republic, and to retaliate upon those who have dared to insult her, and to rob her of that security which she owes to the virtue of our progenitors. Wherefore we confide to you this victorious and dread standard, which it will be your duty to restore to us unsullied and triumphant."²

¹ Romanin (iii. 262-3).² Ibid. (iii. 263.)

On the 24th April, Nicolo di Chioggia, notary of the Ducal Court, was sent to Genoa to make the formal declaration of war;¹ and on the same day Pisani sailed from Lido.² His object was to intercept Luigi de' Fieschi, who was understood to have quitted the waters of the Riviera with ten galleys,³ and whose suspected destination was Tenedos. The commander left Venice with fourteen galleys in company; but he expected, that reinforcements would be forwarded to him, if necessary, from Candia and Negropont.

¹ Caresinus, contemp. (444); Chinazzo, contemp. (fol. 714); Redusio contemp. (fol. 758).

² Chinazzo, *ubi suprâ*.

³ Redusio, *ubi suprâ*.

CHAPTER XX.

A.D. 1379—1383.

Antecedents of Pisani—Defeat of the Genoese at Porto-d'Anzo (May 30, 1378)—Simultaneous Operations of Carlo Zeno—Battle of Pola (May 7, 1379)—Victory of Luciano Doria—Prosecution and Imprisonment of Pisani (July 7)—Resumption of the Negotiations with Louis—Their Failure—Advance of the Genoese on Venice—Precautions of the Government—Chorography of the Lagoons—Situation of Chioggia—Blockade of the Lagoons—Siege and Fall of Chioggia (Aug. 11–16)—Firmness of the Government—Diplomatic Efforts—Their Futility—Preparations of the Venetians for Resistance—Compulsory Liberation of Pisani, who is appointed Captain-General (Aug. 20)—Character and Person of Pisani—Devotion of the People—Fortification of the City—Unsuccessful Attempt of the Allies on Venice (Aug. 24)—The Genoese return to Chioggia—Desperate Posture of Affairs at Venice—Dearth of Food—Expedition to Chioggia under the Doge and Pisani, his Lieutenant (Dec. 21)—Strategical Plans of Pisani—Blockade of Chioggia—Misery of the Venetian Troops—Approach of a Crisis—Biographical Account of Carlo Zeno—His Arrival (Jan. 1, 1380)—Recovery of Brondolo (Feb. 19)—Danger of Zeno—Hopeless Condition of the Genoese—Arrival of a Genoese Fleet to their Relief and its Chase by Pisani (May 14–26)—Various Expedients of the Enemy—Negotiations for Peace (June 1–9)—Surrender of Chioggia (June 24)—Lingering Duration of the War (July, 1380–June, 1381)—Death of Vettore Pisani (Aug. 13, 1380)—His Funeral—Appointment of Carlo Zeno as Captain-General (Aug. 28)—Treaty of Turin (Aug. 8, 1381)—Admission of Thirty Plebeians to the Great Council (Sept. 4, 1381)—Death of the Doge Contarini (June 5, 1382)—Michele Morosini, his Successor (June 10)—Character of Morosini—Anecdote of him—His Death (Oct. 15)—Antonio Veniero, Doge (Oct. 21)—Entry of Veniero on his Functions (Jan. 13, 1383).

VETTORE PISANI, whom the Republic had made the keeper of her honour and the arbiter of her fortunes at the outset of a struggle which threatened to be lengthened and arduous beyond all precedent, was the

son of that Nicolo Pisani of San Fantino,¹ who had attained such eminence during the last Genoese war. Vettore was born in 1324,² and was now in his fifty-fifth year. His earliest employment had been under the Government of Andrea Dandolo, when he embarked in 1354 as a subaltern on the little fleet of Marco Michieli.³ In the following year, he obtained command under his father at Portolongo; and he was one of the few who escaped capture after that fatal action. From 1355 to 1361, he continued to serve with distinction in the navy. In the latter year, being at Venice momentarily out of commission, he was sworn of the Electoral College, which made choice of Lorenzo Celsi, Captain of the Gulf, in the room of Giovanni Dolfino,⁴ and he was fortunate enough to secure for himself the vacancy, which his vote had helped to create.⁵ In 1364, while the torch of civil war was blazing in Candia, Pisani was despatched to the capital of that island as Governor in the name of the Republic;⁶ and it is reported by his biographer,⁷ that he there betrayed the boxing propensities of his younger days by striking Pietro Cornaro, a Proveditor of the Commune,⁸ from whom he happened to dissent on some matter of routine. In 1368, he was one of a deputation of sixteen persons⁹ sent to desire the presence of Andrea Contarini, with whom he was distantly

¹ *Memorie di V. Pisani*, p. 3; Ven. 1767.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* p. 6.

⁴ Sanudo (*Vite*, fol. 653).

⁵ Sanudo (654); *Memorie*, p. 17.

⁶ *Memorie*, p. 25.

⁷ *Ibid.* 25-6.

⁸ *Memorie*, 26.

⁹ Caresinus, contemp. (432).

connected, in the City which had proclaimed him her Chief Magistrate; and it is said that Vettore in the vehemence of his temper employed even comminatory expressions in inducing the Doge designate to accept the office.¹ Subsequently to the accession of Contarini, his relative had been engaged in various capacities as naval officer, military engineer, diplomatist, which opened to him an admirable field for the development and display of his resplendent and versatile talents. In such an illustrious and experienced personage the Government reposed the most ample share of confidence, which it was possible for an Oligarchy to extend to a kinsman of the Doge and a favourite of the people.

Pisani pursued his course along the Ligurian coast so far as Porto-Pisano, and menaced Genoa by sea at the same time that the Marquis of Caretto,² Lord of Finale,³ who at the instigation of Visconti had espoused the Venetian cause, threatened it by land. The consternation of the republic was undisguised. Noli, Castelfranco, Albenga, had fallen already into the hands of Caretto. The common cry was, that a large Venetian fleet was in the immediate neighbourhood of the Riviera, and that the *Stella* Company under Milanese colours would soon be at their gates. There was a panic. The Doge was deposed. Another, more popular or more competent, was elevated in his room. It was solemnly resolved, that it behoved all good

¹ *Memorie* (31-2, 174).

² *Stella, Annales* (1108).

³ *Romanin* (iii. 264).

citizens to merge their party differences, and to coalesce against a common foe.¹

But Pisani, questioning the feasibility of any such design as was ascribed to him, had retraced his steps; and in front of the promontory of Antium, or Porto d'Anzo, he found himself upon the track of Fieschi.² It was the 30th May.³ The day was extremely squally.⁴ The sea was violently heaving. The horizon was skirted by low black clouds, which seemed almost to court the kisses of the tall waves. It was raining in torrents. So severe was the gale, that out of fourteen sail Pisani was able to manœuvre only nine. Fieschi had originally had ten, but one which strayed from its companions was dashed to pieces against a breaker, and the two forces were thus equalized.⁵ The engagement was one of the most singular which had ever been fought on the ocean. Even to come into contact was exceedingly difficult, and boarding was all but impossible. At one moment, a Venetian and a Genoese galley might be seen juxtaposed in full action; at the next, the former was lifted like a nutshell to the topmost crest of a mountainous billow, and its late antagonist was buried in a yawning cavity. At the close of a terrible and trying day, however, the advantage remained with Pisani. Five of the enemy's vessels only escaped. The rest and 800 prisoners, among

¹ Vincens (ii. 11, 12, 13); Varese (iii. 317).

² Romanin (iii. 263).

³ Caresinus (444); Sanudo (*Vite*, 680); *Memorie di Pisani* (71).

⁴ Chinazzo (fol. 714); Sanudo, *ubi suprâ*; Romanin, *ubi suprâ*.

⁵ Chinazzo (fol. 714); Redusio, *contemp.* (fol. 759).

whom was Fieschi himself, became the portion of the conqueror. Of the captives, 400 were shipped to Candia, and 400 were sent to Venice,¹ where the admiral and his men were treated with that humanity which was customary among the Venetians, and which of course had in view the contingency of an exchange. The Genoese were lodged at San Biagio and elsewhere;² patricians were their keepers, and noble dames ministered to their wants. The charitable piety of the Venetian ladies found here again an opportunity of display. They caused the wounds of the sufferers to be properly dressed, and superintended the relief of all their necessities; and history has preserved the names of eight of these benevolent ladies.³

After the fiercely-contested, but triumphant battle of the 30th, Pisani had some thought of carrying his victorious arms into the very heart of the Genoese capital; but the intelligence of the valuable diversion which the Stella Company of Milan was creating in the direction of San Pietro d'Arena, and of the unopposed landing and successful operations of his able lieutenant Zeno at Porto-Venero,⁴ led him to relinquish his half-formed design; and the Captain-General turned his prows toward Dalmatia, where he had some expec-

¹ Redusio, fol. 759; Sanudo (*Vite*, 681). "Morirono de' Genovesi 500 persone," says Chinazzo (fol. 714).

² Romanin (iii. 264).

³ Anna Faliero, Caterina da Mezzo, Francesca Bragadino, Bertuzza Michieli, Margharita Michieli, Chiara Bono, Marchesina Bembo, Caterina della Preson.

⁴ Stella, *Annales* (1111); Vincens (ii. 17-8).

tation of finding the Genoese fleet, which had left the Riviera under Luciano Doria.

The remainder of 1378 was actively spent in an extensive cruise among the Illyric Islands and in the waters of the Levant, in the course of which the victor of Porto d'Anzo conducted a series of brilliant enterprises against various points of the Greek and Hungarian littorals. Zara and Trau, the former of which was watched with special vigilance as the medium of communication between Genoa and the Court of Buda, were twice ineffectually bombarded;¹ the immense strength of their works of defence defied every effort. Cattaro² and Sebenigo³ were sacked (August—October). Arbo submitted without a struggle (November 10⁴). In the continued search after Doria, the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora were diligently explored, and Constantinople itself was menaced.

At the same time, Zeno, who had been summoned from Negropont to serve under Pisani, continued to scour the seas with a separate detachment; and the son of the hero of Smyrna, whose earlier life had been passed in adventures worthy of Sir Bevis of Southampton or Sir Eglamour of Artois, executed his commission with rare daring and skill. Wherever this intrepid officer appeared, his arms were irresistible.⁵

In the course of the year, Pisani was employed to

¹ *Memorie di V. Pisani* (p. 85–132).

² Bonfinius (ii. x. 355).

³ Romanin (iii. 265).

⁴ Caresinus, contemp. (445).

⁵ Giacomo Zeno (*Vita Caroli Zeni*: Murat. xix. 295).

escort Valentina, the daughter of Barnabo Visconti¹ to the palace of her royal spouse, Peter II. of Cyprus (June—July);² and out of complaisance partly to their ally, the Venetians instructed their admiral to bombard Famagosta, and to essay the expulsion of the Genoese from the Cypriot capital. The attempt was gallantly made; but it failed in consequence of inadequate force. As the cold season approached with symptoms of uncommon rigour, the Commander-in-Chief desired the requisite authorization from his government to winter at Venice. But the Senate, reasonably afraid of leaving the Istrian seaboard unsheltered, and of exposing the subjects of the Republic in that quarter to the vengeance or seductions of the enemy, put a peremptory veto upon such a proposal; and Pisani was constrained against his better judgment to brave the inclemency of the weather.

The operations of Venice on the Terra-Ferma against the Carrarese and his confederates, especially Gherardo, Lord of Cammino,³ had been attended by highly flattering results. Upon the recal of Zeno, the command of the Venetian land-forces, of which the flower was composed of 5,000 Turks, was transferred to the Count of Collalto. The Hungarians, under the Waiwode of Transylvania, had again crossed the Piave on the 24th June, 1378; and they reached Padua on the 26th.⁴ On the following day, the united forces of Stephen and Carrara commenced the devastation of the March; and

¹ Stella, *Annales* (fol. 1109); Redusio (*Chronicon*, 760). ² Ibid.

³ Redusio (fol. 762).

⁴ Chinazzo (fol. 714).

on the 5th July¹ they sat down before Mestra, ten Italian miles² north-west of Venice, about 16,000 strong. But the Government of Contarini, anxious to check the progress of the Allies, determined to defend that position at every cost; and means were found to throw victuals and reinforcements into the place, which possessed already a numerous garrison. The enemy made themselves masters³ of the town, of the Borgo of San Lorenzo,⁴ and of the outposts, without much effort; but in the assault upon the citadel, they were repulsed with the loss of 400 in killed, and 1,000 in wounded.⁵ The Venetians facilitated their victory by planting hives of bees on the ramparts which, upon being driven from their cells, flew in a cloud against the foe and stung many to such a degree, that they were quite disabled from fighting;⁶ and the Waiwode, discouraged by that serious reverse of which Carrara appears to have cast the odium on his lieutenant Obizi,⁷ and baffled in his expectation of reducing the fortress by famine, concluded by abandoning his ground, burning his engines, and raising the siege. The defence of Mestra against an overwhelming superiority of numbers deserves to be regarded as one of the noblest achievements in the military history of that period; and it shed the brightest lustre upon the name of the

¹ Chinazzo (fol. 714).

² Sanudo, *Itinerario*, 1483. This distance was equal to six English miles.

³ Chinazzo, *ubi suprâ*. This event is noticed by Pancrazio Giustiniani (*De Ven. Aristocr. Gestis liber*, sign. c. 5).

⁴ Redusio (fol. 764).

⁵ Chinazzo (fol. 715).

⁶ Sanudo (fol. 686).

⁷ Chinazzo, *ubi suprâ*.

Venetian podesta, Francesco Dolfino. The news was received at Venice with profound gratitude.

The anticipations for the winter of 1378 were only too exact. It set in with extraordinary severity.¹ The frost became intense. The fleet of Pisani suffered to a barely credible extent; and out of nineteen galleys, six only retained their proper complements and their seaworthiness. In the beginning of 1379, however, the Venetian commander was joined by twelve others partly built and equipped at the cost of the private admirers of Pisani,² which had been transmitted to him by order of the Senate; and this timely accession raised his squadron to eighteen sail. On the 23rd February,³ in spite of the energetic efforts of his political rivals to supersede him, Pisani was confirmed in the Captaincy-General by a resolution of the Great Council; and Michele Steno and Carlo Zeno were named his Proveditors.

During the entire spring of the new year, the Captain-General prosecuted his search for Doria with no better success than before.⁴ It was only in the early part of the summer, when Pisani, having made a fruitless exploration of the Apulian coast, had returned to Pola with a large convoy of grain which he was escorting from Brindisi, that the desired opportunity was at length thrown in his way. It was the 7th May, 1379,⁵ when Doria presented himself unexpectedly in the

¹ Gataro (*Ist. Padovana*, fol. 273); Varese (ii. 322-3).

² *Memorie* (139-40).

³ Romanin (iii. 266).

⁴ Varese (iii. 320-1-2).

⁵ *Memorie* (172).

roads of Pola, having under his orders five and twenty sail, inclusive of two brigantines. Pisani had several reasons just now for wishing to confine himself to the defensive. His forces were inferior, for he had not more than one and twenty vessels;¹ there happened at this particular juncture to be more than an average amount of sickness among his men; Carlo Zeno was absent on a separate expedition to the Mediterranean. He expressed therefore an opinion that it would be preferable to content himself with repelling attacks, and to postpone an action till the return of Zeno. But his prudent advice was not seconded by the Council of War which he had invited to assemble, and which was unanimous² in favour of giving battle, recognising in the circumspection of the Commander merely a pusillanimity unbecoming the Venetian name. At this scandalous insinuation, the Captain-General, who was naturally of a choleric temper, flew into a paroxysm of rage; he even moved his hand toward the hilt of his sword; and it was with much ado that he restrained himself from drawing upon the Proveditors.³ But, impeded by the mischievous rules of the service from resisting the ignorant and headstrong importunacy of the Council, Pisani reluctantly consented to the step, and, addressing the men who were nearest to him, said:—“Remember, my brethren, that those who now face you are the same, whom you have vanquished with so much glory on the Roman shore; let not the name

¹ Stella, *Annales* (fol. 1111).

² *Memorie* (155-63).

³ *Ibid.* (163).

of Luciano Doria terrify you ; it is not the names of commanders that will decide the conflict, but Venetian hearts and Venetian hands ! ” He then gave the word : *He that loves Saint Mark, let him follow me.*¹ The attack was opened by the Sopra-Comito Vettore Capello,² who was supported by Pisani himself and Donato Zeno. The first onset was propitious to the Venetians, who behaved with their habitual intrepidity : and the victory was beginning to incline to their side when the Genoese, feigning a retreat, receded two or three miles,³ and succeeded by that false movement in throwing their too eager pursuers into irrecoverable confusion. Turning round upon them by a sudden and adroit manœuvre, the enemy renewed the combat with increased vigour and ferocity, and gained a complete triumph. The Captain-General, with Steno and six of the galleys, effected the narrowest escape to Parenzo.⁴ All beside was lost. Between 700 and 800 Venetians perished. 2,400 were taken prisoners.⁵ Twelve Sopra-Comiti were drowned or killed ; five were captured.⁶ On the other side, the losses were serious ;⁷ and Doria himself was among the slain. He had fallen by the hand of Donato Zeno. It was toward the close of the fight, when he felt that victory was within his grasp, that the admiral raised his visor for a moment, and ex-

¹ *Memorie* (164).

² Sanudo (fol. 684).

³ *Memorie* (167).

⁴ *Ibid.* (170).

⁵ Stella, *Ann.* (fol. 1111).

⁶ *Letter of Ambrogio Doria to F. da Carrara*, May 9, 1379 : Gataro (280).

⁷ Sanudo (fol. 684). From Doria's letter to Carrara it appears that all the Venetian Mercenaries captured were butchered in cold blood.

claimed to those about him at the pitch of his voice :—
The foe are already vanquished ; the battle is all but ours.
Zeno, who had singled out the flagship from the outset, seized the opportunity ; a voice behind him, in which he recognised the accents of Pisani, incited him ; and propelling his lance,¹ the Sopra-Comito plunged it with all his force into the throat of the hapless Doria, who instantaneously expired.²

Whatever unfavourable presentiments Pisani might have cherished, or whatever fears might have secretly possessed him, he had not neglected throughout to impart to his followers a confidence in which he hardly perhaps participated. It had now become, however, of paramount importance to make the truth generally known, in order that the Republic herself and all her foreign dependencies might be forearmed against the triumphant enemy. The Sopra-Comito Tommaso Mocenigo³ was accordingly sent to Venice with the dismal tidings, while a second messenger was despatched to the Morea and Levant with the same object.

The news of the terrible reverse at Pola, of which Mocenigo was made the bearer, produced in the breast of the Senate and of the people a mixed sentiment of amazement and consternation.⁴ The sole disposable fleet of the Republic was destroyed ; the enemy

¹ Stella, *Annales* (fol. 1110).

² *Memorie* (168) may be compared with Gataro (fol. 280).

³ *Memorie* (172-3) ; Sanudo (*Vite*, 685).

⁴ Sanudo, *ubi suprâ*.

was within a few cannon-shots of the lagoons ; and Carlo Zeno was quite out of reach. Pisani was now made to pay dearly for his greatness, his popularity, and his fiery temper. All his political antagonists arrayed themselves against him, and attacked him with the spiteful and furious malevolence of partizanship. All rose from their seats in the Councils, of which they were members, and decried his negligence, precipitation, or incapacity. His old and inveterate enemy, Pietro Cornaro, whom he had twice openly and grossly insulted—his envious rival, Taddeo Giustiniani who aspired to the captaincy-general, and who was enormously influential with the Government—the Avogadors of the Commune, who were connected by the ties of marriage or consanguinity with one of the Proveditors, who had met his death at Pola—three of the Privy Council, Dolfino, Donato, and Morosini, who had been severe sufferers at Portolongo, and who nourished on that account a traditional animosity to his family—and, lastly, two of the three chiefs of the Forty, Marino Malipiero and Marco Dandolo, who were jealous of his fame, placed themselves in the foremost rank. On the motion of the Avogaria, the Great Council at once decreed the deposition of Pisani from the supreme command, and his recal from Pascuzo. He was brought to Venice, fettered and manacled.¹ He was taken at his own request to the Palace, where he introduced himself to the Signory. But he was immediately silenced in his attempt at self-

¹ *Memorie* (179).

justification, and remanded to a prison, where he was told to await his trial. On the 7th July, the Great Council having formally delegated its full powers to the Senate,¹ the Avogaria read before the latter the articles of impeachment, and proceeded, in due form, to move *that the accused shall be beheaded between the Red Columns.*² At this brutal proposition a shudder pervaded the assembly,³ and it was negatived forthwith. The Doge himself, in concert with four of the Privy Council, next submitted that Pisani should be simply excluded from all offices and emoluments for five years, and should pay a fine of 2,000 ducats.⁴ To this motion two amendments were suggested, one limiting the punishment to deprivation, and a second, which emanated from one of the remaining Councillors, Simone Michieli, substituting for the pecuniary mulct six months' imprisonment.⁵ Several other modifications were subsequently brought forward; but the proposition of Contarini, as amended by Michieli, was eventually carried by a trifling majority. Steno and the other culprits received their due share of punishment. To Pisani the bitterest of his rivals and foes had imputed want of firmness, not want of courage; but the Proveditor Steno was suspected of something worse than indiscretion. Yet his sentence was comparatively lenient, inasmuch as his interest was more powerful, and his reputation was less dangerous.

¹ *Memorie* (181); Sanudo (*Vite*, 685-6).

² *Memorie* (182).

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Memorie* (183).

⁵ *Ibid.* (184).

To the segregation of Austria from the League, it has already been shown how the Republic made some sacrifices. To the detachment of Hungary herself from that formidable coalition she was prepared to sacrifice even more. With such an object in view, a negotiation was set on foot with the Court of Buda, shortly after the defeat of Pisani at Pola in May, 1379. But the demands of Louis were almost ludicrously extravagant. He required the cession of Trieste, the recognition of suzerainty to his crown on the part of the present Doge and all his successors, an annual tribute of 100,000 ducats, and half a million in ready money. His Majesty concluded by suggesting that if the immediate payment of the last sum was inconvenient, he should not object to receive as a surety for its liquidation the Ducal Berretta and the other jewels of the Commune,¹ and the keys of Treviso, Castelfranco, Conegliano, Noale and Mestra. The Venetian legation at Buda was instructed to spare no pains in seeking a revision of these terms; but Louis, who had already, at the intercession of his consort, reduced the amount of the indemnity from a million to 500,000 ducats, refused to listen to any farther compromise; and the Senate was puzzled how to act. In the first instance, it decreed the acceptance of the conditions; but the acceptance was, on second consideration, revoked;² and it eventually determined, after a waste of three

¹ Some notion may be formed of their value from the fact that one jewel was sold in 1390 for 40,000 ducats, or about 100,000*l.* of the present English money.—See Sanudo (*Vite*, 777).

² Sanudo (*Vite*, 693).

months in nugatory diplomacy, to stake the fortunes of the country on war.

In the tone assumed by the Court of Buda there was everything which could irritate and alarm. The suggestion respecting the hypothecation of the Communal jewels was a peculiarly stinging affront; and the demand of Trieste was the more ominous, that it was suspected, that in that point Louis had received his inspiration from Vienna. The more thinking portion of the Venetian community, however, had long learned to reconcile themselves to the idea of a contest of life and death; and the Government of the Republic, while it might still cling with some tenacity to the hope of a separate accommodation with Hungary, had for some time been preparing for the worst. The only question, indeed, was between two evils—a struggle mitigated by the Treaty of Vienna and the alienation of Louis, and a struggle exterminatory; and it now appeared that the latter was the deliberate and unswerving aim of the Allies.

After their triumph at Pola, the Genoese hastened to neutralize the fruits of Pisani's successes; and finding themselves unchecked in their progress, the enemy coasted along the Venetian littoral, and advanced so far as Pelestrina, which they devastated, and where they destroyed an argosy belonging to Tommaso Mocenigo.¹ Having arrived in the morning, they spent the day in reconnoitring positions and in taking soundings among the shallows and canals. During

¹ Caresinus, contemp. (446); Stella (*Ann. Gen.* 1111).

the night, they lay at anchor off Brondolo, and at dawn they set sail unmolested for the Dalmatian shore. In less than a week, the authors of this daring and unparalleled aggression reappeared. But instead of seventeen galleys, as on the preceding occasion, they had seemingly not more than six. This circumstance encouraged the new generalissimo, Taddeo Giustiniani, to place himself at the head of an equal number, and with the concurrence of the Doge to issue from the port of Venice for the purpose of repelling the invaders. He had gained only a short distance, when one of his galleys picked up a Venetian citizen, named Hieronimo Sabadia,¹ who had escaped from the enemy, and who was swimming toward Malamocco with all his strength, with the startling report that the small detachment which had been seen was merely a decoy, and that the whole Genoese fleet of forty-seven sail² under Pietro Doria, having left Zara on the 2nd of August, and burned Grado (Aug. 3), Omago, Rovigno, and Caorlo (Aug. 4³), was immediately behind. Hereupon Giustiniani hurriedly returned to port; and he had barely reached shelter when, on the 6th, the enemy hove in sight of Lido. But their approach had been happily anticipated by the foresight of the government; they found the passage completely dammed up with sunken vessels, palisades, and chains;

¹ *Chroniche Veneziane dall' Origine della Citta siu al anno 1616*, p. 303 (Add. MSS. 8580).

² *Copy of a letter written by a Genoese*, 13th Feb. 1381 (Murat. xxii. 726-7).

³ Sanudo (*Vite*, 687-8); see also *ibid.* (fol. 743).

and they were obliged to forsake the notion of forcing that entrance. The Admiral then made for Malamocco ; but the port was similarly blocked. The sole remaining chance of penetrating the Sand-Girdle, which formed an impassable cincture round the City, was by the narrow aperture at Brondolo, the port of Chioggia. At Brondolo, unfortunately, the timely precaution used at the two more northerly entrances had been postponed from a regard to the convenience of trade ; the position was easily carried. Little-Chioggia was also taken without difficulty ; and the Genoese found themselves at the front of the bridge, which conducted to Great Chioggia. But the latter was a conquest, which presented a task infinitely more formidable. For this point had been selected by the Venetian strategists as the most eligible for making a stand ; and the head of the bridge was strongly defended by bastions and redoubts with cannon.

Between the mouths of the Piave and the Adige, a mass of fluviatile sediment had created in the process of time a low sandbank, through which the sea had pierced several channels. The space between this outlying tongue of land and the coast formed a shallow basin about five-and-twenty miles in length, and five in its greatest width. It was from the middle of this basin that a cluster of small islands rose from the circumambient waters, in a spot fortified by nature, and approachable only by certain sinuous passages, with which human industry had intersected that terraqueous expanse, and which the most dexterous pilots

alone could thread without danger. On that cluster of islands the City of Venice was built.

Of the natural channels which existed in the fringe of sand, the northernmost was that of Treporti. It separated the islets of San Erasmo and San Nicolo, and it was adapted only for craft of the smallest description. The next aperture was that which lay to the south of San Nicolo, and which disjoined the latter from Malamocco; it was known as the Port of Lido. To the south of Malamocco, in a nearly straight line of five miles, lay Pelestrina; and the space between the two islands formed the Port of Malamocco, or the principal harbour of Venice. It was here that the deepest soundings were taken, and that vessels of the largest draught were able to ride. Below Pelestrina was Brondolo, behind which stood Chioggia. The southern point of Brondolo all but touched the Terra-Ferma.

Chioggia, more antiently known as Sotto-Marina, was thus placed at the southern extremity of the Dogado. It was bisected by the Canal of Santa Caterina into *Chioggia-Piccola* and *Chioggia-Grande*, which communicated by a drawbridge of a quarter of a mile in length.¹ Great Chioggia was nearly 250 yards square, with a circumference of two miles. A canal, running the whole length of the lagoons, connected it with the capital, from which it was distant five and twenty miles.² The configuration of Venice and the

¹ Andrea Gataro (fol. 298).

² *Pylgrymage of Sir Richard Guylforde to the Holy Lande*, A.D. 1506. Lond. n. d. 4°.

narrowness of its superficial area make it easy to imagine the anguish with which the intrusion of a foreign invader on Venetian ground inspired the Senate and the people. Venice was a prey to terror and stupefaction.

The day had been, when a Flemish Peer was forced upon the Greeks by the united arms of Venice and France, when the streets of Buda were hedged with the Militia of the Six Wards, sent to uphold the claims of the son of a Morosini, and when the blood of the murderers of Andrew of Naples, demanded by Hungary, ran down the gutters of Palermo. It was not long since, that a Visconti had planted his heel on the neck of Genoa, and that Padua had kneeled as a suppliant at the feet of the Doge Contarini. There was only one soil and one nationality, which had never been violated; and Italy and Europe were prepared to witness without much sympathy the apparently forthcoming submission of those proud Islanders of the Adriatic to the common lot.

Meanwhile, a new Hungarian army, having crossed the Piave, overran with comparative ease a Province, from which the Republic had in the imminence of her peril found it necessary to withdraw the bulk of her garrisons and troops. Royal forces successively occupied Cittadella, Bassano, Campo-San-Pietro, Mirano, Moranzano on the Brenta, and the Tower of Bebe. Treviso was hemmed in. Finally, the loss of the Castle of Loredò, which succumbed after a protracted resistance, destroyed the sole remaining resource of

the Republic in the direction of the Terra Ferma by intercepting the supplies, which the Marquis of Este had heretofore transmitted through that channel from Ferrara.

At the same time, the Carrarese, who was conscious that he was playing his last stake, and that, in the event of failure, no mercy was to be expected at the hands of the Senate, had laboured with desperate force of will and untiring assiduity at the establishment of a new water communication between Padua and Chioggia, the most probable theatre of war, for the purpose of facilitating the transit of troops, munitions, and victuals; and the small flotilla which guarded the contiguous canal was too weak to interrupt these gigantic works, or to prevent his correspondence with Doria. In the early part of August, the preparations of Lord Francesco were finished; and on the 11th, the first assault was given to the Bridge of Chioggia.¹ The Allies numbered about 24,000. The garrison of the town, where Pietro Emo, of Trevisan celebrity, officiated as Podesta and Captain, exceeded not 3,500.²

The troops of Emo behaved admirably; and during six days they continued to repel their adversaries with undaunted resolution and unrelaxed energy. A tremendous cannonade was kept up on both sides.

¹ "Genovesi, e li Signori di Padova, con potenza del Re d'Ongheria, fero molta gran guerra a Veneziani, e tolser' lo' Chioggia, e quasi l'assediaro per mare e per terra; e andovvi per lo re d'Ongaria Misser Carlo (Charles of Durazzo), ed ebbe poco honore."—Neri di Donato (*Cronica Sanese*; Murat. xv. fol. 264.)

² Gataro (fol. 298).

On the 13th, 14th, and 15th, the roar of the artillery was almost incessant. All was going tolerably well.¹ Reinforcements had been received from Venice. The enemy, whose losses were already large, were beginning to wince under the galling fire which proceeded from the batteries of Emo, when an accident changed the fortune of the day. On the 16th,² an alarm was suddenly spread among the troops of the Podesta, that the bridge behind them was in flames. It was a fire-ship, of which the combustion in the Canal of Santa Caterina had diffused the erroneous impression. The Genoese caught and echoed the cry, and renewed their flagging exertions with fresh ardour. They are mowed down by the guns as they advance; the carnage is terrific. Still, like demons in whose breast the thirst for vengeance and the lust of spoil has extinguished the fear of death, they continue to come up. The Venetians begin to lose ground and to fall back upon the bridge. They recede a little and a little more. It is in vain that Emo and fifty chosen men-at-arms dispute the front with desperate tenacity and transcendent heroism, foot to foot and hand to hand. The position is slowly forced. The Allies are upon the bridge. The Venetians quicken their retrograde pace. In their haste, they omit to destroy the communication; and they enter the gates pell-

¹ Sanudo (*Vite*, 689).

² *Copy of a letter written by a Genoese*, dated Budoia, 13 Feb. 1380, quoted textually by Sanudo, 726; Pugliola (*Chron. di Bologna*, fol. 521); Stella, *Annales* (fol. 1112).

mell with their pursuers. Thus Chioggia fell. About 860 Venetians were killed. Nearly 4,000 were taken prisoners.¹ The losses of the Allies were more than proportionably heavier: yet they were masters of the situation. The town was abandoned to pillage; but female honour was held sacred. The sum raised by the victors upon ransoms was enormous. Emo himself gave 3,000 ducats;² and Taddeo Giustiniani did not escape, probably, under a much smaller amount. An unfortunate man, named Matteo Fasuolo, was obliged to purchase his liberty with 200 ducats, and was robbed in addition of 20,000 *lire*, his entire fortune.³

No description can adequately paint the shock, which the arrival of the disastrous news at Venice afforded to the public mind. The bell of the Campanile was immediately tolled. The armed citizens rushed at the preconcerted signal to Saint Mark's, where the woful intelligence was imparted to the assembled multitude. It bred a singularly profound sensation. In some places were heard the sobs and moans of women, who already began to tremble for the safety of their children and their own honour. Elsewhere, others were wringing their hands, and tearing their hair in blank despair. There were found, too, men who yielded to an effeminate and craven fear, and even such as, consulting only their own sordid interests, hastened to secrete their money and trinkets.⁴ But more generally

¹ Chinazzo (fol. 726).

² Romanin (iii. 275).

³ Romanin (iii. 282). Sanudo (*Vite*, 691) estimates Carrara's share of the booty at 20,000 ducats; see also Gataro (fol. 302).

⁴ Romanin (iii. 276).

the cry was adopted, "that the State cannot be lost while those remain who can man a galley and handle a pike." The Government preserved an exemplarily calm and collected demeanour. The venerable Contarini, who was approaching the completion of his seventy-second¹ year, was a model of constancy and equanimity. Neither the Great Council nor the Senate allowed that there was yet reason to despair. The resources of the Republic were exceedingly straitened, and the supply of food was painfully scanty; but Venetian devotion felt itself a match for any emergency. A special envoy had departed long since in quest of Carlo Zeno, of whose movements since his separation from Pisani nothing was known with certainty; and his arrival, which was to be expected from day to day, was sufficient to turn the scale. Nevertheless, it was thought expedient, before a levy in mass, and other extreme measures were sanctioned, to test for the last time the effect of negotiation. Overtures were addressed, in the first instance, to the Lord of Padua; and that Prince, who had differed from his ally throughout on the point of tactics, and who was beginning to harbour private misgivings as to the final issue of the struggle, declared himself not unwilling to treat on certain conditions; but, with characteristic tact, he shifted the responsibility and possible odium of an answer upon the shoulders of his colleague. Doria, who partly believed that Venice was to be conquered in Chioggia, and that the former

¹ Sanudo (694).

was all but in his power, rejected with bitter scorn the idea of a diplomatic settlement. "By God's faith, my Lords of Venice,"¹ he cried, "ye shall have no peace from the Lord of Padua, nor from our Commune of Genoa, until I have put a bit into the mouths of the horses of your Evangelist Saint Mark. When they have been bridled, you shall then, in sooth, have a good peace; and this is our purpose, and that of our Commune." Some Genoese prisoners of rank accompanied the embassy: their unconditional release was offered as a bait. "As for these captives, my brethren," resumed he, "take them back; I want them not: for in a few days I am coming to release from your prisons them and the rest."²

The harsh and supercilious manner in which the Genoese had met her advances, coupled with the failure of the negotiations at Buda, obviously left the Republic no option but a war to the last gasp. The Arrengo bell was rung; the Popular Assembly was called together; and, in the name of the Doge, Pietro Mocenigo depicted the stupendous magnitude of the present peril. He told his hearers without concealment or colouring that it had become incumbent on all to rally round the national standard, and to unite for the protection of their hearths and homes. All were invited to aid the Government with their wisdom and counsel. There was, however, only one

¹ Chinazzo (fol. 727); *Ad. Hist. Cortus. Addit. Secundum*, xii. 985; 17 Aug. 1379.

² *Copy of a letter written by a Genoese*, Feb. 13, 1381; *Murat.* xxii. 730, *et seq.*; A. Gataro, *contemp.* (fol. 306).

opinion and one cry :—" Let us arm ourselves ; let us equip and mount what galleys are in the Arsenal ; let us go forth ; it is better to perish in the defence of our country than to perish here through want."

An universal conscription was ordered. New taxes were imposed. The salaries of the magistrates and civil functionaries were suspended.¹ The transaction of business and the exercise of professions were at an end. Property fell to a fourth of its former value. The crisis was such as had never yet been known.

To meet the unprecedented pressure, the imposts which had been augmented or created were not found adequate. A new loan at five per cent., to which Venetian citizens alone were allowed to contribute, was decreed ; it produced the enormous sum of 6,294,040 *lire*.² Among the principal subscribers were the Doge, 34,000 *lire*, of which 20,000 for the Crown ; Federigo Cornaro, 60,000 ; Federigo Cornaro, the son of Andrea, 40,000 ; Benedetto Garzoni, 50,000 ; Giovanni de' Bagni, 50,000 ; Marino Lioni, 40,000 ; Giovanni Trevisano, the *rich Procurator*,³ 50,000 ; Daniello Dolfino, 35,000 ; Michele Morosini, 38,000 ; Reniero Morosini, 37,000 ; Paolo Morosini and son, 32,000 ; Lorenzo Morosini, 25,000 ; Giovanni Morosini, 25,000 ; Vettore Pisani, 1,000.

¹ Romanin (iii. 277).

² Romanin (iii. 280). As a special favour, John I., King of Portugal, was admitted as a subscriber for a certain amount. Salverte (*Civilisation*, 152). See also Gallicciolli (*Memorie Venete*, ii. 99-133). Sestiero di Castello, 1,300,683 *lire* ; San Marco, 1,506,844 ; Canalreggio, 1,106,600 ; Dorsoduro, 627,700 ; Santa Croce, 711,500 ; San Polo, 1,040,703.

³ Sanudo (fol. 695).

The fortification of the City with earthworks commenced forthwith; the lines of defence were drawn from Lido to Santo Spirito; and two wooden towers were constructed at the former point to guard the Pass of San Nicolo.

A new Captain-General was elected, and the Government nominated its favourite Taddeo Giustiniani. But the people refused to serve under any leader but one; and they demanded with clamorous and menacing shouts the enlargement of Vettore Pisani. So dioramic had been the course of events that on Thursday, the 8th August, two days after the loss of Chioggia, the Senate met to deliberate upon this urgent affair; and the Tribunal concluded by submitting to the popular wishes. The whole day had been consumed in debate, and it was late in the evening when the Senators deputed by their colleagues, followed by the exulting populace, arrived at the Prison to apprise Pisani of this decision, and to inform him that the Doge and the Senate were expecting him. The noble captive, of whose sentence hardly the moiety had expired, received the announcement without perceptible emotion; and he placidly replied that, as he should prefer to pass the night where he was in reflexion, he would wait on the Signory in the morning.¹

It has been already mentioned, that Vettore Pisani was born in 1324, and that he was the son of Nicolo Pisani of San Fantino.² In person, he was of middle

¹ Gataro, contemp. (folio 312).

² *Memorie*, 3.

stature,¹ strongly built, of a robust constitution, and of a muscular frame. From his earliest boyhood, he had discovered a taste for athletic exercises, in which he was warmly encouraged by his father. Vettore acquired an extraordinary proficiency in rowing, wrestling, archery, and artillery-practice. For the study of letters he displayed small relish.² His head was large, and his brow was broad and capacious; but his lower features were thin and delicately chiselled. He usually wore his hair cropped short under a skull-cap, and his beard flowing. His eyes were dark, lustrous, and quick; and their ordinary expression was mild and agreeable. His countenance was open and cheerful. He was by nature irascible, but forgiving; his manners were frank, even to bluntness; his disposition was ingenuous. He was the idol of the people, who were fond of calling him their Father;³ and by his own class he was viewed with corresponding dislike and mistrust. No man, perhaps, had fewer friends among his equals, or more numerous admirers. His genius and virtue were tacitly acknowledged by thousands who grudged him his popularity, and who envied his greatness. No more loyal heart beat in a Venetian breast: nor had the Republic a truer patriot. Of all the men of his time he was the most magnanimous and unsophisticated.

At daybreak⁴ on Friday, the 19th August,⁵ the Senatorial delegates and the people, accompanied by

¹ *Memorie*, 359.

² *Ibid.* 5.

³ *Ibid.* 194 and 221.

⁴ *Ibid.* 198.

⁵ Chinazzo (fol. 728).

Michele Steno and the other Sopra-Comiti,¹ to whom grace had also been extended, reappeared at the gates of the dungeon. Pisani, wearing his habitual aspect of hilarity and good-humour, soon appeared at the doorway; and having been lifted on the shoulders of some sailors, he was borne in triumph to the Palace amid joyous cries of *Viva Il Nostro Vettore! Viva Vettore Pisani!* to which he chidingly responded, *Viva San Marco!*² On the staircase he was met by the Doge and the Senators, who graciously and affectionately saluted him. Having heard mass in Saint Nicholas's Chapel, Pisani and the College proceeded to business, and remained closeted together for some time. The people stayed outside the building, and continued to shout till their throats were hoarse. From the palace Pisani was carried in the same manner to his own residence at San Fantino, of which he had not crossed the threshold since May, 1378.³ On the route a singular adventure awaited him. He was passing in his triumphal progress the Campanile of Saint Mark,⁴ when he was suddenly accosted by his old pilot Marino Corbaro, a remarkably able seaman, but an incurable grumbler and a morbid malcontent. Corbaro, who had been implicated to some extent in the Faliero Conspiracy, was full of the traditions of 1355; and

¹ *Memorie*, 199.

² Gataro (fol. 312 D).

³ "Ma come non sono mai le umane consolazioni compite, tristamente passo in casa sua le poche ore di quel di, che pote dimorarvi nella rimembranza della morte del padre succeduta l'anno scorso nell'oscurità de' suoi ultimi giorni, e della mancanza di Bertuccio Pisani suo fratello."—*Mem.* 208-9.

⁴ *Memorie*, 206.

it is probable that if he had lived in less critical times, his inflammatory doctrines and his revolutionary opinions would have sent him to the Red Columns. This man, whom Pisani humoured in many crotchets and eccentricities, elbowed his way through the crowd, and as he drew near to his patron, cried out in stentorian tones—"Now is the time, Compadre, for revenging yourself by seizing the Dictatorship of this City. Behold, all are at your service; all are willing at this very instant to proclaim you Prince, if you choose!" He had barely finished the sentence, when Pisani, boiling with rage, dealed the speaker a heavy blow with his clenched fist in the cheek, and burst into a volley of indignant declamation. Then turning to those about him, and raising his voice to a still louder key, he exclaimed¹—"Let none who wish me well say, *Viva Pisani!* but, *Viva San Marco!*" But the populace then shouted, *Viva San Marco e Vettore Pisani! Viva il Pisani, ch'e nostro Padre!* The throng was so dense, that from Saint Mark's to San Fantino it would have been difficult to find an unoccupied spot of earth "large enough to hold a grain of millet."²

But it soon transpired that Pisani had been merely appointed Governor of Lido, and that the command of the Navy rested with Giustiniani. This evasive compromise excited the wrath of the people, who declared that they reposed confidence in him alone, and would execute his bidding, and none other. "Good Master,"

¹ *Memorie*, 207.

² Sanudo (691).

said the spokesman of a deputation of 600 citizens from Torsello, Maggiorbo, and Burano, "we are yours; command us as you will." "Brethren and friends," rejoined the General, "go to the Signory; they will counsel you best what to do." The Government tamely alleged that the services of the popular favourite were more particularly required at Lido; but the petitioners knew their power, and used it. In the name of fifty thousand Venetians, they declined to embark on the galleys, until Messer Vettore Pisani received his commission as Captain-General of all the forces of the Republic by land and sea. The Ten, to whom this momentous affair was referred, were awed into compliance; and the desired concession was granted (August 20¹).

The fall of Chioggia on the 16th had not been followed up by any important consequences; and it happened, fortunately for the Republic, that differences arose between Doria and the Carrarese in respect to ulterior movements. The latter earnestly represented the fatuity of delay; but Doria doggedly persisted in his original plan of operations. The Genoese commander, however, had gradually pushed forward his outposts to Poveja and Malamocco, on the latter of which he erected a battery of guns. This step brought the enemy within three miles of the capital. On a clear day, the peals of the Great Bell of Venice were audible at the Malamocchese Redoubts;

¹ *Chroniche Veneziane*, ii. 310 (Add. MSS. Brit. Mus. 8580).

and many stray shots from the hostile cannon were picked up at Santo Spirito.¹

The first efforts of Pisani were therefore directed to a provision for the safety of the metropolis, to the reorganization of the navy, and to the conversion of some thousands of raw recruits into tolerably efficient soldiers and sailors. The skeletons of forty galleys² were taken from the Arsenal; and the equipment of two-thirds of the number was completed in three days. The city glowed with ardour and enthusiasm. The Chamber of the Armament, where the names of volunteers were registered for the twin services, was crowded to excess.³ Pisani, assisted by Steno, often attended in person, and drew up the lists for the most part with his own hand. All classes hastened to enrol themselves. Painters quitted their studies, in order that they might be initiated in the rudiments of naval discipline on the Giudecca; cutlers and apothecaries closed their workshops, and devoted their time to drilling and exercise. Artisans brought their savings; women plucked the jewels from their dresses, and begged the Signory to dispose of them as they would. The two wooden toys, which Giustiniani, during his tenure of office, had constructed on either side of the Port of Lido, were pronounced by his successor perfectly useless; they were now demolished; and on their site were marked out the foundations of two tall towers of solid masonry. The destruction of his own

¹ *Memorie*, 213.

² Romanin (iii. 280).

³ Gataro (fol. 314).

work naturally stirred the bile of Giustiniani ; and this influential nobleman, secretly tampering with those who were co-operating with the new Captain-General, persuaded them to stand aloof. Pisani, with admirable presence of mind, seized a trowel, and with the words, *He that loves Saint Mark, let him follow me*, laid the first stone with his own hands ; and the recusants, blushing at their misconduct, immediately returned to the post of duty. The two fortresses, which were christened the Castles of San Andrea and San Nicolo,¹ were finished in the marvellously short space of four days.² The paling and earthwork, which Giustiniani had thrown up round the City, were next removed ; and in their room two lofty and massive stone walls were built from Lido to Santo Spirito, in the course of a fortnight.³ At the same time, the best dispositions were made by the Captain-General in regard to the forces which had now become available. Three large men-of-war with guns of the heaviest calibre were confided by Pisani, with his characteristic generosity, to Taddeo Giustiniani. The shallops and skiffs, which were designed for surprises and other light service, were consigned to Giovanni Barbarigo. Federigo Cornaro was stationed, with a certain number of galleys, at Santo Spirito. The defence of the Lazaretto, San Clemente, Sant' Elena, and the neighbourhood, was intrusted to Nicolo Gallicano.⁴ The strand from Lido to Malamocco, behind the inner wall, was

¹ *Memorie*, 226.² Chinazzo (fol. 729).³ Chinazzo (fol. 719).⁴ *Memorie*, 226-9.

occupied by between 7,000 and 8,000 men¹ under Jacopo Cavalli, who was still in Venetian pay. In every direction, the points more exposed to the enemy were protected by ponderous booms, which effectually obstructed the passage of vessels through the Canals.

The wisdom of the measures dictated by Pisani, and the execution of which that great man superintended to a large extent in person, speedily became apparent. On the 24th August,² a Genoese force under Ambrogio Doria effected a landing a little below San Nicolo, while a similar attack was directed by the Lieutenant of the Carrarese on Santo Spirito and Santa Marta. But the aggressors were repulsed at both points with wonderful gallantry; the Venetians maintained their ground with firmness; and an attempt on the part of the League to effect a junction, and to open a combined assault on the Capital, was frustrated by the wakeful vigilance of Pisani and the activity of Corbaro³ who, in his new appointment of Vice-Admiral of Lido, had forgotten the hard knuckles of his chief. The defeat of this bold and well-concerted stratagem, which its projectors had hoped to bring to maturity under cover of the darkness, was of momentous importance. It raised the Siege of Venice. The Carrarese, disgusted by the failure, almost immediately withdrew his troops under the pretext, that he had been summoned to Treviso by the Lieutenant of Louis;

¹ Sanudo (fol. 703). A return made to the College on the 13th of February showed 8,000.

² *Memorie*, 234.

³ *Ibid.* 240-1.

and Doria, imitating his example, relinquished in the early part of October, the undertaking in which he had so sanguinely embarked, destroyed all his works at Malamocco, and once more concentrated himself at Chioggia, where he determined to await the reduction of Venice by famine.

The situation of that capital was daily becoming more hopeless and insupportable. So desperate was the posture of affairs that some members of Council even made a motion for emigrating from the lagoons, and seeking a new home in Candia or Negropont. But this wild proposition was instantaneously negatived; and the Venetians declared "that sooner than abandon their city they would bury themselves under her ruins."

The dearness of food was of course proportionate to its scarcity. Corn was selling at nine *lire*¹ the small, and sixteen *lire* the large, measure; millet, ten *lire* the measure; barley, five *lire*; beans, from eight to twelve *lire*; peas, twelve *lire*, or four ducats. Salt meat was fetching eight soldi a pound; oil, the same. Two soldi were given for an egg or a cabbage; a *lira*, or the third of a ducat, for a rope of onions; for a hundred head of garlic, ten times as much. Wine was not to be procured under six *lire* a quart; the choicer vintages produced double that amount; and the cold season which had now set in raised the price of fuel to eleven *lire*, or nearly four ducats, the boatload. By successful

¹ Il ducato valeva *lire* tre, soldi quattordici.—Sanudo (*Vite*, 724). See likewise Chinazzo (fol. 732) and Caroldo, folio 122 (Harl. MSS. 5020).

sorties,¹ the supplies sent from Padua and elsewhere to the Genoese camp were occasionally secured ; and by these means the doom of the Venetians was retarded. But a large proportion of the people were famishing ; and even in the houses of the better classes it was far from rare to see the members of a family partaking of the last loaf, not knowing whence the next was to come. The nobility, however, from motives which it would be uncharitable to scrutinize too narrowly, exhibited on this occasion, and amid this distress, the most unreserved sympathy with their poorer countrymen, and alleviated their privations to the utmost extent of their power. “Go,” said Pietro Mocenigo, in the name of the Doge, to the Popular Assembly—“Go, all who are pressed by hunger, to the dwellings of the patricians ; there you will find friends and brothers, who will divide with you their last crust !”² Thus passed October, November, and a portion of the ensuing month. Carlo Zeno had not yet been signalled. Nevertheless, by some intercepted correspondence, which was fortunately discovered at this juncture, light had at length been thrown on the movements of that officer. It appeared from a letter, which was found among others on the persons of the passengers of a captured vessel,³ that Zeno had achieved during the summer and autumn the most splendid triumphs for his country ; that the terror of his name

¹ Sanudo (fol. 698).

² Marco Barbaro (quoted by Romanin, iii. 277).

³ Sanudo (fol. 697).

was spread from the Riviera to the Golden Horn ; that so recently as the 25th October last, he had secured a Genoese galleon, valued at 300,000 ducats ; and that at the present moment he was lying off Canea. This gratifying and consolatory intelligence enabled the Signory to breathe more freely ; and on the 16th November, Luigi Morosini *the Fat*¹ was despatched to command the loiterer, under pain of the severest displeasure of his Government, to hasten to the rescue of his fellow-citizens.

Almost concurrently with the accidental receipt of advices respecting Zeno and the Mediterranean squadron, an incident occurred which inspired the desponding population of the Dogado with additional courage. At the head of a considerable number of his small craft, Barbarigo, watching his opportunity, captured three of the enemy's vessels, dragged them into the shallows, and made them prize, killing several Genoese in the conflict, and taking 150 prisoners.² This exploit, which won a factitious degree of applause, amounted to a resumption of the offensive ; its effect was highly exhilarating ; and Pisani, who had already made two or three unsuccessful explorations of Pelestrina and Brondolo with a small reconnoitring force,³ recommended⁴ the Government to follow up the triumph of Barbarigo by concentrating its strength, and essaying the recovery of Chioggia. He allowed that the chances

¹ Sanudo (*Vite*, 698).

² Romanin (iii. 284).

³ *Memorie di V. P.* 254. In one of these reconnoitres Pisani lost ten barks and thirty men, and Antonio Gradenigo, the Doge's nephew, perished.

⁴ *Memorie*, 261.

of failure were not slight, and that much blood would be spilled in the attempt. But he remarked that the capital had become all but untenable, that the pressure of hunger and misery was daily on the increase, and that it was only a choice between two evils which remained to them; and he urged that the minor was the adoption of the hazardous and decisive step which he was counselling. From observations and experiments which he had been enabled to make,¹ he learned that Doria had at least 30,000 men, about fifty galleys, between 700 and 800 light craft, ample supplies, and almost inexhaustible resources of every kind. The superiority of numbers was therefore overwhelming; but, on the other hand, the expectation was warrantable, that before the time had come for forming the siege of Chioggia, Zeno would have arrived. The advice of the Captain-General, which was echoed by Jacopo Cavalli,² was ultimately accepted; and it was resolved to evoke the whole latent energy of the Republic in this final effort, by affording the keenest stimulus to Venetian patriotism. On the 1st December,³ the Senate published a decree that of those families of plebeian rank, who should most liberally meet the present exigency by the proffer of their persons and estates, thirty should be summoned after the Peace to the Great Council; that 5,000 ducats of gold should be distributed yearly among those who

¹ *Memorie di V. P.* 261.

² *Ibid.*

³ Romanin (iii. 280), who quotes *Misti Senato*, p. 85 *all' Archivio*.

were not elected, and their heirs for ever;¹ that every foreign merchant who should display peculiar zeal and affection for the Republic should be admitted to the full privileges of citizenship; and that, on the other hand, such Venetians as might absent themselves with the design of eluding a participation in the common burdens and hardships should be held by that act to have forfeited all their civil rights.

This measure, which had been initiated by the War Department, and had been thence introduced into the Pregadi by Zaccaria Contarini,² was approved by the Great Council in the early part of the same month. It yielded immediate fruit. A list of seventy-five candidates for the hereditary honours of the Patriciate was speedily completed. Some offered money; some personal service or the service of their children and relatives; some brought galleys. The Grand Chancellor Caresinus and his brother inscribed their names for 500 ducats of gold.³ The two sons of the ex-Chancellor Ravegnani gave an equal amount. Bernardino Garzoni contributed 200 ducats of gold toward a Fund for the widows and children of the slain, a month's pay for the arbalisters of the Doge's galley, a fortnight's stipend for the armaments of twenty-five others, two *cocche*, the interest of 50,000 *lire* and of any other investments into which he might enter between the present date and the close of the war, and the services of his

¹ Chinazzo (fol. 733); Caresinus (fol. 466).

² Compare Sanudo, fol. 701, with *ibid.* fol. 740 and 744.

³ Chinazzo (733-8); Gataro (fol. 326-32); Caroldo, fol. 111-12 (Harl. MSS. 5020).

three sons. Bartolomeo Paruta, a skinner, volunteered two galleys and sixty arbalisters, a month's pay for 120 oarsmen, and the services of his brother Zanino with ten men-at-arms. Matteo Fasuolo, who had been reduced to beggary by the loss of Chioggia, presented his two sons, and offered them, as the only treasures which he now boasted, to the Signory. Independently of personal and other service, and the equipment and maintenance of certain men-at-arms, till the Peace, Francesco da Mezzo subscribed a sum of 10,000 *lire*.

The Doge, who was just on the verge of seventy-three, but who was in a green and hale old age, signified his wish to assume the supreme command of the expedition; and he appointed Pisani his first lieutenant, with the title of Admiral and Vice-Captain-General.¹ Exclusively of sixty barks and 400 boats of all builds and dimensions,² thirty-four galleys were equipped,³ and thirty-four patricians were commissioned as their captains. It was the same number which Sebastiano Ziani had led in 1177 to Salboro. The day for the departure had not yet been definitively fixed, when rumours reached the Signory that grave dissensions had arisen in Chioggia, and that the population was in revolt against the Genoese. Pisani protested under such circumstances against the slightest unnecessary delay,⁴ and the 21st December was then named.

¹ Gataro, contemp. (342).

² *Memorie di Pisani*, 268.

³ Caresinus, contemp. (fol. 450); Sanudo (fol. 695).

⁴ *Mem. di V. P.* 266-7.

On that morning, a proclamation issued in the name of the Doge, that all should be in their galleys and at their posts at noon, under pain of death.¹ The armament was divided into three parts. The van, consisting of fourteen galleys, was confided to Pisani; the Doge, assisted by Cavalli, commanded in the centre; and Federigo Cornaro, called *Collo-storto*, or the Crooked-necked, brought up the rear with ten men-of-war.² At the hour of Vespers, his Serenity, Pisani, and the other leaders of the enterprise, attended the celebration of an extraordinary mass in the Church of Saint Mark;³ it was not till nearly eight o'clock⁴ that Contarini mounted his barge, and ordered the great banner of Venice to be unfurled—the same, it was remembered, which had witnessed the triumph of the Signory over Frederic Barbarossa.⁵ The whole process had been conducted rapidly and noiselessly. The night was beautifully bright and calm, a soft and propitious breeze was blowing,⁶ and the weather was much milder than it had been. The squadron weighed anchor at a little after eight from Sopra-Porto; the galleys of Vettore Pisani and Taddeo Giustiniani led the way: while Barbarigo, with some of his lighter craft, was ordered to take the route of the Canal,⁷ with a view of cutting off the supplies of Doria from the Terra-Ferma. The Venetian fleet, however, had barely lost sight of Lido, when it found

¹ Sanudo (fol. 698).

² *Mem.* (268-9).

³ Caresinus (fol. 450).

⁴ Sanudo (fol. 699).

⁵ Chinazzo (fol. 733).

⁶ Caresinus (450).

⁷ Caresinus, *loco citato*; Sanudo (fol. 701).

itself enveloped in a dense black mist;¹ and the Doge and his companions began to entertain the most painful misgivings as to the success of their noble and adventurous undertaking. But their suspense was brief; the fog speedily disappeared; the atmosphere recovered its clearness; and the expedition arrived without farther hindrance at the Pass of Chioggia, at the southern extremity of Pelestrina. It was ten o'clock.²

The strategical plan laid down by Pisani, and approved by the Signory, was simple and masterly. Inasmuch as it was to become a question of a small force, which laboured under serious impediments, coping with one superior to it in resources, numbers, and position, his proposal was, instead of plunging precipitately into hostilities, to take advantage of the blind confidence and self-sufficiency of Doria, and to imprison the Genoese in their own lines by the obstruction of the remaining outlets to the open sea by the Straits of Chioggia, Brondolo, and the Canal of Lombardy. This scheme was not less attractive than prudent. If it proved itself successful, it unavoidably involved the enemy in the very fate which they had reserved for the Republic: while it left the Doge and his lieutenant at full liberty to assume the offensive so soon as Zeno should arrive.

Since its abandonment by Doria in October, Pelestrina had remained in the hands of the Venetians, and Pisani, anxious to be in complete command of the

¹ Caresinus, *ubi suprà*.

² Sanudo (fol. 699).

Strait of Chioggia, landed 4,800 men, on the morning of the 22nd at dawn, on the Brondolese shore. The weather was again somewhat foggy; but the Genoese, speedily perceiving this movement, and appreciating its object, issued from Chioggia in great force; the troops of Pisani were obliged to re-embark in disorder, leaving behind them no fewer than 600 in killed, drowned, and prisoners; and the bastion, of which they had laid the foundations, was totally destroyed. But in the late manœuvre Pisani had had a double design; and one of these two purposes was perfectly answered. For in the meantime, under that cover, a small naval detachment contrived to plant transversely, on the Pelestrinese side of the channel, a huge hulk; and the Genoese, in hastening to oppose the operation, unconsciously assisted it by setting fire to the *coccha*, the wreck of which disappeared in the water, and still more effectually barricaded the passage. The first layer of an artificial dyke was thus formed, upon which the light craft of Barbarigo¹ proceeded to pile stones, marble, and granite; strong girding chains were added; and in the course of the 24th, the Strait of Chioggia was entirely choked and dammed both on the Pelestrinese and Brondolese shores.

But this gratifying result had not been achieved

¹ Copy of the Letter written to this officer by the Signory in December :

“*Consilarii, Rectores, et Collegium Venetiarum* :

“Mandamus vobis, quatenus vos personaliter cum Ganzarolis vestris statim venire debeatis Venetias et sine morâ, ad loquendum cum Collegio quod stat de nocte in Palatio, tenendo bene vestros homines in Ganzarolis; quia istud quod scribimus est pro bonâ causâ.”

without terrible effusion of blood and severe sacrifice of life, and the service was unprecedentedly arduous and harassing. The Venetian volunteers, who had been almost incessantly under a galling and murderous fire from the enemy's batteries, began at this early stage to repine. They were badly armed and badly fed. They were submitting to hardships under which even the most inured veterans might wince. In spite of the bitterly cold weather which was prevailing, they were constantly up to their waists in water, and in perpetual danger of being drowned. Their companions were being mowed down on every side like hay. They declared that it was more than flesh and blood could bear; their constitutions were sinking under the fatigue and exposure; and they querulously demanded leave to return home. Pisani, who was an unshrinking partaker in all the perils and toils of his humbler comrades and fellow-citizens, saw that great firmness would be requisite to check this natural but ill-timed outburst of feeling. He demonstrated to the murmurers the vital importance of the undertaking, contrasting it with the absolute folly of the course which they desired to pursue; and he dexterously silenced them by soliciting the Doge, in a tone which might have been mistaken for a command, to swear on his sword that he, "although he was toward eighty years of age, would never return to Venice, unless Chioggia was reconquered." Contarini took the oath. It was the day before Christmas.

It was reasonable to presume that the Genoese,

when they were awakened to a full sense of their highly critical situation, would make a desperate struggle to extricate themselves; and promptitude was, therefore, the sole guarantee for success. On the 24th, two hulks were submerged in the port of Brondolo under the eye of Cornaro the Crooked-necked; they were similarly overlaid and similarly secured with booms. Doria, who had been obstinately clinging to a foregone conclusion that the Venetians would attempt nothing of consequence before the appearance of Zeno, had not till now thoroughly penetrated the motives of Pisani; he immediately despatched fourteen galleys to crush Cornaro, who had only four. But the Admiral brought up forthwith ten others, which offered an invincible front to the enemy; and Cornaro, thus supported by his chief, succeeded admirably in his enterprise in the teeth of the Genoese, and in defiance of their artillery at Brondolo.

On the same day, the Venetian engineers began the construction of a fort at Fossone, on the southern shore of the port of Brondolo, and facing the Convent which Doria had transformed into a citadel, and had studded with artillery; and notwithstanding the raking volleys of the bombards from the opposite side, the work was in an advanced stage toward completion on the 29th. The new Castle of Fossone, which was christened the *Lova*, and which was designed as a counterpoise to that of Brondolo, was mounted with cannon of the largest calibre. One monster-gun, named the *Trevisan*, discharged stones of 195 pounds weight; a

second, the *Victory*, was of slightly inferior capacity;¹ but neither was susceptible of being fired more than once in *four-and-twenty hours*. On the 25th or 26th December, the Canal of Lombardy was likewise rendered impervious; and thus within a week from the date of his arrival, the Admiral was in a position to pronounce Chioggia in a state of blockade.

It was a gigantic task which the Venetians had imposed upon themselves, and it was a stupendous feat which they had just accomplished in the face of a resistance which, as their labours proceeded, became more and more strenuous. The work which the volunteers performed in this memorable Christmas week was such as would have done honour to the veterans of Portolongo; and a severer ordeal for men, untrained to toil and privation, could not easily be imagined. But there was a limit to human endurance. On the 29th, the condition of the Venetian troops reached its climax of misery. They were placed upon half-rations; the cold was piercing; and they were obliged to keep continuous watch at the dykes, where they came into deadly collision every day with the enemy. The officers, the arbalisters, the oarsmen, alike declared that they would brave all consequences, and return to Venice without farther delay. For a moment, the resolution of Pisani himself was shaken; even his iron nerve and tough sinews were beginning to give way. But, suppressing by a powerful effort his own misgivings, he summoned up all his courage

¹ Formaleoni (*Sulla Nautica Antica di Veneziani*, 24).

and energy, and besought his companions-in-arms to exercise a little more patience. The example of the Doge and the stimulating accents of his lieutenant prevailed; and the voice of complaint was once more hushed. But a pledge was exacted from Pisani, in the name of Contarini and himself, that if Zeno should not be signalled between the present time and New Year's Day, he would accede to their wishes and raise the blockade of Chioggia. Upon this comparatively slender chance the Admiral was forced to stake the fortunes, perhaps the existence, of that Republic, which it was his noble ambition to save. *In eight-and-forty hours it was to be decided whether a State which, through a perspective of a thousand years, could look back upon the rise and decay of so many empires, should retain or should renounce its independence.*

Whatever allowance is to be made for the difference of the notions entertained in that age respecting the extirpation of a time-honoured nobility, and the evanescence of a great and classic commonwealth, it is impossible to doubt that the destiny of the Signory formed a fruitful source of solicitude to the more intelligent section of every community in Europe. Whatever might be the true interest of Italy, it was the true interest of civilization that Venice should continue to flourish. By her fall, the former would gain nothing, and the latter would assuredly lose much. The presumption is, that the statesmen of the fourteenth century were either unwilling or unable to foresee the vast and convulsive changes which the exterminatory

project of Louis, as enunciated in his Letters to Carrara, would immediately tend to operate, if it was carried to its distant consequences. It was a safe prediction that it would inaugurate a new era of darkness, that it would throw arts, sciences, literature, and all other humanizing influences a century back, and would deluge the Peninsula with the blood of its own people. For, after all, the ulterior question, which might be expected to arise, was not whether Venice should be transformed into an appanage to the crown of Saint Stephen, or should be degraded into a Paduan fishing-station, but if Venice ceased to be, who was to be her successor? Which member of the Coalition was to receive the coveted prize, the most adjacent or the most remote, the most or the least potent? There was Hungary, there was Padua, there was Aquileia. It was natural that the Carrarese, in his violent jealousy of the Venetians, should take part with Louis against them; but it was barely likely that he would view with more complacency, or would treat with greater toleration, than the other Italian Powers the extension of Hungarian sway to both shores of the Adriatic. It was intelligible, seeing the grossness of the fiscal system introduced into that province, that Louis himself should feel inquietude for Dalmatia: but it was hard to divine what advantage would accrue to him if Venice was to be the price of Paduan friendship, and Trieste was to be the price of Austrian perfidy. It was well for the Visconti and the Scaligers to wink or connive at the ruin of the Republic; but they did not perhaps take into

account the immense preponderance which such an event would give to the Duke of Padua over the Dukes of Milan and Verona.

The lot of Venice was thus trembling fearfully in the balance, and all minds were wrought to an agonizing pitch of suspense when, the 30th and 31st December having passed without bringing any change for the better, the earliest streaks of daylight on the 1st January, 1380, revealed fifteen¹ sail in the offing. The anxiety of the Doge and his companions then became still more intense. It was extremely probable that the vessels, which were still barely visible to the naked eye, were the squadron so long and so ardently expected; but there was a painful possibility that the new-comers might be the reinforcements which Doria was known to be awaiting. Some light craft were sent forward to reconnoitre. It gave birth to a delirious and frantic joy, when the messengers returned announcing that, on their approach within range of sight, the strangers hoisted a flag, and that that flag had been distinctly recognised as the Lion of Saint Mark. IT WAS CARLO ZENO WHO HAD COME AT LAST; AND VENICE WAS INDEED SAVED.

This remarkable man was one of a numerous family, which Pietro Zeno, the great-grandchild² of Marco Zeno, the brother of the Doge Reniero, had by his wife, Agnese Dandolo.³ He was born in 1334,⁴ and

¹ Gataro, contemp. (fol. 338).

² *Albero della famiglia Zeno*, presso Caterino Zeno, *Viaggio in Persia*, 44.

³ Giacomo Zeno (*Vita Caroli Zeni*, 210 D.)

⁴ G. Zeno, *ubi suprâ*; Mutinelli (*Annali*, 185).

was therefore the junior of Pisani by ten years. The Emperor Charles IV., between whom and the elder Zeno a personal friendship subsisted, stood for the infant at the font by proxy; and, after his imperial sponsor, the boy was christened *Carlo*.¹ The fair Agnese died in childbed; her offspring never knew his mother: and how Pietro Zeno perished under the ramparts of Smyrna, in October, 1344, has been related in a preceding page. Young Carlo, whose expectations were slender, was adopted by his paternal uncle Andrea, who destined him for the Church, hoping to be able to procure for his ward high ecclesiastical preferment. The orphan, who exhibited a precocious genius and an extraordinary aptitude for learning, received his elementary education under a Venetian pedagogue; the *Psalms of David* was one of the earliest books which was put into his hands. On leaving school, he was invited by Clement V. to Avignon, where he remained sixteen months; the Pope bestowed upon him the reversion of a rich prebendal stall at Patras; and uncle Andrea, when the youth, so fortunate in his influential connexions, returned home, determined that he should go, at a suitable age, to complete his studies at Padua University. On his journey thither, Carlo was waylaid by footpads, who robbed him of all he had, and left him for dead. He was restored to consciousness, however, and carried to his destination. Zeno became an accomplished

¹ G. Zeno, *ubi suprâ*.

scholar,¹ and dialectician; and he displayed a passionate fondness for music.² But his besetting sin was gambling; at play, he lost every penny; and he was at length obliged to escape from his creditors by a stealthy flight from the Gymnasium. During the next five years, the young Venetian wandered over various parts of the Peninsula, soldiering and troubadouring, and eluded all the inquiries of his friends who, for the second time, mourned him as dead. On the expiration of this term, he suddenly made his appearance at uncle Andrea's door, was overwhelmed with welcomes, and finally was persuaded to proceed to his prebend.

Patras was at that time beleaguered by the Turks. The prebendary at once placed himself in the foremost rank of her defenders, and behaved like a paladin. But having been grievously wounded, he was treated as a corpse, wrapped in the winding-sheet, shrouded and confined; and he was on the point of being nailed down when he shewed signs of reviving animation. After this strange adventure, he again repaired to his native city (1361). He was now in his twenty-fifth year. The King of Cyprus happened to be making at that moment a short sojourn at Venice; Lorenzo Celsi had just succeeded to the throne. Zeno ingratiated himself with Lusignano, and was employed by this

¹ *Funebris Oratio Leonardi Justiniani pro Carolo Zeno* (Murat. xix. 374).

² Ibid. and "Vita del Magnifico M. Carlo Zeno egregio e valoroso Capitano della Illustrissima Republica Vinitiana, composta dal Reverendo G. Feltrense (Giacomo Zeno), et tradotta in volgare da Messer Francesco Quirino:" Ven. 1544.

prince on more than one mission of consequence. The erratic Venetian next paid a visit to his godfather the Emperor, travelled through Germany, France, and England, and then once more settled at Patras. He had not long resumed his sacerdotal functions, when he fought a duel,¹ and forfeited his stall. This unpleasant incident left him no alternative but to renounce the clerical profession. He accordingly abjured celibacy and lawn, married a wealthy heiress at Chiarenza, and embarked in commercial life. His wife died shortly after the union; and Carlo contracted a second matrimonial alliance with the daughter of the admiral Marco Giustiniani. These nuptials, which were the turning-point of Zeno's life, opened a new phase in his stormy and checkered career. He now forsook the paths of commerce, and entered the political arena. In 1377, he was appointed co-Proveditor with Michele Steno under Antonio Veniero, Governor of Tenedos; and he speedily enabled his employers to detect his valuable qualities and his sterling merit. He was recalled from Tenedos to take an important military command in the March of Treviso, where the Republic was then at war with the Carrarese. Here the ex-Prebendary of Patras had a noble opportunity of exhibiting the dazzling brilliancy of his genius and the latent powers of a master-mind.² His name was victory. Neither paucity of number, nor slenderness of resource, nor

¹ Mutinelli, *Annali*, 186.

² "Ejus virtus semper laudabilia vestigia secuta est felicitis memoriæ genitoris sui Athletæ Christi Petri Zeno."—Caresinus (fol. 461).

disadvantage of situation, deterred him. There was no instance in which he allowed himself to be worsted. He became known as Zeno *the Unconquered*. In April, 1378, this distinguished officer received his commission as Bailo and Captain of Negropont; and after a brief interval he exchanged that position, in which he had earned fresh laurels, for a naval command under the new Captain-General Pisani. It is already familiar enough that the Lieutenant of Pisani was intrusted with a separate detachment; that after a short time his chief lost sight of him altogether; and that it was by his continued absence that, on the 7th May, 1379, Luciano Doria contrived to win the Battle of Pola, and that Venice itself was so gravely imperilled.

In personal appearance, Zeno was of ordinary height, square-shouldered, broad-chested, well-knit, erect in his gait, and of a symmetrical figure. His head was manly and handsome; his nose was aquiline; his eyes, large, dark, piercingly bright, and wide apart, were over-arched by strongly-marked brows. His air was grave and thoughtful, unlike that of the jocund and buoyant Pisani; but although his temper was more equable, his character was hardly less impulsive.

There is every probability that Zeno had already left Candia, when Luigi Morosini arrived in the island. But from some other source he there learned for the first time the exact situation of his country. Nevertheless, he appears to have been ignorant of the extreme nature of the dilemma; and he made, in the first instance, for Lido. But an agent of the Govern-

ment was in attendance to direct him to waste not a moment in proceeding to Chioggia, where prayers were being offered up to the Almighty for his speedy arrival. For that point, consequently, he pressed all sail; and on the next day, being the 1st January, he presented himself, at four o'clock in the morning, to Contarini.¹ He gave the Doge, in hurried accents, a succinct account of all that had happened; how he had captured nearly seventy Genoese vessels of various size; and how he had, by keeping a narrow watch on the Riviera, and closing the Mediterranean against the enemy, aimed a blow at their commerce which they would not promptly retrieve, and precluded the transmission of reinforcements to Pietro Doria. Finally, he substantiated all the particulars already in circulation respecting the galleon of Nicolo Bechignono² and the worth of her cargo. On the behaviour of his officers and men throughout he passed the highest encomium. It appeared from his log,³ that he left Constantinople on the 9th August; Tenedos, 11th September; Rhodes, 30th October; Candia, 2nd December;⁴ Parenzo, 14th December. In the summer, he had been at Naples, where he obtained an audience of Queen Joan; but the Battle of Pola⁵ deafened her Majesty to the proposition which he had ventured to address to her for seceding from the League and allying herself with the Republic.

¹ A. Gataro, contemp. (fol. 353).

² Stella (*Ann.* 1114).

³ Gataro, *ubi suprâ*.

⁴ Chinazzo (fol. 749-52).

⁵ J. Zenus (*Vita C. Zeni*, 222).

To any suggestions for taking repose, Zeno refused to listen. He assured the Doge that his comrades and himself were impatient for action. He was desired to choose his post; and he selected the most perilous. He was stationed at Brondolo.

The story of the War of Chioggia subsequently to that notable New Year's Day is shortly told. From that hour, by a rapid change of fortune, the situation of the enemy became more and more hopeless. Their resistance was considerably prolonged by the remissness of the Venetians in intercepting supplies; but this circumstance afforded merely a respite. The question, indeed, had resolved itself purely into one of time. The eventual recovery of Chioggia amounted almost to a certainty. By deaths and desertions the ranks of the besieged were greatly thinned. In the course of as many months they made six sorties, and six several times they were repulsed by the unconquerable Zeno and the not less intrepid and indefatigable Pisani. On the 22nd January, Doria was crushed by the fall of part of the wall of Brondolo Castle, which had been battered in by the *Victory*. His place was temporarily supplied by Napoleone Grimaldi.

Zeno was a host in himself; but he was desperately rash, and was incessantly exposing himself to fearful risks. His life was in perpetual jeopardy. One wintry evening after dusk, his own vessel, having been accidentally torn from its anchorage in the vicinity of the Lova by the force of the wind and currents,

was driven against the enemy's forts; and in an instant the hero became a target for a hundred marksmen. One shaft pierced his throat. Without pausing more than to pluck out the barb, he continued to issue his orders for manœuvring the endangered galley, bade a seaman swim with a tow-rope to the moorings, angrily imposed silence upon those who, beholding themselves in the jaws of death, intreated him to strike his flag, and was not content until he found himself and his companions again in safety. But a second casualty now befel him. In hurrying about the deck, he tumbled down an open hatchway, and was precipitated into the hold upon his back, speechless and unconscious. In a few moments, the blood rushing back into the arteries would have surcharged the vessels of the heart, and suffocation would have ensued. With marvellous self-possession and coolness, he feebly raised his body from its supine position, and turned upon his face. The wound was thus permitted to bleed copiously; Zeno breathed faintly and opened his eyes; and his life was providentially saved.

The condition of the besieging force, and the posture of affairs at Venice, were now materially ameliorated. The reconquest of Loredo had been the earliest exploit of Zeno after his arrival; and this acquisition restored the communication with Ferrara, whence supplies could be drawn to any extent. Following up his triumph, Zeno, now appointed (February 18¹) General-in-Chief of the Land Forces of the Republic, beat the enemy

¹ Caresinus (fol. 452).

from all their positions at Brondolo and Little Chioggia (February 19¹); and on the 20th February he established his head-quarters under the ramparts of Great-Chioggia, from which point he directed a destructive and uninterrupted fire upon the citadel. The Genoese, many of whom were drowned in the Canal of Santa Caterina by the fall of the bridge under their weight,² retreated in complete confusion, leaving behind them an abundant quantity of arms, accoutrements, and war material; and "any one," as it is graphically put by Chinazzo, "who might have wished to have a suit of mail for a few shillings, might have bought at that rate of the spoilers as many as he liked."³ "And then," adds the same contemporary author,⁴ "the common opinion was that the Venetians might have taken Chioggia if they had chosen. But they deemed the hazard too great. Whereupon those within took courage, and began to strengthen their works, hoping soon to have help from Genoa and Padua. And they sent away the women and children, who were treated by the Doge humanely and forwarded to Venice; and from them it was gathered how straitened the Genoese were. And they were beginning to deal out allowances of bread and wine and other kinds of nutriment. The Venetians, to hasten the end, closed all the outlets toward Padua." "I recollect," says an eyewitness, the Chancellor Caresinus, writing almost immediately after the occurrences which he describes, "that our

¹ Stella (*Annales*, fol. 1115).

³ P. 756.

² Stella, *ubi suprâ*.

⁴ P. 757.

galleys were sometimes so close to Chioggia that stones were thrown into them without number; but, by Divine providence, no one was hurt. The enemy are now so thoroughly blockaded that they can neither leave nor get help from outside." The Signory, having thus hemmed Doria's successor, Gasparo Spinola, completely in, and having drawn a circumvallation of palisades and forts round Chioggia,¹ resolved to spare neither labour nor expense in conducting the undertaking to a triumphant issue. Zeno, as General-in-Chief, had now under his command the Star Company of Milan and the Tard Venus of Sir John Hawkwood. These two corps, with that of Jacopo Cavalli, represented a total of 20,000 men. Barbarigo had 500 barks distributed over several stations. The Fleet was composed of fifty-two galleys of the heaviest draught, and in an excellent state of efficiency. One moiety under Pisani lay off Chioggia: the other, under the Doge in person, was anchored in front of the Lova. The Dykes, which had so admirably answered their object, became on the recovery of Brondolo absolutely useless, and they were destroyed. Of money there was happily no dearth, and provisions were comparatively plentiful.

One feeble chance was left to Spinola in the arrival of a fleet from Genoa. On the 18th January, 1380, the departure of Zeno having raised the blockade of the Riviera, Matteo Maruffo² was despatched to the

¹ Caresinus (fol. 456). See also Agostino Giustiniano (*Annali di Genova*, lib. iv. c. 146, ed. 1537).

² Stella (*Annales*, 1115).

relief of Chioggia. But Maruffo, in a spirit of blind folly, took a circuitous route and wasted inestimable moments in exploring the Mediterranean. On the Neapolitan coast, in the neighbourhood of Manfredonia, he fell in (April 20¹) with Giustiniani, whom the Doge had sent to Apulia and elsewhere in search of grain² (March 21³). Giustiniani who had not more than five galleys was, after a gallant defence, enveloped and taken prisoner with his whole squadron; and the elated Maruffo pursued his course toward the Adriatic. On the 14th May, he appeared before the Port of Chioggia, and challenged Pisani to an engagement. But the admiral, knowing that the moment of triumph was at hand, and conscious that, if he met with a reverse, the consequences would be indubitably fatal, withstood for several days every temptation to fling away the golden opportunity. At length, the outrageous conduct of Maruffo provoked him to such a point that, on the 25th of the month, he prevailed on the Doge to allow him to accept the defiance.⁴ The two forces remained for some time facing each other. Not a blow had been exchanged, not a shot had been fired, when the Genoese, seized by a sudden panic, took to flight. Pisani, desirous of obliterating the recollections of Pola, gave them chase. But after following in their track several miles, he abandoned the pursuit. It was with ecstasies of delight, that the Genoese in Chioggia had witnessed the first approach

¹ Caresinus (fol. 454).² Ibid. (455).³ Sanudo (fol. 706).⁴ Caresinus (fol. 455).

of their countrymen; they clomb to the roofs of houses, and waved flags and pennons in sign of joyful recognition. It was with unspeakable pain that they beheld the mysterious retreat of Maruffo on the 26th May. Through the laggard movements of that officer, the Venetians had had time to render themselves masters of all the approaches to Chioggia; and, although within two miles the means had existed of replenishing their magazines, and reinvigorating frames sinking under a spare and nauseous¹ diet of vermin, the Genoese derived no more benefit from the fleet, than if it had been a thousand leagues beyond the Equator. Brondolo was an impassable and fatal barrier.

Spinola was in despair. His supply of fresh water was failing. Hunger was gnawing at the entrails of the soldiers. Want and disease were doing their work; so enfeebled were the physical powers of the Genoese, that they almost wholly ceased, after the first week in June, to ply the guns; and the silence of the bombards was an eloquent omen. Self-preservation was now the ruling instinct; and it was not unusual to observe Venetian² and Genoese officers parleying

¹ Pugliola (fol. 523).

² It appears, from a Letter written by the Signory to the Doge on the 22nd April, 1380 (Murat. xxii. 731-2), that the old man had expressed a wish to return to Venice. It begins: "Serenissime et Excellentissime Domine, recepimus literas Excellentie Vestrae datas apud Clugiam die 22 Aprilis horâ 2 noctis, facientes mentionem, quod provideamus de Serenitate Vestra, quod possit redire ad patriam ex rationibus in dictis literis sapientissime allegatis. Quibus intellectis, vestrae benignitati ad præsens respondemus, quod nos, tota terra, et omnes subditi et

together under those very walls, which had been till lately the theatre of a furious cannonade.

Resort was had to various dolefully forlorn expedients. The Genoese endeavoured to escape by cutting a new passage through the centre of Brondolo to the sea; but that scheme of canalization signally miscarried. They fomented discontent among the troops. They attempted to assassinate Zeno. But the companies were appeased by a promise of a three days' sack of Chioggia, and the bonus of a month's pay at the close of the War. All the plans of the enemy proved themselves nugatory. A proposal for a peace-congress was among them. It emanated ostensibly from the Pope who, seeing that Chioggia was virtually lost, and aroused to a perception of the political complications which would infallibly arise, if Genoa was permanently crushed, volunteered his intercession on behalf of that commonwealth; and the representatives of Venice, Genoa, Rome, Padua, Hungary, and Aquileia, actually sat at the Lova during a few days in June.¹ But the Signory remembered with bitterness her own situation on the 31st December, 1379; she remembered that, when she was on the brink of ruin, no Power had come forward to *her*

fideles nostri, clarè et manifestè habemus, quod via Excellentie vestrae ad partes Clugiae fuit vita, salus, confirmatio, immo affirmatio status nostri, et cum omnibus posteris nostris semper erimus obligati vestrae benignitati et filiis, et descendentes vestris, et benignitati et gratioso dominio vestro." The epistle is signed "Consiliarii, Rectores, Collegium Venetorum;" and the superscription is *Serenissimo et Excellentissimo Domino, Andreae Contareno, Dei Gratiâ Venetiarum, &c., Duci inclyto.*

¹ Chinazzo (fol. 759); copy of a Letter written by a Genoese, Feb. 13, 1380 (O.S.); Gataro (fol. 374).

rescue. Europe, in fact, had been willing to connive at the destruction of Venice. Heaven had willed that Venice should not perish; and there was no just reason why she should be robbed now of her legitimate triumph. The negotiation silently dropped.

Meanwhile, Maruffo, having procured reinforcements, had reappeared (June 15); and he continued to hover about Chioggia, repeating his former tactics. But the victory of the Republic was too near at hand, and Pisani was immovable.¹

Spinola had played his last stake. A sally, in which the entire garrison was appointed to join, had been secretly concerted with the Carrarese, who prepared to take part in the movement.² But the correspondence was fortunately intercepted by the vigilance of Zeno; and the General-in-Chief was on his guard. The idea was relinquished. Not the faintest gleam of hope remained. The compulsory inaction of Maruffo, whose manœuvres were watched with breathless anxiety from the house-tops of Chioggia was a sad and bitter disappointment. There was no longer any alternative but submission. On the 21st June, a deputation, armed with a safe-conduct, waited on the Doge, and on their knees offered to capitulate, if their lives and property were guaranteed. They were informed, that

¹ "In hanc sententiam concurrebant Magnifici Domini Bernabos et Galeatio Vicecomites Mediolani Colligati nostri, scribentes amicabiliter in hanc formam: Cum res præsentialiter in talibus terminis posita sit, quod Clugiam obtinebitis, non est tutum exponere periculo fortunæ ludum victum. Habeatis obsidionem bene vallatum; non transibunt multi dies, quod victus deficiet."—Caresinus (fol. 456).

² Caresinus, *ubi suprâ*.

an unconditional surrender alone would be accepted. On the 22nd, the flag of Saint George was hoisted on the Bell-Tower as a signal to the Commander of the galleys lying at Fossone; and, the latter having come within a certain distance of Chioggia, Spinola ordered the colours to be struck in token of distress. The Commander signalled with smoke to implore a little more patience. But no answer was given; and he returned with a heavy heart to Fossone.¹

On the morning of the 24th June,² the Doge, accompanied by his lieutenant and the General-in-Chief, made his formal entry; and the Lion of Saint Mark was planted on the Campanile. The booty was enormous; and faith was scrupulously kept with the Venturi, who received the stipulated bounty and the licence to pillage. Exclusively of this spoil, of which one of the English adventurers, by name William Gould or Gold,³ had 500 ducats as his portion,⁴ the Republic obtained nineteen seaworthy galleys, 4,440⁵ prisoners, and a vast assortment of valuable stores in the shape of salt, gunpowder, arms and naval equipments. It is said that the salt alone was computed at 90,000 crowns.⁶ The captives were haggard, emaciated,

¹ Chinazzo (fol. 767); Giustiniano (*Annali di Genova*, lib. iv. c. 146, edit. 1537).

² The author of the *Chronicon Tarvisinum* (fol. 775) states that the Genoese "*sponte restituerunt Civitatem et personas suas.*" — (Murat. xv.)

³ Romanin (iii. 292).

⁴ Sanudo (fol. 742).

⁵ Genoese, 4,172; Paduans, &c. 268 = 4,440. Sanudo (fol. 712). Stella (fol. 1117) says "*ultra quatuor millia.*"

⁶ *Memorie*, 342.

and cadaverous to an extreme degree. They wore the aspect of ghosts rather than of living persons. Their jaws were hollow and lank. Their eyes were sunken and lacklustre.¹ All were transmitted to Venice, and were incarcerated in the Magazines of Terranuova,² where between twelve and fifteen perished daily.³

At the same time preparations were being made for the triumphal progress of Contarini to his capital. On the 30th June, his Serenity, having appointed Saraceno Dandolo Governor of Chioggia, and Carlo Zeno, Commander-in-Chief,⁴ set out for the City with Pisani. At San Clemente, the Doge, the Admiral, and their escort of honour were received on board the Bucentaur by the College and some of the Senate; and on the 1st July,⁵ the august party landed at the Piazzetta amid an enthusiasm which bordered upon delirium. The concourse of people is described by an eyewitness⁶ as so extraordinary, that it was with the utmost difficulty a path could be cleared for the Ducal procession to Saint Mark's, where a mass and thanksgiving were celebrated for the merciful deliverance of the Republic.⁷

Such was the glorious conclusion of the WAR OF

¹ Romanin, *ubi suprâ*, *et alia*.

² Sanudo (fol. 712).

³ Caresinus (fol. 459, *note*); Sanudo (fol. 713).

⁴ Chinazzo (fol. 768); and see *Letter of the Doge to the College*, June 26, 1380, in Sanudo (fol. 712) and Gataro (fol. 393-4).

⁵ Caresinus (fol. 459); Chinazzo (col. 768); Sanudo (fol. 712).

⁶ Caresinus, *ubi suprâ*; also Sanudo (fol. 713).

⁷ Caresinus, *loco citato*.

CHIOGGIA,¹ by which the Allies nefariously sought to compass the extinction of Venetian liberty. The war had lasted nearly a full year; and seven months had elapsed, before Contarini was enabled to redeem the oath exacted by Pisani on that memorable Christmas-eve, that he would never set his foot in Venice again, till Chioggia was free. Crises are the opportunities of latent greatness; and every crisis has its heroes. But the present war, which afforded so striking an exemplification of the axiom that, in a struggle between two nations, the one which is prepared to make the largest possible sacrifices to its independent existence, must triumph in the end, was peculiarly prolific of distinguished names. In the centre of that remarkable group of men, upon whom the events of 1379 and 1380 conferred a classic reputation, was seen the illustrious Doge himself, supported on either side by the magnanimous and single-hearted Pisani and by the peerless and inimitable Zeno: the former, a person of the most spotless character, of the purest integrity, of the most dauntless courage, and of the most unselfish patriotism: the latter, a soldier devoted to his country, inexhaustible in resources and expedients, without a rival in the extent and variety of his acquirements, a stranger to fear and despair, a patron of virtue and learning.

Venice was once more mistress of her own alluvial

¹ The War of Chioggia is related by Carlo Varese (*Storia di Genova*, iii. 326-64), and by Pietro Dolfino, *Annali Veneti*, pp. 75-100 (King's MSS. 149).

dominion, but Genoa was still mistress of the ocean. Two fleets, one under Spinola, the other under Maruffo, kept the seas; and the Signory felt that the moment had arrived for the reclamation of maritime supremacy. On the 3rd July,¹ Pisani, having been confirmed by the Great Council for the fourth time² in the [responsible office of Captain-General, started from Chioggia³ with a force of seven and forty galleys,⁴ for the Istrian coast. On the 30th, he reached Pirano,⁵ where the inhabitants presented a few barks to him as a mark of loyalty.⁶ On the 31st⁷ he stood off Capo d'Istria, which had been appropriated by the Patriarch of Aquileia; and on the 1st August⁸ that place was taken and sacked.⁹ On the following day,¹⁰ the Captain-General proceeded to Trieste, and every preparation had been made for a formal siege, when reports arrived that a Genoese fleet of thirty sail had been seen in the immediate vicinage of Arbo.¹¹ Impatient to bring the enemy to an action, Pisani, promptly abandoning Trieste, made all sail for the island in question. He reached the point, however, only in time to learn from some Genoese deserters that Gasparo Spinola, at the head of twelve galleys, had just left Zara, and was on his way to Manfredonia in quest of corn.¹² Toward Manfredonia therefore the Vene-

¹ Caresinus (fol. 760).

² *Memorie*, 343.

³ Sanudo (fol. 714).

⁴ Caresinus, *ubi suprâ*.

⁵ Sanudo, *ubi suprâ*.

⁶ Caresinus, *ubi suprâ*.

⁷ Chinazzo (fol. 770).

⁸ Caresinus, *loco citato*.

⁹ Chinazzo, *ubi suprâ*.

¹⁰ Caresinus, *ubi suprâ*.

¹¹ Caresinus, *ubi suprâ*.

¹² Caresinus (460); Sanudo (714-15); Marin (vi. 207).

tians bent their course, eager in the pursuit; on the 10th, they put into Rhodes for water;¹ and on the 12th the desired destination was reached. The weather had been hazy, and the nights were moonless; but the two squadrons were at one time so close to each other that they exchanged shots; and many were wounded on both sides, and a few met their death.² The Genoese at length, favoured by the darkness, succeeded in eluding observation,³ and on the morning of the 12th August they were nowhere to be found.

On several occasions lately, the Captain-General had been heard to complain of indisposition. The continuous toil and harass, which he had undergone from August, 1379, to June, 1380, had left their trace upon his constitution. Those ten months were so many years snatched from his life. There were whole weeks during which he had scarcely enjoyed an hour's repose; night and day he worked and watched; and while the mothers and daughters of Venice slept, he kept his vigils. At the terrible Dykes, there was no hardship from which he shrank, however severe, and no labour, however mean, of which he did not partake. No artizan was freer from arrogance or false pride: for it was his sole ambition to become the saviour of his country.

Symptoms of fever had already manifested themselves, while the fleet was passing Zara;² as Pisani approached Manfredonia, the malady gradually assumed

¹ Caresinus, *ubi suprâ*.

² Ibid.

³ Caresinus, *synchronus* (fol. 460).

an acute form; and those about him began to entertain apprehensions for his safety. But he affected to treat his illness lightly, and bade all be of good cheer. Nevertheless, he continued to grow more and more languid, and he was soon obliged to keep his bed. On the morning of the 13th August, he desired his attendants to summon Corbaro, now commissioned as Admiral of the Squadron.¹ He told his old companion he had heard that some of the enemy were in sight; he wished him to take eight of the galleys, and to follow them. The order was implicitly obeyed. But Pisani, with that restlessness of temperament which belonged to his nature, soon became nervous about the result of the undertaking, and conceived an irresistible longing to see with his own eyes how the matter stood. All advice and expostulation were vain: he sprang from his sick couch, attired himself, ascended to the deck, directed the sails to be set, and proceeded in the wake of the detachment. The enterprise did not answer its object; Corbaro was killed; Pisani himself was slightly wounded; and at dusk the Fleet regained the port, sadly depressed in spirits. His wound and the dampness of the night-air had aggravated the disorder of the Captain-General; the fate of poor Corbaro had given him a shock; and he felt excessively faint and ill. He now suffered himself to be removed to the house of the Commandant of Manfredonia, Guido da Fojan, with whom he was intimate,² and who procured for him the best medical treatment.

¹ *Memorie*, 351.² *Ibid.* 353.

It was quite dark outside; but in the room of the invalid an oil-lamp was glimmering. Pisani requested that a clerk might be sent to him with writing materials. He then dictated a long letter,¹ in which he communicated to the Senate all that had occurred since the despatch of the 2nd, in which he made known the reduction of Capo d'Istria on the 1st,² and added that, so soon as he was able, he purposed to repair to the Riviera,³ and to make Genoa rue the day when she entered upon the War of Chioggia. The epistle was dated "Manfredonia, August 13, 1380." When it was finished and folded, the Captain-General, feeling his throat husky, and his lips parched with fever, asked for some water, which he swallowed with relish and avidity; and then, as if the liquid had left some disagreeable flavour upon his palate, he begged a crust of bread. Of this he ate a morsel or two ravenously; but he was immediately seen to change colour, to gasp for breath, and to sink back upon his pillow. *Pisani was no more!*⁴

Concerning the cause of death, various hypotheses were formed. Some surmised⁵ that he was poisoned, and that the water or the bread, or both, were drugged; but the more common opinion was that his frame, debilitated by the fever, succumbed to the weakening effect of the wound and the highly deleterious influence of the nocturnal dews.

¹ *Memorie*, 353.

² Chinazzo (fol. 770).

³ *Memorie*, 354.

⁴ *Memorie*, 354.

⁵ Sanudo (fol. 715).

Pisani was only in his fifty-sixth year.¹ His loss was profoundly mourned; and many a frozen heart was melted, and the tears trickled down many a weather-beaten cheek when the sailors were told of the melancholy and sudden end of their *Father* and best friend. It was impossible to witness without emotion the passage of the embalmed remains of the adored Pisani through a dense multitude of sobbing and sorrowful spectators to the quay, where the flagship was waiting to transport them with those of the excellent and faithful Corbaro² to Venice.

A public funeral of the most splendid and sumptuous character was decreed by the Senate to the Great Citizen, and the obsequies were appointed to take place in the Church of San Antonio di Castello,³ where the ashes of his father Nicolo and his brother Bertucci already reposed. The Doge, the Signory, with few exceptions the entire nobility, the religious orders, the clergy, the Arts⁴ and the people in mass, followed the hero to the grave; and on that day Venice⁵ was so wrapped in grief, and her streets were so deserted, that "if the smallest Genoese fleet had made a descent at that conjuncture, the country would have stood in the utmost peril." The procession was preparing to start from the parochial Church of San Fantino,⁶ where the coffin upon its

¹ *Memorie*, 354. The exploits of Pisani have been celebrated in two poems: 1. *Vettor Pisani, Canti Tre di L. A. Baruffaldi*; Ven. 1844, 8°. 2. *Vettor Pisani, Carme di G. Prati*; Ven. 1846, 8°.

² *Memorie*, 355.

³ *Memorie*, 356.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Sanudo (fol. 716).

⁶ *Memorie*, *ubi suprâ*.

arrival on the 22nd August¹ had been provisionally deposited, when a popular clamour was raised, that the Deliverer of the Republic ought to be entombed nowhere but in the Ducal Chapel itself.² The cry was being adopted, and a tumult was threatened, when a mariner, who had perhaps been officially inspired, put his shoulder to the bier, and exclaimed —“ We, his children, are carrying this brave Captain to our father Saint Anthony !” Thus the incipient commotion was adroitly appeased, and the funeral train began to move. It traversed nearly the whole extent of the capital, but it was of such a length that, while the pall-bearers who occupied the centre of the cavalcade were entering Saint Anthony’s, many hundred mourners had not yet quitted San Fantino !³

A magnificent mausoleum was erected over the ancestral vault at San Antonio,⁴ upon which was reared a pedestrian statue of Pisani, habited in the uniform of Captain-General, grasping in his right hand an ensign with two streamers, surmounted by a cross ; the *Capture of Cattaro*, in August, 1379, was contributed at a later epoch by the pencil of Vicentino to the decorations of the Sala dello Scrutinio.⁵

Pisani thus outlived the accomplishment of his noble task, and the redemption of the Doge’s vow, only seven weeks. When the question arose of


¹ Sanudo (fol. 715) ; Caroldo, *Hist.* fol. 120 (Harl. MSS. 5020).

² *Memorie*, 356-7.

³ *Memorie*, 357-8.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Cigogna (*Iscrizioni*, i. 182).



VETTOR PISANI.

B. 1324 : D. 1380.

(From the MEMORIE DI PISANI, 1767.)

supplying his place, all eyes were turned upon one candidate. On the 28th August,¹ Venice beheld with unmingled satisfaction the delivery of the commission of Captain-General and the presentation of the great gonfalon of Saint Mark to Carlo Zeno.²

The operations of Pisani's worthy successor during the autumn of 1380 were limited to the fruitless siege of Marano, which the Genoese had rendered all but impregnable; he took the responsibility upon himself of returning to Venice for the winter. The Senate was extremely indignant and wrathful at this liberty, and commanded him to retrace his steps. Zeno declined. On presenting himself to the Body, he was coldly received; and the explanation which he proffered of his conduct was not accepted. The dispute was increasing in warmth; some of the Senators suggested that he should be arrested for contumacy. But the Captain-General, perceiving his danger, prudently withdrew, and retired to his own house. He found that the populace, apprised of the jeopardy in which their favourite was placed, had already begun to congregate round the Palace, with the manifest design of overawing the Assembly. Ultimately a compromise was effected, by which Zeno re-embarked for Marano, not with the squadron which he had so recently brought into port, but with a flotilla of small barks. He met, however, with no better success than before; and in an assault upon the place he received a severe wound.

¹ Chinazzo (fol. 772).

² Caroldo, *Historia*, fol. 120 (Harl. MSS. 5020).

Upon his second return, not a whisper was raised against him.

The naval campaign of 1381 was hardly more eventful than its predecessor. The Republic indeed regained her ascendancy on the ocean, and by menacing the Riviera, Zeno constrained the Genoese commander to evacuate the Adriatic and to hasten to the succour of his country. But no decisive action was fought : for Spinola uniformly avoided battle or eluded pursuit. Both parties were naturally weary of such an idle and unprofitable contest.

Meanwhile, the Republic was continuing to lose ground on the Terra-Ferma which, since the beginning of hostilities, had necessarily become her weakest point ; and her domination in that quarter was now a cipher. Venice detested Austria much, but she detested the Carrarese infinitely more. The former was, perhaps, the more powerful, but Vienna was farther than Padua from Treviso. In the early part of 1381, the Signory resolved to effect what she regarded as a master-stroke. By a secret understanding with Leopold, Treviso was delivered to his troops on the 2nd May, on condition that the Duke should hold against the Lord of Padua the remainder of the Province and Ceneda. The bargain certainly appeared not dear ; for the Marches were already out of the Venetian grasp ; and the City itself was no longer tenable.

The general state of the Peninsula was at this period supremely miserable ; it was not Venice alone which had suffered. Rome was torn by the French and

Italian factions. Florence was distracted by the feuds of the Guelphs and Ghibellines. Genoa was a prey to internal spasms and throes. At Naples, a Revolution hurled the guilty Joan from a blood-stained throne; and the vacant crown was offered to the nephew of the King of Hungary, Charles of Durazzo.

The Neapolitan Revolution of 1381 had the effect of diverting the attention of Louis of Hungary from the affairs of Northern Italy. The moment, therefore, seemed propitious for terminating the sterile conflict between Venice and Genoa; and the Count of Savoy, at the instigation of the Florentines, hastened to volunteer his intercession. The friendly offices of Amadeus VI., the master of a small but rising Principality, were accepted; and the representatives of the Powers which had previously sat at the Lova in June, 1380, reassembled, with the addition of Florence and Ancona, at Turin. The Doge accredited Zaccaria Contarini, Michele Morosini, Procurator of Saint Mark, and Giovanni Gradenigo. At the outset, a controversy arose between the Venetian and Genoese Delegates on the point of precedence; but Contarini at once silenced the syndics of the rival Commune by rising from his seat, and observing in an emphatic tone—"It is not as conquered, but as conquerors, that we come to demand peace!"¹ This sentiment was applauded; and after a fair share of difficulty the treaty was

¹ Sanudo (*Vite*, 720).

prepared for signature on the 8th August, 1381.¹ Under its leading articles, the Republic purchased with an annual payment of 7,000 ducats the cessation of the Hungarian Salt-Manufacture, the abandonment by Louis of Pago, in the Gulf of Fiume, the suppression of privateering in the Dalmatian ports, and freedom of navigation on the Adriatic. 2. She obtained from Francesco da Carrara Moranzano and Capo d'Argine, or Cavarzero; the surrender of his pretensions to the City and March of Treviso and to Ceneda; the demolition of all the new works of defence which he had constructed in the direction of her lagoons; and an adoption of the boundary lines of 1373. 3. She agreed to transfer the possession of Tenedos to the Count of Savoy, who was pledged to dismantle the fortifications; and to abstain, in common with Genoa, from trading² at Azoph till the expiration of two years. 4. She ceded Trieste to Duke Leopold. 5. She returned to her former relations with Aquileia, to whom she transferred Muco. 6. She formally relinquished Dalmatia. 7. She was reinstated in her commercial privileges at Constantinople. 8. She assented to an exchange of prisoners without ransom.³ The execution of the last clause involved the most frightful revelations. It transpired

¹ Caresinus (fol. 466); Chronicon Regiense (Murat. xviii. 87); Cronica Ripaltæ (Murat. xvii. 322); Varese (iii. 363).

² *Dichiarazione di Documenti di Storia Piemontese*, 1285-1617 (*Arch. Stor. Ital.* xiii. 115, 119).

³ Chinazzo (fol. 778-81); Sanudo (fol. 721); Marin (vi. 215-21); Romanin (iii. 296-7-8).

that nearly 4,000¹ human beings had perished between June, 1380, and September, 1381, in the dungeons of the Terra-Nuova, not so much from any neglect which they had experienced as from the utterly exhausted condition, in which they were found on the recovery of Chioggia. On the other side, it was discovered that many hundred Venetians of the better class had died in the prisons of Genoa through sheer maltreatment. It appeared that these victims were allowed neither beds nor mattresses, and that the sole nutriment which they received had been twelve ounces of bread a day and a little water.² On the enlargement of the Genoese prisoners, many of whom had languished in their cells since the victory of Portodanzo in 1378, the Venetian ladies³ furnished them with clothes, sent them viands from their own tables, and paid their passage home.

Such was the Treaty of Turin, which put an end to the war, and to which it will be remarked that Austria was not a contracting party.⁴ Its terms were very different from those which Louis had dictated at Buda in 1378: nor were they exactly such as the Signory would have framed for herself. Yet on the

¹ Caresinus, *loco citato*; Sanudo, 721.

² Chinazzo (fol. 784).

³ Vincens (ii. 52).

⁴ The ratifications were exchanged at Venice in the course of September. See *Copy of Letter of the Doge of Genoa, Nicolo Guarco, to Andrea Contarini*, dated Genoa, Sept. 3, 1381, and endorsed: "Magnifico et Potenti Domino Andreæ Contarino, Dei gratiâ Venetiarum Duci, Consilio, et Communitati Venetiarum, fratri et amicis nostris carissimis."—(Murat. xxii. 745). *Vide also* Murat. (xxii. 721).

whole they were not unfavourable.¹ The restoration of the Venetian establishments at Constantinople was more than an equivalent for the withdrawal of the Venetian garrison from Tenedos. The footing on which they left the Republic with the Carrarese was tolerably satisfactory. The exclusion from Azoph was a two-edged measure. The tribute to Hungary was a certain humiliation ; but the advantages which it carried with it were considerable. So many changes had supervened in Italy in the course of a short space, that it was impossible to predict the longevity of the treaty of 1381, to divine how distant or how near the day might be when it would become the merest waste paper, or to say that in a twelvemonth it would not share the lot of many equally solemn and equally time-serving documents, and be thrust into the little closet over Saint Mark's, where the books of Petrarch were turning to mould !

In the ensuing month (September 4, 1381²), thirty of the contributors to the patriotic movement of the 1st December, 1379, were solemnly called by the Great Council to take their seats on its benches. The Grand Chancellor Caresinus was among the number ; but he was permitted to retain the seals.³ The remaining twenty-nine⁴ were:—Marco Storlado, Marco Orso, Nicolo Lerigo, Nicolo Tagliapietra, Pietro Penzino,

¹ Chronicon Regiense synchron. (Murat. xviii. 81).

² Caresinus, *synchronus* (fol. 465).

³ Sansovino (*Cronico*, 40).

⁴ Caresinus (fol. 467), who gives the extract from the books of the Pregadi, with the omission of clerical errors.

Nicolo Reniero, Donato Porto, Francesco da Mezzo, artizans; Marco Cicogna, apothecary; Bartolomeo Paruta, dealer in peltry; Georgius Calergi and Jacobus Pizzamanos, patricians of Candia; Paolo and Jacopo Trevisano, Francesco Girardo, Marco Pasqualigo, Nicolo Polo, Pietro Lippomano, and Andrea Giusto, *cittadini*; Antonio Arduino, wine-merchant; Pietro Zaccaria, Giovanni Negro, and Paolo Nani, grocers; Jacopo Condolmiero, trader; Andrea Vendramino, banker; Nicolo Garzoni, Luigi della Fornace, and Giovanni Arduino, undescribed.¹ The election was conducted in the Pregadi; and the balloting process occupied the whole of the 4th, till a late hour in the night. Each person present had the power of proposing a name. The successful candidates nearly capered with joy, when their good fortune was notified to them. The 5th September was a day of ovation; the elect and their friends went in procession to the Basilica, each of the newly-made Nobles carrying a lighted taper in his hand; and tournaments, regattas, and banquets were held in honour of the happy occasion. It is to be suspected that many of the tribunitial families looked with a wry visage upon these plebeian interlopers, and that the Badoeri and Sanudi, whose genealogical stems were coeval with the Republic, winced slightly, when they were asked to salute as a compeer and fellow-legislator the vintner Arduino or Tagliapietra the mason!

¹ Caresinus (fol. 467); Romanin (iii. 301).

On the 5th June following, Venice was bereaved of the Last of her Hero-Princes (1382¹). The active share, which Contarini had borne in the late troubles naturally produced at his advanced age extreme lassitude and debility; during several months passed, he had been bedridden, and interfered little in public affairs; and the Senior Privy Councillor had officiated, according to custom, as his Lieutenant. At the time of his death,² the Doge was 74; and he had presided over the councils of his country between fourteen and fifteen years. He formed the central figure in that noble and stern phalanx which had rallied round the national colours, when Venice was within an ace of passing under the Caudine Forks. It was his example which had animated so many breasts, and which had instilled new courage into so many drooping hearts. It was the presence of that chivalrous old man which had helped to ward off the dreaded catastrophe. Those were, indeed, days of tribulation and trial, when Andrea Contarini reigned; and the next generation listened with drawn breath to veterans who had fought in their youth at the Lova or at the Dykes under the egregious Pisani, as they recited the legend of *The Syrian Dervish and the Venetian Merchant*, or narrated anecdotes of the famous War of Chioggia.

The successor of Contarini was Michele Morosini

¹ Caresinus (fol. 469).

² Ibid. The funeral oration was pronounced by his kinsman Antonio Contarini, Archbishop of Candia. See Agostini (*Notizie degli Scrittori Veneziani*, Prefaz. xlii.); and Apostolo Zeno (*Lettere*, v. 416).

of Santa Maria Formosa, Procurator of Saint Mark, and one of the negotiators of Turin (June 10, 1382¹). All the contemporary and early historians pronounce a warm eulogium on this nobleman; and Caresinus² does not appear to have thought any terms of panegyric too extravagant. Morosini was remarkable for the ardour of his patriotism, the affluence of his circumstances,³ and his administrative abilities. In his charities he was so profuse, that he was popularly called the Father of the Poor. His eloquence, his sagacity, his love of peace and justice were proverbial. He was elected by the College of Forty-one in preference to two other candidates of established fame, Leonardo Dandolo the Cavalier,⁴ and Carlo Zeno, Captain-General,⁵ to the latter of whom it had been more validly than fairly objected that his services in his present capacity were absolutely indispensable.⁶

To the forced loan of 1379, Morosini had necessarily been one of the leading contributors; his return was 38,000 ducats.⁷ Moreover, at a moment when the very existence of the Republic was a grave problem, and when, real property being almost valueless, money was correspondingly precious, he assisted the Government by purchasing certain houses belonging to the Commune for 25,000 ducats, a sum which the stagna-

¹ Caresinus (fol. 466); Sanudo (fol. 746); Letter of Morosini to the Commune of Perugia notifying his election, dated June 16, 1382.

² *Ubi suprâ.*

³ Sanudo, *ubi suprâ.*

⁴ Romanin (iii. 307).

⁵ J. Zenus (*Vita C. Zeni*, 293).

⁶ Romanin (ii. 307).

⁷ Galliciolli (ii. 99).

tion of business rendered equal to 100,000 or upward. His friends came to the conclusion that he was moon-struck, and said among themselves:—"We are in danger of losing Venice, and he is buying tenements!" "Michele!" exclaimed some, when they met him after the transaction, "what a simpleton you must be; you had much better have kept your ducats!" But he rejoined:—"If this land come to ill, money is nothing to me!"¹ For that answer he was much admired; and "when," says an historian, "the Forty-one wished to make him Doge, this, among many encomiums which were passed upon him, was the chief."²

Morosini, however, did not long enjoy his honours. He died in the same autumn (Oct. 15³) of the plague, one of nineteen thousand persons⁴ who are reported to have been swept away by its ravages. He left a son Giovanni,⁵ who probably inherited his vast property, and lived to see the day when the little investment, which his father had made in houses, had quadrupled in value.⁶ To recruit the population, the Government conceived the project of endowing the orphan daughters of the poor.⁷

This Prince was replaced (October 21⁸) by Antonio

¹ "Se questa terra stava mal, io no voglio aver bene."—Romanin (iii. 309). In Sanudo (fol. 743), *no* is misprinted *ne*, which has occasioned a serious controversy, and exposed Morosini to some detraction.

² Sivas, quoted by Romanin (iii. 309).

³ Caresinus (fol. 466-7).

⁴ Sanudo (fol. 748)

⁵ Sanudo (fol. 743).

⁶ Romanin (iii. 309).

⁷ Caroldo, fol. 123 (Harl. MSS. 5020).

⁸ Caresinus (fol. 468).

Veniero of San Giovanni e Paolo, Governor of Candia, and formerly Governor of Tenedos. Veniero did not arrive at San Nicolo Del Lido to enter upon the discharge of his functions till the 13th January, 1383;¹ and during the interregnum, the Senior Privy Councillor remained Vice Doge.² On the 14th of the month, Veniero was installed in his dignity.³

¹ Caresinus (fol. 468); Sanudo (fol. 750).

² Sanudo (fol. 749).

³ Caroldo, fol. 122 (Harl. MSS. 5020).

CHAPTER XXI.

A.D. 1383—1413.

Rally of the Republic from the War of Chioggia—Decline of Genoa—Attitude of Affairs in Hungary, Naples, and the Frioul—Death of Louis of Hungary (Sept. 11, 1382)—Intrigues of Carrara at Venice—Alliance between Venice and Verona against Padua (1385)—Defeats of Antonio de la Scala—Coalition between Padua and Milan against Verona (1387)—Partition of the Veronese Territory—Treachery of Giovanni-Galeazzo Visconti—Coalition between Venice and Milan against Padua (1388)—Abdication of Carrara in favour of his Son Novello—Partition of the Paduan Territory—Occupation of Treviso by the Republic (Dec. 14)—Recovery of Padua by Novello, aided by Venice, Florence, and Bavaria (1390)—Hostilities between Milan and Florence—Famous Retreat of Sir John Hawkwood—Peace of Genoa (1392)—Investiture of Visconti with the Dukedom of Milan (1395)—Defeat of the Milanese at Governolo (Aug. 1397)—League against Milan between Florence, Mantua, Ferrara, and Padua—Truce—General Peace of 1400—Progress of the Ottoman Power—Venetian Acquisitions of Argos, Napoli di Romania, Scutari, Durazzo, Alessio, and Corfu (1386–1402)—Mediation of Venice between the Christians and the Turks—Battle of Nicopolis (1396)—Acceptance of a French Yoke by the Genoese (Oct. 1396)—Increasing Power and Prosperity of Venice—Her Relations with Granada and other Powers—Death of Antonio Veniero (Nov. 24, 1400)—Anecdote of his Son Luigi—Illustrations of Venetian Manners during the Fourteenth Century—Accession of Michele Steno (Dec. 1, 1400)—His Installation (Jan. 9, 1401)—Festival—*Compagnia di Calza*—Rupture of the Republic with the French Government of Genoa (1403)—Defeat of the French and Genoese at Zonchio by Carlo Zeno (Oct. 9, 1403)—Peace (March, 1404)—Death of Giovanni-Galeazzo Visconti (Sept. 3, 1402)—Partition of his Dominions among his Sons—War between Venice and Francesco Novello—Occupation of Vicenza by the Republic—Submission of Colonia—Mutual Preparations—Secession of Ferrara from its Alliance with Padua (March, 1405)—Occupation of Verona by the Signory (July 16, 1405)—Capture of Jacopo da Carrara, one of the Sons of Novello (July 25)—His Transmission to Venice (July 31)—Duplicity of Novello—Gradual Exhaustion of his Resources—Fall of Padua (Nov. 22, 1405)—Incar-

ceration of Novello and his Son Francesco (Nov. 23)—Revelations of a Great Conspiracy against Venice—Strangulation of Novello and his two Sons (Jan. 17, 1406)—Considerations on the Conduct of the Republic—Implication of Carlo Zeno in the Carrara Affair—His Sentence (Jan. 21)—Formal Submission of Verona (July 12)—And of Padua (Jan. 4, 1407)—Liberal and Enlightened Policy of Venice—Her large Territorial Acquisitions—Troubles of the Church (1406–11)—Election of the Venetian Angelo Corraro to the Papal Chair as Gregory XII. (Dec. 19, 1406)—Council of Pisa (March, 1409)—Neutrality of the Republic—Fresh War with Hungary (1411)—Successes of the Venetian Troops—Pressure at Venice—Appointment of an Extraordinary Council of War (July 4, 1412)—Defeat of the Hungarians near Motta (Aug. 24)—Truce for Five Years (April 17, 1413)—Conspiracy of Francesco Baldovino and Bartolomeo D'Anselmo (March, 1413)—Execution of the former—New Territorial Acquisitions (1409–12)—Death of Michele Steno (Dec. 26, 1413)—Plague at Venice—Anecdote of Steno's Reign.

IN a very short time after the Treaty of Turin, the Republic had retrieved the disaster of Chioggia; and in 1383 that town was rebuilt. Trade revived. The choicest productions of all countries were poured once more into the lap of Venice. Fresh mercantile treaties were concluded. The commercial intercourse with India and China was improved by the establishment of a consulate in Siam.¹ The money-market and the exchange resumed their buoyancy; and the State, rallying from the shock which it had experienced, soon afforded a new proof of its indestructible vitality.

The sacrifices which Genoa had made to the late war, though prodigious, were even less great than those of her rival. But the latter bled from no inward wounds; and the latter boasted the most concrete and compact Government which the world had ever seen.

¹ Romanin (iii. 335).

At Genoa, the power of recoil, the resilient force, was wanting. The political system was decentralized by faction. Genoa was hopelessly prostrated.¹ Her resources and credit were at the lowest ebb ; her trade was stagnant ; her strength was paralysed. In four years (1390-94), she was shaken by ten thronal revolutions.² Few of the lessons which History teaches are more impressive than this : few of its warnings are more sad !

The death of the Doge Michele Morosini in October, 1382, was preceded by that of Louis of Hungary, who had expired in the previous September after a reign of upward of forty years.³ This great monarch having left no male issue, the succession was contested between his eldest surviving⁴ daughter Mary, affianced to Sigismund, Marquis of Brandenburg, brother of the Emperor Wenceslaus, and Charles III. of Durazzo, King of Naples, the nephew of Louis. The Venetians, who perceived where their true interests lay, espoused the feebler side in this dynastic quarrel ; supported by the arms and counsels⁵ of the Republic, Mary triumphed ; her nuptials with the Marquis of Brandenburg were solemnized ; and Charles was, in February, 1386,⁶ assassinated by their satellites. The Signory aided the child of Louis, so far as the bare upholding of Mary's rights

¹ Varese (iii. lib. 9) ; Vincens (ii. 83-4).

² Sismondi (vii. ch. 55, p. 369 : edit. 1809).

³ Sismondi (vii. 252).

⁴ Bonfinius (*Res Ungar.* iii. 1).

⁵ The Venetian Ambassador to Buda, Pantaleone Barbo, was accompanied by Lorenzo de Monacis, the historian and poet. The latter relates that the King received Barbo and himself in his garden.

⁶ Sismondi (vii. 254).

was concerned ; but she did not hesitate the more to connive at the diminution of Mary's power by the embodiment of Rascia and the Dalmatian littoral with the Bosnian possessions of Tuartko, Ban of Croatia.¹ By that step Hungary acquired a dangerous neighbour, and Venice lost one of the most troublesome of her foes. The fear of a coalition headed by the wearer of Saint Stephen's crown, was, it seemed, for ever at an end.

Coeval with the decline of Genoa and the dismemberment of Hungary were the convulsions of Naples and the troubles of the Frioul. The throne of Charles III. was claimed, to the exclusion of his widow Margaret, by Louis of the House of Anjou. Upon the death of Marquardo Patriarch of Aquileia in 1381,² the Holy Father (Urban VI.) endeavoured to impose on the people of Udine, Philip d'Alençon ; and a war was the consequence. The Venetians astutely fomented this struggle by seconding the cause of the oppressed with arms and money ; a League was framed by Udine and the other Friulan communes, under their auspices, against the Pontiff Urban and his partizan, the Lord of Padua, who was aiming at the extension of his patrimony in that direction (January 20, 1386); and hostilities were prosecuted with various success. These differences derived a large share of their importance from Venetian intrigue ; through the same agency they were studiously prolonged.

¹ Wilkinson (*Dalm. and Mont.* ii. 283).

² *Vitæ Patriarch. Aquilejens.* fol. 60 (Murat. xvi.).

This chain of circumstances was eminently favourable to Venice, and promoted in an admirable manner her retributive projects against Francesco da Carrara, whom she had already thwarted in his efforts to obtain permanent footing in the Frioul, and in a fresh endeavour to procure caterers to his ambitious designs among the confidential members of her Government. From the revelations of Vettore Morosini, one of the Avogadors of the Commune, made in April, 1385, to the Decemvirs, it transpired that his colleague, Pietro Giustiniani, was in the frequent habit of receiving bribes from Lord Francesco. On one occasion Morosini related that he was standing at his casement, when he saw some men pass with a heavy basket of grapes; he became curious to learn their destination, and his suspicions were awakened when he perceived that they entered the door of the dwelling of Giustiniani. Giustiniani was summoned to the presence of the Council. "This morning, my lord," said one of the Ten to him, "we understand that you have received a handsome gift?" The guilty functionary repudiated all knowledge of the circumstance; but, upon being put to the Question, he retracted his denial, and owned that the fruit had been sent to him by Antonio Meneghino of Chioggia, the Agent of the Carrarese. The latter was arrested forthwith; and sentence of death was pronounced against both. On the 9th May, they were beheaded between the Red Columns,¹ and on the 31st August following, one of the Quarantia, Stefano Mano-

¹ Sanudo (fol. 768); Navagiero (fol. 1070).

lesso, having been convicted of complicity, was also sent to the scaffold.¹

The Lord of Padua, thus foiled at two points, now stood indeed quite alone. His great patron Louis and his Aquileian ally were dead. The Genoese connexion had ceased to be of any utility. In Italy he was environed by enemies, who were either plotting his destruction, or who were prepared to insult him in his fall.

One of the objects at least, contemplated in the cession of Treviso to Austria in 1381, was to raise a new enemy against the Lord of Padua. The Signory piqued herself upon her dexterity; but it unfortunately happened that, what she had treated as a masterly stroke, proved itself a miscalculation. Leopold was indigent and venal; and Carrara, by temporizing, negotiating, cajoling, and bribing the Austrian officers, gained time to collect 80,000 ducats, for which sum he persuaded the Duke to sell his interest in Treviso and the Marches. At such a totally untoward turn of affairs, the Government of Antonio Veniero was severely irritated. But it soon armed itself with a second expedient.

In 1381, Antonio de la Scala, a natural son of Can de la Scala, had become, by the murder of his brother Bartolomeo and his family, sole ruler of Verona and Vicenza. The crime, by which he raised himself to undivided power, was universally decried; but none was more bitter in his comments or

¹ Sanudo (fol. 760).

more unsparing in his reproaches than the Lord of Padua. A mortal enmity had thus been engendered between the two neighbours; and the Scaliger thirsted for an opportunity of marking his resentment. That occasion was now thrown in his way by the Signory, who concluded with him (1385) a Treaty of Partition, and engaged to grant him a monthly subsidy of 25,000 florins on condition that he should declare war against Padua. The offer was too enticing to be rejected; and the Duke of Verona, whose funds were excessively low, determined to raise some money for his new purposes in addition to the pecuniary assistance furnished him by his confederate, on the security of certain jewelry, which he transmitted to Venice for valuation. The trinkets were estimated by their owner at 21,500 ducats; and two Jew bankers agreed to lend 19,000 ducats upon the property.¹

But the arms of La Scala were not triumphant. On the 25th June, 1386,² he was totally defeated at the Brentella by Cortesia da Sarego, the general of Carrara, with a loss of 800 in killed and 8,000 in prisoners. The latter, according to usage, were merely stripped of their arms, equipments, and horses, and were sent back without ransom; and the Republic consoled Antonio for his disappointment with a present of 60,000 florins. Assured by an astrologer, that he would soon retrieve his fortune, he spurned all propositions of peace, and resolved to embark in a second campaign. On the

¹ Sanudo (fol. 780-1).

² Ad. *Hist. Cortus.* Addit. Sec. fol. 987.

11th March following (1387), the two armies met at Castagnaro near Castelbaldo on the Adige,¹ and the Veronese troops sustained a second defeat at the hands of Giovanni D'Azzo and Sir John Hawkwood, the successors of Sarego, Hawkwood carrying desolation to the very walls of Verona and Vicenza. La Scala was in the utmost despondency; but the Ducal government soothed him by a farther donative of 100,000 florins for the purchase of new arms and war-material.

Carrara had been victorious; but at the same time he was sinking into a condition bordering upon bankruptcy. All his money was in the pockets of Hawkwood and the Tard Venus, and he was left without any adequate resources. La Scala was beaten indeed; but his purse had been punctually replenished; and he was seconded by the wealthiest Power in Christendom. Under such circumstances, the ultimate issue of the war undertaken at Venetian instigation and conducted with Venetian gold was hardly dubious.

But a new actor appeared now on the scene. It was Giovanni-Galeazzo Visconti who, by the death of his father Galeazzo in 1378 and the assassination of his uncle Barnabo in 1385, had acquired the sovereignty of Lombardy.² Insatiably ambitious, cold-hearted, profoundly astute, this Prince who, from a small Champagnese fief of Vertus, held in right of his wife Eliza-

¹ Sanudo (*Itinerario*, 38).

² Froissart (*Chroniques*, xiii. 338); Cagnola, *Stor. di Milano*, 21 (*Arch. Stor. Ital.* iv.)

beth, a daughter of John of France, the prisoner of Poitiers, was often called *the Count of Vertus*,¹ had watched with secret glee and complacency the progress of the internecine struggle between Verona and Padua; and it was his aim to turn to the best advantage the quarrel of these petty potentates. On more than one occasion, Giovanni-Galeazzo had already proffered his assistance to the Scaliger against the Carrarese, and to the Carrarese against the Scaliger. But both naturally looked askance at such a dangerous alliance; and his insidious advances were not met. After the Battle of Castagnaro, he resumed his solicitations; but at first they were not more successful than before. At length, La Scala, changing his mind, and reconciling himself to an idea previously so repulsive, responded in an affirmative sense; but he found to his surprise and chagrin, that he had been forestalled. On the 19th April, 1387,² a Treaty of Partition was signed between Padua and Milan, by which Visconti was to receive Verona, while Vicenza fell to the share of Francesco.

This compact was carried into effect with extraordinary rapidity. The Veronese district was overrun; Antonio was robbed of his entire patrimony; and, seeking safety in flight, the unfortunate Prince, with his wife and children, threw himself into a boat on the Adige, and escaped to Venice, where the Scaliger was

¹ Froissart, 337; Candido (*Vita Philippi Mariæ Vicecomitis*: Murat. xx. 987).

² Sismondi (vii. 267); Romanin (iii. 320).

comforted by a presentation of citizenship¹ and an annuity of 1,200 ducats.² The long arm of the Count of Vertus, however, reached him shortly afterward in the mountains of the Frioul, to which he had retired. On the 5th August, 1387,³ poison completed the work which the sword had begun; and the discontinuance of his pension reduced his family to beggary. Meanwhile, in egregious contravention of the Treaty of April, Visconti proceeded to claim Verona in his own right, *and Vicenza by right of his wife*. All protest against the gross and barefaced fraud was ineffectual; and the subtle Carrara himself was thoroughly outwitted and ensnared.

This political metamorphosis left two courses open to the Signory, to ally herself with the dupe or with the deceiver. It became a delicate question, whether it was desirable to check the cupidity of Visconti, or whether it was safe to accelerate and complete the ruin of Carrara. Both anxiously courted her friendship. The latter, appealing to the interest of Venice in the preservation of a barrier against the Count of Vertus, asked her to join him in vindicating his wrong, and in averting a common danger. The former invited her to concur in the spoliation of the Carrarese.

The aggrandizement of Giovanni-Galeazzo, and the extension of his frontier toward the Lagoon, were entirely at variance with the views of the Republic.

¹ Sanudo (431, 767).

² Sanudo (fol. 778).

³ *Annales Forolivienses*, fol. 195 (Murat. xxii.); Platina, *Hist. Mantuana*, lib. iii. 753 (Murat. xx.)

But the Signory conceived that it was competent for her to make use of that Prince as an instrument for wreaking her vengeance on her hateful neighbour. If the Count of Vertus proved himself troublesome, she calculated that she had always the means of turning the scale against him; and on the 29th May, 1388, a partitive Treaty was ratified between Venice and Milan, by which the Padovano was allotted to Visconti, and the Trevisan and Cenedese to his new ally, with the fortress of Curano, and the district of San Ilario. It was stipulated, that the future possessor of the Carrara patrimony should not construct any fresh fortifications in the direction of the Lagoons, and that such of those already in existence as might be obnoxious to the Signory should be destroyed. The latter consented to allow Giovanni-Galeazzo 100,000 ducats of gold for the expenses of the first year, and for those of the second and succeeding years at the rate of 8,000 a month.¹ From the former amount was to be deducted a sum sufficient to defray the cost of the small Venetian contingent of 2,900 or 3,000 men. At the suggestion of the Venetian Government, Mantua, Ferrara, and Udine, were admitted into the alliance.

Carrara, commonly called Francesco *Vecchio*, in contradistinction to his son Francesco *Novello*, was thus reduced to a lamentable strait. Before any length of time had elapsed sufficient to obtain succour from distant quarters, he knew that he would be attacked almost simultaneously at least on three sides.

¹ Sanudo (fol. 758).

A Venetian army of 2,900 strong was on the point of debouching into the Padovano by Mestra; a Venetian flotilla was about to ascend the Brenta; and Jacopo del Verme, the nephew of Petrarch's friend, was conducting the Milanese battalions through Noale.

There was a cruel struggle in the bosom of Francesco Vecchio between many conflicting emotions. But, indeed, when the question was at all calmly viewed in all its bearings, it was palpably evident that no choice of policy was left to him, and that a great sacrifice of personal ambition was demanded at his hands. On the 29th June, precisely a month after the formation of the League, the old Lord of Padua abdicated in favour of Novello,¹ the same whom Petrarch had accompanied to Venice in 1373; and on the following day, he set out for Treviso,² of which he had reserved the principality. Vecchio flattered himself too readily that the decisive step which he had adopted would disarm or mollify a resentment directed against him rather than against his Commune or his House; and he wrote under the influence of this feeling to the College at the moment of his renunciation, acquainting it with the change in the Government, and begging that it would deign to vouchsafe to the son the friendship which it had withdrawn from the father.

¹ Redusio (*Chron. Tarvisinum*, contemp. 789).

² "Prius decapitato Albertino de Peraga in poyolo Palatio Paduæ, et aliis multis Paduanis straxinatis et crucibus affixis, quia dicebat adversus se conjurâsse."—Gataro, *ubi suprâ*.

This final appeal was left unanswered; and hostilities began in July. The Venetian flotilla closed the passage of the Brenta and the Adige; Del Verme hastened to establish a blockade on the side of the mainland. But the defence was conducted by the younger Carrarese with surprising energy and skill: the canals, which intersected the Trevisan and Paduan, formed so many strategical lines which his general gallantly and firmly disputed with Del Verme; and he managed, in spite of the pressure of superior numbers and of the insubordination of his troops, with which the enemy had tampered, and of the seditious clamours of the people, to maintain his position through the entire summer and autumn of 1388. He was unable, however, to prolong his resistance till the spring, when there was more than a possibility that he might have been relieved. On the 24th November he solicited and obtained a safe-conduct from Del Verme; and on the same day the latter occupied Padua in the name of Giovanni-Galeazzo. It was not till the 14th December¹ that Treviso was similarly consigned by the people to the Republic,² amid cries of "Death to the Scaliger!" "Long live the people of Treviso!" "Long live our blessed Venetian Evangelist Saint Mark!" and the promptitude and audacious self-possession of her proveditors alone frustrated the designed repetition of the trick

¹ Gataro (*Ist. Padov. contemp.* 789; Mur. 17); Redusio (*Chron. Tarr.* 790; Mur. 19); Sanudo (fol. 779).

² Platina, *Hist. Mantuana*, iii. 753 (Murat. xx.)

which Visconti had played so effectively at Vicenza in the preceding year.

Both the Carrarese had been armed with safe-conducts. Neither of these passes was respected. Novello and his father were arrested by the agents of the Count of Vertus at Verona. The son was relegated to a castle near Asti, where he was surrounded by spies and guards. Vecchio was closely incarcerated at Monza.

Such were the first and second phases of the war in the Lombard Marches in 1387 and 1388. Seldom had so great and so momentous a revolution been consummated in so dioramic a manner and with such astonishing facility. The proud House of Carrara was in exile—in captivity. The only male representative of Antonio de la Scala was a child of tender years. The keys of Treviso, Ceneda, Castelfranco, Bassano, Feltre (town), and Motta, were in the possession of the Doge. Those of Padua, Verona, and Vicenza, hung at the girdle of Giovanni-Galeazzo.

The recovery of Treviso and her other dependencies cost the Republic in indemnities and other trifling outlays between 22,000 and 23,000 ducats. The author of the *Chronicle of Treviso* was among those employed to convey the treasure to its various destinations; and “I carried,” writes Redusio, “6,000 ducats at my own saddle-bows!”¹

The ambitious dreams of the remorseless and unblushing Visconti seemed to be approaching their

¹ Redusio (*Chronicon Tarvisinum*, fol. 814).

realization. The Milanese dominion was brought within a few miles of the Lagoons, and the Viper Standard floated almost in sight of the Campanile of Saint Mark. Only one Power of any importance stood between the Count of Vertus and the Iron Crown ; and when the Paduan syndics came to throw themselves at his feet and to implore his clemency, he dismissed them with the comforting assurance that (please God) before five years had passed over his head, he would leave them no ground to be jealous of the Venetian Republic !¹

These words shewed how Visconti, by nature so reticent and discreet, could sometimes act the braggart and the swaggerer. For the bombastic expression, which he had permitted to escape his lips, was at the utmost an empty threat.

From his confinement at Asti, Novello had found means to open a correspondence with Padua and Venice. He had no difficulty in feeling the temper of the Signory, or in learning her views. He discovered that she was satisfied, for the present at least, with the castigation which he had suffered, and the revenge which she had exacted. The truth was that the master of one city had become a preferable neighbour in her eyes to the master of one-and-twenty cities ;

¹ The rise of the Visconti had been somewhat rapid. In 1325, Marino Sanudo Torsello, writing to the Archbishop of Capua (*Epist.* iii.), says : " It is not very long since Galeazzo Visconti was here with his wife, humble and abject enough, to whom the Venetians out of charity allowed 100 *lire grossi* = 1,000 florins of gold." The allusion of Sanudo is to Galeazzo, the son of Matteo Visconti, who, after being in exile six years, recovered (says Cagnola, *St. di Mil.* 15-16) his patrimony in 1324.

and it was intimated to him unequivocally that, if he meditated the recovery of his original patrimony, he might rely at least upon her collusion.

A hint from such a quarter was readily appreciable. With the connivance of the Governor the prisoner left the Castle of Asti in the weeds of a Palmer, under the pretext of visiting the shrine of Saint Antoine de Vienne, in Dauphiny. Having, in fact, accomplished that pilgrimage to save appearances, he proceeded through Avignon and Marseilles to Italy. Genoa and Pisa extended to him every mark of sympathy; but the menaces of Giovanni-Galeazzo deterred them from affording him any active succour or overt countenance. Tuscany looked askance at the expatriated wanderer. Adversity, however, developing the sterling qualities of his mind, armed him with invincible courage and constancy. With unswerving continuity of purpose and steadfast singleness of aim, he pursued the task of winning back the sceptre which had been wrested from his family; all the obstacles which beset his path were heroically overcome; and after a series of untold hardships in which, for the most part, a pregnant wife was a partner, he finally enlisted in his cause the Duke of Bavaria, son-in-law of the murdered Barnabo Visconti, and the Florentine and Bolognese Republics, which were scarcely less interested than Venice in the repression of Milanese ambition. The former engaged to supply troops, the latter to find subsidies. The Carrarese elicited, moreover, promises of assistance, or pledges of neutrality

from several petty princes in Croatia, Carinthia, and the Frioul.

Upward of a year and a half was consumed by the illustrious refugee in these negotiations; and it was only at the close of the dreadful winter of 1390,¹ that he was able to utilize the resources which he had been so indefatigably collecting, and that the Bavarian troops began to march. But the halting pace of the Germans soon excited his impatience, and Novello was encouraged by the rumours which had reached him of a revulsion of popular feeling at Padua to hasten with a few hundred lances in advance of the army. In the course of June he appeared unexpectedly in the Province, and despatched a summons to the Milanese governor to surrender. The latter charged a trumpeter to tell him in answer "that he must be an uncommon fool who, having made his exit through the gates, imagines that he can re-enter over the walls!"² This jeering response obliged the Carrarese to resort to a different expedient. He happened to be aware, that the Brenta at that point was not above two and a half or three feet deep, and that a wooden fence constituted the sole barrier on that side; and this topographical knowledge enabled him to hazard a daring stratagem. On the night of the 19th June,³ his companions and himself stealthily descended into the bed of the stream, waded noise-

¹ *Annales Forolivienses* (fol. 196).

² Sismondi (vii. 314).

³ *Annales Forolivienses* (fol. 196) may be compared with *Hist. Cortus.* Addit. Sec. 988.

lessly through the water which barely wetted their knees, clomb with ease over the palisade, and amid joyous and triumphal cries of *Carro! Carro!* threw themselves into the City. The storm of the citadel was not essayed, however, till the arrival of the Germans, who were 6,600 strong; its fall, on the 27th August,¹ reinstated Francesco Novello in his ancestral honours. The sufferings of the young prince had been intense, and the recompense was well-earned. He lost no time in communicating his good fortune to Venice, Florence, Bologna, and Ferrara;² and toward the Republic herself, who had secretly subsidized him to a large extent, he was prodigal of his protestations of friendship and devotion.

The Paduan Revolution of 1390 answered, in a certain measure, the anticipations of Florence and Bologna. Giovanni-Galeazzo was compelled by that event to recall a portion of his troops from the Tuscan frontier:³ while Novello, penetrating into the Ferrarese territory, obliged the Marquis of Este to secede from his fraternization with Visconti, and to afford him a free passage through his estates. The war continued to rage nevertheless; and it was prosecuted with unslackened vigour.

The influence of the divisions in the Roman Church, springing out of the translation of the Apostolic See to Avignon in the beginning of the century, was traceable in the recent rise in France of two great parties,

¹ *Hist. Cortus.* Addit. Sec. 988.

² Romanin (iii. 327).

³ Sismondi (vii. 321).

of which one, headed by the Transmontane Pontiff, favoured the aggrandizement of Milan, while its rival, composed of Jean, Comte d'Armagnac, and other distinguished personages, embraced the Tuscan cause. Hence it arose that the Florentines and their confederates, under the celebrated Sir John Hawkwood, were now joined by a small French force, commanded by Armagnac. The Allies advanced so far as the Adda, where their progress was arrested by the Milanese under Del Verme. It was the desire of Hawkwood to act with extreme circumspection, and to defer any engagement until the forces of the enemy had been accurately reconnoitred. But his impulsive and self-opinionated colleague spurned all argument or admonition, pushed forward alone with a detachment of lances, and was enveloped and overwhelmed.¹ The vanquished, agreeably to the custom of the times, were stripped of everything but their habiliments, and were reduced by the boyish temerity of the Count to the miserable necessity of begging their way back to France. The rout of Armagnac placed Hawkwood himself in the most serious dilemma, and exposed him single-handed to the attack of an enemy flushed with success and superior in numbers. His best, if not his sole course, appeared to be to shun a collision, and to fall back upon Florence by cautious countermarches. The genius of the Englishman now shone with unapproachable splendour; and with masterly coolness and intrepidity, he conducted his army in its retrograde course

¹ Cagnola, 21; *Arch. Stor. Ital.* iii.

across the Mincio, the Oglio, and the Adige, under the very eyes of his pursuers. On the banks of the Oglio, Hawkwood halted, laid out an encampment with studied formality, intrenched himself in his position, allured the enemy by a feint of inaction and distress, fell upon them with electric rapidity and unerring skill, gained a brilliant advantage, and before they had rallied from their disorder, effected the passage in safety. The general had thus outstripped his pursuers, and the Mincio was crossed without impediment. But, owing to the force and swiftness of the current, the Adige presented far greater difficulties; and he encamped on its banks with the intention of repeating the experiment, which had answered so well in the passage of the Oglio. But Hawkwood was mistaken in his calculations. Del Verme was not to be overreached a second time. Instead of exposing himself once more to probable discomfiture, the latter desisted from the chase, and cut the dykes of the river. The whole Veronese valley was converted into a sheet of water, and the Florentine army was insulated in its intrenchments. The Milanese commander now became so sanguine of success, that he sent word to the Count of Vertus, desiring Giovanni-Galeazzo to apprise him in what form he would wish his prisoners to be delivered to him; and, at the same time, he symbolically advised the Englishman to lay down his arms, by forwarding to him, through a trumpeter, a caged fox. Sir John chose to treat the insolent suggestion in a jocular light, and bade the messenger tell his master, "that

so far as he can see, his fox is in excellent spirits, and that beyond doubt he is conversant with some sure method of egress unguessed by them.”¹

Hawkwood, indeed, skirting the Adige, traversed the whole valley, and marched day and night through water which often reached to the bellies of his horses, until he reached, in a state of great exhaustion, the fortress of Castelbaldo, seven miles lower down the stream, near which he had defeated the Veronese in 1387. This fortress belonged to Novello, and there consequently he gave his troops rest. A considerable number of the infantry had missed their footing in the trackless path, and had perished; and a large portion of the horses were drowned. Still, the bulk of the Florentine army was saved. Its arrival at Florence, where it had been mourned as lost, was a source of mingled congratulation and amazement; and many and many a year afterward, the favourite topic of discourse among Italians themselves, and in all countries which Italians frequented, was the famous retreat from the Adda to the Arno of the English Condottiero, *John o' the Needle*.²

The military resources of Visconti were far superior to those of his adversaries. But, fortunately for the latter, he committed the egregious blunder of spreading his troops over too wide a surface; and it followed that their operations were limited to skirmishes and equally resultless conflicts. That species of warfare

¹ Sismondi (vii. 331-6).

² In satirical allusion to his father's alleged calling.

was peculiarly sterile and fatiguing. In point of outlay it was even more onerous than the most decisive campaigns, and no commensurate fruits were gained; and both parties began to sicken of the languid hostilities. Several States had already volunteered their mediatorial offices: the propitious moment was now seized by the Genoese Government. The triumphant retreat of Hawkwood, and the absolutely barren nature of the subsequent contest, inspired Giovanni-Galeazzo himself with a disposition to listen to terms; and Padua and the Tuscan Republics were persuaded by the Doge Antoniotto Adorno to concur in the reference of their respective grievances to a congress assembling at Genoa.

The Grand Master of Rhodes had been asked to preside as the representative of a strictly neutral Power; but the articles of the Peace were framed by Adorno in the capacity of arbitrator. After a protracted discussion, it was agreed that there should be a general amnesty; that, in consideration of a tribute of half a million florins to Milan by fifty annual instalments, Novello should retain the Padovano, excepting Bassano and two fortresses; that the Count of Vertus should not meddle for the future in the affairs of Tuscany, nor Tuscany in those of the Count of Vertus; that there should be a reciprocal adjustment of territory between Florence and Siena; that Lucca should be included in the present Peace; and that, while Ferrara, Bologna, and Padua were admitted as the allies of Florence, Mantua, Lucca and Perugia

should be similarly admitted as the allies of Giovanni-Galeazzo. These conditions were signed on the 28th January, 1392; but in consequence of some ulterior differences and disputes, their publication was postponed till the 18th February ensuing.¹

Francesco Novello, thus reinstated by Venetian influence² and his own force of character in the most valuable portion of his hereditary possessions, hastened to consolidate his position by cementing his relations with the Signory. On the 5th March, 1393, he presented himself at Venice, accompanied by his eldest son, and obtained a public audience of the Doge. Casting himself on his knees before Veniero, he reiterated his declarations of gratitude and affection, and averred that his own services and those of his family were ever henceforth to be commanded by his Serenity. The Doge graciously bade the Lord of Padua to rise, embraced him, and assured him of the friendship of the Republic. He returned in the highest spirits to his capital, summoned his wife and children from Florence, and entered into a negotiation with the Count of Vertus for the liberation of his father from Monza. But the afflicting intelligence was returned that the elder Carrara *had died* on the 6th October of that year; and Giovanni-Galeazzo transmitted to Padua a stiffened corpse, which the filial piety of Novello honoured with splendid rites of sepul-

¹ Sismondi (vii. 338-9); Romanin (iii. 398).

² Poggio Bracciolini (*Hist. Florentina*, lib. 3; Murat. xx. 257, C. note 7); P. G. Cagnola, 22; *Arch. Stor. Ital.* iii.

ture. The condolence of the Signory was expressed through her local Podesta, Jacopo Gradenigo; and she sought to assuage in some measure the grief of her late visitor by the registration of the House of Carrara on the lists of the Venetian Peerage (November 24, 1393).

It might be predicated of any peace to which the infamous and perjured Giovanni-Galeazzo was a principal party, that it possessed the strongest element of instability. That of Genoa was precisely so ephemeral; and, before any length of time had elapsed, it became a dead letter. In 1395 (May 1), the Emperor Wenceslaus, whose vices and imbecility sullied the diadem of Frederic II., sold to the Count of Vertus for 100,000 florins the peculiar privileges of an imperial foffeee and the Ducal title.¹ By this accession of rank and grandeur, Giovanni-Galeazzo was immoderately dazzled and inflated; his ostentation and arrogance exceeded all bounds; and the parchment of 1392 was soon crumpled up in his hand. The intrigues of the new Duke of Milan at Pisa and Perugia, and an attempt to establish himself in the heart of Tuscany by the acquisition of San Miniato, midway between Pisa and Florence, contributed their share to the resuscitation of the expiring flame; but the revival of hostilities was more proximately due to an aggression upon the dominions of the House of Gonzaga, and by the advance of a Milanese army to the walls

¹ Cagnola, 23.

of Mantua. That audacious infraction of the most solemn pledges raised an outcry of alarm and indignation throughout Lombardy and Tuscany; a League was formed against the Count of Vertus between Mantua, Florence, Ferrara, and Padua; and Carlo Malatesta, Lord of Rimini, accepted the post of Captain-General. The Republic herself declined to bear any personal share in the approaching movements; but she secretly lent her aid to Novello. The campaign which followed was severely detrimental to Milanese glory and ascendancy. In a battle which was fought at Governolo, ten miles south-east of Mantua, and on the Mincio near its confluence with the Po, the army of Giovanni-Galeazzo, led by Del Verme, was nearly annihilated (August 28, 1397).¹

The growth of Venetian influence in Italy since the War of Chioggia had been rapidly progressive, and her wealth and expansive resources enabled her to command the respect of Europe. The Hungarian dynasty at Naples cultivated her alliance; the Este dynasty at Ferrara was changed by her instrumentality. From the legitimate son of the Marquis Albert the sceptre was transferred to Nicolo, a bastard of the same House; to support his pretensions, 50,000 gold ducats were advanced to him for five years, on the security of the Polesine of Rovigo (March—April, 1395);² and his rival Azzo was thrown into prison, first at Venice

¹ Sismondi (vii. 392).

² Jacobus da Delayto (*Annales Estenses*, fol. 922; Mur. xviii.)

³ Joh. Bembus (Murat. xii. 516).

itself,³ and subsequently in Candia (August, 1400-4).¹ The Signory, however, had heretofore studiously refrained from intervention in Milanese affairs; but she resolved at last to espouse the stronger side, and to co-operate in repressing the too-powerful Visconti. Shortly after the signal triumph of the confederates at Governolo, her representatives and ablest diplomatists, Giovanni Barbarigo, Pietro Emo, Michele Steno, Carlo Zeno, and Ramberto Quirini, signed with them a defensive alliance for ten years (March 21, 1398);² and Jacopo Suriano was despatched a fortnight later to Vienna (April 3)³ to procure Austrian adhesion.

The Count of Vertus was not undismayed by this attitude of calm defiance and methodical preparation; and he speedily discovered a spirit of tractability. At his express desire, a negotiation was set on foot; and an armistice was arranged on the 11th May, which within two years was superseded by a general pacification (March 21, 1400), conducted under the superintendence of the two Venetian syndics, Emo and Steno.

The proposition has been advanced by more than one writer, that the Venetians, in allying themselves in 1388 with Giovanni-Galeazzo Visconti, perpetrated a grave error in tactics. But where that error lay is not readily apparent. The Second Partitive Treaty

¹ Joh. Bembus (Murat. xii. 516).

² Joh. Bembus, 515; Jacobus de Delayto (*Annales Estenses synchron.*; Murat. xviii. 947-8).

³ J. de Delayto, *ubi supra*; Romanin (lii. 329).

was, on the contrary, strictly in unison and harmony with the trimming policy, which the Government of the Doge had been pursuing throughout since the Peace of Turin. The Signory had subsidized the Scaliger and the Visconti to weaken the Carrarese; and she had employed the Carrarese, in his turn, as an instrument for weakening the Visconti. In both these efforts she succeeded admirably. It might be urged that she had shown less than her customary circumspection in allowing the master of Milan and Verona to become the master of Padua; but it was to be recollected that she held the balance in her own hands, and that she practically reserved to herself the faculty of making the elder Carrara or his son the hero of a Counter-Revolution. By the restoration of Novello, Milan lost Padua, but Venice did not lose Treviso.¹

The originator of this apparently inconsiderate charge is said to have been no less a person than the author of *The Prince*. Instead of impugning Venetian foresight, Nicolo Machiavelli might have directed his scrutiny with larger profit to other points, where more solid ground existed for animadversion. At Milan, a Visconti espousing a French princess: at his own Florence, an unstable and tremulous Executive beseeching French protection: at Genoa, a factious aristocracy accepting a French yoke, presented a spectacle, indeed full of portent and ignominy. Italy lay already under

¹ Joh. Bembus, 515.

the heavy curse of a profligate military organization¹ and of a hybrid constitutional system. But from Transmontane intermarriages and protectorates she was destined to experience even a greater bane.

Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire had been making gigantic strides; and the moribund dominion of Greece was hastening to its final collapse. The total incapacity of the Byzantine Court to defend a wide littoral, or to protect its subjects, was transparently evident; and several of the more exposed dependencies of that crown, shuddering at the prospect of falling under Turkish sway, were beginning to turn their eyes toward the Republic.

Maria, the daughter and heiress of Guido d'Engino, Lord of Argos and Napoli di Romania² (Nauplia) had been united to Pietro, the son of Federigo Cornaro of San Luca,³ one of the heroes of the War of Chioggia. Pietro Cornaro died quite in early life; and his widow, not entering into second nuptials, now sold her seigniorial rights to the Venetians (1388) for an hereditary pension.

The example was followed by Giorgio Strazimero, Lord of Scutari (1395)⁴ and by Giorgio Topia, Lord of Durazzo (1399),⁵ and almost simultaneously, Alessio, on the same line of coast, was committed by some of its Nobles⁶ to a Venetian protectorate.

¹ Machiavelli (*Il Principe*, c. 12).

² Caresinus, contemp. (fol. 482).

³ Sanudo (fol. 760).

⁴ Sanudo (fol. 762).

⁵ Ibid.; Romanin (iii. 316).

⁶ "Copia delli Patti firmati pel nobil huomo Z. Miani, Capitano del Golfo, con alcuni nobili al Castello di Alessio."—MS. cited by Daru (ii. 185).

But a more valuable and important acquisition had been made in Corfu,¹ which was originally assigned to Venice in fief after the fall of Constantinople in 1204, and which, having been at a subsequent date (1221) appropriated by the Despot of Epirus, passed in dowry (1258) to the Neapolitan branch of the imperial House of Hohenstaufen. So far back as 1382, the perturbed state of Naples incited the Signory to address overtures to that court, and to the Corfiots themselves, for the transfer of an island, which she viewed as more than an equivalent for Tenedos. The diplomatic correspondence, however, was tedious and protracted.² It was not till 1386³ that the principal inhabitants of Corfu could be persuaded to embrace the proposal: nor was the King of Naples prepared to complete the bargain, until 30,000 gold ducats had been offered to him as a bait.⁴ Twenty years were occupied on the whole by this negotiation; it lingered from 1382 to 1402.

At the same time, the Signory was knitting more closely her connexion with Greece and the Morea by compacts and matrimonial alliances; the trading charter with Constantinople was twice renewed (1383-92); Petronilla Felicita,⁵ widow of Giovanni Crispo, Duke of the Archipelago, was united to Nicolo Veniero, one of the sons of the Doge; and a daughter of his Serenity⁶ was betrothed to a stripling of

¹ Caresinus (fol. 472-3).

² Sanudo (fol. 760).

³ Cigogna (*Iscrizioni*, ii. 92).

⁴ Romanin (iii. 315).

⁵ Romanin (iii. 316).

⁶ Sanudo (fol. 779).

ten years,¹ son of Frangulo Crispo, the Duke's kinsman.

The present occupant of the throne of Othman was Bajazet I., who rejoiced in the appellation of Ilderim, or *the Lightning*. The development, which had been already imparted to the Mussulman power, was portentous; and the insatiable ambition of the new Sultan precluded the possibility of any limit being assigned to its advance and expansion. It was a rolling tide of aggressive barbarism, which seemed to be sweeping away the bulwarks of European civilization. The empire of the Palæologi was sinking into inanition. The successor of Louis of Hungary was trembling on his throne. Wallachia was a Turkish tributary. Bulgaria was all but a Turkish province. Servia was at the feet of Bajazet; and her prince, Stephen, who had solicited the protection of Venice, merely obtained admission to civic honours (June, 1391.)²

On the first intimation, however, of the accession of Bajazet Ilderim (1389) the Venetian Senate, true to the pliant and accommodating policy which naturally belonged to a commercial people, lost no time in accrediting Francesco Quirini, loaded with rich donatives, to his court (October 17, 1390);³ and the ambassador contrived to elicit from the Sultan a renewal of the charter already existing in favour of his countrymen. This step did not prevent the Senate from

¹ Sanudo, *loco citato*.

² Romanin (iii. 331).

³ Romanin, *ubi suprâ*.

directing explicit instructions (April 27, 1392) to be sent to Tommaso Mocenigo, the new Captain-General, to keep a vigilant watch on the foreign possessions and dependencies of the Signory, particularly Candia and Negropont, or from tendering its counsel to the Byzantine Court touching the best means of stemming the forthcoming crisis.

In 1391, Emmanuel Palæologus succeeded to a tottering throne. While he remained Valet of Constantinople, this prince had been employed in invoking on behalf of his father Johannes the charity and support of Europe. But his mendicant peregrinations were not productive of any substantial fruits. The Powers of Christendom restricted themselves to the transmission of bald messages of condolence. England and France were too perturbed, Arragon, Castile, and Portugal were too feeble to engage in any costly schemes of Oriental enterprise. Genoa had no money; Hungary had no ships; and even the Republic was too much absorbed at present by the concerns of the Peninsula to go beyond sympathy and advice.

At the same time, its Eastern policy constituted a question, on which the Senate was gravely divided. Some were of opinion, that the College should write to the Bailo of Constantinople, instructing him to persuade the Emperor to remain firm in his capital, "of which his departure would be the certain ruin," exhorting him to trust in God and in the succour of the Christian Princes, and recommending Palæologus to communicate with the Pope on the subject of a General

League. Others, pleading the imperfect state of their knowledge on the Oriental question, urged the propriety of waiting with patience, until the advices from Constantinople and Turkey were completed and verified. A third and more influential section proposed a mediation between the Sultan and the Byzantine Court; and the embassy to Bajazet had been actually commissioned (February, 1396¹) when the matter assumed a phase, which led the Signory to alter her views. The arrival of official reports from Buda and Constantinople shewed, that all the arts of persuasion had been fruitlessly exhausted upon the Sultan, and that the King of Hungary and the Emperor saw no course before them but war.

The alarming preponderance of Ilderim had already constrained the Republic to enjoin on the part of Mocenigo the exercise of the utmost alertness, and to confer for the third time the peculiarly responsible and arduous appointment of Bailo of Negropont upon Carlo Zeno (January, 1396²). The improved complexion of Italian politics since the peace of 1392 induced her Government to quit its attitude of neutrality, and to declare itself openly favourable to the proposed Crusade.

In France, the Duke of Burgundy, uncle of Charles VI., his son Jean de Bourgogne, Count of Nevers,³ the Count of Eu, Constable of the Kingdom, the Sire de Coucy, the Maréchal de Boucicault, and

¹ Romanin (iii. 332).

² Ibid. (iii. 335).

³ Froissart (*Chroniques*, ch. 47-8).

others, obeyed the call. Several thousand Hungarians under Sigismund in person were in the field. The Count of Hainault, son of the Duke of Holland,¹ expressed an earnest desire to take part in the expedition. But his father checked him by saying: "Gwylliam, what haste or wyll have you to go in this voyage into Hungery and into Turkey, to seke armes upon people and countrey that never dyd us any forfeyte; thou hast no tytell of reason to go, but for the vaine glory of the worlde: let Johan of Burgoyne and our cosins of Fraunce do their enterprise, and do thy dedes aparte, and go thou into Frese, and conquere our herytage, that these fresones by pride and rudenes do witholde frō us, and wyll come to none obeysaunte; and to do this I shall ayde the."²

The French penetrated into Turkey through Transylvania and Wallachia; the Magyars followed the route of Servia: while the Venetian squadron under Mocenigo, reinforced by a few galleys from Rhodes and the Ionian Isles, proceeded to station itself at the mouth of the Danube. The forces of Bajazet were concentrated near Nicopolis on the right bank of the river, 300 miles in a north-westerly direction from Constantinople; and the two armies confronted each other on the 28th September, 1396.³ The Christians

¹ The Count of Hainault was the brother-in-law of the Count of Nevers, who had married one of the daughters of the Duke of Holland.—*Froissart*, ch. 47, p. 294; edit. Buchon.

² *Chronicles of Froissart*, translated by Sir John Bouchier Lord Berners, 1523, cap. 206.

³ Romanin (iii. 333).

numbered fully 100,000.¹ But the valour of the French was more than neutralized by their foolhardiness; Sigismund, who was alone conversant with the Turkish system of strategy, was strenuous in his exertions to curb the mercurial impetuosity of his allies; the latter dashed forward with tremendous vehemence, and broke the first and second lines of the enemy, who designedly gave way. Their strength was expended, when they found themselves face to face with the main body under the Sultan himself, who had taken up a strong position at the foot of a hill; and the tide of war was at once rolled back. The confederates were rapidly enveloped by the dense masses of the Mussulmen, who assailed them in front and rear; and they were routed with horrible carnage. The day was irrecoverably lost; Sigismund made nugatory efforts to restore order, and to retrieve the misfortune; and the discomfiture of the French prepared the way to that of the Hungarians.² The humane and sensible usage, which had been introduced within the last half-century into the canons of European warfare, was repugnant to the proselytizing spirit of Bajazet, or to his bloodthirstiness; and all the prisoners who declined to renounce the faith of their fathers were decapitated on the field. The King and the Duke of Burgundy escaped by flight, and were received on board the galleys of Mocenigo; while by a stretch of clemency the Count of Nevers and twenty-four of his compeers were admitted to ransom.

¹ Froissart (xiii. 330; edit. Buchon).² Froissart (402-3).

The prostration of the combined forces of France and Hungary at Nicopolis cruelly extinguished the hope of relief from those quarters, which Christendom, and the Byzantine Court especially, had permitted themselves, perhaps too easily, to nourish, and opened to Bajazet the gates of Constantinople and the road to Vienna. The sole remaining barrier against the Turks was the fleet of the Republic in the Danube; and by a strange caprice of fortune the successor of the proud Louis of Hungary was there obliged to seek Venetian hospitality and protection.

“The Duke of Burgoyn,” writes Froissart,¹ “and the duches studyed all the wayes they could devyse, by what maner or tretye they myght gette their sonne out of prysone; they knewe well or (ere) they coulde have hym they shulde be fayne to paye for hym a great rannsone; they mynished their housholde and kept a meaner estate, and gathered as moche golde and sylver as they coulde: and they gate theym acquayntaunce with marchauntes, Venycience, and Genovois, and suche other, for they thought by their meanes they shulde the rather come to their purpose. . . . The same season there was at Parys a marchaunt of Turkey, who had all the doynge for all other Lombardes; he was knowen and spoken of throughout all the worlde: his name was called Dyne of Responde, and by him all exchaunges were made. . . . Oftentimes the Duke of Burgoyne demanded of him counsayll how he might entre into treatie with Lamorabaguy

¹ *Chronicles*, translated by Lord Berners, 1523, cap. 221.

(Bajazet) for the redempcion of his sonne and of the other prisoners in Turkey. 'Sir,' quod this marchānt, 'lytell and lytell some meanes wyll be founde, syr, the marchauntes of Gennes (Genoa) and of other isles are knowen over all, and occupyeth the trade of marchāndyse in Quayre (Cairo), in Alexandre, in Damas, in Damiet (Damietta), and out in farre countreys hethan: for as ye knowe well, marchaundyse flyeth over all the worlde. Syr, let the kynge and you write amyably (amicably) to theym, and promesse them great benefytes and profytes, if they wolde do for you: there is nothyng but it is overcome with golde and sylver.'"

The counsel of the sagacious Responde was adopted; and the Count of Nevers and his unfortunate companions obtained their liberty, though not without many delays and great difficulty.¹

It was in less than a month subsequently to the battle of Nicopolis that an event occurred, which France had been for some time anticipating, and which more than indemnified her for the reverses which she had suffered in the East. On the 25th October, 1396,² after numberless procrastinations and interruptions, a treaty was signed between Charles VI. and the Republic of Genoa, by which the latter surrendered her political freedom and her national independence, under the guarantee that her civil rights and judicial institutions should be preserved in their full integrity. The Genoese elected the King of

¹ Froissart (*Chroniques*, ch. 55).

² Stella, *Annales*, lib. iii. (Mur. xvii. 1151).

France their perpetual sovereign, and accepted the lieutenant nominated by his Majesty, the Count of Saint Pol, who arrived at the seat of his government with an escort of 200 French lances.

The most factious of Italian commonwealths had thus at length proclaimed itself no longer capable of liberty. Her historians report that it had been the wish of Genoa to give herself to Milan, rather than to France, and that a correspondence, which occupied several months, was maintained between the Doge Antoniotto Adorno and the Count of Vertus. But Giovanni-Galeazzo cajoled, trifled and temporized, until the opportunity was lost; and he found that, by a refinement of subtlety, he had overreached himself. The nation which was seeking a master appears to have finally considered that the humiliation of a French yoke was less pointed and galling than that of a Milanese, and that the former was more susceptible of being shaken off; and although a more advantageous offer was brought by the courier of Visconti, before the October treaty had been signed, Adorno and his countrymen persevered in their resolution, and threw themselves by preference into the arms of Charles.

The Genoese Revolution of 1396 necessarily gave preponderance to Venetian maritime power, and weakened the Genoese influence at Constantinople and in the Mediterranean. To the Republic this conclusion of the affair afforded immeasurable relief: for in a second amalgamation between Milan and Genoa she had dreaded a measure which might not improbably

prepare the way to a second Italian League and to a repetition of the horrors of 1379. The remoteness of the suzerain whom her rival had chosen, and the rancorous animosity which subsisted between Charles and the Count of Vertus,¹ formed in the eyes of Venice an amply sufficient pledge against any such contingency. Upon the earliest intimation of the stunning disaster of the 28th September, the Signory instructed her Captain-General to protect the flag of Saint Mark and the Venetian mercantile marine, and to the extent of his ability to provide for the safety of the Greek capital.

It has been demonstrated in a preceding page how the defensive League of 1398 against the encroachments of the Count of Vertus was joined by the Venetians, and how again, in eighteen months from that date, a general peace was arranged through the direct instrumentality of Pietro Emo and Michele Steno. Excepting in a diplomatic sense, however, the Republic remained from 1396 to 1400 a stranger to the troubles of the Peninsula. While the banner of Saint George was sullied by a French escutcheon, and an indelible blot had been cast upon the Genoese name, Venice advanced with wonderful rapidity in her great career. The national prosperity was unexampled. Food was abundant. A prodigious impulse was given to trade and commercial speculation. The argosies of the Cornari and the Mocenigi traversed every arm of the ocean, and visited every port and inlet. It was

¹ Froissart by Berners, 1523, cap. 210.

an illustration of the elasticity which was felt,¹ that the long credit heretofore enjoyed by the wine-merchants was discontinued by the Board of Customs, and that they were required to pay the duty on their wines within two months after their arrival in port; and the returns of the Census were so satisfactory, that a check was imposed in 1383 on the too rapid increase of naturalized subjects by an abolition of the low standard tolerated in a period of pestilence and war, and a relapse to the qualification adopted in the preceding century, of fifteen years' residence.²

With England, France, Spain, Portugal, Granada, Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, and even India, the Venetian intercourse was frequent and regular. The traffic which one mercantile firm, that of Albano and Marco Morosini, Brothers, maintained with Damascus, Beyrout, Famagosta, Aleppo, and other places, was enormous. In all those countries they had factors who transmitted to Venice the products and manufactures of the East, and to whom they consigned in exchange the staple commodities of Europe, or the curiosities of Thibet and Siam. In the hold of a Venetian galleon every land was represented by its fruits or its industry; and among the most precious articles of merchandize in those days were the iron of Staffordshire, the tin of the Cornwall and Devon stannaries, and the wool of Sussex.

A personal narrative by Bernardo Contarini, consul and ambassador at Malaga under this reign, contains

¹ Sanudo (fol. 767).

² Sanudo (fol. 777).

a singular account of his first introduction to the Moorish King of Granada. Contarini wrote on the 6th October, 1400, to the Venetian College thus:—
 “ Upon my arrival at Granada I was received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who informed me that his Majesty was extremely anxious to see me. I excused myself at first on the plea that the distance to the royal residence was fatiguing after my long journey, and that my vestments were soiled and dusty from travelling. But the minister was importunate, representing that it was an extraordinary honour which his master conferred upon me, since other envoys were usually detained for some time before an audience was granted to them. Hereupon I yielded, retired to my apartments, opened my valise, attired myself in a bright Court-suit, and prepared to wait upon the monarch. My reception was peculiarly gracious and amiable, and I procured from the King, whom I found seated on a thronal dais surrounded by his councillors, a charter written in Arabic characters upon red papyrus, by virtue of which the subjects of the Republic are placed in the enjoyment of personal security and many special and valuable privileges throughout Granada.”

Such was the flourishing aspect of Venice, when the lengthened reign of Antonio Veniero was terminated by his death, after a short indisposition,¹ on the

¹ “ Questo Doge avendo dogato anni 18 e un mese . . . s'ammalo di *condormia*, perche certo scisma e odio regnava ne' cuori della Nobilita di Venezia, onde egli morì.”—Sanudo (fol. 766).

21st November, 1400.¹ His administration of eighteen years had been remarkable for the quick reaction which was experienced from the political and commercial crisis of 1380, and for the marvellous extension of Venetian influence in all parts of the world. The weight of the Republic in the councils of Italy itself was such as had never before been known; and all the European Powers respected the liberties and rights of Venetian subjects. In 1399, one of the earliest acts of the Duke of Lancaster on his accession to the throne of England as Henry IV., was to write (October 4) to his Serenity, notifying the circumstance, and expressing his readiness to grant every sort of indulgence and exemption throughout his dominions to the merchants of Venice.²

Veniero was not more renowned for his urbane and gracious manners³ than for his severe morality. It happened in the summer of 1388, that one of his three sons, named Luigi, indulged, in concert with another young patrician, Marco Loredano, a curious freak by posting on the Bridge of Santa-Trinita, on a certain night of May, near the residence of Giovanni de Bocolis, a person of high respectability, a placard surmounted by horns, in which the foulest aspersions were cast upon the wife of that gentleman and his kinswomen. The indignant husband lodged an information of this atrocity with the Criminal Court of the Forty, and prayed for redress.⁴ The delinquents

¹ Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 111 (King's MSS. 149).

² Romanin, iii.

³ Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 102 (King's MSS. 149).

⁴ The process is preserved in Sanudo (fol. 772).

were identified; their guilt was established beyond denial; and each of them was condemned to a fine of 100 ducats and two months imprisonment in the *Carceri di Sotto*, or the Lower Dungeons (June 11, 1388). In the solitude of his confinement, Luigi Veniero arrived at an acute sense of his degraded and compromised position; his thoughts preyed upon his mind; and he fretted and pined to an excessive degree. After a while the young man caused a letter to be put into the hands of his parent, in which he described himself as sinking, and implored the exertion of his influence in the mitigation of the cruel sentence. But the Doge, though hardly unmoved by the harrowing appeal, considered that it was a duty which he owed to his country¹ to set a terrible example; if that example was to be found in the bosom of his own family, the sorrow was keener, but weightier only was the obligation; and, stifling the instincts of parental love, he allowed the law to keep its course. In a short time, the prisoner was a corpse. Such were the reasoning and practice of a Venetian noble of the fourteenth century. Such, at least, were those of the Doge Veniero.

For the illustration of the civilization of Venice during this epoch, a certain store of materials is found in the judicial proceedings of the *Pregadi* or *Rogati*, and other Councils. Of these proceedings, usually

¹ Long anterior to this period a clause had been inserted in the Promise by which the Doge and his family were placed before the law on an equality with other citizens. But this rule referred, it is suspected, merely to civil suits.

presented in the form of decisions, a large selection has been preserved. The following are specimens:—

1339. *September 16.* It was resolved that the members of the Quarantia shall be elected five at a time in the Great Council.

1344. *August 12.* C. F. P.¹ That bounties be given to any who shall bring corn into the country within a stated time, of 17 grossi the bushel.

1345. *May 16.* C. F. P. That to the Prince of Bolza, who has been instrumental in operating the League against the Infidels, 200 gold ducats be given in a purse.

1346. *January 16.* C. F. P. That to the Lord Jacopo da Carrara, come hither, 100 florins be given.

1355. *October 15.* C. F. P. That Ser Marino Baffo dalla Maddalena, and Marco Trevisano, bankers, having absconded with 20,000 ducats, be cried, and that whoever shall convict them and deliver them into custody, shall have 500 *lire*.

1356. *April 2.* C. F. P. That it being understood that two holy bodies, viz., Ermacora and San Fortunato, had been purloined, and conveyed to Aquileia by the Patriarch, Jacopo Maragnoni was sent as orator to demand their restitution; and the Patriarch has sent hither another orator to say, that these bodies were originally in Aquileia. Nevertheless, C. F. P., that he must restore the said holy bodies, otherwise all the money which is due to him on the part of the

¹ *Capta fuit pars*; or, the resolution was taken. These details will be found in Sanudo (fol. 773-83).

Commune will be kept back. And of this notice was given to the Pope and the Emperor.

1358. ——. Ser Pancrazio Giorgio, Avogador of the Commune, was cited before the Quarantia by his colleague Jacopo Marango, for having used opprobrious words against the Doge in disparagement of the Ducal office; and he was condemned to pay 100 *lire*.

1372. *April* 8. It was proposed by Lorenzo Dandolo, Chief of the Forty, that an intimation be sent to Ser Giovanni Foscari, father of Ser Paolo, Bishop of Castello, that he cause his son to quit Rome and to come hither; *aliter*, that Ser Giovanni will be banished from Venice, and his property sequestrated.¹

1375. *April* 15. C. F. P. That our Governors (of provinces) shall not be less than five and twenty years of age.

1376. *March* 12. C. F. P. That Don Pietro Capello, Bishop of Cremona, be permitted to hold 6,000 ducats in the Funds, of which he desires to apply the interest to the endowment of (poor?) girls.

1383. *October* 18. C. F. P. That the Cardinal of Ravenna be permitted to hold 12,000 ducats in the Funds, being desirous of applying the interest to the maintenance of the scholars at Padua (College).

1386. *January* 16. C. F. P. That the wife of the Count of Vertus be allowed to hold 100,000 ducats in the Funds.

¹ Foscari the younger had proceeded to Rome to procure the mediation of the Holy See in regard to certain differences between the Government and himself on the subject of the levy of mortuaries.

1386. *March 28.* C. F. P. At the suit of the magnificent Count of Vertus, that Ser Carlo Zeno may go as Podesta to Milan.

1388. *January 13.* C. F. P. That the Lord Antonio de la Scala, *olim* Lord of Verona, who has come to live in this land, shall have 100 ducats a month for his maintenance.

1388. *November 28.* C. F. P. That Guglielmo Quirini be appointed Vice-Governor of Treviso, with a salary of four ducats a day.

1389. *March 15.* C. F. P. That Don Manfredo di Saluzzo be permitted to hold 3,000 ducats in the Funds, the proceeds to be applied to the relief of the poor.

1389. *September 3.* C. F. P. That Joseph de Vult and his son-in-law, Jews, be admitted (into the Republic) to hold a bank, and to advance money on loan at Venice. And he (De Vult) engaged to invest (in the business) 4,000 ducats, and to lend from 1 to 30 ducats.

1390. *March 26.* C. F. P. That a present be made to the Lord of Mantua of sweetmeats and trinkets of the value of 30 ducats, and that a banquet be given in his honour.

1390. *March 27.* C. F. P. That it being understood that the Bank of Ser Antonio Contarini has failed, the *Consoli de Mercatanti* be charged to wind up his affairs.

1396. *April 3.* C. F. P. That the Jews shall not be suffered to remain in this land more than a fortnight (together) under penalty.

1397. *February 19.* C. F. P. in Quarantia; that Ser Giusto Orio be condemned by default, for seeking to drown Ser Nicolo Orio, his nephew, by throwing him into the water at the bridge called *Orto di Castello*, and afterward at the Bridge of San Basilio, and be banished from Venice; and if he come hither, he shall be quartered, and all his property given to the said nephew.

1397. *September 25.* C. F. P. That 500 ducats be expended to do honour to the Count of Nevers, the son of the Duke of Burgundy, who has come into this land. Also that 15,000 ducats be lent to Henri and Jacques de Bourbon, great Lords of France, who promise not to depart hence until they have satisfied the Signory.

1398. *September 21.* C. F. P. That 5,000 ducats be lent to the Commune of Perugia.

1398. *October 18.* C. F. P. That 300 ducats a year be given to Fra Benedetto of the Order of Preachers, who offers for that money to attend persons attacked by the Plague, and to bury the dead.

A few of the foregoing extracts may be thought dry and trivial; but, in truth, there is hardly one which is not of value in elucidating some dark point relative to the spirit and tone of early Venetian society.

In the septuagenarian who was elected (December 1, 1400) to replace Veniero, it was not altogether easy to recognise that Michele Steno who, as a hot-blooded young man of four-and-twenty, had danced at the Doge's ball on Carnival Thursday, 1355, and had

afterward thrown Venetian society into an unexampled ferment by a coarse and pungent squib on the old husband of the young and beautiful wife. The blood of Steno was not now quite at fever-heat; he was at present sixty-nine; and in the uninterrupted discharge of a variety of important public functions, it had been his apparent endeavour to efface the dark stain which his indiscretion had cast upon his name, and to assuage in some measure his remorse for the inextinguishable wrong which he had contributed to inflict five-and-forty years ago, under the influence of severe exasperation, on the family of Marino Faliero. At the time of his election, Steno was labouring under an attack of illness, and his health was not sufficiently restored to permit him to assume the direction of affairs till the 9th January, 1401.¹ During the interval, the functions of Vice-Doge devolved on Luca Bragadino, senior privy councillor.²

Amongst the new clauses which were incorporated with the Promission at this epoch was one, which altered the style of addressing the Crown from *Monsignore* to *Messer lo Doge*. The variation may seem immaterial, nor was it strictly observed; but the spirit of the change was obvious.

The ceremony of the installation of Steno in January, 1401, was unusually pompous. The inaugurative speech was delivered on the occasion by Leonardo

¹ Johannes Bembus (fol. 516, Murat. xii.); Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 111 (King's MSS. 149).

² Sanudo (fol. 785).



A COMPANION OF THE STOCKING (WITH THE CLOAK).

(From MUTINELLI.)

Dolfino, Bishop of Castello,¹ and it was followed by a series of festivities and spectacles, to which all the Arts and Schools contributed their share. These pageants, which were exceedingly magnificent, spread over the twelvemonth.² They probably partook to some extent of the nature of an ovation for the general peace of March, 1400. The *Veluderi*, or Velvet-Dressers, prepared for distribution through the neighbouring Cities a Circular, advertising the entertainments which they were purposing to give. A portion of the necessarily large outlay was borne by the COMPAGNIA DELLA CALZA, or the *Company of the Stocking*. It was a society of young noblemen which had been formed of late years for the object of holding jousts, serenades, and regattas, at their own charge and for their private recreation. The uniform of this society was peculiar.³ It consisted of a striped particoloured stocking (*calza*) on the left leg, reaching to the hip, drawn over tight breeches and embroidered with quaint figures of quadrupeds and birds, a doublet of velvet or cloth-of-gold, with open sleeves and facings, displaying the shirt-frill, a flowing mantle of silk or other costly texture, thrown back on the shoulder in such a manner as to shew the emblematic stocking richly worked on the lining, a black or red bonnet with a jewelled apex, and long pointed shoes studded with precious stones. Many of the female members of the Aristocracy were honorary

¹ Agostini (*Notizie degli Scrittori Viniziani*, prefaz. xlii.)

² Joh. Bembo (fol. 516); Dolfino, p. 111 (King's MSS. 149).

³ Romanin (iv. 6, 7).

associates ; and on festive occasions, the latter wore a dress bearing on the sleeve the mystical device of the CALZA. The Company had its own statutes and by-laws, and it was under the immediate control of the Proveditors of the Commune. At a subsequent date its numbers increased, and it was divided into several branches, of which the *Immortals*, the *Royals*, the *Ethereals*, and the *Peacocks* were the most noted.¹

The French Government of Genoa was not slow to embroil itself with the Republic. The Count of Saint Pol had been succeeded in his vicarious functions by the Maréchal de Boucicault, a member of the ill-starred expedition of 1396,² and a brave, but bluff and head-strong soldier. Boucicault proceeded to signalize his regency by the prosecution of the crusade against the Mohammedans ; a Genoese fleet of eleven sail, under his personal orders, scoured the Mediterranean, and in feigned ignorance inflicted incalculable damage upon the Venetian establishments at Rhodes, Famagosta, and Beyrout.³ It was upon his return from this enterprise, that the marshal somewhat unexpectedly encountered, between Modon and Zonchio on the coast of the Morea, a Venetian squadron of fifteen galleys under the renowned Zeno. It was the 7th October, 1403. A battle was unavoidable, and a fierce contest ensued.

¹ Morelli (*Solennita e pompe nuziali presso li Veneziani*, 14, 15, 16 : 1793) ; Mutinelli (*Del Costume Veneziano*, 1831). The drawings in the latter work (here given) belong, seemingly, to a later period.

² Froissart (*Chroniques*, c. 47-8, 52 : 1825).

³ Copy of a Letter sent by Ser Bernardo Morosini, Bailo of Cyprus, to the Government of Crete, dated 21st August, 1403 : received Sept. 19th, 1403. Murat. (xxii. 800-1).



A COMPANION OF THE STOCKING (WITHOUT THE CLOAK).

(*From* MUTINELLI.)

It terminated, after four hours' hard fighting, in favour of the Venetians, who captured three galleys, and took several prisoners of rank. On the following day, the conqueror repaired to Modon, where he placed the wounded under medical treatment; and on the 9th he addressed the ensuing letter to the Doge Steno.¹

“Most Serene Prince, I beg to apprise your Ducal lordship how, being here (at Modon) with eleven galleys, and two besides of Romania, about noon on the 6th of this month, I was signalled by the guardship at Sapienza. Whereupon I proceeded thither, and found three ships, one from Canea, the other two from the vicinage of Coron; and asking them if they had seen any armed vessels, I was answered in the negative. I then repaired to Portolongo, while it was still daylight. But a little while afterward came the Loredano galley, which I had sent on a mission to Modon. This was about sunset; and Loredano stated that he had seen nine galleys pass Capo di Gallo, and make for Giaglo. I immediately quitted the harbour, as I was unwilling to remain there, from fear of being surprised; and I sailed to the Scoglio di San Nicolo near the Caurere, and summoned thither the Captain-General of Romania and all the masters of ships, to advise with them what it was best to do, seeing that the galleys (of the enemy) were already in

¹ Copy of a Letter sent by Ser Carlo Zeno, Captain (General) of our Signory, to Messer Lo Doge Michele Steno, dated Modon, 9th Oct. 1403; Murat. xxii. 801. See also Georgius Stella, *Ann. Genuenses*, 1200 (Murat. xvii); and Jacobus Zenus, *Vita C. Zeni*, lib. viii. (Murat. xix.)

the neighbourhood, and were eleven in number, with their lights hoisted. They came at last to Sapienza and cast anchor, and remained there the whole night. I agreed with the Captain (of Romania) and the masters to stay where we were that night and to get in readiness, and in the morning (October 7) to come to Modon, and recover the two great galleys (which we had left there), and afterward to hasten to meet the said galleys of the Genoese; and so we did. The Genoese stood all the night (of the 6th) at Sapienza, with their lights aloft burning; and they were so haughty and self-sufficient that they took no notice whatever of us, which I ascertained from a small bark sent to me here by Messer Almorò Lombardo. In the morning, according to the orders given, we started for Modon; and on our way we descried those galleys (of the Genoese) which had left a little while before without giving me any notice, or communicating with me at all. This seemed to every one a token of ill-will and animosity to your Signory on their part, in respect to the damage and spoliation at Beyrout. For if they had been of good intention, they would have shown a desire to come to a parley with me or with the Castellan (of Modon?), on the subject. Seeing, however, that they had gone, I took the two great galleys, and followed them, using the oars. They had now distanced Modon eight miles, and were on the mouth of Zonchio, and when they observed that we were giving them chase, they wheeled round, and advanced toward us. When I saw them do this, I certainly imagined that Messer

Boucicault (Boucicaldo), intended to send a galley to me (as he had on a former occasion, when I received it amicably), because then we might have come to some friendly settlement respecting the affair of Beyrout. I immediately hoisted my flag; but such was the arrogance of the enemy, that they proceeded toward me without farther ado in order of battle; and the fight commenced on both sides with great vigour and severity, lasting nearly four hours. At the end, by the mercy of God and the Evangelist Saint Mark, we discomfited his galleys, and eight (only) escaped in sorry plight;¹ and of wounded and killed there were enough. If all our men had done their duty, not a single galley would have been saved by them. Wherefore, if God vouchsafes me a return to Venice, I beseech your Lordship that you will cause such as have been the means of preventing me from reaping a full triumph to be prosecuted by your Avogadors of the Commune.

“Of my own achievements I care not to speak, since every man saw how I invested the galley of Messer Boucicault, in which were from 280 to 300 combatants, and should have mastered it, had not two other galleys come up to its relief; and after an hour's fighting, I was obliged to relax my hold.

¹ Joh. Bembus (fol. 517), estimates the loss of the enemy at 800, that of the Venetians at 153. “There were taken,” says Jacopo da Delayto (*Annales Estenses contemp.*; Murat. xviii. 988), “with the three galleys, many Frenchmen of note, whom Carlo Zeno sent with the other prisoners to Venice, where they were treated kindly, and were maintained for some time at the public expense.” See also Redusio (*Chron. Tarv.*, 808); and Muratori (*Annali*, ix. 15.)

My Admiral fought like a lion; but none came to assist us, save Messer Leonardo Mocenigo, who was the means of forcing Messer Boucicault to retire. . . . I thank God for his aid. I made a most strenuous attack and defence; and if there had been none but Genoese, they would have been worsted at the first encounter. I declare to you, most serene Prince, that I have stated the facts to your Serenity exactly as they stand. God forgive those who have been wanting in their duty! The prisoners of whom I should make mention are: Messer Pietro and Messer Cosmo de' Grimaldi, Messer Leonardo Sauli, and Messer Cassano Doria, and others not worth enumerating. But of galeots and foot soldiers there are at least 400. Given at Modon,¹ the 9th October, 1403.—'CARLO ZENO, Procuratore² Capitano.' "

This triumph was celebrated by a jubilee. Tournaments and other athletic sports were prepared. The capital was illuminated at various points. On the Campanile of Saint Mark a large bonfire was lighted, as a signal of joy to surrounding Cities; and the heat which it emitted was so intense, that it liquefied a portion of the leaden roof, and occasioned an amount of damage, which was not repaired without great outlay.

¹ This letter is likewise found in Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 122-3 (King's MSS. 149).

² Among the letters of Vergerius (Murat. xvi.) is one (No. 10) to Zeno, complimenting him on his exploit at Zonchio. It bears date Nov. 22 (1403).

The loss of the Battle of Zonchio was exceedingly galling to Boucicault, and that officer, whose temper had never been remarkable for its serenity, now completely lost his head. He proceeded to commit every sort of mischievous and silly extravagance. Without the slightest authorization from Paris, he declared war against the Signory. He directed Genoese cruisers to attack and make prize Venetian merchantmen wherever they met with them. He wrote a letter¹ to Michele Steno, in which he gave the Captain-General the lie, and challenged the Doge or Zeno, or both, to single combat. As for the choice of weapons, he was profoundly indifferent; and that and every point of detail were left to them. He did not object, upon consideration, to fight *any six Venetians*, or to take any odds which might be offered, ten against twelve, fifteen against eighteen, five-and-twenty against thirty, or, varying the character of the duel altogether, to measure his strength with them galley to galley.² This puerile rodomontade was treated with the silent contempt which it so richly deserved; and the Marshal had the chagrin of seeing his herald return without an answer.³ At the same time, the College, sensible of the harm which might arise from the dissemination of falsehoods respecting the late affair, addressed a circular to all the Italian Powers, and a letter to the French King, in which the facts of the matter were

¹ Stella (*Annales*, fol. 1203-4). It began, "I, Jean de Meingle, called Boucicault, Marshal of France, signify to you," &c.

² Vincens (ii. 128).

³ Stella (*Ann.* fol. 1204).

temperately and lucidly rehearsed in vindication of the conduct of Zeno.

In France itself, however, a strong feeling of indignant resentment was excited by the intelligence of the defeat of the Maréchal de Boucicault; and at Montpellier, among several other places, Venetian property was seized in reprisal to the value of 30,000 ducats or upward.¹ But a report had also reached Paris of the vigorous preparations which Venice was making for war. The French prisoners, in their letters to their friends at the Court of Charles VI., besought them not to prolong their captivity by any violent counsels; and the King, influenced by these considerations, sent a peremptory mandate to Boucicault to desist from hostilities, and to seek an accommodation on the footing of restitution and indemnity. In obedience to the instructions of his royal master, the Governor of Genoa adopted a conciliatory tone, and made pacific advances to the Republic. He found that the Venetian Government had already taken bail for its more distinguished prisoners, who were liberated on parol;² and a compensatory treaty was signed on the 22nd March, 1404, by which the damages sustained by Venetian subjects at Beyrout, Rhodes, and Cyprus were assessed at 180,000 ducats.

By this pacification the captives were released on both sides. It came to the ears of the College that a Frenchman, who was among the number of those set at liberty, had boasted subsequently to his enlarge-

¹ Sanudo (fol. 805).

² Romanin (iv. 10).

ment, that he would wash his hands yet in Venetian blood. He was arrested on this charge, brought back to Venice, and sentenced to be hanged. On his way to execution, he continually protested his innocence, exclaiming : *God forgive me, if I ever uttered the words !* The populace, having learned the cause of his punishment, was peculiarly bitter against him ; and as the miserable wretch dangled from the gibbet between the Red Columns, some of the mob brutally slashed the soles of his feet with knives, saying : *Let the Frenchman's blood flow, who vaunted that he would spill ours !*¹

The feebleness of the German empire was now apparently approaching its climax. To the despicable Wenceslaus had succeeded, in 1401, the almost equally despicable Robert, Count Palatine of the Rhine. Invited by Padua and some of the Tuscan Communes to take part with them against the overgrown power of Visconti, and enticed by the promise of subsidies and arms, Robert entered Italy in the summer of that year, and having obtained leave from the Signory to traverse the Trevisan, proceeded direct to Padua, where he concerted with Novello the military plan of the intended campaign. Before his arrival in the Peninsula, the new Cæsar notified his exaltation to the Signory, soliciting her friendship, her counsel, and her succour. On the 27th September (1401) it was resolved in the Pregadi, that he should be told in reply, “that his Majesty had so much discernment, and was surrounded by such

¹ Joh. Bembus (fol. 518).

able advisers, that any external suggestions could only be supererogatory; that the Republic would, upon his coming into Italy, send her ambassadors to congratulate him; that she did not object to place at his disposal the two barks which he had demanded; that it was with regret that she declined to gratify his wishes in respect to an honorific deputation; and that, so far as her assistance was concerned, she would take an early opportunity of ascertaining with greater precision the desires and intentions of his Majesty!"

The preparations of the Count of Vertus for the struggle which was awaiting him were on a scale which distanced all competition. The most famous captains of the age, and the best troops which were procurable, were drawn into Milanese pay. The prodigality of Giovanni-Galeazzo was bounded only by his immense pecuniary resources. His adversaries were inferior in number, in discipline, in strategy. Carlo Malatesta, the Hero of Governolo, was on his staff of generals. The Venetians exhibited a tendency to remain strictly neutral. In every respect he was the master of the situation. Nevertheless, the Imperialists, encouraged by a few trifling successes at the outset, marched upon the Brescian territory. But they were speedily met by Jacopo del Verme and the Milanese; and on the 21st October, 1401, the Army of the League was exposed to a humiliating and disheartening rout.¹ The emperor had not participated

¹ Cagnola, 24; *Arch. Stor. Ital.* iii.

to any material extent in the military movements; he now furnished a conclusive proof of his abject pusillanimity by breaking faith with Novello and the Tuscans, and withdrawing from the war. This drivelling and inane prince loitered and lounged away his time between Venice¹ and Padua till the spring of 1402, when he escaped from the just scorn and well-earned sneers of the Italians by returning to his own Fatherland.

It is difficult to surmise, how far the splendid success achieved by Del Verme for the Viper Standard might have been detrimental to Tuscany, if its consequences had not been averted by the opportune appearance of the Republic in the character of an arbitress, and by the sudden decease of Giovanni-Galeazzo himself in the following September.² By his will, the tyrant apportioned his dominions among three sons. The eldest, Giovanni-Maria, received Milan, Cremona, Como, Lodi, Piacenza, Parma, Reggio, Bergamo, Brescia, Siena, Perugia, and Bologna. The second, Filippo-Maria, was invested with the title of *Count of Pavia*, and with the sovereignty of Pavia, Novara, Vercelli, Tortona, Alessandria, Verona, Vicenza, Feltro, Belluno, and the Riviera of Trento.³ To Gabriello-Maria, a bastard, he bequeathed Pisa and Crema.⁴ The funeral of the Count of Vertus, of which an eye-witness has left a minute narrative, was

¹ Joh. Bembus (fol. 517); A. Gataro (*Ist. Padov.*, contemp., fol. 845).

² Muratori (*Annali*, ix. 10).

³ Ibid. (ix. 11).

⁴ Joh. Ser Cambius, *Cronica di Lucca*, synchron. (Mur. xiii. 841).

one of the most magnificent spectacles which had ever been seen in Italy ; it took place at Milan on the 20th October, 1402.¹

All the Italian States contemplated this partition with ill-suppressed ecstasy, and the event was viewed by the Republic herself with unqualified satisfaction. Even Giovanni-Maria Visconti had not yet reached his fourteenth year. A regency was consequently appointed ; and agreeably to the instructions of the testator, his consort Catherine was placed at its head. The situation of the Milanese dominion, deprived of the talents of the Count of Vertus, and environed by so many enemies, was already critical enough. But its weakness and its peril were soon much increased by the follies and crimes of the Regent Catherine.

The Lombard annals of the first decade of the fifteenth century are mainly occupied by a recital of the war waged against the Duchess of Milan by a league formed under the auspices of Francesco Novello. The object of that struggle was redistributive. It aimed at the spoliation and dismemberment of the colossal empire which it cost the most ambitious, the most faithless, and the most fortunate member of a dynasty, not proverbial for tenderness of conscience, five-and-twenty years to found and consolidate ; and the task was one to which Novello, animated by the hope of extending his dominion in the direction of Vicenza or Verona, lent himself with peculiar alacrity and zest. The analogy of her own Genoese experiences

¹ Muratori (*Ann.* ix. 11).

was perhaps of service to the Republic in assisting her to appreciate the inherent proclivity of her Continental neighbours to weaken each other. The ultimate consequences of such an internecine policy were patent enough; and during the earlier stages of the new war in the Marches, she preserved the neutrality which she had warily maintained since the Treaty of 1398.

The political changes at Milan wrought a¹ complete metamorphosis in the attitude of affairs in the Peninsula, and appeared to yield fresh scope to the vaulting ambition of Novello.² The Venetians exerted their influence in the interest of peace, and prevailed on the Regent to offer to the Lord of Padua the cession of Feltre, Belluno and Cividale. But their pacific efforts were unexpectedly thwarted by the intrigues of Jacopo del Verme and the other Milanese condottieri, who were at present on half-pay, and who were consequently impatient to be placed on a war-footing. The negotiation served merely to afford Novello time to mature his projects and to form more soaring views; and on the 27th March, 1404, a league was framed by that Prince with Guglielmo, an illegitimate scion of the Scaligers, and his own son-in-law³ Nicolo Marquis of Ferrara, by which the Carrarese was to receive Vicenza and the seven Communes of Ariago, Rozzo, Lusiana, Enego, Roana, Foga, and Gallio; La Scala, Verona; and Este, the Polesine of Rovigo. Catherine,

¹ Cagnola, 23; *Arch. Stor. Ital.* iii.

² Joh. Bembus (fol. 518).

³ P. Morosini (*Memoria intorno alla Repubblica di Venezia*, p. 9.)

alarmed at this step, made new advances to the Signory; and the latter consented, after much hesitation, to pay the Duchess a sum of 200,000 ducats for the right of protection over Feltre, Belluno,¹ Verona, Vicenza, and Bassano.²

The League of March was an audacious defiance thrown in the teeth of Venice, which had held the Polesine since 1395 for an unsatisfied debt of 50,000 ducats,³ contracted by her creature Nicolo; and Vicenza and the Communes immediately complicated the difficulty by a spontaneous cession to the Republic.⁴ The Vicentines had previously represented to the Duchess of Milan their critical position, situated between Padua and Verona, and had asked her advice as to what course they should pursue. "We have only two Allies" said their ambassadors, "against the Carrarese, the Duke of Austria and the Venetians." "You will find" returned the Regent, "the government of Venice the more just and the more humane; the Germans may protect you more powerfully."⁵

The Government at once communicated to Novello, by a Trumpet,⁶ the character of the negotiation with Milan, as well as the subsequent offer from Vicenza which it had determined to accept, and ad-

¹ *Notizie Istoriche di Belluno*, p. 23; Bell. 1780.

² Joh. Ser Cambius, contemp. (*Chr. di Lucca*, fol. 841); Caroldo, *Historia*, fol. 129 (Harl. MSS. 5020).

³ Jac. de Delayto (*Ann. Estenses*, contemp. fol. 922).

⁴ Redusio (*Chr. Tarvisinum*, contemp. fol. 813).

⁵ Paolo Morosini (*Memoria intorno alla Repubblica di Venezia*, p. 11. edit. 1796).

⁶ Cagnola (p. 25).

monished him to waive his claims. Novello cropped the ears and slit the nostrils of the messenger, saying facetiously, "*Out of this trumpet let us make a lion of Saint Mark,*"¹ and sent him back in that mutilated condition without a reply. The demand was speedily reiterated (May, 1404), with a complaint of the damages which his troops had committed in the Vicentine; but Novello declined to yield, unless he was indemnified with Bassano. The Government then proceeded to recapitulate the obligations under which he lay to the Venetians, and to protest that he had no right whatever on his side, inasmuch as Vicenza had voluntarily given itself to the Signory, and that he might rest assured that the latter would uphold her pretensions at every cost and hazard. The answer of Carrara was,² that he wondered much at the rashness of the Venetians who, although they have no rights on the continent, insist on dictating laws to those who rule there legitimately; that he should certainly take possession of all the places which belonged to him, and would wage war against any who flang obstacles in his path; and that he would make the Venetians smart some day, if his life was spared, for the injuries which they had inflicted on his family. "Let them go," he finished, "and content themselves with their estuaries and swamps, and leave the empire of the land to those to whom it properly pertains."³ Such was the hectoring and churlish language which the

¹ J. Bembo (fol. 518.)² Platina (*Hist. Mant.* iv. 793).³ Platina, *ubi suprâ.*

Lord of Padua thought fit to employ toward the Power which had been principally instrumental in restoring him to his patrimony, and which deserved on the whole to be considered his best ally.

The example of Vicenza had been imitated by Colonia,¹ twenty miles from Verona; but the Carrarese, in a strange spirit of infatuation, took possession of it, and suggested that he should be permitted to hold it in fief, and should come to Venice to treat of the conditions in person. Independently, however, of any other point, the Doge and the Senate were unwilling to comply with this proposal, inasmuch as Novello possessed several influential friends among the nobility, and it was feared that he might employ corrupt means to gain his ends.² To the remonstrance of the College he replied, that he would restore Colonia within a month, and would give one of his sons in the interim as a material guarantee. But "no negotiation can begin," was the ultimatum, "until the Vicentine territory is utterly evacuated;" and it was added: "the acceptance of the proposed guarantee is thought to be consistent neither with the honour of the Republic nor with your own,"³

War, indeed, became inevitable; and the Signory prepared for it with her wonted energy. The intercession of Florence and Ferrara was rejected: for it was now too late. Pandolfo Malatesta, Lord of Pesaro,

¹ Sanudo (*Itinerario*, 105).

² Joh. Bembo (521); Verci (*St. della Marca Trivigiana e Veronese*, x. 136). The family of Novello had intermarried with that of Contarini.

³ Romanin (iv. 17).

the brother of the Lord of Rimini, was invited to enter the Venetian service, and was appointed (June 25, 1404)¹ Captain-General, Carlo Zeno and Pietro Emo being named his Proveditors.² The mouths of the Brenta and the Adige were fortified. Lines of palisades were constructed at Cavarzero. An embassy was accredited (June 26) to the Court of Germany, to contradict officially the scandal which the Lord of Padua had spread through that country, "that every soul who came thence to Venice would be cast into gaol." Armed with a just ground of resentment against Nicolo D'Este, the Signory recalled his rival Azzo from Candia,³ and promised to aid him in recovering his possessions. The Great Council was convoked; and all such as had landed interests in the Padovano having, agreeably to the law of 1290,⁴ been excluded from the Hall, it was solemnly and irrevocably decreed, to some extent at the instigation of Francesco Foscari, one of the Chiefs of the Forty,⁵ that war should be waged against the Carrarese *to the very utmost power and possibility*⁶ of the Commune of Venice. At the same time, an official and statistical return was demanded (June 28) of all citizens who were feoffees of Novello *in capite*, or of his subjects; all commerce with the enemy was suspended (August 7); and as a precaution against the occurrence of any plot analogous to

¹ J. Bembus (fol. 518).² Sanudo (fol. 807).³ J. Bembus (fol. 519).⁴ Romanin (iv. 18.)⁵ Berlan (*I Due Foscari*, 1852, p. 200).⁶ Delayto (*Ann. Estenses*, contemp., fol. 1006).

the Gobba conspiracy, a proclamation was published (August 8) that all householders were prohibited until farther notice from harbouring any strangers whomsoever without giving previous notice to the Chief of the Ward, who was enjoined to institute in his turn a searching inquiry into the character of the new-comer, and to satisfy himself that the motive of his visit or presence was legitimate.¹

On his part, Novello hastened to deliver to the Signory a letter, accompanied by a challenge, in the former of which he announced that, although *he had ever proved himself a dutiful son of the Republic, the latter had studiously thwarted all his projects*. He lamented the course which he was at present *constrained* to pursue: for the Venetians, sagacious and prudent as they were, could not but know that *out of wars spring sometimes things that men wot not of!*²

The Herald of the Carrarese who, on his entry into the capital would have been infallibly mobbed,³ had he not been rescued by some Nobles who observed his danger, was benignly received by the Doge and the Senate. "I challenge you," he cried, as he flang down the glove, "on the part of my lord, the Lord of Padua!" "You are welcome," returned his Serenity; "we have accepted the challenge with gratification, hoping that the Almighty, who abases the proud and confounds the wicked counsels of Princes, will smite him on that account, if He does not hurl him down

¹ Romanin, *ubi suprâ*, et seq.

² Gataro, *contemp.*, p. 845-6.

³ P. Morosini (*Memoria*, p. 13).

into the infernal regions.”¹ The functionary, having accomplished his commission, was clothed in a new suit, honourably dismissed, and safely escorted to Padua; and “a lucky fellow he was,” exclaims a contemporary,² “to find enemies more generous than the master whom he had served twenty years!” “He had not imagined,” adds the Author of the *Chronicle of Treviso*, referring to Novello, “that matters would come to this pass.”

The preparations of the Republic were conceived in a princely spirit, and were on an unusually large scale. Independently of 30,000³ men, which under the Lord of Pesaro penetrated into the Paduan territory itself, a second force, commanded by the Lord of Mantua, invaded the Veronese frontier:⁴ while Azzo d'Este, at the head of 200 arbalisters and 250 archers from Crete,⁵ marched upon Ferrara. After a few trifling reverses at the outset, the Venetian arms remained triumphant. At one moment, indeed, the forces of the Republic under the Lord of Pesaro became entangled in a swamp, and were in imminent danger of being cooped up in that situation by Novello, and thus taken at a great disadvantage. It happened that Malatesta was absent on leave at this conjuncture, and that Carlo Zeno was officiating as Commander-in-Chief. By his surpassing courage and indomitable strength of will alone, Zeno saved the Army. That

¹ Redusio (*Chron.*, contemp., 814); P. Morosini (*Memoria*, 13).

² Ibid.

³ J. Bembus (fol. 518).

⁴ Bembus (fol. 519); Delayto, contemp. (fol. 1006).

⁵ Sanudo (fol. 811).

extraordinary man, who was verging on threescore and ten, tested in person the practicability of throwing an artificial causeway across the morass by wading through it *at night where the water ascended to his shoulders*; a dyke was constructed with astonishing rapidity; and the Venetians and their heroic leader began their retreat. The enemy came up to oppose them; but they were severely repulsed, and the Carrarese himself was wounded and narrowly escaped capture. From this prodigious exploit the splendid reputation of Zeno derived new lustre.¹

Vicenza had been already occupied by Jacopo Suriano in the name of the Signory.² On the 27th of December, 1404, a bounty of 10,000 ducats of gold, with an annuity of 1,000 ducats, was offered to whomsoever should deliver Francesco Novello into her hands.³ On the 14th March, 1405, Nicolo d'Este, who had been occupying the Polesine of Rovigo since September,⁴ was compelled to desert his father-in-law,⁵ and to make peace upon humiliating conditions. It is said that the Doge, who had held Nicolo at the baptismal font, was personally instrumental in persuading his godson to adopt the important step.⁶ On the 16th of the following July, Verona, partly at the persuasion of the Vicentines,⁷ likewise succumbed, and was occupied by Venetian Proveditors, who observed toward the people the mildest and most conciliatory conduct. The

¹ Romanin (iv. 20).

² Romanin (iv. 20).

³ Redusio, contemp. (fol. 815).

⁷ J. Bembus (fol. 520).

² J. Bembus (fol. 520).

⁴ Sanudo (fol. 810).

⁶ Ibid. (fol. 816).

security of their persons and property was guaranteed; their municipal privileges were respected. Novello, having long since poisoned his confederate Guglielmo de la Scala, who was a favourite at Venice,¹ had replaced him by his own son Jacopo. The latter, after the fall of the City, attempted to effect his escape in disguise. But he was unfortunately recognised by some rustics, as he was crossing the Po² between Verona and Vicenza, and betrayed (July 25); and on the 31st, he found himself an inmate of the *Orba*,³ one of the Venetian State-Prisons.

Padua was already reduced to frightful distress. The horrors of war were aggravated by pestilence, famine, and drought. The supply of fresh water was cut off by a Florentine engineer in the Venetian service. The rate of mortality had risen from 300 to 500 a day, and the atmosphere was tainted by the stench of unburied and putrefying corpses. The desperate condition of the City, coupled with the capitulation of Verona and the subsequent capture of his son, inspired Novello with an inclination to treat (July 31, 1405);⁴ and the Signory offered 50,000, or even 60,000 ducats,⁵ for the free evacuation of Padua. The parley, however, dropped, the Lord of Padua asking 100,000 ducats as his price;⁶ and the Venetians resumed the offensive. But the attitude of affairs in the City only grew worse

¹ J. Bembus (fol. 518); Morosini (*Memoria*, p. 10).

² J. Bembus (fol. 520); Platina (*Hist. Mant.* v. 795); Cambius (*Chron. di Lucca*, 850).

³ Cambius, *loco citato*.

⁴ Romanin (iv. 24).

⁵ J. Bembus (fol. 520).

⁶ Sanudo (fol. 821).

and worse ; and in the beginning of September (September 4) Zeno tendered his offices as a medium for renewing the negotiation. The terms proposed by the Carrarese were accepted by the Proveditor, and that acceptance was indorsed by the Senate. They were—1. That the Republic shall pay 50,000 ducats, of which 10,000 in ready money, 5,000 in bills of exchange on Florence, so soon as the place is actually delivered, the remainder being secured under good guarantee ; 2. That Carrara shall have a safe-conduct to Florence ; 3. That his sons and himself shall settle neither in the vicinage of Padua, nor in Ferrara, nor in the Frioul ; 4. That the City shall be exempt from sack, that Carrara shall be allowed to remove all his personal property, and that whatever sales may be effected in his name, or whatever donatives he may make, shall be recognised ; 5. That his servants and dependents may continue to live in the Padovano, so long as they behave peaceably ; 6. That Jacopo da Carrara and Paolo Leoni shall be released from confinement, and shall be permitted to rejoin him ; 7. That the Venetians shall give 5,000 ducats for the ransom of Obizzo da Polenta, Lord of Ravenna, and other prisoners ; 8. That the soldiers of Carrara shall be unmolested and at liberty to remove all their property save their weapons ; that the safety of the Podesta and other members of the Paduan Executive shall be secured, and that they shall not be required to render any account of their administration to the Signory.

Peace was upon the point of being concluded on this equitable basis, when the Lord of Padua received intelligence, which encouraged the hope of speedy relief from Florence. He immediately shifted his ground, and presented to Zeno an entirely new prospectus. The Venetian Government was naturally incensed at this slippery and treacherous proceeding. On the 8th September, the College wrote to Zeno and his co-Proveditor: "the Republic plainly perceives that the proposals of Carrara are so many subterfuges merely for gaining time, and if the latter does not give his adhesion to the treaty of the 4th without delay, the diplomatic relations must be considered as broken off." To this missive no answer came. Novello was perplexed and silent. Procrastination, however, though perfectly intelligible on his part, was fatal to him on every account. As his resources dwindled, the terms of the Republic became proportionally harder; the offer of the Government fell from 50,000 to 30,000 ducats, and the ransom-money for Polenta sank from 5,000 to 3,500 ducats. On the 25th September, his son Jacopo, who had previously experienced the most gentle treatment at the Orba, was committed to the Lower Dungeons, thrown into irons, and placed upon a diet of bread and water, expressly in consequence of the stubborn refusal of his father to liberate the Lord of Ravenna.

The severe pressure thus put upon a parent, and the critical extremity to which Novello was reduced by the ravages of disease and the failure of water

and supplies, procured at length the enlargement of Polenta. The object of this step was partly to employ the prisoner as a channel, through which he might address fresh overtures to the Signory. But he was told (October 21):¹ "that nothing short of an unconditional surrender would now be accepted; and that, in regard to the amount which should be assigned to him for the maintenance of his family, he must be content to rely on the generosity of the Government."

The possession of Padua was a point, upon which the Signory had at last set her heart. The spoliation of Novello had not, at the same time, been originally contemplated. It was Novello who had wrought his own ruin. Never imagining that the other Italian Powers would tamely witness his destruction, or that Florence would so cruelly mislead and delude him by promises which she was unable to fulfil, the Lord of Padua had the folly to treat the straightforward advances of Venice with shuffling duplicity and falsehood, by heaping outrageous insults upon her Government, and by mutilating and assassinating her envoys. He played the hypocrite when he could no longer play the bully. "This I can assert," writes an impartial contemporary,² "that if the Lord of Padua had been inclined to make peace with the Commune of Venice, he might have had every good condition, so that he and his sons might have always continued to do well." The Carrarese had gradually expended all the arts of

¹ Romanin (iv. 26).

² Joh. Ser Cambius, contemp. (fol. 876).

corruption and intrigue. Between the months of April and September, 1405, several plots, the sources of which were traced to Padua, were disconcerted by the vigilance of the Council of Ten; and the authors were sent to the gallows. It transpired that a physician, named Giovanni di Pavia, had been hired by Novello, at a salary of 800 ducats a year, for infamous purposes;¹ and the life of the medical practitioner paid forfeit. In July, a deep-rooted conspiracy against the government and the nobility was discovered, at the head of which were Nicolo Buono and certain other priests; these scoundrels were also gibbeted with gags in their mouths;² and the Signory obtained formal absolution for the act from the Holy See. Several other schemes, of which the origin was unequivocal, were revealed from time to time, and numerous arrests took place. But some of the suspected persons, in consequence of insufficient evidence of their criminality, were subsequently acquitted by the Decemvirs.³ All these base and flagitious projects tended only to exasperate the Venetians, and to destroy altogether that favourable bias which had once been general toward Novello among the upper classes in the Republic.⁴

The Lord of Pesaro had not retained for any length of time the post of Generalissimo. It was transferred at an early stage of operations to Paolo Savelli, one of the two Field-Marsals under the late Commander-in-Chief,

¹ J. Bembus (fol. 520).

² Sabellico (part i. p. 255: edit. 1718).

³ J. Bembus (fol. 520); Romanin (iv. 29).

⁴ Bembus (fol. 521).

with a salary of 100 ducats a month ; Carlo Zeno and Pietro Emo remained Proveditors.¹ Savelli, who was a native of Rome, though not sufficiently vigilant, and somewhat too fond of chess, rendered great services to the Republic during his tenure of office. He at last fell a victim to malaria (Oct. 3, 1405²). Venetian gratitude accorded to the departed splendid obsequies. The Doge Steno, the Senate, and all the Members of the Administration, clad in deep mourning, honoured the ceremony with their presence. Chargers, sumptuously caparisoned in black, and led by the bridle, formed part of the funeral procession, and followed their late master to the grave.³ The remains of the general were deposited in the vaults of Santa⁴ Maria dei Frari. His successor in the command was Galeazzo Cataneo of Mantua,⁵ to whom Francesco Bembo was named Proveditor.

The chances of Novello had become excessively meagre. On the 13th November, he expressed a desire to come to a parley at All-Saints' Gate⁶ with the Proveditor Bembo. He stated that he wished to surrender the city, and to come to Venice with his sons. Bembo applied to his Government for instructions. The question having been laid before the Senate for decision, a member of that Body moved, "that the favour be granted, but that the interview take place immediately, and that no farther grace be shown."

¹ Sanudo (fol. 809, 814).

² Sanudo (fol. 826); Cambius, contemp. (875).

³ Bembus (520).

⁴ Sanudo (fol. 826).

⁵ Bembus (fol. 521)

⁶ Sanudo (*Itinerario*, 26).

But upon reference to the ballot, this proposal was quashed; and it was resolved that, "the demand being merely a temporizing trick, the Proveditor leave it unanswered."¹ Four days later (Nov. 17), by the connivance of the defenders of the Borgo of Santa-Croce,² an entry was gained into that quarter; and on the 19th November, the Commune of Padua, sensible of its forlorn position, sent a deputation to tender its submission to Venice. "For the people" says a contemporary,³ "were dying like dogs."

The Lord of Padua felt that the crisis was at hand. As an ultimate resource, he begged a safe-conduct to the Venetian camp at Terranigra,⁴ and the privilege of a personal parley with the Generalissimo. This empty boon was conceded. Novello conversed for some time with Cataneo, and with the new Proveditors Tommaso Mocenigo and Giovanni Barbarigo. But diplomacy was now out of place; and without having been able to obtain any advantage, he returned in the most depressed spirits to the City. The last stake was played. The last glimmer of hope was extinguished. On the 22nd, Cataneo entered Padua, and took military possession. The Venetians were hailed with transports of joy by the people, who naturally welcomed any relief from their cruel and prolonged sufferings. They were

¹ Romanin (iv. 29).

² Sanudo (*Itin.* p. 24-5).

³ Redusio (*Chronicon*, contemp., 817).

⁴ Sabellico (*Dec.* 2, lib. viii.) For this period Sabellico, the Historiographer—who, according to the Life prefixed to the edition of 1718 by Apostolo Zeno, was born about 1436—becomes a useful authority. Of course, he must be treated cautiously.

treated with the same clemency and gentleness¹ as the Veronese. The poll-tax, and other extraordinary imposts which had been levied by the Carrarese, were repealed. The civic rights, the privileges of trade, and the charter of the University, were confirmed.

Jacopo da Carrara had been the prisoner of the Signory since July. A similar fate was at present reserved for his father and his brother Francesco.² They were conducted to Venice, under an order from the Senate, on the 23rd November.³ As they entered the city, they were greeted by popular shouts of "*Crucify, crucify!*"⁴ and it was thought prudent to withdraw them from the immediate observation of the common people, by lodging them at San Giorgio Maggiore.⁵ On the following day, they were brought through a secret passage into the Palace, and admitted to an audience of the Doge.⁶ Prostrating himself before Steno, the father acknowledged his guilt, and besought forgiveness. "I have offended, my Lord," he said, "have pity on me!"⁷ His Serenity held out his hand to assist him to rise, and begged him to seat himself at his side, saying, "You shall have that justice which you deserve." He then upbraided him with his ungrateful and perfidious conduct, but not with any particular stress, or at much length. Novello

¹ A. Gataro, contemp. (fol. 938).

² J. Bembus (fol. 521).

³ Romanin (iv. 31).

⁴ A. Gataro, contemp. (fol. 938).

⁵ Caroldo, *ubi infrâ*.

⁶ Sanudo (fol. 830); Caroldo, *ubi infrâ*.

⁷ Sanudo (fol. 830); Caroldo, *Historia*, fol. 134 (Harl. MSS. 5020); *Chroniche Veneziane*, p. 373 (Add. MSS. 8580).

replied not a word in justification.¹ He merely observed, as he was taking leave, "it is not meet for the servant to answer his master."² After the audience, the prisoners were remanded to San Giorgio, where their own servants were allowed to wait upon them, and where they remained a whole week, with no other interruption than a message from the Signory (Nov. 27³), "that they could furnish no better proof of the sincerity of their professions, than by summoning to Venice Ubertino and Marsilio da Carrara, who were plotting against her in various directions."

For the acquisition of Padua the Republic offered a solemn thanksgiving on the 29th November.⁴ It was resolved by the Council of Pregadi that in honour of the occasion, all the Venetian poor should receive donations varying from four to ten ducats; and that every person imprisoned for debt, or other offence not capital, should be presented with a free pardon.⁵ To Galeazzo Cataneo, late Captain-General, the Government granted civic honours and a pension for his own life of 1,000 ducats of gold (Nov. 25⁶).

Meanwhile, the Government had been indefatigable in its researches. The most startling disclosures were made from day to day. On the 30th November, an order came from the Ten, "that the two Carrara should

¹ Gataro, *ubi suprâ*.

² *Chron. Venez.* p. 373 (Add. MSS. 8580).

³ Romanin (iv. 32). "It was intimated to the prisoners . . . that they should cause Ubertino and Marsilio to come before December with all their property. The object of this proposal was not the possession of the money, which was of no importance, but the removal of the means of concocting plots."

⁴ Sanudo (fol. 831).

⁵ *Ibid.* (830).

⁶ *Ibid.* (fol. 431, 836).

be removed from San Giorgio by night¹ to the *Gheba*, (a portion of the spacious *Torresella* Prison within the precincts of the Ducal Palace, where none but criminals of distinction were confined,) and should be separated."² But, as the *Gheba* was found to be out of repair, they were provisionally accommodated at the *Orba*. On the 1st December, some Paduan agents were arrested at Noale, in the Venetian territory. A large sum of money was found upon their persons; and a safe-conduct of the Captain-General, which they presented, was more than suspected to be a forgery.³

On the second and following days, several fresh arrests were made. Among others were those of Brodeto, a pensioner of Novello, who promised to divulge the names of those who had kept his patron informed of the proceedings of the Ten, and of a certain Armano, who had been at Venice during the War of Chioggia. The former, in order that nobody might tamper with him, was committed to the *Catolda* Prison in solitary confinement. The particulars which were elicited from Armano were accounted so important, that the Council demanded on the 10th the co-operation of a *Giunta* of six extraordinary members. It was ascertained among other points, that Novello had been in the habit of keeping an alphabetical register, with the initials of all persons to whom he paid bribes and annuities, and in which were entered, besides, many miscellaneous confidential matters. Means were taken forthwith to

¹ Joh. Bembus (fol. 521); Sabellico (part 1, 457).

² J. Bembus, *ubi suprà*.

³ Romanin (iv. 33).

secure this volume. The revelations which ensued were portentous. The book afforded a direct clue to recent conspiracies and machinations of every sort against the Signory; and a large number of new warrants were signed. On the 23rd December, the elder Carrara was consigned to the *Carceri Forti*, where his son Jacopo already seems to have been immured. Francesco the younger, however, still remained at the Orba, and was suffered to retain the services of an attendant.

On the 26th December, in a vessel laden with silk lying off an hostelry at San Basso, were discovered some papers of the most damning character. The Decemvirs desired an amplification of the Giunta; and a reward of 1,000 *lire* a year was proclaimed to any one who would denounce the author of those anonymous documents, or, if the offender was also the informant, a free pardon.¹

The Ten and the Giunta now sat day and night. The revelations and commitments were unceasing. On the 7th January, 1406, a warrant was granted for the apprehension of Jacopo Gradenigo and Pietro Pisani,² the former ex-Podesta of Padua and a gentleman of some literary repute,³ who had been criminated by the confessions of Armano and others. The latter was charged with having, at his own house at Santa Chiara, presided at a secret conversation which *three individuals*

¹ I am indebted for all these particulars to Romanin (iv. cap. 1-2, and *Documenti*, No. 1).

² Stella (*Annales*, fol. 1210). ³ Agostini (*Notizie*, i. 278, *et seq.*)

from Padua had held with Michele Rabata and Arrigo Galeto, agents of the Carrarese. Pisani was interrogated on three points. 1. The topics discussed at the conference at Santa Chiara; if any other Venetian but himself was present; and why Rabata and Galeto, instead of presenting themselves to the Signory to whom they had been previously sent by Carrara, *returned immediately to Padua?* 2. If he had on any prior occasion spoken to any emissary or agent of Carrara, and if so, when, and where, and why? 3. If after such interview he had continued to maintain relations with the Lord of Padua, and if so, at what dates, and on what subjects?

Pisani replied by a flat denial of the whole accusation. But on the night of the 8th, one Antonio Rizzo, who had actually carried a letter for him to Padua, having been found and questioned, it was resolved to examine the accused more searchingly; and a committee was named for the purpose, with liberty, at need, to use torture. Pisani was ultimately condemned to five years' imprisonment, the sacrifice of all his honours and emoluments, and if he attempted to effect his escape, he was threatened with the confiscation of his property. The sentence of Gradenigo, whose complicity was held to be of a more venial kind, was three years' exclusion from employment. The sons of both were disabled from sitting as judges in any cause affecting the existing members of the Council of Ten, lest their filial instincts should betray them into a deviation from the path of justice.

This accumulation of facts, coupled with additional statements made before the Committee on the 8th January, persuaded them to come to the resolution that "it being of the highest essentiality to the welfare of this City, Francesco da Carrara the younger, who must necessarily be cognizant of all the foregoing matters, be placed under examination, and that at need he be put to the Question." At the same time, Ser Pietro Leoni, Ser Bernardo Castelbaldo, and Nasembeni Colza, factor of Carrara, were summoned to Venice; and the Podesta of Padua was directed to transmit all books and papers in the municipal archives, which might help to elucidate the subject in hand.

Their subsequent discoveries left no doubt on the mind of the Committee that a terrible conspiracy with numberless ramifications had been *recently* concerted at Padua. Capital punishment was then decreed. The sentence is not found registered¹ among the transactions of the Council; but Sanudo² writes, that "at the hour of vespers on the 17th January (1406), a rumour was generally current in the Capital that Francesco da Carrara (the elder) had been strangled in prison by command of the Ten, and that, on the following day, his two sons suffered a similar doom;" and he adds that (in order that the ordinary rites of sepul-

¹ Romanin (iv. 38).

² Sanudo (fol. 832). "Dissesi," says the Author of the *Chronicle of Bologna* (Murat. xx. 590), "che la Signoria di Venezia aveaglio fatto stringere la gola con uno pannicello in prigione da uno Schiavone."

ture might be accorded to them, without scandal or infringement of usage ?) “countenance was afforded to a belief that they had died of catarrh.” Among the lower classes it soon became a common saying: *Uomo morto, vera (guerra) finia!* or, *Dead men make no wars!*¹ The body of Novello, enveloped in a suit of Alexandrian velvet, with the spurs at his heels, and a sword of splendid workmanship buckled round his waist, was interred without any inscription in the church of Santo Stefano, near the grave of a merchant named Paolo Nicolo Tinti, whose initials, carved in capital letters on his tomb, long continued to be mistaken for the words: PRO NORMA TYRANNORUM, and to indicate the sepulchre of the Lord of Padua!² Where his two sons were laid, is less certain; but Cigogna is favourable to the opinion that their bones were deposited at San Giorgio Maggiore.³

In person,⁴ the late Francesco Novello was of somewhat low stature and thickset, but not ill-formed, of a swarthy complexion, of a haughty expression of face, yet when he chose, winning and gracious in his manner. His son Francesco,⁵ who was at this time in his thirty-first year, was a larger man than his father, powerfully and symmetrically built, and like Novello, dark-featured. But he stooped in his gait, and squinted with the right eye. He was from the latter circumstance nicknamed *Guercio*. He was of a revengeful temper,

¹ Romanin (iv. 40).

² Caroldo, fol. 134 (Harl. MSS. 5020).

³ *Iscrizione* (iv. 618). See also *Chroniche Veneziane*, p. 373 (Add. MSS. 8580).

⁴ Gataro, contemp. (fol. 940). ⁵ Ibid. (fol. 941).

and of a frigid, cruel disposition. In every respect he was a remarkable contrast to his brother Jacopo, who was five years his junior. The latter was fair like his mother,¹ tall and handsome. In his voice and manner there was an irresistible fascination. He was warm-hearted, kind, considerate, gentle, and virtuous. His air possessed an angelical and unconquerable sweetness. “Nor,” writes a contemporary,² “was he less brave and intrepid than he was amiable and good. If he had been spared, he would have been a second Scipio Africanus.”

The policy of the Council of Ten has been grievously misunderstood, and of its system of criminal procedure, the few particulars which have hitherto transpired have come through channels which ignorantly perverted the truth or wilfully propagated falsehood; and the inaccessibility of accurate information has thrown back historians on presumptive proofs and conjectural inferences. It is possible that the trial of the Carrarese was not conducted on any principles of criminal law analogous to those which have been introduced into practice within the last half century. But it was conducted on such principles as the law recognised in those days. The Decemviral Constitution was adapted to the spirit of the age as well as to the wants of Venice; and it was a source of unqualified admiration to the Tuscans and the Lombards, who vainly sought

¹ Taddea, the daughter of Nicolo *il Zoppo*, a former Marquis of Ferrara. She was married to Novello in 1376.—Galeazzo Gataro (fol. 219; Murat. xvii.)

² Gataro, *loco citato*.

to copy¹ or transplant what was the fruit of a peculiar soil and the result of peculiar conditions. At the court of the Visconti, the Carrarese would have been poisoned. At the court of the Scaliger they would have been assassinated. At Venice they were *tried*. There was the decency of a judicial process. It is always easier to vituperate than to examine; it is easy to stigmatize that judicial process as a judicial murder. But the tendency of documentary evidence is to prove such a criticism superficial, and such a charge at least precipitate.

Every country has its own moral tone, and every system of government has its own drawbacks, as well as its points of excellence. Venice enjoyed an exemption from the horrors of the Feudal System and the Forest Laws. She was free from the dynastic troubles and crimes of Milan, Naples, and Hungary—from the Palace Revolutions of Paris and Constantinople—from the popular tumults which shook Florence and Lucca—from the family assassinations by which the thrones of Russia and Poland, as well as of the Scaligers, were polluted and disgraced—and from the twenty factions

¹ In the following verses, written in 1426 by an intelligent Florentine, the allusion is to his countrymen:—

“E quando fornirete la rubrica
Dell'ordinanze delle vostre leggi
Non vi rincresca di trarve fatica
Di farle in modo tal, che appareggi
A quelle della donna Vineziana,
Che sai mill'anni stati ne' lor seggi.”

Versi fatti da Niccolo da Uzzano (l'anno 1426)

Archivio Stor. Ital. iv. 297–300.

See also the remarks of the Editor at p. 288.

which rent the Genoese Republic. This internal tranquillity and constitutional equilibrium were not obtained without a price. That price was her political liberty.

At Venice, in common with other commercial Powers in an imperfect state of civilization, the security of the person was subordinate to the security of the constitution and the security of trade. A member of the Executive, who was guilty of a breach of confidence, and a man who stole a certain quantity of cotton or taffeta, were equally sent to the gallows. One, on the other hand, who drowned a kinsman in a well, or ran a sword through the body of an acquaintance, was at the utmost punished with exile.

The line of conduct, which the Signory observed toward Novello and his sons, was neither insidious nor wantonly degrading. They had been thrown into her hands by a caprice of fortune, not by the infringement of a safe-conduct. They were prisoners of war, not the victims of a paltry fraud. The evidence of a contemporary writer, the author of the *Chronicle of Treviso*, demonstrates that there was much diversity of opinion in regard to their treatment; he insinuates, whether truly or not, that the only person in the Great Council who recommended death was Jacopo del Verme of Verona; and it is capable of proof that the fate of the Carrarese was not proximately due to their *ambitious* projects, or their resistance to the Venetian arms, but to ulterior revelations of the existence of a Plot, which would have thrown the Gobba conspiracy into the shade. The form of execution, again, was

the least ignominious which could have been devised. They were not publicly beheaded, like the Avogador Giustiniani. They were not poisoned, as Novello had poisoned his ally, Guiglielmo de la Scala. They were not left to die in torments, like the unhappy men whom Novello's father had formerly *suspected* of conspiring against *him*. They were strangled in prison,¹ like Lentulus, the accomplice of Catiline, and the progenitor of the Cornari.

It soon appeared that Pietro Pisani and Jacopo Gradenigo were not the only patricians implicated in the recent transactions. On the night of the 19th January, 1406, the Ten, still prosecuting their researches, and still nourishing their fears, resolved to desire the presence at their table of the noble gentleman, Carlo Zeno, Procurator of Saint Mark, and to question him on three heads, resorting at need to torture:—1. If he had ever received anything from the Carrarese, and if so, on what ground; 2. If he had had conversations with his ambassadors and emissaries, who were in the habit of coming to Venice; 3. If he had at any time written letters to that Prince, or received letters from him, and if so, what were the contents of such letters?

On the following day, the detention of Zeno and the formation of a Committee of Special Inquiry were decreed. At the close of the examination, which fully

¹ Sabellico (part i. p. 457). “La clemenza Veneta inclinava a lasciar loro la vita.”—Muratori (*Ann.* ix. 32). *Chroniche Veneziane*, p. 373 (Add. MSS. B. M. 8580); and Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 140–50 (King's MSS. 149).

criminated the accused, it was put to the Committee in the usual manner : *Does it appear to you from what you have heard and read, that it is expedient to proceed ?* and it was carried affirmatively by fourteen suffrages. Whatever disposition might exist to spare the feelings of such a man, it was impossible to doubt that Zeno had been guilty of a heinous and aggravated fault in maintaining a correspondence, though very probably from no sinister motive, with an enemy during actual hostilities, and during his tenure of the peculiarly responsible office of Proveditor of the Army ; and to acquit him would have been an act of the most flagrant injustice to Pietro Pisani, who was condemned to five years' imprisonment for an analogous offence.

On the night of the 21st January, the Commissioners assembled to deliberate upon the sentence. There were four opinions. The first was, that the prisoner should simply be required to refund the money which he had accepted from Novello, in contravention of the law of the 27th December last ; it obtained seven votes. The second was, that he should be deprived of every office and dignity, and relegated for two years to Istria ; it obtained no more than two. The third proposed that he should be similarly deprived, and in addition should be banished for five years to Capo d'Istria ; it found only five advocates. The final motion was, that Carlo Zeno should be stripped of all his honours, and be condemned to a twelvemonth's imprisonment in the Lower Dungeons ; and it was adopted by fourteen suffrages. In the abstract, a penal

verdict, which committed to a degrading confinement at the age of threescore and ten one of the greatest of Venetians, was assuredly barbarous: yet, when the severe maxims which governed the Venetian political system are taken into account, the sentence loses much of its attribute of harshness.

The Republic had been in military possession of Verona since July, and of Padua since November, 1405; but a sufficiently long period elapsed before she completely established her civil jurisdiction over those places. Her earliest care was to extinguish all trace of the former dominations. On the 17th February (1406), the College offered to grant Ubertino and Marsilio da Carrara an annuity for their lives of 2,000 ducats, provided that they should settle in some distant locality. This overture having been rejected, a price was set upon their heads.

At length, on the 10th July, 1406, the Veronese deputies, one-and-twenty in number, made their appearance at Venice in magnificent array; and on the 12th they did homage. A platform had been erected in front of Saint Marks, where the Doge, the College, and the Senate, sat to receive the Delegates. The latter, attired in white,¹ and mounted on horses with white trappings, rode through the principal thoroughfares of the City, and thus approached within a certain distance of the Grand Stand. They then quitted the stirrup, formed themselves into treble file, and advanced on foot toward Steno and the august

¹ Paolo Morosini (lib. xvii).

company, who were dressed in the same colour. Those who composed the central file carried the ensigns of submission. The first held in his hand the credentials; the second, a sheet of pure vellum. The third rank bore a truncheon, to which were attached three silver keys belonging to the three gates of Verona—Saint George's, the Bishop's, the *Porta de' Calzari*. The next presented a long white staff without any ornament, which symbolled the Government of Verona—pure, guileless, eternal. The sixth supported a square banner, that of the People, with a gold cross on field azure, emblematic of the sun and the firmament. The seventh and last brought the banner of the Commune, of which the device was a silver cross on field rouge, the type of purity and love. The train was accompanied by a band of musicians; and a great many Venetian citizens followed behind. The Doge accepted with suitable expressions the tokens of fealty, saying: *The people, that walked in darkness, have seen a great light; upon them hath light shined.*¹ Jacopo de' Fabri, the Grand Chancellor, then opened the Missal-Book, and tendered to the ambassadors the oath of allegiance, which they took; he closed the volume, exclaiming: *My soul doth magnify the Lord*. Steno concluded this picturesque and imposing spectacle by delivering to his visitors the great standard of Venice. The Veronese colours were afterward placed on either side of the principal altar in Saint Marks.

¹ Paolo Morosini (*Historia*, lib. xvii. p. 377).

Four days later, the statutes of Verona were approved by the Doge Steno. They differed substantially from those which had been in force during the rule of the Scaligers. The Signory respected the civil rights of her new subjects, and gave the strongest stimulus to their educational system. In suits, appeals, and litigations, laymen and churchmen were placed upon an equal footing. Schools of instruction in humanity, canon-law, the arts, and medicine, were instituted or sanctioned, and a seminary was established, where arithmetic might be taught gratuitously to those destined to a commercial desk at the charge of the Trading Guilds. Every professor at the University, who occupied a chair endowed by the Commune, was bound to deliver a series of lectures during the winter evenings; and these gentlemen, as well as their pupils and medical men, were permitted to enjoy a partial exemption from the payment of taxes, and from the performance of military service. On physicians it was made incumbent, whenever they were summoned to attend a patient attacked by any serious disorder, to exhort the invalid to dictate his will to a clerk, and to shrive himself; this provision was directed against the growing evil of intestacy or of ill-considered testaments. The Republic reserved to herself merely the faculty of appointing a Governor, whose office was annual, and his staff. The salary of the former was fixed at 2,400 ducats; and it was defrayed by the Ducal Fisc.

The submission of Padua was received with nearly

similar formalities on the 4th January, 1407.¹ The deputation, which was composed of representatives of the four classes of Paduan society, the Knights, the Doctors, the Silk-Merchants, and the Esquires,² was headed by Francesco Zabarella.³ The members were clothed in scarlet, and they were followed by their servants, clad in green liveries, and by a brass-band. Zabarella himself was the bearer of the credentials, and of the great Gonfalon of Padua. Three of the other syndics presented to his Serenity the sceptre, the keys, and the Silver Seal of the Commune. The Doge who, with a brilliant retinue of councillors and senators, robed in scarlet in compliment to their visitors, was seated on an elevated dais, employed the same scriptural quotations as before; and the ambassadors were similarly sworn by the Chancellor. A splendid tournament and banquet, at which a large number of the Venetian aristocracy of both sexes were present, were subsequently given in honour of the occasion. On their departure, Zabarella and his colleagues received a banner of crimson taffeta, upon which the effigy of the Patron Evangelist was embroidered in gold.⁴

In the statutes of Padua, the Republic equally exhibited her warm zeal in the cause of commerce, education, and social advancement. The utmost protection was afforded by prohibitive measures to the Paduan

¹ A. Gataro, contemp. (fol. 939).

² Ibid. *ubi suprâ*.

³ Afterward a Cardinal, and a very noted man.

⁴ Gataro contemp. (939).

wine-growers and manufacturers. The Venetians limited their interference to the nomination of the Executive, and to the exaction of a moiety of the salary of the Podesta. The remaining moiety was allowed to devolve on the Signory, which also provided for the cost of the Militia, and contributed handsomely to the support of the *Studio*, or University, allowing 4,000 ducats a-year for the stipend of the Doctors and Professors, among whom were gradually numbered some of the most eminent scholars of Italy and Europe. Among others the celebrated Tiptoft, Earl of Worcester, the translator of Cæsar, occupied a professorial chair in the fifteenth century.¹ On the 3rd September, 1408, a decree of the Senate called into existence a species of *Casino*, where the citizens of Venice and Padua might meet and converse.²

The liberal and enlightened treatment, which Venice had shown toward Verona and Padua, was extended to her other acquisitions. The Seven Communes more especially, which were included in the Vicentine territory, were conciliated by peculiar privileges. These Communes possessed a population of hardy and robust mountaineers, thickly spread over a sterile and hilly tract of country, ignorant of agriculture or industrial economy, but superb soldiers. The district promised therefore to form a perpetual nursery for the armies of the Republic.

If Venice, from her insular situation, was not the

¹ *Commentaries*: London, 1530. folio.

² Romanin (iv. 50).

first Italian Commune which detected the vicious character of the mercenary system, she was, at least, foremost in recognising the necessity of rooting out from her military organization that false and destructive element; and in the wars which she had occasion to wage in the later decades of the fifteenth century, her levies were invariably composed, so far as was found practicable, of troops raised on her own territories. Sometimes, indeed, she even endeavoured to disenthral herself from the baleful influence of foreign Condottieri, upon whom she looked as an institution not less odious than necessary, and intrusted the Gonfalon of Saint Mark to a Pisani or a Zeno.

Such was the issue of a War, which cost the Signory 2,000,000 gold ducats,¹ which ruined the two great Houses of Carrara and Scaliger, and by which the Venetians built up on the mainland of Italy an empire, of which the smallest section equalled in area their antient alluvial domain.

Meanwhile, the arduous labours of the Decemvirs were drawing to a close. On the 1st September (1406) Marco Giustiniani, chief of the Ten, and Giovanni Loredano, *Inquisitor*, proceeded to Padua to subject to a final scrutiny all the records of the

¹ Joh. Bembus (fol. 520). According to Paolo Morosini (*Memoria*, p. 15), a bounty of 50,000 ducats was given to the victorious troops, and an offer on the part of the latter to conquer for the same Power the whole of Lombardy, if the Signory consented to pay them 100,000 ducats, was rejected only by the moderation of the Venetians, who preferred to give the moiety as a bonus.

municipality; but no farther disclosures were made. About the same time, a letter came accidentally into the hands of the Government, which threw additional light on the movements of Ubertino and Marsilio da Carrara, and the two Scaligers, and shewed that the exiles were fomenting in every quarter a spirit of disaffection to Venice. It was collected from that and other sources, that they had many accomplices and correspondents in the very heart of Padua.¹

The year 1406 closed auspiciously, nevertheless, with fêtes in honour of the accession of the Cardinal Angelo Corraro, a subject of the Republic, to the chair of Saint Peter, under the title of Gregory XII.² (December 19). Corraro was the first Venetian who had worn the tiara. The Republic accredited to him eight instead of four ambassadors; and his Holiness created Pietro Morosini and Giovanni Barbarigo, Bishop of Verona, Cardinals.

The discord in the Apostolic See had preserved all its violence and all its bitterness. The pretensions of Gregory XII. were contested by Benedict XIII., the nominee of the opposite faction. A protracted and angry correspondence ensued between Corraro and his competitor. An ineffectual attempt was made to reconcile the rival claims. At length, in March, 1409,³ a General Council assembled at Pisa, which

¹ Joh. Bembus (fol. 523).

² Leonardi Aretini *Rerum suo tempore* (1378-1440) *Italiâ Gestarum Commentarius* (Murat. xix. 925); Leodrini Cribelli *Vita Sfortiæ Vice-Comitis* (Ibid. 647).

³ Muratori (*Annali*, ix. 48).

deposed both the disputants, and elected in their room another Venetian subject, Pietro Filargi of Candia, Archbishop of Milan. Corraro had already quitted Rome in the autumn of 1407, and had proceeded successively to Viterbo, Siena (September 4)¹ where he remained for some time, Rimini, and Udine, where he purposed temporarily to fix his residence. He had written from Rimini to the Signory, praying leave on his way to the Frioul to pass through Venice. But, from a fear that some party spirit might be unadvisedly kindled, permission was refused by the Ten;² and as to the pecuniary assistance which he required, he was told "that the Republic has already expended 30,000 ducats in embassies to various courts in the interest of peace, and that she can, therefore, give no more!"³ His Holiness was fêted, however, at Chioggia and Torcello, and large numbers flocked from the Capital to do honour to the Venetian Pope.

The only fruit of the Council of Pisa was the addition of a third to the two existing successors of Saint Peter. Benedict continued to receive the support of Arragon and Sicily. Gregory was still countenanced by the Emperor, Naples, and Malatesta of Rimini. The cause of Filargi, who assumed the title of Alexander V., was espoused by France, Burgundy, and England; and the Alexandrines importuned the Republic to take the same side in the controversy (August, 1409).⁴ The Venetian Executive, which

¹ *Annali Sanesi*; Mur. xix. 421.

³ *Ibid.* (fol. 847).

² *Sanudo* (fol. 842).

⁴ *Ibid.*

had equally denied Corraro the authority which he solicited to transfer his residence to Padua or Treviso,¹ determined to shift the responsibility of an answer upon the Pregadi; and the question was agitated with great warmth in that Body during several days (August 18–22).² The Doge, who is said to have borne Corraro a grudge for declining, on the valid ground of unfitness, to make his nephew a Bishop,³ was favourable to the overtures of England and her party; and he concluded by moving that, “for the sake of the welfare and repose of Christendom, the Signory declare herself for Alexander.” On his withdrawal from the Council, in conformity with etiquette, the motion of Steno was put to the ballot; and in a House of 130 members, it was carried by 69 against 48; 13 abstained from voting.⁴ The thwarted minority inveighed loudly against the course of policy thus prefigured; and some even went so far as to vent their spite and rage in personalities against his Serenity. A *Ducal*, however, was published, announcing the result of the ballot, and ordering all recusants to quit the Venetian dominions within three days.⁵

At the same time, the Republic was feeling small relish for polemics, and was little disposed to become the champion of any particular section in the Church. The novel and somewhat embarrassing position, in

¹ Sanudo (fol. 847).

² Ibid. (fol. 843).

³ F. Cornaro, quoted by Romanin.

⁴ Sanudo (fol. 843).

⁵ Romanin (iv. 55).

which she was placed by recent events, obliged her statesmen to occupy themselves with a widely different class of considerations; and the establishment of sound alliances with those Powers which still retained their independence, was a task which she had infinitely nearer at heart. In the course of 1407, fresh treaties were concluded with Frederic, Duke of Austria, (June 2); with Nicolo, now Marquis of Ferrara (July 1), and with Pandolfo Malatesta, Lord of Pesaro and Brescia. At Ravenna, Obizzo da Polenta placed himself under Venetian protection, received a Venetian Podesta, and, in the event of failure of male issue, bequeathed his property to Venice. In the East, the charter with Constantinople was renewed for the usual term (1406-11); from India, Prester-John transmitted to the Doge a present of rich aromatic drugs and four leopards;¹ and in 1403, letters had been received from Candia and elsewhere,² communicating the defeat of Bajazet at the Battle of Angora by Tamerlane, Sultan of Samarcand and Emperor of Tartary, who advanced against the Turks at the instigation of some Genoese and Venetian merchants. The Battle of Angora was treated as a timely counterpoise to the Battle of Nicopolis.

¹ Romanin (iv. 55). In the sonnets of San Geminiano, written about 1260, this potentate is described as "Presto Giovan. Re di Babilonia."

² Relation of Gherardo Sagredo, Oct. 2, 1402; Copy of a Letter of Pasqualino Veniero, Castellan of Micone and Tino; Copy of a Letter of Marco Grimani, Sopra-Comito, written to the Duke of Crete, "Chio, Aug. 9 (1402)"; Copy of a Letter of Ser Tommaso de Molino, written to Ser Piero Cornaro (Mur. xxii. 795-800).

The four leopards arrived at Venice in the summer of 1402. His Serenity was a little puzzled what to do with them. He ultimately sent two to Milan as a compliment to Giovanni-Galeazzo, then still living, and two in a similar manner to Vienna as a gift to William and Albert, reigning Dukes of Austria.

The follies and vices of her neighbours had enabled the Republic to aggrandize herself in the Peninsula. The troubles of Hungary soon enabled her to aggrandize herself in another direction. The contest for the crown of Saint Stephen was still maintained by Lladislaus, son of the ill-fated Charles of Durazzo, against Sigismund, whose unconstitutional excesses had rendered him obnoxious to his subjects. But the resources of the former eventually compelled him to confine himself to a narrower sphere of action; and by an instrument, dated the 9th of June, 1409,¹ the King of Naples sold to Venice for 100,000 florins all his rights and pretensions over Dalmatia. The Commissioners of the Signory entered into possession of Zara (August 17), after experiencing some resistance from the officers of Lladislaus, who disputed the transfer; a Venetian garrison superseded the Neapolitan garrison;² and, at a distance of half a century, the Republic thus achieved an object, over which she had been secretly brooding since the Treaty of 1358. Sanudo states, that this was the eighth time

¹ Romanin (iv. 55).

² Ibid.; and Navagiero (fol. 1079).

the Signory obtained Zara, and that hence arose the adage :—

“Zara Zaratini

E compra nostri Schiavolini.”¹

But the surrender of Dalmatia was to be something more than a mere pecuniary transaction. The prospects, which Lladislaus possessed of uniting the two crowns in his own person, were sufficiently faint, and his want of money was sufficiently urgent, to induce that prince to accept an enticing offer. His rival, however, was less poor, less venal, and less sordid; his interest in the province was of a higher and more tangible character; and the ratification of the Treaty of 1409 involved the Venetians in a dispute with the successor of their old enemy Louis, which had slight chance of a pacific settlement.

The resolution of the King of Hungary was strengthened and even accelerated by the intrigues of the remaining representatives of the houses of Scaliger and Carrara. Since 1406, Pietro-Brunoro de la Scala, and Marsilio da Carrara had been constantly occupying themselves with plots and cabals against the Signory, at the court of Buda and elsewhere. Their virulent animosity against Venice formed an excellent introduction to the Marechal de Boucicault; and at Genoa they had for some time found an asylum. The giddy impetuosity of the marshal, however, and his wild schemes prepared the way to the fall of the French domination (Sep-

¹ Sanudo (fol. 841).

tember 1409;¹) and the exiles were obliged to seek shelter and sympathy elsewhere. They repaired to the court of Buda, whence they proceeded to scatter the seeds of rebellion amongst the Paduans and Veronese. But their efforts were rendered uniformly nugatory by the vigilance and alertness of the oligarchical government; and the latter at length resented these dangerous machinations by setting a price on the heads of the two Scaligers, as it had already done on those of the two Carrarese.

The Steno Ministry exerted all its powers of persuasion to turn the king from his hostile purpose (March, 1410). It reminded him of the debt of gratitude which he owed to Venice for the assistance, which she had rendered to him and his consort during the contest for the succession in 1382. It represented that the Republic had purchased Zara of Lladislaus in order that so important a place *might not fall into the hands of strangers*, independently of the fact that the Zaratines had been Venetian subjects since the tenth century; and it concluded by observing that she paid a good price for Dalmatia in the systematic suppression of privateering on that coast. But Sigismund replied "that they should have no peace, until the province was absolutely evacuated." The Signory made a farther effort. She offered to hold Dalmatia by the tribute of a white horse and a robe of cloth of gold (June 1, 1410²). But his Majesty merely reiterated his

¹ Stella (*Ann. Gen.* 1222); B. de S. Giorgio, *Historia Montisferrati* (Murat. xxiii. 678).

² Romanin (iv. 59).

former declaration ; and the two Powers thus drifted into war.

Toward the close of that year, two circumstances occurred which might have appeared to prognosticate misfortune. On the evening of the 10th August,¹ a furious W. S. W.² wind, accompanied by a deluge of rain and hail,³ swept over Venice, and committed incalculable damage. Houses were thrown down ; ships were torn from their anchorage, and dashed against the quays ; men were lifted from their feet by the force of the hurricane, and blown into the sea. Several boats, returning from the fair at Mestra,⁴ were lost in the gale. On the following day, a great many corpses were picked up in various places ; and there were no fewer than forty-five, which were too severely bruised and mangled to be identified.

On the 15th October,⁵ intelligence arrived that “on the 12th August, 1409, a foraging party of 1,800 Tartar horse, armed with bows and scimitars, broke during the night into Azoph, massacred all the Venetians in the place, with the exception of the Consul and a few others, who contrived to escape in their shirts, and pillaged or destroyed property valued at 100,000 ducats.”⁶

The Frioul became the new seat of hostilities ; and fortified lines were drawn along ten⁷ miles of the

¹ Sanudo (fol. 853).

² Filiasi (*Ricerche*, 59).

³ Sabellico (*Dec.* ii. lib. ix.)

⁴ Sanudo, *ubi suprâ*.

⁵ Sanudo (fol. 854).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Poggio, *Vita di Filippo Scolari detto Spano* (*Arch. Stor. Ital.* iv.)

frontier by Venetian engineers under proveditorial superintendence. Alliances were contracted with several of the petty feudatories of the Province. At Udine, Tristano Savorgnano engaged to lend every support to the Signory. In this instance, the forces of the Republic, which did not exceed 15,000, were composed largely, if not wholly, of troops raised on her new territories. Vicenza offered to maintain at her own charge 1,000 foot and 600 horse. In the same manner, Padua gave 100 lances. A fair proportion of the subordinate commands were judiciously distributed among Paduans, Vicentines, and Veronese. The post of Generalissimo was at first entrusted to Taddeo, the nephew of Luchino Del Verme, and the son of his brother Bartolomeo;¹ but that officer, who does not seem to have inherited the genius of his uncle and his cousin, proved himself inefficient, and he was superseded in the beginning of December (1410), by Malatesta of Rimini. In order to meet the extraordinary expenditure, which was expected to reach 60,000 ducats a month, fresh credits were opened.

No operations of moment took place till the spring of 1411. On the 20th April, 12,000 Hungarian cavalry and 8,000 foot² crossed the Tagliamento under Filippo Scolari, more usually called Pippo Spano, or *Pip the Captain*. Pippo, who was by birth a Florentine, pierced all the defiles and gorges of the mountains, and, profiting by the dissensions

¹ Litta in voce *Del Verme*.

² Poggio (*Vita di Scolari*; *Arch. Stor. Ital.* iv.); Romanin (iv. 58).

between the Friulan landowners and the Patriarch of Aquileia, overran the district almost unopposed. The agricultural population which, from that tendency on the part of a commercial State to favour the cities, cherished an animosity to the Signory, welcomed the new-comers, officiated as their guides through the passes, and facilitated in numerous ways their progress. On the 22nd April, the enemy presented themselves in front of the Venetian lines, which the dilatoriness of Malatesta, combined with the rawness of his troops, enabled them to carry and traverse. "The Venetian commander," observes a contemporary,¹ "depended in this enterprise upon his former reputation, more than upon his present exertions. The General came to Treviso, where he arranged the preliminaries much at his leisure, and completed his grand dispositions. What do you think? Certainly the earth quaked, and

‘—— nascitur ridiculus mus.’

At length, that magnificent captain moved from Treviso; but it was with a foot of lead!"

In person, Pippo was of middle height, with dark, lustrous eyes, a fair complexion, and a radiant countenance. His frame was spare, but well-knit. His face wore a perpetual smile. He was passionately fond of smart clothes; and he usually appeared dressed in a long silk mantle trailing on the ground, and a military hat with lappets which reached to his shoulders. As an orator, he was remarkably accomplished; and he spoke

¹ Redusio (*Chronicon*, contemp., fol. 836).

the Hungarian, Polish, German, and Bohemian dialects with as much fluency as his own language. In his habits, he was severely abstemious.¹

At Prata, the Hungarian and Venetians encountered each other for the first time; and the former were beaten. But they did not cease to advance; and under the influence of treachery, rather than force, Feltre and Belluno opened their gates. At Motta, a second battle took place, Malatesta having allowed himself to be surprised; and after a hard fight, in which Pippo had the advantage at the outset, the enemy were still more signally worsted, with a loss of more than 1,000 men in killed.² But the Lord of Rimini remained so badly wounded,³ that it was necessary to transfer the command to his brother the Lord of Brescia.

The winter of 1411 suspended hostilities; and the Hungarians, retiring beyond the Venetian frontier, occupied and ravaged the Frioul. Scolari himself was at this juncture attacked by an alarming fit of illness,⁴ and, obtaining temporary leave of absence, he was carried to Buda in a litter⁵ by easy stages (Feb. 1412). On his restoration to convalescence, Captain Pip purposed to return to his post, and to bring reinforcements. The army of Sigismund was already superior to that of the Republic in number and discipline: yet

¹ Poggio (*Vita di Scolari*, 176).

² Redusio, contemp. (*Chr.* fol. 837).

³ Cavalcanti, contemp. (*Storie Fiorentine*, Appendice).

⁴ Poggio (*Vita*, p. 177).

⁵ Sanudo (fol. 861).

so far from having made head against the latter, they had been twice sorely discomfited.

During the momentary inaction, the Venetian Government busied itself with preparations for the new campaign, and sought concurrently to obtain peace through Apostolic intervention. The desire of the Signory to procure a pacification arose from the increasing gravity of the struggle. On the 11th September, 1411,¹ despatches had been received, announcing that in the room of the feeble Robert, Sigismund had been elected by the Diet, King of the Romans;² and this circumstance, which one of the Venetian writers calls a "dolorous piece of news,"³ added vast weight to the Hungarian power. On the 28th March, 1412,⁴ a message arrived from the Venetian Legation at Rome, stating "that the King is willing to listen to terms, on condition that the Signory indemnifies him for the losses which he has suffered in Dalmatia, and becomes answerable for the expenses of the war, which his Majesty fixes at between 500,000 and 600,000 ducats!"⁵ This proposition was not accepted.

Pippo returned with fresh soldiers, but without better fortune. His troops were obliged to carry their foraging excursions on a singularly wide range: for the Venetian commander had taken the precaution to strip the country adjoining the seat of war many miles

¹ Sanudo (fol. 854).

² Muratori (*Annali*, ix. 57).

³ Sanudo (fol. 854).

⁴ Ibid. (fol. 863).

⁵ Ibid.

round of its crops and verdure. On the night of the 10th June, 1412, a party of foragers presented themselves unexpectedly at Lido, in skiffs and barks which they had contrived to collect at some point of the mainland. The alarm was promptly given; the tocsin was sounded; the citizens resorted to a levy in mass; and the aggressors withdrew.

The government of Michele Steno now recognised more fully than ever the necessity of bringing the contest, which had lasted two years, to some speedy and satisfactory issue. The pressure on the Republic was becoming daily more sensible. A series of loans and imposts was grinding the people. The duty on corn had been augmented, and the poorer classes were forced to make their bread of millet-flour. The members of the Civil Service were sorely grumbling at the tax on their salaries. The Funds had fallen from 59 to 38.¹ Such was the attitude of affairs when, on the 4th July (1412),² the Great Council resolved that a Committee of a hundred persons, clothed with unlimited powers, should be appointed for the management of the war. Into this Body were admitted the Doge, the Privy Councillors, the Decemvirs; but the Quarantia was excluded from its sittings. A fee of a *lira*, or twenty *soldi*, was paid for each attendance; and recusants incurred a penalty of 100 *lire*.

The measure of the 4th July instilled more vigour into the movements of the army. On the 24th August, the

¹ Sanudo (fol. 867); Galliciolli (*Memorie*, lib. i. c. 13).

² San. (fol. 868).

Lord of Brescia advanced to dispute with Scolari the passage of the Livenza, near Motta, the scene of the last action; and a general engagement succeeded. The Hungarians behaved with uncommon gallantry; and fortune was beginning to incline toward them, when Malatesta, seconded by Pietro Loredano, one of his Proveditors, gave the rallying cry, restored confidence to his wavering ranks, persuaded the Venetians to resume the combat, and gained a signal victory. Pippo lost several standards,¹ and exclusively of those who were left dead on the field, a considerable number in prisoners.

Since July, several Powers had proffered their mediatorial services without effect. The result of the second Battle of Motta was more influential than any arguments in persuading Sigismund to follow the advice, which his Ministers had been offering to him during some time, and to come to terms. At length, on the 17th April, 1413,² a truce for five years, with exchange of prisoners, was negotiated at Castelletto, in the Frioul by the plenipotentiaries Tommaso Mocenigo and Antonio Contarini. The allies of both the belligerents were included in the stipulations of this armistice.

One of the conditions of the instrument was, that the Republic should furnish the King with a passage to Rome, on the understanding that the object of his

¹ Sanudo (fol. 871).

² Romanin (iv. 62). Caroldo, *Historia*, fol. 129 (Harl. MSS. 5020), gives a day later.

Majesty in proceeding to that point was purely pacific ; but she was also bound by the Treaty with Lladislaus, of June, 1409, to lend no naval support to his rival in any war which he might thereafter undertake against Naples. When, therefore, Sigismund demanded with no slight effrontery certain galleys at her hands for a purpose avowedly hostile and aggressive, her Government refused absolutely to comply with his desire ; and the master of a hundred legions was powerless before the Sovereign of the Adriatic. At the same time, the Signory scrupulously fulfilled her diplomatic engagements. Sigismund crossed over in a Venetian ship to Italy ; and, having met at Lodi the Pontiff John XXIII., arranged with him the preliminaries of the General Council which was about to assemble at Constance, with a view to an adjustment of the pending differences in the Church ; and the King was also confronted at Lodi by a Venetian legation, composed of Mocenigo, Contarini and a third delegate, Francesco Foscari, which carried instructions from its Government touching the conclusion of a definitive peace. The Florentines exerted themselves in a similar interest ; and during the months of June and July, their ambassadors had two audiences of his Majesty at Trento. But the King confined himself to generalities, and no progress was made.¹

The services of Pandolfo Malatesta were magnifi-

¹ *Istruzione data dai Dieci della Balìa di Firenze a Gino di Neri Capponi, Ambasciadore a Venezia* (Cavalcanti *Storie Fiorentine*, Documenti, No. 1 : 1839) ; G. Canestrini (*Discorso sulle Relazioni di Fiorenza coll' Ungheria* ; *Arch. Stor. Ital.* iv. 195).

cently rewarded. He reached Venice on the 30th May. The Doge and select retinue went a certain distance to meet him, and offer their congratulations. On the 31st, the Great Council decreed the Lord of Brescia a Venetian citizen. An annuity of 1,000 ducats of gold, with a yearly allowance or half-pay of 400, were granted to him. A house, for which the Procurators of Saint Mark were authorized to give 6,000 ducats, was purchased for the General on the Canal Grande; and he was presented with trinkets, dresses, and other compliments to the value of 600. The Signory proposed to make him Duke of Candia, but he declined the responsibility. The officers who had served under Malatesta, and who were reported to have acquitted themselves meritoriously, received liberal recompences.¹

A short time before the important events of April, 1413, an accidental occurrence had shown, that Venetian society was not yet quite reconciled to the fundamental changes in the Government, and that in the lower strata of the system still lurked some volcanic remains. Francesco Baldovino was a gentleman in affluent circumstances, of a handsome person, and of engaging manners. His domestic establishment was princely.² He had a large sum in the Funds. In short, every adventitious advantage, which fortune brings, was within his reach, excepting one; Baldovino was not a noble. It is said that, at the period of the

¹ Sanudo (fol. 880).

² Ibid. (fol. 862).

War of Chioggia, he desired to become, among the rest, a candidate for the honours of the peerage. But, his paternal ¹ ancestor having been implicated in some manner in the Bocconio conspiracy of 1300, the family laboured under a certain obloquy, and Baldovino was a disappointed man. Among his numerous acquaintance was one Bartolomeo D'Anselmo, also a *cittadino* of great wealth, and also an unsatisfied expectant of nobility. It happened on Friday, the 4th March, 1413,² that Baldovino and D'Anselmo met at the Minorites, and began to discuss their common grievance. "We," cried Baldovino, at once launching into diatribe, "pay taxes enough forsooth; yet those of the Council enjoy the emoluments of office." "True," returned his companion, "and indeed we ought to make it our business to see if we cannot get for ourselves a share in the administration. Devise some plan in which I may co-operate." "The way would be," whispered Baldovino, "to collect a company of our following, and to massacre them as they are leaving the Council, particularly the College, the Decemvirs, and the Avogadors." D'Anselmo said, "That is an excellent plan. How then do you purpose to find your men?" "I intend," the other continued, "to seek a good many trusty fellows, who will be at my elbow to compass this matter for us on Sunday that is coming." "I, too," rejoined D'Anselmo, "will bring some." So they parted.

¹ Sandi (lib. v. c. 2).

² Sanudo, *ubi supra*.

Bartolomeo D'Anselmo was not a bad man ; but he was a man of no steady principle, and of an exceedingly nervous temperament. He had hardly bidden farewell to Baldovino, when the treasonable dialogue which had passed between them began to haunt his imagination. He found himself a prey to a variety of unwholesome and chimerical fancies. The echoes of his own words grated on his ears. The sound of his own voice threw him into a cold sweat. He conceived it more than possible that they might have been overheard, and that they were betrayed. He pictured himself arrested, dragged before the Ten and into the chamber of torture, put to the question, condemned to an infamous and horrid punishment. If there had been eavesdroppers, he was pretty sure that this would be his destiny ; and he knew that there was only one method of escaping from the danger. He was base enough to pursue that method ; D'Anselmo turned evidence, on the same day, against his friend. The informer was pardoned and ennobled. The man, whom with such vile and pitiful cowardice he had denounced, was taken into custody, examined under the cord, and on Saturday morning the 5th, at eight o'clock, was executed between the Red Columns, where he was left hanging three days, as a warning to traitors.¹

Whatever influence a prolongation of hostilities might, from an imperfect knowledge of political

¹ Sanudo (fol. 862).

economy, rather than from an absence of pecuniary resources, have exercised on the Venetian finances, the Republic emerged with high credit from her arduous struggle against the Emperor. Zara, Sebenigo, and other cities along the Dalmatian littoral were recovered. In the only engagements by which the late war had been signalized, her arms were triumphant; and the great battle of Motta covered with glory the name of Pietro Loredano.

At the same time, Venice faithful to the traditions of the Veniero Administration, was silently persevering in her policy of territorial expansion in various quarters. In 1409, Ottobuono Terzo, Lord of Parma and Reggio, a monster of cruelty and vice, was slain in the course of a war with Ferrara and the Malatesti. The Republic became a party to that contest on the side of the latter by taking into pay 600 Lances; and she somewhat unceremoniously reimbursed herself for the outlay and requited herself for the service by entering into possession of the territories of the fallen tyrant. Venetian governors were sent to Parma and to Reggio. An advantageous exchange, however, was subsequently negotiated with the Marquis of Este; and Venice ceded her acquisitions to Ferrara, obtaining as an equivalent four important castles on the Po—Brescella, Guastalla, Casal-Maggiore, and Colorno.¹

In 1411, Mugia, on the Istrian coast, ten miles

¹ Muratori (*Ann.* ix. 54).

from Justinople,¹ tendered its submission, which was accepted; but a similar offer on the part of Ancona was rejected. Cephalonia and Patrasso ranged themselves under the Venetian flag. In the Veronese, several feudatories, dying without heirs, bequeathed their estates to the Signory.

The Doge, who had occupied the throne since the beginning of the century, did not long survive the close of the Hungarian war. He expired on the 26th December, 1413, at the advanced age of 84. The career of Michele Steno was very singular; he was one of the few remaining links between the passed and the present generation. Steno was already twenty-three when, in 1354, Andrea Dandolo died in the flower of manhood of a broken heart. He was a lad of fifteen when Marino Faliero, by gaining the battle of Luca (1346), proved himself one of the most able of Venetian generals; and he had not passed his five-and-twentieth year when the same Faliero was led to the block. He was a contemporary of the events which culminated in the Treaty of 1358: he witnessed the severance of Dalmatia from the dominion of the Signory; and he was sitting on the throne when, at a distance of fifty-one years, that Province was at length restored to her rule. In the momentous incidents which filled the last two decades of the fourteenth century, he was an active mover. He had seen the

¹ Sanudo (*Itinerario*, 129).

day, when the independent existence of his country appeared to be a question of hours; and it was his fortune to live into an epoch, when Genoa possessed in the councils of Italy scarcely more weight than Pisa or Perugia, and when the Venetian Republic was aspiring to render herself the greatest Power in Europe.



GOLD DUCAT OF MICHELE STENO.¹

The latter days of this distinguished man were saddened by a visitation of the plague, which carried off between 32,000 and 33,000 souls,² and by many personal afflictions. He was a martyr to stone, and had grown at last perfectly deaf.³ Yet he preserved to the end the vigour of his understanding, and even some share of his youthful fire. A curious illustration of

¹ Zanetti (*Moneta Viniziana*, 1750, plate ii.)


² Sanudo (fol. 883). "In Venezia, 32,000; Chioggia, 800."

³ Ibid. (fol. 884).

the unimpaired state of his mental faculties is furnished by a scene,¹ which had taken place in the Great Council a few years back. On the 2nd June, 1410, a meeting of the Council was held after dinner at the prayer of the Advocates of the Commune, who desired to procure the annulment of a resolution formerly put by Ser Donato Michieli, and carried; and they moved to that effect at the commencement of the sitting. The old Doge, who was at this time in his eighty-first year, immediately rose from his chair, and declared himself of opinion "that the Avogadors had no jurisdiction in the matter." The Avogadors contended, in their turn, that "Messer lo Dose" was out of order, having no right to interfere without the concurrence of a certain portion of the College; and in support of such a view they quoted at length the 60th clause of the Promission. Two of the Privy Councillors and a chief of the Forty, acting in the same capacity, adopted this view, and taking up the discussion, one of them said: "May it please your Serenity to sit down and hold your tongue." Steno, however, paid no heed to the injunction, and continued to talk, until he had exhausted his argument. The Avogadors formally pronounced him guilty of a misdemeanor, and liable to a penalty of 1,000 lire. The meeting separated; but the controversy did not drop. On the 7th September, the Doge petitioned the Great Council, "that the Avogadors should either cite him

¹ Sanudo (fol. 850-1-2).

before it, or rescind their sentence." This bold step solved the difficulty. The Avogaria yielded, and apologized in writing (October 29, 1410¹).



PILLAR COMMEMORATING THE DISGRACE OF BAJAMONTE TIEPOLO,
A.D. 1310 (IN ITS MUTILATED STATE).—See p. 17.²

¹ All these proceedings are given *in extenso* by Sanudo (fol. 850-1-2.)

² The cut is copied from Litta in voce *Tiepolo*.

ERRATA.

VOL. I.

- Page 9, line 9, *for* "former," *read* "pristine."
 „ 12, „ 16, *dele* "in Istria."
 „ 117, note 1, *for* "i" *read* "li."
 „ „ 2, *for* "jure" *read* "jura."
 „ 152, line 10, *for* "V." *read* "VI."
 „ 161, note 2, *for* "celebre," *read* "celebri."
 „ 187, „ „ *for* "Benediciti," *read* "Benedicti."
 „ 189, line 20, *for* "his two predecessors," *read* "his predecessor."
 „ 222, note *for* "Costuma Veneziana," *read* "Costume Veneziano."
 „ 397, line 23, *for* "Jensou," *read* "Jenson."
 „ 403, note 1, *for* "Giannotti," *read* "G. Contarini."
 „ 406, line 6, *for* "a," *read* "an."
 „ 408, note 3, *for* "Centessiræ," *read* "Centessimæ."
 „ 417-18, line ult. *for* "pounds of gold," *read* "marks."

VOL. II.

- „ 61, note 2, *for* "compominenti," *read* "componimenti."
 „ 95, line 4, *for* "granted," *read* "grant."
 „ 128, „ 8, *for* "Peloponnesian," *read* "Peloponesan."
 „ 280, „ 20, *for* "confines," *read* "confluence."
 „ 288, „ 21, *for* "They," *read* "It."
 „ 290, „ 23, *for* "a," *read* "an."
 „ 332, „ 8, *for* "nine," *read* "ten."
 „ 338, „ 21, *for* "deceptiveness," *read* "firmness."
 „ 407, „ 3, *for* "vigour," *read* "rigour."

ERRATA *continued.*

VOL. III.

Page	53,	line	23,	for "and,"	read "or."
"	55,	"	16,	for "twice,"	read "once."
"	56,	"	2,	for "subscription,"	read "superscription."
"	177,	"	13,	for "forces,"	read "force."
"	212,	"	21,	for "are,"	read "is."
"	224,	"	22,	for "two,"	read "too."
"	275,	"	17,	for "has,"	read "have."
"	280,	"	12,	for "8th,"	read "18th."
"	284,	"	2,	for "Torsello,"	read "Torcello."
"	416,	note	3,	for "Iscrizione,"	read "Iscrizioni."



VOL. IV.

"	348,	line	8,	for "he,"	read "the individual."
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